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**Our ref:** project\_32862  
**Date:** 3 June 2021

**COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE**

Dear Sirs,

**Award Notification: Contract for the Provision of a Political, Economic & Technical Analysis to support the Biodiverse Landscapes Fund**

Thank you for submitting a proposal dated 19 May 2021, the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (the Authority) has now completed the evaluation of your proposal.

I am pleased to advise that the Authority has approved your proposal and is now looking to enter into contract pertinent to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Offices (FCDO) Expert Advisory Call Down Service (EACDS) Framework Agreement.

An electronic copy of the proposed contract, in its final form, will be sent to you via the Authority's e-Tendering system. The Authority would be grateful if you could arrange the contract to be executed, by way of electronic signature, on behalf of DAI Global UK Ltd. by Friday 4 June. The Authority then intends to execute the contract.

This award and contract is comprised of the following documents:

- EACDS Call Down Contract Section 1 Form of Agreement
- Framework Agreement Terms and Conditions

Annex A of the EACDS Call Down Contract Section 1 Form of Agreement is comprised of the following 8 documents:

- 1. Annex A Terms of Reference
  - 2. Annex A Terms of Reference, Annex B K4D Report
  - 3. Annex A Terms of Reference, Annex D Landscape Papers
- 4. Annex A Clarification Log
- 5. Annex A The Supplier's Proposal document 1 of 2
- 6. Annex A The Supplier's Proposal, Roster of Experts document 2 of 2
- 7. Annex A Post-Tender Clarification Log v1
- 8. Annex A Post-Tender Clarification Log v1 DAI's Response

### Clarification Points

This award is subject to the Authority's understanding of the below points being correct:

- The Authority anticipates working closely with DAI Global UK Ltd. to allocate individuals to each landscape team, ensuring that we have individuals with the right geographical and thematic experience, and that their location is considered.

The Authority understands that the Roster of Experts is not 'locked', and if there are more suitable individuals who are available to complete this work that they can be added to the Roster of Experts.

- The Authority understands the importance of confidentiality when engaging with stakeholders. The Authority however understands that DAI Global UK Ltd. will provide organisation names, as a minimum, when providing details of interviews conducted in each landscape.
- Where appropriate DAI Global UK Ltd. will propose national interventions, rather than transboundary interventions. This will be based on DAI Global UK Ltd.'s assessment of the most appropriate and effective method to address biodiversity loss and poverty in each landscape.

### Potential Scale Up


The Authority is looking to discuss potential scaling up of the requirement with regards to the following elements:

- A Deputy to the Technical Lead [REDACTED] who can provide greater focus on operational delivery; and
- Development of Business Case products in line with the Authority's expectations (Strategic and Appraisal Cases) as detailed in the Terms of Reference.

The Authority will look to agree potential areas of scale up during the inception phase. This will include a written proposal from the Supplier regarding the timescales and costs for each area of potential scale up.

On behalf of the Authority I would like to thank you for your proposal, we are looking forward to working together.

Yours faithfully



Tom Redfearn  
Senior Category Officer  
Defra Group Commercial

***Execution of this award notification letter is carried out in accordance with EU Directive 99/93 (Community framework for electronic signatures) and the Electronic Communications Act 2000.***



# Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office



## CALLDOWN CONTRACT

**Framework Agreement with:** DAI Global UK Ltd

**Framework Agreement for:** Expert Advisory Call Down Services LOT B

**FCDO Framework Agreement Purchase Order Number:** 7468

**Call-down Contract For:** Provision of A Political, Economic & Technical Analysis to support the Biodiverse Landscapes Fund

**Contract Number:** ecm\_61603

I refer to the following:

1. The above mentioned Framework Agreement dated 19<sup>th</sup> October 2016;
2. Your proposal of 19 May 2021

and I confirm that Defra requires you to provide the Services (Annex A), under the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement which shall apply to this Call-down Contract as if expressly incorporated herein.

### 1. Commencement and Duration of the Services

- 1.1 The Supplier shall start the Services no later than Friday 4 June 2021 ("the Start Date") and the Services shall be completed by 13 August 2021 ("the End Date") unless the Call-down Contract is terminated earlier in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement.

### 2. Recipient

- 2.1 Defra requires the Supplier to provide the Services to the Defra ("the Recipient").

### 3. Financial Limit

- 3.1 Payments under this Call-down Contract shall not, exceed [REDACTED] + VAT ("the Financial Limit") and is exclusive of any government tax, if applicable.

### 4. Defra Officials

- 4.1 The Project Officer is: [REDACTED] [@defra.gov.uk](mailto:[REDACTED]@defra.gov.uk)
- 4.2 The Contract Officer is: Tom Redfearn [tom.redfearn@defra.gov.uk](mailto:tom.redfearn@defra.gov.uk)

### 5. Key Personnel

The following of the Supplier's Personnel cannot be substituted by the Supplier without Defra's prior written consent:



# Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office



N/A

## 6. Reports

- 6.1 The Supplier shall submit project reports in accordance with the Terms of Reference/Scope of Work at Annex A.

## 7. Duty of Care

All Supplier Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Agreement) engaged under this Call-down Contract will come under the duty of care of the Supplier:

- I. The Supplier will be responsible for all security arrangements and Her Majesty's Government accepts no responsibility for the health, safety and security of individuals or property whilst travelling.
- II. The Supplier will be responsible for taking out insurance in respect of death or personal injury, damage to or loss of property, and will indemnify and keep indemnified Defra in respect of:
  - II.1. Any loss, damage or claim, howsoever arising out of, or relating to negligence by the Supplier, the Supplier's Personnel, or by any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with the performance of the Call-down Contract;
  - II.2. Any claim, howsoever arising, by the Supplier's Personnel or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with their performance under this Call-down Contract.
- III. The Supplier will ensure that such insurance arrangements as are made in respect of the Supplier's Personnel, or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier are reasonable and prudent in all circumstances, including in respect of death, injury or disablement, and emergency medical expenses.
- IV. The costs of any insurance specifically taken out by the Supplier to support the performance of this Call-down Contract in relation to Duty of Care may be included as part of the management costs of the project, and must be separately identified in all financial reporting relating to the project.
- V. Where Defra is providing any specific security arrangements for Suppliers in relation to the Call-down Contract, these will be detailed in the Terms of Reference.

## [8.] Call-down Contract Signature

- [8.1] If the original Form of Call-down Contract is not returned to the Contract Officer (as identified at clause 4 above) duly completed, signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within 15 working days of the date of signature on behalf of Defra, Defra will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Call-down Contract void.

:



# Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office



For and on behalf of the Secretary of State  
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

For and on behalf of DAI Global UK Ltd

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:



Foreign, Commonwealth  
& Development Office



### Model Calldown Contract Amendment Letter

Department for Environment, Food & Rural

Affairs

Defra Group Commercial

Lateral House

8 City Walk

Leeds

LS11 9AT

03459 335577

File Ref: ecm\_61603

Date:

Contract Amendment No: [ ]

CONTRACT FOR: Provision of A Political, Economic & Technical Analysis to support the Biodiverse Landscapes Fund

CONTRACT NUMBER: ecm\_61603

1. With reference to the contractual letter dated [ ] (as most recently amended by the letter dated [ ]) whereby your firm [(in association with [ ])] was engaged to [ ] and with reference to your letter(s) of [ ] and subsequent discussion, I confirm that the UK Government wishes to make the following further amendment(s) to the letter of [ ]:
2. These / This amendment(s) relate(s) to [ ]
3. Please confirm in writing by signing and returning one copy of this letter, within 15 working days of the date of signature on behalf of Defra that you accept the amendment(s) set out herein.
4. Please note the provision in the contractual letter that the financial limit of the UK Government's liability to the Supplier under this engagement shall not exceed the sum specified unless the amount of any such excess has been agreed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in writing before the Supplier takes any action which might result in the financial limit being exceeded.

For and on behalf of the Secretary of State for  
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

September 2020





Foreign, Commonwealth  
& Development Office



For and on behalf of DAI Global UK Ltd

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

# Annex A: Terms of Reference

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## Abirritations & Definitions

Table 1: Abirritations & Definitions

Abirritation	Definition
The Authority	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
BLF	The Biodiverse Landscapes Fund
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
COP15	Convention on Biological Diversity Conference of Parties 15
COP26	UN Climate Change Conference Conference of Parties 26
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCM	Delivery Chain Mapping
DFID	Department for International Development
ESG	Environmental, Social and Governance
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FCDO Country Post	FCDO staff based in an overseas country
FCDO Desk Teams	FCDO staff based in London
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HoM	Head of Mission
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICF	International Climate Finance
IPLCs	Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
IWT	Illegal Wildlife Trade
Landscape	A Landscape refers to a geographical region. Each landscape averages [REDACTED] km2 in size. Landscape may contain both protected and (as yet) unprotected areas. Each landscape may cross national boundaries yet constituting geographically and environmentally coherent areas.
LMMA	Locally Managed Marine Area
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NBSAPs	National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance, as defined by the DAC of the OECD
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECMs	Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures
PCR	Project Completion Review
PETA	Political, Economic & Technical Analysis
PDF	Portable Document Format

PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PES	
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SME	Small Medium Enterprise
The Supplier	The successful bidder
UNEP	UN Environment Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNODC WISE	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime World Wildlife Seizures
VfM	Value for Money
WCMC	World Conservation Monitoring Centre

## 1. Overview & Background

### 1.1. Introduction

The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (the Authority) is the UK government department responsible for safeguarding our natural environment, supporting our world-leading food and farming industry, and sustaining a thriving rural economy. The Authority also helps to deliver the government's international poverty reduction and sustainable development priorities through our breadth of international programming. The Authority's broad remit means the Authority plays a major role in people's day-to-day life, from the food we eat, and the air we breathe, to the water we drink.

The Authority has three overarching international objectives centred on:

- The **global environment**: Our strained relationship with nature affects the climate, global health, the economy and national resilience. This objective focuses on halting biodiversity loss, scaling up the use of nature-based solutions, protecting and enhancing ocean health and resilience, conserving endangered species, and sustainable land-use and wider resource use.
- **Global trade**: Increasing secure, high-quality trade will be fundamental to supporting our stakeholders and UK consumers, projecting the UK's global reputation for excellence, and safeguarding our national interest.
- **Global health**: Improving human, animal and environmental health, based on a One Health approach, will be essential if the UK is to reduce the public health and economic impact of future disease emergence at home and abroad.

Delivering on these objectives is essential for achieving 13 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals which the UK committed to in 2015 and which provide a roadmap for achieving a better and more sustainable future for all.

At the 2019 United Nations General Assembly the Prime Minister announced a new £100m Biodiverse Landscapes Fund (BLF) to restore key landscapes and their ecosystems and support human development objectives in global biodiversity hotspots.

### 1.2. Background

The BLF aims to reduce poverty and create sustainable economic development for communities living in, and dependent upon, environmentally precious landscapes. It will restore landscapes and will deliver their long-lasting protection through sustainable management practices, improving the quality of ecosystems and safeguarding biodiversity. Protecting landscapes and habitats will also help to tackle climate change with a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions through protection of natural carbon sinks. It will address the drivers of environmental degradation and support local governments, local and park authorities and communities to deliver long-term sustainable management and use of natural resources.

The BLF will deliver three overarching outcomes, as described within table 2 below, relating to the management and governance of specified areas of land (the landscape), both within and across national borders, the ecosystems and natural resources therein and the people dependent upon



them. The BLF will ensure it works and creates synergies with other mutually reinforcing donor driven and domestic initiatives.

Table 2: BLFs overarching outcomes

<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>PEOPLE</b>	To develop economic opportunities through investment in nature in support of climate adaptation and resilience and poverty reduction.
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>NATURE</b>	To slow, halt or reverse biodiversity loss in six globally-significant regions for biodiversity.
<b>Outcome 3</b>	<b>CLIMATE</b>	To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and safeguard natural carbon sinks.

There are six transboundary landscapes as described within table 3 below:

Table 3: BLFs transboundary landscapes

Region	Countries Covered
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Please note that Madagascar is **not** included in this call for bids.

Both the objectives and theory of change are high level and the Authority envisages specific and tailored products for each individual landscape which are developed as a result of and grounded in the Political, Economy and Technical Analysis (PETA), as well as stakeholder engagement including with host governments and indigenous people and local communities.

### 1.3. Objective

The Authority is seeking a supplier (the Supplier) to carry out a political, economy and focused technical analysis to support development of the BLF in five transnational landscapes.

The Supplier will produce a detailed assessment of the political, economic, social, cultural and environmental factors driving poverty and biodiversity loss in each landscape. The analysis will establish the theory of change for significant intervention across these drivers, determining which proposed interventions will have the most significant impact when considered against cost, tailoring as necessary according to the inherent barriers and opportunities in each region.

The Supplier will provide a theory of change, based upon or consistent with the theory of change, logframe and outcomes as described within Annex C, Annex E, and Annex F and an appraisal of proposed options for major intervention. This will include setting out problem statements and testing of assumptions based on the guiding political economy questions provided in this document. The Supplier will ensure that gender issues are set out with a view to full compliance with the Gender Equality Act.

The Supplier must deliver within three months of contract signature.

#### 1.4. Recipient

The primary recipient of the exercise will be the Authority and the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) country offices.

#### 1.5. Budget for the Services

The Suppliers bid will not exceed GBP £425,000 inclusive of tax and VAT, this budget is an allocation of the Authority's ODA budget. The Supplier must explicitly demonstrate provision of value for money.

The Authority will by default make payments upon satisfactory completion of work. In exceptional circumstances, and at the sole discretions of the Authority, the Authority may make payment in advance.

#### 1.6. Official Development Assistance

All expenditures must meet the requirements of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

ODA is a term created by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to measure aid. ODA should be undertaken by the official sector (official agencies, including state and local governments, or their executive agencies) and has promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective.

An overview of, and the requirements imposed by, ODA can be obtained from the UK Governments website by accessing the following link:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/official-development-assistance-oda--2>

#### 1.7. Authority Co-ordination

The supplier will report to the Senior Responsible Office for the BLF [REDACTED] and Programme Lead [REDACTED].

## 2. Specific Deliverables

#### 2.1. Suppliers Ability & Background

The Supplier must have a strong background in carrying out political economy and biodiversity/natural resource management, in a transboundary setting. The Supplier must have an understanding of BLF geographies, specifically, encompassing:

- Proven ability and experience to carry out Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to inform and facilitate projects focused on poverty reduction, sustainable livelihoods, sustainable development, improved natural resource management and biodiversity conservation and sustainable use in a range of geographies; familiarity with challenges and solutions related to environmental issues.
- Proven ability to engage with partner governments and relevant ministries, and a range of stakeholders including Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) key to improved biodiversity and ecosystem management in BLF geographies.
- Proven ability to work on biodiversity and development projects with a strong network of contacts in BLF geographies.



- Knowledge and expertise of:
  - Innovative models of financing for improved biodiversity and ecosystem management payment (e.g. public finance mechanisms such as ecological fiscal transfers and private finance).
  - Conservation and sustainable management of intact forests and other ecosystems, including protected area designation and management and biodiversity conservation.
  - Technical assistance to support improved biodiversity and ecosystem management, for national and local government, IPLCs and other stakeholders.
  - Community and private sector engagement.
- Fluency in languages required to communicate effectively in landscapes is essential for field visits; Fluent English is essential for drafting and communications.

## 2.2. Scope

The Supplier will establish the rationale for potential major interventions in each landscape, provide an analysis and appraisal of indicative options for intervention, and assess options for delivery taking into account both value for money and longevity of sustainable impact. The analysis will pay particular attention to the drivers of change in each landscape, operating at both an institutional and community level, to ensure the greatest contribution to the BLF's outcomes for the duration of the programme.

Critically, the Supplier will set out a theory of change for each of the proposed interventions that would contribute significantly to the following:

- The reduction of poverty in ways that protect and enhance the environment.
- The development of economic opportunities that protect and enhance the environment.
- The halting and reversing of biodiversity loss.
- A reduction in greenhouse gas emissions through protection of natural carbon sinks.

The above interventions will lay out the principal problem statements in the current situation which would be the starting point for a theory of change and what assumptions would have to come to pass for progress to be made. The landscape theories of change, outcomes, outputs and logframes are expected to be based upon or be consistent with the overarching theory of change as described within Annex E. The Supplier will outline the main risks to achieving contribution to BLF outcomes.

The BLF's activities and interventions will vary by landscape. The Authority anticipates that outputs may include:

- Improving the effectiveness and equitable management of existing protected, and other conserved, areas, and creating new protected areas as appropriate.
- Improving site-based management and governance of natural resources by communities, private sector and government.
- Development of sustainable livelihoods and economic development pathways that are consistent with, and linked to, maintaining biodiversity and ecosystems. Working with indigenous people and local communities will be important.
- Improved governance of land and natural resources across the landscape, including integration of biodiversity into decision making.
- Working with the private sector to encourage markets for sustainably produced goods, to be delivered through improved standards, offsetting and compensation mechanisms and improved sourcing.

- Leveraging long-term financial resources for sustainable management of biodiversity and ecosystems and for local development.
- Create opportunities for women and marginalised groups, who might otherwise be excluded from decision-making or livelihood opportunities.

### 2.2.1. Scope for [REDACTED] landscape

Due to the nature of previous work of this nature undertaken in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] landscape and the existence and work of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the Authority's engagement with FCDO Country Posts has highlighted that the majority of the information that this PETA is requesting (as detailed in sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 is already in existence.

The Authority envisages less input from the Supplier will be required to meet the Authority's requirements. The Authority anticipate the scope of work to be approximately 50% of the scale of the other four landscapes.

The Supplier will work closely with and receive support from [REDACTED] FCDO Country Posts, locally engaged staff, FCDO Desk Teams, and the [REDACTED]. This will be co-ordinated by [REDACTED] FCDO Country Posts.

Proposed activities for the Supplier include:

- Working closely with [REDACTED] FCDO Country Post, locally engaged staff, FCDO Desk Teams, and the [REDACTED] to compile a thorough literature review of existing relevant political, economic, and technical analyses of this nature in the landscape and identify any knowledge gaps for where further analytical work is needed.
- Lead on the formatting of the PETA produced in collaboration with the parties mentioned in the first bullet point to ensure that the produced report is of the same format and to the same standard of the other four landscapes.
- Test bias and challenge assumptions of the information provided by the parties mentioned in the first bullet point.

The Supplier must address:

- What role does gender play in landscape dynamics in [REDACTED] How do the drivers of biodiversity loss impact men and women differently and how can they be addressed to promote wider HMG policy on gender equality and equity? What should be done to ensure women participate in/benefit from the BLFs activities at least equally?
- What impact has the Covid-19 pandemic had on landscape dynamics in [REDACTED] How can these changes be accounted for in long-term planning?
- What are the risks and opportunities specific to the UK delivering a programme addressing biodiversity loss in [REDACTED]

### 2.2.2. Political economy analysis

The Supplier will address the following overarching questions within each Landscape:

- how is the landscape currently being managed and why?
- what are the political, institutional and economic factors driving poverty and biodiversity loss?

The above questions are posed from the perspective of the whole landscape, which may transcend national boundaries, in addition to the national perspective of respective portions of

landscapes. The Authority's aim is to understand the political, economic, institutional, social and cultural situation, issues and dynamics (current and impending) in the landscape, and therefore the context of, and opportunities for, major intervention.

The Authority will use this information to design interventions which work with the current political economy of the landscape in countering or rebalancing influences detrimental to the Authority's aims.

The Authority requires an understand of:

#### Description:

- What are the drivers of biodiversity loss and environmental degradation, including where they lead to, or are exacerbated by poverty in the landscapes?
- Who lives in these landscapes? What are the language and other determinants of identity in these areas based? What characterises their relationship with governing authorities (executive and ruling party) at local and national level? What do local groups believe about the land and water around them (e.g. cultural values)?
- What are the relative roles of formal and traditional authorities in the concerned areas – de facto and de jure? What other decision-makers are there with influence over processes of change? What are the relevant institutions, their responsibilities, capacities, strengths and weaknesses?
- What are the opportunities for cross-border working to reduce biodiversity loss and environmental degradation? What has worked or not worked in the past regarding cross-border collaboration?

#### Lessons Learnt:

- What plans or actions are been taken by actors, such as host governments and NGOs, in the region and what measures have been taken to reduce biodiversity loss, how successful have they been and what conflicts have arisen (violent, judicial, or other)? What accounts for their performance? What is the level of ambition and direction of change?
- What has been the experience of actors, such as host governments and NGOs, to influence decision-making and what should that tell us about opportunities for successful influence in the future?
- Where may the interests of local/national actors, such as host governments and NGOs, align with project objectives, and where may they represent barriers to planned activities?
- What existing programmes – government, donor-funded, NGO or private sector, etc – exist in the landscape? How are they performing, and what is their current status and likely sustainability? What opportunities exist for the BLF to build upon what exists, and strengthen existing initiatives?

#### Economics:

- What are the key incentives shaping the decision-making of power-holders (government party, local chiefs etc.) about the development of the landscapes (such as social and economic policies, subsidies and profit-making opportunities at play)?
- What is level of relevant private sector (whether large companies, small and medium sized enterprises or micro-enterprises) activity and prevalence in each landscape, and extranational influences (public, private, civil society)? Could any be potential partners for BLF interventions, and which pose risks for programme implementation?

- Where do supply chains and financial investment flows that influence the landscape originate from? Where are the final markets, who are the actors, what are the points of influence? How do the landscapes involved help contribute towards poverty alleviation, which industries are most impactful for those on lower incomes?

Other:

- What role does gender play in landscape dynamics? How do the drivers of biodiversity loss impact men and women differently and how can they be addressed to promote wider HMG policy on gender equality and equity? What should be done to ensure women participate in/benefit from the BLF activities at least equally?
- What impact has the Covid-19 pandemic had on landscape dynamics? How can these changes be accounted for in long-term planning?
- What are the risks and opportunities specific to the UK delivering a programme addressing biodiversity loss in a particular landscape?

In order to complete the political economy analysis, the Supplier must work closely with FCDO Country Posts in each landscape to explore any pre-existing work of this nature that has been completed and utilise their wealth of experience in this field.

### 2.2.3. Technical description and analysis

The technical analysis must complement the political economy analysis and allow the Supplier to develop indicative options for significant intervention in each landscape. The Authority considers the following four areas to be relevant. The Supplier must address, as a minimum, these areas:

#### 1. Description:

- Summarise key features of the biodiversity and natural resources of each landscape including information relevant to improving the quality of ecosystems and safeguarding biodiversity.
- Identify directly relevant transboundary, national and other donor initiatives.
- Provide maps and appropriate Geographical Information Systems (GIS) information sources for each landscape.

#### 2. Prioritisation:

- Consider in each landscape what are the potential areas where the BLF could focus to maximize the impact on biodiversity.
- What are the critical risks from an environmental perspective?

#### 3. Lessons learnt:

- What relevant initiatives from central or local governments, other donors, CSOs or private sector etc. have been developed or are ongoing?
- What past initiatives has been successful and why?
- What past initiatives can be replicated or scaled up?
- What opportunities are there for joint working with ongoing initiatives?

#### 4. Potential new activities:

- What new activities or initiatives have potential to deliver BLF objectives? For example, innovative models of financing for improved biodiversity and ecosystem management payment.

#### 2.2.4. Identification of potential options for major intervention

The Supplier will combine the technical and political economy analyses to propose entry points and indicative options for intervention (refer to the list of potential activities in 2.2 which meet the broad BLF objectives):

- What are the risks associated with different options?
- Consider how indicative interventions should be sequenced and delivered to have best impact and manage risks. What are the potential pathways of intervention? Deliverability of intervention options is crucial. Ensure BLF is suitably positioned and compliments existing initiatives.
- Show rationale by developing landscape specific theories of change including setting out problem statements and testing of assumptions based on the guiding political economy questions provided in this document. The landscape theory of change outcomes and outputs are expected to be based upon or be consistent with the overarching theory of change as described within Annex E.
- Present a draft logframe for the intervention, based upon the overarching BLF logframe found within Annex F, including identification of baseline data sources where they exist.
- Set out what technical skills and capacity building would be needed for each intervention option to be delivered successfully.

#### 2.3. Methodology

The Authority anticipates that the Supplier will undertake a mixture of literature research, one-to-one interviews and group consultations. The Authority requires the Supplier to engage with a wide variety of stakeholders from FCDO Country Posts, government, private sector, bilateral and multilateral donors, academia, civil society, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and communities representing a mix of international, central, regional and local levels. Information provided by interlocutors may require double-checking before being presented as fact.

Given travel restrictions around the Covid-19 pandemic the Supplier must still ensure the requirements are fully met. The Supplier must assess the risk of each landscape as part of their proposal and ensure in-country consultants and expertise is draw upon.

The Supplier will engage openly and constructively with FCDO Country Posts. Entry and exit meetings with HMG representatives at British Embassies or British High Commissions will be held to brief the Supplier prior to in-country work and to feedback findings to FCDO Country Posts on completion of in-country work. British Ambassadors / High Commissioners or their staff, may choose to accompany the Supplier to some meetings, e.g. with Ministers or government officials. The Supplier must seek approval from British Ambassadors or High Commissioners, as relevant, or their authorised representatives prior to arranging meeting with foreign government officials.

The Authority expects the Suppliers activity to include:

- Review of existing documentation.
- Review of relevant material identified.
- Review broader issues related to landscape restoration, sustainable management practices, safeguarding biodiversity, and sustainable economic development for local communities.
- Describe relevant data sources.
- Stakeholder consultations visits to a selection of hotspots in landscapes.
- Informal discussions with HMG staff on progress and reflections upon emerging findings.



- Provide an interim presentation at a pre-agreed mid-point to discuss proposed structure and content.
- Preparation of final report and presentation covering main findings.

## 2.4. Delivery Chain Mapping

Delivery Chain Mapping (DCM) is a process that identifies and captures, usually in visual form, the name of all partners involved in delivering a specific good, service or charge, down to the end beneficiary.

DCM addresses risk throughout the network to reduce exposure and vulnerability. DCM will capture risks such as poor performance, financial melt-down or financial corporate responsibility.

Before engaging with private sector, civil society or multilateral partners the Supplier must carry out a DCM exercise. The DCM will form a part of the Suppliers due diligence, decision making, and tender process. The Authority is required to report the above throughout the intervention to ensure all Authority monies can be tracked through the chain.

## 2.5. Reporting

The Supplier will make the following reports to the Authority. The indicative timetable, within table 4, below assumes contract award early-to-mid May 2021.

Table 4: Reporting Requirements

Phase/Output	Key Deliverables	Indicative Timetable
Output 1 – Inception	Inception report; initial data collection, including working closely with FCDO Country Posts.	May 2021
Output 2 – PETA and identification of potential options for significant intervention	Presentation and written report for each landscape. Agreement with the Authority of options to be included in the landscape business case and be considered in Output 3, before commencing Output 3.	May – June 2021
Output 3 – Support to Authority landscape proposal development	Presentation and written report for each landscape.	April -July 2021

### 2.5.1. Report requirements

The reports described within Table 4 above must meet the following requirements:

- Language: Reports must be written in English. Meetings with the Authority must be held in English.
- Format: Digital PDF document.
- Length: Page length, including of the executive summary, will be agreed during the Inception Phase.
- Structure: For the implementer to decide, as long as it responds to the items identified in the relevant outputs section of this document
- Review: the Authority will endeavour to review reports in the following timescales: one week to review and comment on the inception report after oral presentation and two weeks to review and comment on the final written documents after oral presentation.
- Deadline: The Supplier may either:

- A. Submit reports for all five landscapes simultaneously. The final submission must be received by 21st July 2021; Or
- B. Take a staggered approach submitting reports for two landscape by 21<sup>st</sup> July 2021 with the remaining three landscape reports received by 30<sup>th</sup> July 2021. Should the Supplier wish to take a staggered approach the ordering of landscapes must be agreed with the Authority in writing and during the Inception Period.

Dates for initial findings to be presented to Authority and the initial draft report to be presented to Authority will be confirmed during the Inception Period.

## 2.5.2. Outputs

### Output 1 – Inception

The inception report must:

- outline the ways of working, methodology and a timeline/delivery plan for the various outputs.
- include initial contact with FCDO Country Posts.
- be reviewed by the Authority BLF Programme Team and FCDO Governance Advisors.

Output 2 – PETA and identification of potential options for major intervention.

*Political economy analysis:* Refer to section 2.2.2 for guidance on the political economy analysis element of this work.

- Proposed methodology must take into account the K4D report, a copy of which can be found within Annex B, commissioned by FCDO “Thinking and Working Politically on Transboundary Issues” and the suggestions around tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings.
- The BLF includes a strong focus on adaptive management and the PEA should provide a baseline on which to identify entry points but also set the foundations for periodic reviews which feed into the learning cycle.
- Include specific recommendation on adaptive management:
  - Recommendations should be made on how to update the PEA, and how best in-country staff should be deployed to do this.
  - Recommendations on how to incorporate the findings of the political economy analysis into the learning cycle.
  - How do programme funded posts maintain political economy analysis up-to-date to provide the grounding for ongoing adaptive management.

*Technical description and analysis:*

- The technical description must include features such as the following:
  - Protected areas location and the effectiveness of management.
  - Key populations of globally threatened species.
  - Description of Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures (OECMs) and their location.
  - Description of indigenous territories and their location.
  - Reference to relevant biodiversity and conservation planning tools. For example, National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) and regional plans.
  - Mapping of other relevant donor activity and domestic initiatives including Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and other




jurisdictional programmes. For examples, sustainable / deforestation free supply chains. Potential sources of support that could be leveraged.

- Existing transboundary conservation initiatives and high-level political agreements.
- Information on wildlife crime / illegal wildlife trade etc.
- Any available information relevant to pollution and reducing risks of zoonotic diseases.

*Analysis and development of indicative interventions:* refer to section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for guidance on the steps the Authority expects the Supplier will take in their analysis and selection of options by landscape.

- The Supplier must develop major interventions which deliver the outcomes and outputs Authority seeks to achieve which are shown in the programme logframe.
- In section 2.2 the Authority has indicated a list of activities which might be anticipated, the Authority does not wish to pre-judge the type of interventions. The landscapes are very different and the balance between 'enabling environment' type intervention aimed at promoting systemic change and more local on-the-ground interventions will need to be considered by the Supplier with regards to outcomes and outputs.
- The Authority does not expect comprehensive detail in the description of interventions, as this will be developed when landscape delivery partners develop their proposals. However, this PETA analysis will be key in the delivery partner procurement with the bids put forward by organisations dependent upon this analysis. Additionally, indicative options for intervention must be sufficiently developed with theories of change (including problem statements and tested assumptions) to allow quantitative and qualitative appraisal, and consideration of value for money, have considered a range of practical options with rigour and have buy-in from host Governments.
- Set out what technical skills and capacity building would be needed for each intervention option to be delivered successfully.

#### Output 3 – Support to the Authority's landscape proposal development



- Refer to Annex A for a template on how to present this output. The Supplier must follow the structure detailed (the word count will be agreed during the Inception Period). The full extent of material gathered must still be provided to the Authority.
- The Supplier must develop a succinct strategic case for intervention in each landscape, with corresponding landscape theory of change and logframe (with references to evidence) and then consider the options agreed with Authority as a product of Output 2. The theory of change and logframes must be based upon or be consistent with the overarching theory of change as described within Annex E.

- Support the Authority's appraisal case must include quantitative value for money considerations such as benefits: cost analysis as well as qualitative considerations of the proposed indicative interventions.
- Include options for delivery, governance and monitoring and evaluation arrangements.

## 2.6. Government Reporting

The Authority must make reports within central government on the levels of contracted work being allocated to Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and other sub-contracted organisations.

The Authority must provide details regarding the levels of direct and indirect departmental SME spend with major suppliers to the cross-government SME Small Business Policy team working on this initiative. The Authority must also gather details of the organisations working within the supply chains of directly contracted partners.

The Supplier acknowledges that the Authority will share such information with government partners. The Supplier must, in a reasonable timeframe, comply with any request from the Authority for information related to the Suppliers supply chain or other such data to enable the Authority to meet such reporting obligations.

## 2.7. Scale Up/Down

The Supplier shall commit to being fully prepared in the event any decision is made to scale up (increase) or scale down (decrease) the scope of the programme.

# 3. Legal & Regulatory Compliance

## 3.1. Safeguard Considerations

All organisations that work with or come into contact with children must have safeguarding policies and procedures to ensure that every child, regardless of their age, gender, religion or ethnicity, can be protected from harm. Protection from violence, exploitation, and abuse through involvement, directly or indirectly, with Authority programmes. This includes sexual exploitation and abuse but must also be understood as all forms of physical or emotional violence or abuse and financial exploitation.

The Supplier must have appropriate policies and procedures in place to expressly prohibit sexual exploitation and abuse and to receive and address reports of such acts.

## 3.2. Disability Considerations

The Authority takes disability inclusive development to mean that people with disabilities are systematically and consistently included in and benefit from international development. Civil Society and Private Sector partners must outline their approach to disability inclusion and how people with disabilities will be consulted and engaged throughout the project.

## 3.3. Prevention of Fraud and Bribery

In line with ODA guidance, the Authority has a zero-tolerance approach to corruption and will pursue aggressive recovery approaches.

The Supplier, and all organisations associated with the delivery of this Contract, must adopt a zero-tolerance approach to fraud and corruption; to act immediately if it is suspected, to cooperate fully with HMG and other authorities to bring perpetrators to account, and to pursue aggressive loss recovery approaches.

The Supplier must have systems in place to detect and combat fraud. Section 48 of the overarching Framework Terms and Conditions sets out this requirement in more details.

### 3.4. UK Aid Branding

The Supplier, and all organisations associated with the delivery of this Contract, that receive funding from the Authority must use the UK aid logo on their development and humanitarian programmes to be transparent and acknowledge that they are funded by UK taxpayers. The Supplier, and all organisations associated with the delivery of this Contract, must acknowledge funding from the UK government in broader communications but no publicity is to be given to this Contract without the prior written consent of the Authority.

The UK aid logo can be provided to the Supplier by the Authority upon written request.

### 3.5. Transparency

The Authority has transformed our approach to transparency, reshaping our own working practices and pressuring others across the world to do the same. The Authority requires Suppliers receiving and managing funds, to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate sub-contractors, sub-agencies and partners.

The Supplier must release data in accordance with International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards. Further information IATI information is available from the following URL:

<http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

The Supplier must ensure appropriate tools are in place to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this to the Authority.

### 3.6. Duty of Care

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under this Contract, including appropriate security arrangements.

The Authority will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in country where appropriate.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this Contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above.

Travel advice is also available on the FCDO website and the Supplier must ensure they and their Personnel are up to date with the latest position.

The Supplier understands that the Supplier remains fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above. In particular the Supplier understands that:



- The Supplier is fully responsible for Security and Duty of Care.
- The Supplier understands the potential risks and affirms that the Supplier has the required knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- The Supplier has the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

The Authority will not accept any responsibility with regards to the Suppliers Duty of Care obligations.

Whilst the Authority, and our wider HMG partners, will share information pertinent to security status, developments or other similar pieces of information, the Authority makes no warrant, commitment or guarantee regarding the accuracy of any information which is shared. The Supplier shall at all times be responsible for making their own enquiries regarding their Duty of Care obligations.

## Annex A: Presentation Template

With regards to output 3, development of the strategic case, the following be must include:

1. Global context and need for a UK intervention including market, governance and information failures
  - Give the rationale for intervention - what is the problem it is trying to solve. Why is the UK best placed to deliver a solution(s)?
2. The need for landscape-level intervention
  - What are the problems the Authority is trying to address?
  - What are the barriers to effective landscape approaches?
3. Impacts, Outcomes, and Activities
  - What would success look like?
  - How would the Authority measure success?
4. Landscape Level Theory of Change
5. Risks
  - What are the risks/uncertainties on this approach? Consider sustainability and feasibility, gender and equality, safeguarding, etc.

With regards to development of the appraisal case, the Supplier must provide information to allow Authority to carry out the following:

1. Economic rationale
2. Appraisal summary
3. Appraisal design and options overview
4. Detailed analysis of options
5. Value for money appraisal: Economy; efficiency; effectiveness and cost-effectiveness; equity
6. Mechanisms to ensure value for money

## **Annex B: K4D Report**

See accompanying document entitled “Annex 1 Terms of Reference, Annex B KD4 Report”

# Thinking and Working Politically on transboundary issues

Izzy Birch

Independent researcher

18 January 2021

## Question

*What are the key challenges to Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) when designing and delivering development interventions around transboundary issues? How have tools and concepts, including Political Economy Analysis, been adapted to overcome these challenges and what lessons have been learned?*

## Contents

1. Summary
2. Thinking and Working Politically
3. Challenges of TWP on transboundary issues
4. Tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings
5. Lessons learned
6. References

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# 1. Summary

There is growing consensus that political factors are a key determinant of development impact. The practice of Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) is built around three inter-connected principles: (i) strong political analysis, insight and understanding; (ii) detailed appreciation of, and response to, the local context; and (iii) flexibility and adaptability in program design and implementation. From the limited experience thus far of applying TWP on transboundary issues, the following challenges are apparent:

1. **The process becomes more complex** as both the number of actors and the diversity of interests and incentives increase.
2. **There are variations in the political traction** attached to different policy areas and the institutions responsible for them.
3. **Geo-political sensitivities** shape the space for transboundary cooperation, which is therefore vulnerable to opening and closing unpredictably.
4. **There are differing interpretations of what is 'regional'**. Further, transboundary interventions are not always a response to a failure of collective action at that level.
5. **The governance of transboundary issues is likely to involve the interplay of multiple institutions operating at different levels.** Practitioners must then navigate this complexity.

Some of the lessons learned are as follows:

1. **While TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is still important and can reinforce the political agenda**, for example by increasing the confidence of smaller states or by strengthening collective understanding.
2. **Improving the quality of domestic cooperation** can be a step towards regional cooperation.
3. **Flexible engagement with the diverse range of actors** that populate transboundary settings has been shown to be an effective strategy.
4. **Transboundary cooperation can be built from the bottom up**, either by focusing spatially or by working incrementally in modest steps.
5. **For development partners, pre-existing bilateral partnerships** may facilitate their engagement at a transboundary level, particularly on sensitive issues.

Given the relatively isolated experience of TWP in transboundary settings, the evidence base for this report is also limited. The two areas where most examples were found concern regional integration and transboundary water management.

While there has been some work to advance TWP and gender, neither gender nor disability were features of the literature under review.



## 2. Thinking and Working Politically

There is growing consensus that the critical success factor in achieving developmental change is a deep understanding of, and active engagement with, local political and power relations (Laws & Marquette, 2018).<sup>1</sup> The practice of Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) reflects this consensus and is guided by three core principles (Table 1).

See: Table 1: Thinking and Working Politically: Principles and Characteristics, Source: TWP Community of Practice (nd), p. 2, <https://twpcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/the-case-for-thinking-and-working-politically.pdf>

Political economy analysis (PEA) underpins TWP by exploring the distribution and contestation of political and economic power and the implications of this for development (McGregor et al, 2020). PEA may be applied in different ways and at different levels of operation (Harris & Booth, 2013). Practitioners with the right skill-set can incorporate the insights from PEA into their ongoing work, thus connecting the two complementary elements ('thinking' and 'working') of TWP (McGregor et al, 2020).

A recent evidence review of TWP (Dasandi et al, 2019; Laws & Marquette, 2018) finds that its literature has certain limitations, including in rigour and robustness, and in its capacity to demonstrate that TWP can deliver better development outcomes; the authors also note the lack of journal articles. The same evidence review indicates that most of the contexts in which TWP has been applied are country-based, even if programmes are designed or managed regionally. In 2017, the TWP Community of Practice discussed how TWP might extend its scope to address 'larger and messier' development challenges that cross national boundaries (TWP Community of Practice, 2017, p. 2). The two case studies presented at that meeting were on transboundary water management and regional integration, and these two issues provide most of the material in this report. The searches for this report, reinforced by consultation with members of the TWP Community of Practice, suggest that the application of TWP in transboundary settings is still limited.

## 3. Challenges of TWP on transboundary issues

1. **The larger number of actors, each with their differing interests and incentives, makes the process of TWP more complex.** Transboundary analysis is multi-layered: it needs to explore the political dynamics within each country, as well as those between countries, and the interaction between the two (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). Transboundary dynamics also play out within countries, particularly over shared natural resources (Tincani et al, 2018). The multi-dimensional nature of transboundary issues brings in a wide range of actors and presents challenges for PEA, which risks being

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<sup>1</sup> In their discussion of TWP and biodiversity, Schuttenberg et al (2020) note that 'local', when used in the context of TWP, does not imply working at a small geographical scale but rather distinguishes between local actors and outsiders. It does not rule out working on the larger scale that an ecosystem approach may require.

overly general or unfocused unless the research question is tailored to the specific needs of the team at that time (World Bank, 2017).

2. **The political traction attached to different policy areas varies.** In their synthesis of the findings from the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO) programme, Byiers et al (2019) show that different cross-border issues, such as trade, security, energy, or ecosystem management, have different political imperatives that alter the incentives to engage across borders. For example, immediate threats carry greater political urgency than aspirational agendas focused on the creation of future benefits. Those sectors where country priorities are largely national or local in nature, such as water in Southern Africa, are unlikely to generate strong incentives for regional cooperation (Woolfrey & Muller, 2017).<sup>2</sup> The power of sector ministries also varies: Wells-Dang et al (2016), reviewing the political economy of environmental impact assessments in the Mekong region, note the limited influence and authority of environment ministries, and the risk that generous donor support may isolate them still further from the more influential parts of government.
3. **The space for transboundary cooperation is politically sensitive, shaped by geopolitical priorities, and can open and close unpredictably.** 'Resource nationalism', in which cross-border cooperation over natural resources is determined by wider geo-political considerations, is a particular challenge; Stanbury-Davis (2018) discusses how governments in Asia regard rivers as both national assets and tools for managing their external affairs. Unrelated political events can stall progress on collective action (Tincani et al, 2018).
4. **There are differing interpretations of what is 'regional', or transboundary.** Regions exist on a variety of spatial scales and levels which may be understood differently by different actors, and which may overlap with each other or function in parallel. The range of a regional or transboundary issue and the mechanism intended to manage it may not coincide; an eco-region and a political region, for example, may in practice occupy separate geographical spaces (Söderbaum & Granit, 2014).<sup>3</sup>  
Further, the added value of transboundary action is not always apparent; nor does it necessarily drive regional cooperation. Byiers et al (2019) find that not all activities carried out by regional organisations are responses to a failure of collective action at the regional level; many appear to be projects that happen to be implemented by a regional organisation in more than one country.
5. **The governance of transboundary issues is likely to involve the complex interplay of multiple institutions operating at different levels.** This may be a consequence of asymmetries in governance at the national level. For example, since water governance in India is a state-level function, transboundary discussions are influenced by the political dynamics within India's basin states, which are themselves also key actors in those

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<sup>2</sup> Woolfrey & Muller (2017) also attribute the lack of regional traction to a divergence between the priorities of national governments and development partners. The water priorities of member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are largely driven by their national development concerns, such as energy generation and economic development, rather than the conservation and environmental agenda favoured by development partners.

<sup>3</sup> The authors list six types of region: (i) eco-region, (ii) cultural region, (iii) economic region, (iv) administrative region, (v) political region, and (vi) security region.



# Thinking and Working Politically on transboundary issues

Izzy Birch

Independent researcher

18 January 2021

## Question

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1. **The process becomes more complex** as both the number of actors and the diversity of interests and incentives increase.
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Some of the lessons learned are as follows:

1. **While TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is still important and can reinforce the political agenda**, for example by increasing the confidence of smaller states or by strengthening collective understanding.
2. **Improving the quality of domestic cooperation** can be a step towards regional cooperation.
3. **Flexible engagement with the diverse range of actors** that populate transboundary settings has been shown to be an effective strategy.
4. **Transboundary cooperation can be built from the bottom up**, either by focusing spatially or by working incrementally in modest steps.
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Given the relatively isolated experience of TWP in transboundary settings, the evidence base for this report is also limited. The two areas where most examples were found concern regional integration and transboundary water management.

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## 3. Challenges of TWP on transboundary issues

1. **The larger number of actors, each with their differing interests and incentives, makes the process of TWP more complex.** Transboundary analysis is multi-layered: it needs to explore the political dynamics within each country, as well as those between countries, and the interaction between the two (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). Transboundary dynamics also play out within countries, particularly over shared natural resources (Tincani et al, 2018). The multi-dimensional nature of transboundary issues brings in a wide range of actors and presents challenges for PEA, which risks being

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interactions, thus complicating the process of international negotiation (Stanbury-Davis, 2018).

There may be multiple overlapping frameworks of decision-making and cooperation with responsibility for the same resource. These are two examples:

- i. Jensen & Lange (2013) categorise the various forms of water governance in the Mekong and Zambezi river basins: (i) unilateral water development interventions by a single country that affect the basin; (ii) bilateral cooperation agreements governing specific projects in the basin; (iii) bilateral water agreements between riparian countries and basin water commissions; (iv) multilateral water agreements between three or more countries; and (v) regional cooperative frameworks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
- ii. Knaepen & Byiers (2017) explore the institutional arrangements in the Nile Basin. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an intergovernmental partnership of ten Nile Basin countries to promote collaboration and benefit-sharing. Most are also members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which is also developing a regional water strategy. Other actors involved in managing Nile waters include the Lake Victoria Basin Commission under the East African Community (EAC), and the East Africa Power Pool under the Community of East and Southern Africa.

It should also be noted that authority is exercised, and regional cooperation may be pursued, through informal as well as formal mechanisms such as those listed above, and by private as well as public actors, further adding to the institutional complexity (Byiers et al, 2019; Söderbaum & Granit, 2014).

## 4. Tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings

Given the limited body of literature on transboundary TWP, it was not possible to identify a wide number of tools and concepts adapted to this context. However, two are summarised here: the first from the literature on regional integration and the second from the literature on transboundary water management.

### Five-lens tool

The PEDRO research programme sampled and adapted PEA frameworks and tools commonly used at country and sector level to inform the development of a 'five lens' framework for analysing the political economy of regional cooperation (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). The five lenses interact with each other and are as follows:

1. Structural or foundational factors
2. Formal and informal institutions / rules of the game
3. Actors, agency and incentives
4. (Sub)-sector-specific technical and political characteristics
5. External or exogenous factors.

The authors note that this approach is broadly in line with the TWP agenda, in that political analysis and contextual understanding should inform programming that is flexible and adaptable in design. To that end, Byiers & Vanheukelom (2016) present five options that can guide decisions about a programme's level of ambition, which reflect what is politically feasible and will work 'with the grain', rather than from a normative template. The five options, with their key guiding questions, are:

1. **Alter:** Given the context laid out using the five lenses, what are the chances of being able to alter the interests of key stakeholder groups and actors?
2. **Adapt:** To what degree can objectives be met, or can 'the problem' be addressed building on existing incentives and informal practices?
3. **Avoid:** What are the prospects, but also the potential costs and benefits of working through alternative and/or parallel processes and institutional forms?
4. **Await:** Are there some potentially important political or other game changers on the horizon that might offer better opportunities for reform?
5. **Abandon:** Assuming none of the other 4 A's apply, is abandoning the intervention or reform politically feasible or desirable, and might any negative effects otherwise be offset?

## Perceived risks to cooperation

The Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) initiative has published guidance on PEA for transboundary water management (World Bank, 2017). This takes a problem-driven approach to PEA, the five steps in the analysis being (i) problem definition, (ii) context, (iii) institutional arrangements, (iv) underlying drivers, and (v) 'what can be done?'

In exploring steps 3 and 4 (institutions and drivers) the guidance recommends a tool that analyses countries' perceived risks to cooperation and helps draw out underlying concerns and priorities. The risks are clustered in five areas and defined as follows (World Bank, 2017, p. 9):

1. **Capacity and knowledge:** Confidence in the ability to negotiate a fair deal; having adequate and correct information and knowledge to negotiate a deal.
2. **Accountability and voice:** Deliverability of benefits by the regional entity and co-riparians, often related to trust; having a say in decision making in the governing structures of the regional entity.
3. **Sovereignty and autonomy:** Ability to act in the best interest of the country without constraints; making decisions independently.
4. **Equity and access:** Fairness of (relative) benefits to a country, including timing of benefits and costs and obtaining/retaining fair access to the river.
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## Other frameworks

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complexity and uncertainty. There was insufficient time to explore these in any depth given the size of the literature, but two may be relevant:

1. **Water Diplomacy Framework:** this is presented as an alternative to technically focused water management approaches (Islam & Repella, 2015). It starts by exploring the values and interests of stakeholders, acknowledging the need to incorporate diverse viewpoints. It then seeks 'politically legitimate and tentative prescriptions' given the high levels of both complexity and uncertainty. The authors comment: 'Our challenge is how to translate solutions that emerge from science and technology into the messy context of the economy and politics' (Islam & Repella, 2015, p. 1).
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## 5. Lessons learned

1. **While TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is still important and can reinforce the political agenda.** For example:
  - a. **Strengthening technical competence can help to level the transboundary playing field.** An evaluation of the South Asia Water Initiative found that smaller countries in the region felt more confident negotiating with their larger and more powerful neighbours once they had a clearer technical understanding of the issues (Tincani et al, 2018).
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interactions, thus complicating the process of international negotiation (Stanbury-Davis, 2018).

There may be multiple overlapping frameworks of decision-making and cooperation with responsibility for the same resource. These are two examples:

- i. Jensen & Lange (2013) categorise the various forms of water governance in the Mekong and Zambezi river basins: (i) unilateral water development interventions by a single country that affect the basin; (ii) bilateral cooperation agreements governing specific projects in the basin; (iii) bilateral water agreements between riparian countries and basin water commissions; (iv) multilateral water agreements between three or more countries; and (v) regional cooperative frameworks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
- ii. Knaepen & Byiers (2017) explore the institutional arrangements in the Nile Basin. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an intergovernmental partnership of ten Nile Basin countries to promote collaboration and benefit-sharing. Most are also members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which is also developing a regional water strategy. Other actors involved in managing Nile waters include the Lake Victoria Basin Commission under the East African Community (EAC), and the East Africa Power Pool under the Community of East and Southern Africa.

It should also be noted that authority is exercised, and regional cooperation may be pursued, through informal as well as formal mechanisms such as those listed above, and by private as well as public actors, further adding to the institutional complexity (Byiers et al, 2019; Söderbaum & Granit, 2014).

## 4. Tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings

Given the limited body of literature on transboundary TWP, it was not possible to identify a wide number of tools and concepts adapted to this context. However, two are summarised here: the first from the literature on regional integration and the second from the literature on transboundary water management.

### Five-lens tool

The PEDRO research programme sampled and adapted PEA frameworks and tools commonly used at country and sector level to inform the development of a 'five lens' framework for analysing the political economy of regional cooperation (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). The five lenses interact with each other and are as follows:

1. Structural or foundational factors
2. Formal and informal institutions / rules of the game
3. Actors, agency and incentives
4. (Sub)-sector-specific technical and political characteristics
5. External or exogenous factors.

The authors note that this approach is broadly in line with the TWP agenda, in that political analysis and contextual understanding should inform programming that is flexible and adaptable in design. To that end, Byiers & Vanheukelom (2016) present five options that can guide decisions about a programme's level of ambition, which reflect what is politically feasible and will work 'with the grain', rather than from a normative template. The five options, with their key guiding questions, are:

1. **Alter:** Given the context laid out using the five lenses, what are the chances of being able to alter the interests of key stakeholder groups and actors?
2. **Adapt:** To what degree can objectives be met, or can 'the problem' be addressed building on existing incentives and informal practices?
3. **Avoid:** What are the prospects, but also the potential costs and benefits of working through alternative and/or parallel processes and institutional forms?
4. **Await:** Are there some potentially important political or other game changers on the horizon that might offer better opportunities for reform?
5. **Abandon:** Assuming none of the other 4 A's apply, is abandoning the intervention or reform politically feasible or desirable, and might any negative effects otherwise be offset?

## Perceived risks to cooperation

The Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) initiative has published guidance on PEA for transboundary water management (World Bank, 2017). This takes a problem-driven approach to PEA, the five steps in the analysis being (i) problem definition, (ii) context, (iii) institutional arrangements, (iv) underlying drivers, and (v) 'what can be done?'

In exploring steps 3 and 4 (institutions and drivers) the guidance recommends a tool that analyses countries' perceived risks to cooperation and helps draw out underlying concerns and priorities. The risks are clustered in five areas and defined as follows (World Bank, 2017, p. 9):

1. **Capacity and knowledge:** Confidence in the ability to negotiate a fair deal; having adequate and correct information and knowledge to negotiate a deal.
2. **Accountability and voice:** Deliverability of benefits by the regional entity and co-riparians, often related to trust; having a say in decision making in the governing structures of the regional entity.
3. **Sovereignty and autonomy:** Ability to act in the best interest of the country without constraints; making decisions independently.
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- Ed Laws, Overseas Development Institute
- Neil McCulloch, The Policy Practice
- Graham Teskey, Abt Associates

## Key websites

- Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice: <https://twpcommunity.org/>
- European Centre for Development Policy Management: <https://ecdpm.org/dossiers/political-institutional-dynamics-regional-organisations-africa/>

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## About this report


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## **Annex D: Landscape Papers**

This Annex D provides the Authority's rationale behind the section of each landscape and provide a number of publicly available key statistics. The Authority envisages through the provision of these statistics, the Supplier's efforts can be reduced.

This Annex D further provides an indication of the Authority's key interests in each landscape.

See accompanying document entitled "Annex 1 Terms of Reference, Annex D: Landscape Papers"



## Annex D: Landscape Papers

