

Detailed Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment

Site: **Junction of Station Road and Blyth Road**

Client: **Southwold Town Council**

Ref: **8893 RA**

Date: **12th May 2021**

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This Report has been produced in compliance with the Construction Industry Research and Information Association guidelines for the preparation of Detailed Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessments in the management of UXO risks in the construction industry.

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Glossary of Terms

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ARP	Air-raid Precautions
BDO	Bomb Disposal Officer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal (current term for "bomb" disposal)
HE	High Explosive
HG	Home Guard
IB	Incendiary Bomb
Kg	Kilogram
LM	Land Mine
LSA	Land Service Ammunition (includes grenades, mortars, etc.)
Luftwaffe	German Air Force
m bgl	Metres Below Ground Level
MoD	Ministry of Defence
OB	Oil Bomb
PM	Parachute Mine
RAF	Royal Air Force
SI	Site Investigation
SAA	Small Arms Ammunition (small calibre cartridges used in rifles & machine guns)
UXB	Unexploded Bomb
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
V-1	"Doodlebug" the first cruise type missile, used against London from June 1944. Also known as 'Flying Bomb'
V-2	The first ballistic missile, used against London from September 1944
WWI	First World War (1914 -1918)
WWII	Second World War (1939 – 1945)

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Executive Summary

THE SITE:	
Address	Station Road, Southwold, Suffolk, IP18 6AX
OS National Grid Reference	TM 50475 76598
Details	The site is comprised of several commercial buildings, in addition to peripheral areas of hard-standing, including a car-park in the centre of the site. Furthermore, two roads are located adjacent to the north and east of the site.
PROPOSED WORKS:	
The proposal is to redevelop the site to form two new buildings with L-shaped footprints that loosely interlock around an intimate central courtyard space in conjunction with the rear of Nos. 3-9 Station Road.	
Risk Assessment Methodology: In accordance with CIRIA guidelines this assessment has carried out research, analysed the evidence and considered the likelihood that the site has been contaminated with unexploded ordnance; that such items remained on site; the risk that they could be encountered during any intrusive works and the consequences that could result. Appropriate risk mitigation measures have been proposed.	
Explosive Ordnance Risk Rating	LOW
THREAT OF CONTAMINATION FROM GERMAN AIR-DELIVERED UXO:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By the end of WWII, the Municipal Borough of Southwold (within which the site was located) had experienced a moderate bombing density, as confirmed by official statistics. The town itself was not host to any significant industry or military targets for the Luftwaffe, as such the majority of raids in the surrounding rural area therefore likely consisted of opportunistic 'Tip and Run' bombing incidents. These incidents occurred when enemy aircraft under heavy AA fire or fighter interception would prematurely / indiscriminately jettison their bomb loads in order to escape the combat zone. These apparently random incidents also occurred when pilots became lost / disorientated over enemy territory. Anecdotal evidence confirms that most of the raids over Southwold were likely intended for Lowestoft. Anecdotal and secondary evidence confirms that Southwold suffered from several raids throughout WWII owing to its location on the eastern coast of England, making it an easy target for Luftwaffe pilots coming from the continent. At least 4 x HE bomb strikes fell within 300m of the site, however there is likely to be more, owing to the lack of precise details, such as the exact number of strikes and their locations, from each raid. Numerous incendiary bombs were also scattered across the town. The site was located within a predominantly urban setting on the outskirts of the coastal town of Southwold, comprised predominantly of residential buildings inclusive of private rear-gardens. However, the north-eastern corner of site may be undeveloped open ground, though this could not be confirmed. 	

<p>No evidence of clearance, ruins or significant redevelopment was observed between pre-war and post-war OS mapping of the site and local area.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WWII-era aerial photography of the site confirms that the site comprised residential buildings that do not appear to have suffered from bomb damage. However, due to the low-resolution of the image, an accurate assessment of the buildings and ground conditions on site cannot be made. • Had a UXB strike fell on undamaged buildings / areas of hard-surfacing on site, it would have caused substantial / obvious damage (even without detonating) or a persistent, easily identifiable entry hole, which would have been noticed immediately, reported and exhumed at the time. • However, had an UXB fell within gardens or the area of open ground on site, the entry hole could easily have become obscured within soft ground or unmaintained vegetation. Note the entry hole of an SC50 (the most commonly deployed German HE bomb) could be as little as 20cm in diameter. • However, owing to the lack of evidence to suggest that the site suffered from any bomb damage, the likelihood of this occurring is considered low. 	
THREAT OF CONTAMINATION FROM BRITISH / ALLIED UXO:	
Land Service Ammunition / Small Arms Ammunition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No known registered HG battalion for the Southwold area could be found during the timeframe of the report. However, it is likely that due to the towns coastal position, that a battalion operated the defensive fortifications in the surrounding area, which included pillboxes in addition to several anti-tank cubes on the beach. The closest of these is located 80m north. • Anecdotal and in-house evidence confirms the presence of coastal defence batteries on the Southwold coastline, in addition to at least two camps located 80m and 550m south respectively. • HG battalions and the army would typically take part in training exercises in recreational, open areas during WWII. The site, however, appears to have been occupied by several buildings including residential properties inclusive of rear gardens. As such, it is unlikely that any training exercises occurred within its perimeter.
Anti-Aircraft Projectiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary evidence confirms the existence of coastal defence batteries within the surrounding area, defending the Southwold coastline. It is likely that due to the towns location, that further anti-aircraft batteries were located in the surrounding area. At least one was located on The Common, in addition to trenches, barbed wire and pillboxes, located 240m south.¹ • It is possible that during air raids in the surrounding area, AA fire may have occurred over the site in retaliation. • AA shells were high explosive (HE) projectiles, fitted with a contact fuze to make them explode on impact. If these shells failed to strike an aircraft, they would eventually fall back to earth. This type of ordnance is not likely to have had great penetration ability, and the majority of unexploded AA shells are found close to WWII ground level or in made ground.

¹ <https://heritage.suffolk.gov.uk/Monument/MXS19280>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> However, given that the site was occupied predominantly by buildings, any AA shells (UX or not) falling on the site would likely have been noticed immediately and subsequently dealt with.
BOMB PENETRATION ASSESSMENT:	
<p>It has been assessed that a 500kg bomb would have had an approximate maximum bomb penetration depth of between 9-11m below WWII ground level. Penetration depth could potentially have been greater if the UXB was larger (though only 4% of German bombs used in WWII over Britain were of that size). Note that UXBs may be found at any depth between just below the WWII ground level and the maximum penetration depth.</p>	
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT UXO REMAINS ON SITE:	
<p>The threat of UXO contaminating the site has been assessed as minimal and therefore the likelihood of UXO remaining on site is also minimal.</p>	
RECOMMENDED RISK MITIGATION MEASURES:	
Site Specific Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness Briefings (UXO Toolbox Briefing) to all personnel conducting intrusive works	✓
Site Specific Safety Instructions (SSSI)	✓
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer On-Site Support	✗
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer to support site investigation works	✗
Search & Clear	✗
Non-Intrusive Magnetometer Survey and Target Investigation (greenfield land only)	✗
Intrusive Magnetometer Survey of all pile locations down to the maximum bomb penetration depth	✗
<p>In making this assessment and recommending these risk mitigation measures, the proposed works outlined in the 'Scope of the Proposed Works' section were considered. Should the planned works be modified, or additional intrusive engineering works be considered, SafeLane Global should be consulted to see if re-assessment of the risk or mitigation recommendations is necessary.</p>	

Annexes

Annex A	Site Location Maps
Annex B	Recent Aerial Photograph
Annex C	Pre and Post-WWII OS Maps
Annex D	WWI UK Air Raid and Naval Bombardment Map
Annex E	German Air-Delivered Ordnance
Annex F	Recent WWII-era German UXB Finds in the UK
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Annex H	WWII-era RAF Aerial Photography
Annex I	Recent UXO Incidents – Home Guard
Annex J	Land Service Ammunition
Annex K	Small Arms Ammunition
Annex L	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Annex M	UXO Press Articles

Detailed Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment

In Respect of

Junction of Station Road and Blyth Road

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Southwold Town Council has commissioned SafeLane Global to conduct a Detailed Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment of the Junction of Station Road and Blyth Road site.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) presents a significant risk to construction projects in parts of the UK as a result of enemy actions during the two 20th Century World Wars and historic British and Allied military activity.

One of the legacies of this conflict is buried unexploded air-dropped bombs or anti-aircraft projectiles resulting from the failure of a proportion of the weapons to function as designed. It is commonly accepted that the failure rate of these munitions was approximately 10% and, depending on their shape, weight, velocity and ground conditions, many penetrated the ground and came to rest at depth.

In addition, it is estimated that over 20% of the UK landmass has been used by the military at some point and between 2006 and 2009, over 15,000 items of British / Allied ordnance (excluding small arms ammunition) were found on UK construction sites (CIRIA).

Intensive efforts were made during and after the war to locate and render safe all UXO but, unsurprisingly, not all were found and dealt with. This is evidenced by the regular, on-going discoveries of UXO during construction-related intrusive ground works.

As a result of a generally increased risk awareness amongst professionals involved in ground engineering works and proactive health and safety measures, the risk to life and limb from UXO has been minimised. However even the simple discovery of a suspected device during on-going works can cause considerable disruption to production and cause unwanted delays and expense.

Such risks can be more fully addressed by a better understanding of the site-specific risk and the implementation of appropriate risk mitigation measures.

2 Construction Industry Duties and Responsibilities

2.1 The UK Regulatory Environment

There is no legal requirement for the control and mitigation of UXO risk in the construction industry, but guidelines for good practice, information, and solutions with regards to UXO risk are detailed within CIRIA (C681).

These guidelines provide the construction industry with a set process for the management of risk associated with UXO, from preliminary risk assessment to implementation of site-specific risk mitigation strategies.

Specific legislation does however exist for health and safety, and is addressed under a number of regulatory instruments, as outlined below.

In practice, the regulations impose a responsibility on the construction industry to ensure that they discharge their obligations to protect those engaged in ground-intrusive operations (such as archaeology, site investigation, drilling, piling or excavations) from any reasonably foreseeable UXO risk.

2.2 The Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974

The Act places a duty of care on an employer to put in place safe systems of work to address, as far as is reasonably practicable, all risks (to employees and the general public) that are reasonably foreseeable.

2.3 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015

CDM 2015 ensures that health and safety within the construction industry is continually improved:

- Works are sensibly planned and managed.
- Competent staff are engaged in the works.
- Risks are identified and managed.
- All parties cooperate and coordinate activities.
- Communication flows to those who require it.
- Workers are consulted and engaged about risks and how they are being managed.

In line with CDM 2015 legislation, SafeLane Global are able to assist parties in their discharge of CDM duties as follows:

- Assist Principal Designers with pre-construction information and risk assessments.
- Assist the Designer with the Designer's Risk Assessment.
- Issue UXO risks as have been identified and manage risks accordingly.
- Assist the Principal Contractor with the construction phase information, in particular risk assessments and mitigation strategies.
- Plan, manage and monitor survey and clearance works under SafeLane Global's control.

2.4 Other Legislation

Other relevant legislation includes the "Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999" and "The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007".

3 The Role of the Authorities and Commercial Contractors

3.1 The Authorities

The Police have the responsibilities for co-ordinating the emergency services in the case of an ordnance-related incident on a construction site. They will make an initial assessment (i.e. is there a risk that the find is ordnance or not?) and if they judge necessary impose a safety cordon and/or evacuation and call the military authorities (JSEODOC - Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Centre)

to arrange for investigation and/or disposal. In the absence of an EOD specialist on site many Police Officers will use the precautionary principle, impose cordon(s)/evacuation and await advice from the JSEODOC.

The priority given to the request by JSEODOC will depend on their judgement of the nature of the risk (ordnance, location, people and assets at risk) and the availability of resources. They will respond immediately or as resources are freed up. Depending on the on-site risk assessment the item of ordnance may be removed or demolished (by controlled explosion) in situ. In the latter case additional cordons and/or evacuations may be necessary.

Note, that the military authorities will only carry out further investigations or clearances in very high profile or high-risk situations. If there are regular ordnance finds on a site, the JSEODOC may not treat each occurrence as an emergency and will encourage the construction company to put in place alternative procedures (i.e. the appointment of a commercial contractor) to manage the situation and relieve pressure from the JSEOD disposal teams.

3.2 Commercial Contractors

In addition to pre-construction site surveys and follow-on clearance work, a commercial contractor is able to provide a reactive service on construction sites. The presence of a qualified EOD Engineer with ordnance recognition skills will avoid unnecessary call-outs to the authorities and the contractor will be able to arrange for the removal and disposal of low risk ordnance. If high risk ordnance is discovered actions will be co-ordinated with the authorities with the objective of causing the minimum possible disruption to site operations whilst putting immediate, safe and appropriate measures in place.

4 This Report

4.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of this report is to examine the possibility of encountering any explosive ordnance during any intrusive works at the site. Risk mitigation measures will be recommended in line with the CIRIA C681 guidelines, to reduce the risk of initiating UXO, and the subsequent risk of harm / damage during the envisaged works to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

4.2 Risk Assessment Methodology

The following issues will be addressed in the report:

- The likelihood that the site was contaminated with unexploded ordnance.
- The likelihood that unexploded ordnance remains on site.
- The likelihood that ordnance may be encountered during any intrusive works.
- The risk that ordnance may be initiated.
- The consequences of initiating or encountering ordnance.

Risk mitigation measures, appropriate to the assessed level of risk and site conditions, will be recommended.

4.3 Approach

In preparing this Unexploded Ordnance Risk assessment, SafeLane Global has considered general and, as far as possible, site specific factors including:

- Evidence of German bombing and delivery of UXBs.
- Site history, occupancy and conditions during WWII.
- The legacy of Allied military activity.
- Details of any known EOD clearance activity.
- The extent of any post war redevelopment.
- Scope of the current proposed works.

4.4 Sources of Information

SafeLane Global has carried out detailed historical research for this Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment including accessing military records and archived material held in the public domain and in the MoD.

Material from the following sources has been consulted:

- The National Archives.
- The GeoInformation Group.
- Landmark Maps.
- Relevant information supplied by the client.
- Available material from 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) Archive.
- SafeLane Global's extensive archives built up over many years of research and hands-on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the UK.
- Open sources such as published books, local historical records and the internet.

4.5 Reliability of Historical Records

4.5.1 General Considerations

This report is based upon research of historical evidence. Whilst every effort has been made to locate all relevant material SafeLane Global cannot be held responsible for any changes to the assessed level of risk or risk mitigation measures based on documentation or other information that may come to light at a later date.

The accuracy and comprehensiveness of wartime records is frequently difficult or impossible to verify. As a result, conclusions as to the exact location, quantity and nature of the ordnance risk can never be definitive but must be based on the accumulation and careful analysis of all accessible evidence. SafeLane Global cannot be held responsible for inaccuracies or gaps in the available historical information.

4.5.2 Bombing Records

During WWII, considerable efforts were expended in recording enemy air raids. Air Raid Precautions (ARP) wardens were responsible for making records of bomb strikes either through direct observation or by post-raid surveys. However, their immediate priority was to deal with casualties and limit damage, so it is to be expected that records are often incomplete and sometimes contradictory. Record keeping in the early days of bombing was not comprehensive and details of bombing in the early part of the war were sometimes destroyed in subsequent attacks. Some reports may cover a single attack, others a period of months or the entire war.

Records of raids that took place on sparsely or uninhabited areas were often based upon third party or hearsay information and are not always reliable; records of attacks on military or strategic targets were often maintained separately from the general records and have not always survived.

5 The Site and Scope of Proposed Works

Site Address	Station Road, Southwold, Suffolk, IP18 6AX
National Grid Reference Centre Point	TM 50475 76598
Site Description	The site is comprised of several commercial buildings, in addition to peripheral areas of hard-standing, including a car-park in the centre of the site. Furthermore, two roads are located adjacent to the north and east of the site.
Proposed Works	The proposal is to redevelop the site to form two new buildings with L-shaped footprints that loosely interlock around an intimate central courtyard space in conjunction with the rear of Nos. 3-9 Station Road.
Maximum Depth of Ground Works	At least 2m bgl.
Site Location Maps and a Recent Aerial Photograph of the site are presented in Annexes A and B .	

6 Ground Conditions

Data Source		Description
British Geological Survey Borehole	Borehole Reference	No publicly available boreholes were located within 300m of the site.
	Location	
	Date	
	Recorded Shallow Geology	
British Geological Survey Mapping	Superficial Deposits	None recorded.
	Bedrock	Crag Group – Sand.

Client Provided Data	Phase 1 & 2 Geo-Environmental Assessment: Station Road/Blyth Road Ref: UK18.3076 Date Issued: 10/05/2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.40m of MADE GROUND • 2.45m of Crag Group (Sand)
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7 Site History

7.1 Pre-WWII

The following pre-WWII OS map was reviewed.

Date	1938	Scale	1:10,560	Source	Landmark Maps
Observations	The site is occupied by at least two buildings in the south and centre of the site, with the remainder comprising open ground. Two buildings border the site to the west and south-east.				
A section of the map showing the site and immediate surrounding area is presented in Annex C-1 .					

7.2 Post-WWII

The following post-WWII OS map was reviewed.

Date	1971	Scale	1:2,500	Source	Landmark Maps
The following are indicative of serious bomb damage on early post-WWII OS mapping:					
Ruins	✗	n/a			
Clearance	✗	n/a			
Redevelopment	✗	n/a			
Further Observations	No significant changes can be observed on site, nor across the surrounding area.				
A section of the map showing the site and immediate surrounding area is presented in Annex C-2 .					

8 The Threat from Aerial Bombing

8.1 General Bombing History of Suffolk and Southwold

8.1.1 First World War

Suffolk sustained numerous attacks by both airship and aircraft throughout WWI. The location of the county, on the east coast of England meant that it was frequently the point at which German Zeppelin airships crossed the coast from their bases in occupied northern France and Belgium. As a result, Suffolk sustained air raids which targeted Ipswich and Lowestoft amongst others. However, given poor navigation and the inability of the airships to accurately target an objective with any precision, bombing by Zeppelins was usually erratic. As the war progressed Gotha bomber aircraft began to operate over the east of England and were able to more accurately find and successfully bomb a target.

A consolidated WWI raid map of the UK showing air raids and naval bombardments is presented in **Annex D**; this demonstrates the intensity of attacks that East Anglia sustained. This map shows one bombardment from the sea located over Southwold; however, the small scale of the map and related problems of accurately plotting incidents should be taken into account. Anecdotal evidence also confirms that a Zeppelin raid occurred over Southwold, including an attack on the train station located north of the site.²

WWI bombs were generally smaller than those used in WWII and were dropped from a lower altitude, resulting in limited UXB penetration depths. Aerial bombing was often such a novelty at the time that it attracted public interest and even spectators to watch the raids in progress. For these reasons, there is a limited risk that UXBs passed undiscovered. When combined with the relative infrequency of attacks and an overall low bombing density the risk from WWI UXBs is considered low and will not be further addressed in this report.

8.1.2 Second World War

At the start of WWII, the Luftwaffe planned to destroy key military installations, including RAF airfields and Royal Navy bases, during a series of daylight bombing raids in southern and eastern England. After the Battle of Britain these tactics were modified to include both economic and industrial sites throughout the rest of the Britain. Targets included dock facilities, railway infrastructure, power stations, weapon manufacturing plants and gas works. As a result of aircraft losses, daylight raids were reduced in favour of attacking targets under the cover of darkness.

Bombing in Suffolk was mainly concentrated around the coastal towns and cities, such as Ipswich, Felixstowe and towns close to the coast in other counties such as Harwich and Colchester, however it is known that Bury St Edmunds was bombed in the Spring of 1942, albeit to a significantly lesser degree. During the Autumn and Winter of 1940, the Italian air force was responsible for several air raids on Suffolk until their majority redeployment in January 1941. In West Suffolk bombing incidents declined from 67 in September 1940 to 55 in October and then just 28 in November. By spring 1941 all the bombing activity over East Anglia was concentrated on shipping and Suffolk's east coast ports. Due to the sites location on the eastern coast of Suffolk, it is possible that the area was at risk from bombing by the

² <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-32336191>

Luftwaffe. Anecdotal evidence suggest that most of the raids on Southwold were intended to hit Lowestoft, but were diverted due to barrage balloons.

In 1943 Luftwaffe activity in the region was typified by infrequent nuisance raids, usually carried out by single fighter bombers, often hitting minor coastal targets. Between January and May 1944, the Luftwaffe returned to London in mass for Operation Steinbock. These raids were executed by inexperienced Luftwaffe crews, whose poor navigation, coupled with improved AA defences, resulted in large quantities of bombs being dropped on the Home Counties, as well as Suffolk.

The town of Southwold was attack by the Luftwaffe on numerous occasions throughout WWII, however these attacks largely were comprised of 'tip and run' raids, owing to the town's location on the coast and lack of industrial targets. These bombing incidents occurred when German aircraft, either lost over enemy territory, or potentially caught in AA or fighter aircraft interception, dropped their bombs prematurely/indiscriminately. Wherever possible, these pilots will have aimed for any opportunistic target in the vicinity, such as railway lines, towns etc.

From mid-1944 the "V-weapon" (for Vengeance) campaign, using unmanned cruise missiles and rockets, represented Hitler's final attempt to reverse Germany's imminent defeat. The V1 (Flying Bomb or Doodlebug) and the V2 (Long Range Rocket) were launched from bases in Germany and occupied Europe and many landed within Suffolk.

Although these weapons caused considerable destruction, their relatively low numbers allowed accurate records of strikes to be maintained and these records have mostly survived. There is a negligible risk from unexploded V-weapons on land today since, even if an unexploded 1,000kg warhead had survived impact, the remains of the munition's body would have left incontrovertible evidence of the strike and would have been dealt with at the time.

8.2 Generic Types of WWII German Air-delivered Ordnance

The nature and characteristics of the ordnance used by the Luftwaffe allows an informed assessment of the hazards posed by any unexploded items that may remain today. Detailed illustrations of German air-delivered ordnance are presented in **Annex E**.

- **HE Bombs:** In terms of weight of ordnance dropped, HE bombs were the most frequent weapon deployed. Most bombs were 50kg, 250kg or 500kg (overall weight, about half of which was the high explosive) though large bombs of up to 2,000kg were also used. HE bombs had the weight, velocity and shape to easily penetrate the ground intact if they failed to explode. Post-raid surveys would not always have spotted the entry hole or other indications that a bomb penetrated the ground and failed to explode, and contemporary ARP documents describe the danger of assuming that damage, actually caused by a large UXB, was due to an exploded 50kg bomb. Unexploded HE bombs therefore present the greatest risk to present-day intrusive works.
- **Blast Bombs/Parachute Mines:** Blast bombs generally had a slow rate of descent and were extremely unlikely to have penetrated the ground. Non-retarded mines would have shattered on most ground types, if they had failed to explode. There have been extreme cases when these items have been found unexploded, but this was where the ground was either very soft or where standing water had reduced the impact. SafeLane Global does not consider there to be a significant risk from this type of munition on land.
- **Large incendiary bombs:** This type of bomb ranged in size from 36kg to 255kg and had a number of inflammable fill materials (including oil and white phosphorus), and a small explosive charge. They were designed to explode and burn close to the surface, but their shape and weight meant

that they did have penetration capability. If they penetrated the ground, complete combustion did not always occur, and, in such cases, they remain a risk to intrusive works.

- 1kg Incendiary Bombs (IB): These bombs, which were jettisoned from air-dropped containers, were just over 30cm in size and therefore highly likely to go unnoticed. They had the potential to penetrate soft ground and left a very small entry hole. Furthermore, if bombs did not initiate and fell in water or dense vegetation or became mixed with rubble in bomb damaged areas, they could have remained hidden to this day. Some variants had explosive heads, and these present a risk of detonation during intrusive works, particularly due to their shape, which leads them to often be misidentified.
- Anti-personnel (AP) Bomblets: AP bombs had little ground penetration ability and should have been located by the post-raid survey unless they fell into water, dense vegetation or bomb rubble.
- Specialist Bombs (smoke, flare, etc): These types do not contain high explosive and therefore a detonation consequence is unlikely. They were not designed to penetrate the ground.

8.3 German Air-delivered Ordnance Failure Rate

Based on empirical evidence, it is generally accepted that 10% of the German HE bombs dropped during WWII failed to explode as designed. This estimate is probably based on the statistics of wartime recovered UXBs and therefore will not have taken account of the unknown numbers of UXBs that were not recorded at the time and is probably an underestimate.

The reasons for failures include:

- Fuze or gain malfunction due to manufacturing fault, sabotage (by forced labour) or faulty installation.
- Clockwork mechanism failure in delayed action bombs.
- Failure of the bomber aircraft to arm the bombs (charge the electrical condensers which supplied the energy to initiate the detonation sequence) due to human error or equipment defect.
- Jettison of the bomb before it was armed or from a very low altitude. Most likely if the bomber was under attack or crashing.

War Office Statistics document that a daily average of 84 bombs which failed to function were dropped on civilian targets in Great Britain between 21st September 1940 and 5th July 1941. 1 in 12 of these (probably mostly fitted with time delay fuzes) exploded sometime after they fell; the remainder were unintentional failures.

From 1940 to 1945 bomb disposal teams dealt with a total of 50,000 explosive items of 50kg and over (i.e. German bombs), 7,000 AAA shells and 300,000 beach mines. These operations resulted in the deaths of 394 officers and men. However, UXO is still regularly encountered across the UK (see recent press articles, **Annex F**).

8.4 UXB Ground Penetration

8.4.1 General Considerations

The actual penetration depth of aerial delivered bombs into the ground will have been determined by the mass and shape of the bomb, the velocity and angle of the bomb on impact (dependent on the height of release) and the nature of the ground and ground cover; the softer the ground, the greater

the potential penetration. Peat, alluvium and soft clays are easier to penetrate than gravel and sand. Bombs are brought to rest or are commonly deflected by bedrock or large boulders.

8.4.2 The “j” Curve Effect

An air-dropped bomb released from normal bombing altitude (approx. 5,000m) on its curved trajectory can reach a terminal velocity of between 350-400 ms⁻¹. In this case of high-level bombing, the angle of which the bomb enters the earth is approx. 15° from the perpendicular and its exact path is difficult to trace. The bomb is being driven by its kinetic energy can unless deflected, will continue its line of flight and can turn in an upwards curve towards the ground surface as it comes to rest. The upwards curve is caused by the transfer of energy as the bomb travels through the ground. The nose of the bomb travels slower than the rear of the bomb due to the drag/friction of it passing through the ground. The rear of the bomb, having more energy due to less drag/friction is travelling much quicker.

The location of the bomb is thus “offset” from the hole of entry. This “offset” from vertical is generally understood to be about one third of the penetration depth but can reach up to (and have been found at) 15m/50 ft from point of entry, dependent on ground conditions and the bomb's angle of impact. **Annex G** depicts the various paths of UXB through homogenous ground, showing how the J-curve effect can lead to a UXB coming to rest beneath undamaged buildings.

8.4.3 Second World War Bomb Penetration Studies

During WWII, the Ministry of Home Security undertook a major study on actual bomb penetration depths, carrying out statistical analysis on the measured depths of 1,328 bombs as reported by Bomb Disposal, mostly in the London area. They then came to conclusions as to the likely average and maximum depths of penetration of different sized bombs in different geological strata.

The median penetration of 430 x 50kg German bombs in London Clay was 4.6m and the maximum penetration observed for the SC50 bomb was 9m.

They concluded that the largest common German bomb, 500kg, had a likely penetration depth of 6m in sand or gravel but 8.7m in clay. The maximum observed depth for a 500kg bomb was 10.2m and for a 1,000kg bomb 12.7m. Theoretical calculations suggested that significantly greater penetration depths were probable.

8.5 Second World War Bombing Statistics

The following table summarises the quantity of German bombs (excluding 1kg incendiaries and anti-personnel bombs) falling on the Municipal Borough of Southwold between 1940 and 1945:

Record of German Ordnance Dropped on the Municipal Borough of Southwold	
Area Acreage	621
High Explosive Bombs (all types)	51
Parachute Mines	2
Oil Bombs	-
Phosphorus Bombs	-
Fire Pots	7
Pilotless Missile (V1)	1

Long Range Rocket (V2)	-
Total	61
Items Per 1,000 Acres	98.2

Source: Home Office Statistics

Detailed records of the quantity and locations of the 1kg incendiary and anti-personnel bombs were not routinely maintained by the authorities as they were frequently too numerous to record.

Although the incendiaries are not particularly significant in the risk they pose, they nevertheless are items of ordnance that were designed to cause damage and inflict injury and should not be overlooked in assessing the general risk to personnel and equipment. The anti-personnel bombs were used in much smaller quantities and are rarely found today but are potentially more dangerous. This table does not include UXO found during or after WWII.

8.6 Site Specific WWII Bombing Records

8.6.1 Southwold ARP Bomb Census Maps

A search was conducted of a bomb plot map covering the town of Southwold; however, none could be found during the timeframe of this report.

8.6.2 Original ARP Bombing Incident Records

Throughout WWII, records of bombing incidents were kept by the ARP and Civil Defence Office. These records were kept in the form of typed or hand-written notes and/or presented on bomb plot maps. Some other organisations, such as port authorities and railways, maintained separate records.

ARP written records were reviewed for:	Municipal Borough of Southwold
Source:	National Archives
Records of bombing on / near the site were found	x

8.6.3 Secondary Source / Anecdotal Evidence

Anecdotal evidence of local bombing incidents was sought from publications and web resources. The following references to incidents on site or in the surrounding area were found.

Date	Weapon	Details
20/08/1940 - 21/08/1940	HE bombs 1000lb bombs	<i>"The first bombs to hit the town were dropped on 20th August 1940, causing little damage and no casualties. The German Focke-Wulfs returned the next afternoon dropping 1,000lb bombs which demolished three houses in Lorne Road and damaged 100 houses and shops."</i> ³

³ https://www.southwoldmuseum.org/war_worldwar2.htm and Michael J.F.Bowyer, *Air Raid!* (Patrick Stephens Limited, 1986)

		Lorne Road is located 565m south of the site.
20/08/1940	9 x HE bombs	Nine HE bombs were dropped on Southwold, with two falling on Hotson Road, located 95m east. ⁴
1940-1941	1 x HE bomb	A bomb crater is reported to be located 1.4km south of the site and likely occurred between 1940 and 1941. ⁵
May 1941	HE bombs 500 x Incendiary bombs	<p><i>"The following May during a night raid, bombs damaged houses on Barnaby Green, York Road and the High Street, and later that month more than 500 incendiary bombs were dropped. A bomb hit St Edmund's Hall, which was burnt out."</i>⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barnaby Green is located 210m south. • York Road is located 210m south but travels as far as 1.3km south-west. • The High Street is located 310m south. • St Edmunds Hall is located 352m south-east.
17/05/1941	UXB's Incendiaries	A raid occurred over Southwold involving HE's (all unexploded) and incendiaries. ⁷
09/02/1943	500kg bomb Firepots	<p>A lone bomber dropped one bomb near houses in Pier Avenue, located 40m north-east. However, the road travels as far east as 660m.⁸</p> <p>Further evidence confirms this occurred on 9th February, with a 500kg type bomb having dropped, in addition to confirmed use of firepots over the town, which extensively damaged at least two houses.⁹</p>
15/05/1943	4 x HE bombs	<p>On 15th May 1943, seven Focke Wulf FW190 bombers attacked Southwold, killing 10 people and injuring 21.</p> <p>One of these bombs fell on Bartholomew Green (300m south-east). No precise locations of the others were available.</p> <p><i>"Like many of the raids on Southwold it was really intended for Lowestoft. The bombers had come in over the N Sea but encountered barrage balloons at Lowestoft. So instead of dropping their bombs there, they carried on inland, making a wide sweep south and heading back towards the coast from the SW dropping their payload just before going home."</i>¹⁰</p>

⁴ Michael J.F.Bowyer, *Air Raid!* (Patrick Stephens Limited, 1986) pp 71-73

⁵ <https://heritage.suffolk.gov.uk/Monument/MXS19291>

⁶ https://www.southwoldmuseum.org/war_worldwar2.htm

⁷ Michael J.F.Bowyer, *Air Raid!* (Patrick Stephens Limited, 1986) pp 186

⁸ https://www.southwoldmuseum.org/war_worldwar2.htm

⁹ Michael J.F.Bowyer, *Air Raid!* (Patrick Stephens Limited, 1986) pp 261

¹⁰ <https://www.southwoldmuseum.org/War%20popups/Bomb%20story.pdf> and Michael J.F.Bowyer, *Air Raid!* (Patrick Stephens Limited, 1986) pp 279

February 1944	1000 x Incendiary bombs	A 1000 incendiary bombs were dropped on The Common (240m south) where anti-aircraft guns were placed. ¹¹
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8.6.4 WWII-era RAF Aerial Photography

The following WWII-era photography of the site was reviewed.

Source	The GeoInformation Group	Image Type	Aerial	Quality	Small-scale Low resolution
Date	Circa 1945				
Observations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• WWII-era aerial photography of the site appears to be largely consistent with conditions seen on pre-war and post-war OS mapping, however an additional building appears to be located in the north of the site.• Unfortunately, due to the low resolution of the image, ground conditions on site as well as the structural integrity of buildings could not be accurately assessed.				
This image is presented in Annex H .					

8.6.5 Abandoned Bombs

A post-air raid survey of buildings, facilities and installations would have included a search for evidence of bomb entry holes. If evidence were encountered, Bomb Disposal Officer teams would normally have been requested to attempt to locate, render safe and dispose of the bomb. Occasionally evidence of UXBs was discovered but due to a relatively benign position, access problems or a shortage of resources the UXB could not be exposed and rendered safe. Such an incident may have been recorded and noted as an Abandoned Bomb.

Given the inaccuracy of WWII records and the fact that these bombs were 'abandoned', their locations cannot be considered definitive, nor the lists exhaustive. The MoD states that 'action to make the devices safe would be taken only if it was thought they were unstable'. It should be noted that other than the 'officially' abandoned bombs, there will inevitably be UXBs that were never recorded.

SafeLane Global holds records of officially registered abandoned bombs at or near the site.		x
Additional comments:	n/a	

¹¹ https://www.southwoldmuseum.org/war_worldwar2.htm

8.7 Site Specific Bomb Penetration Considerations

When considering an assessment of the bomb penetration at the site, the following parameters would be used:

- Geology – Crag Group – Sand.
- Impact Angle and Velocity – 80-90° from horizontal and 267 metres per second.
- Bomb Mass and Configuration – The 500kg SC (General Purpose) HE bomb, without retarder units or armour piercing nose. This was the largest of the common bombs used against Britain.

Taking into account the above-mentioned factors it has been assessed that a 500kg bomb would have had an approximate maximum bomb penetration depth of between **9-11m** below WWII ground level. Penetration depth could potentially have been greater if the UXB was larger (though only 4% of German bombs used in WWII over Britain were of that size). Note that UXBs may be found at any depth between just below the WWII ground level and the maximum penetration depth.

8.8 Likelihood of Post-raid UXO Detection

Utilising the available historical bombing records as reviewed in *Section 8.6*, it is possible to make an assessment of the likelihood that evidence of UXO would have been noted on a site during the war and the incident dealt with or recorded at the time. Factors such as bombing density, frequency of access, ground cover, damage and failure rate have been taken into consideration.

8.8.1 Density of Bombing Assessment:

Bombing density is an important consideration for assessing the possibility that UXBs remain in an area. A very high density of bombs will have increased the likelihood of errors in record keeping at the time, as civil defence personnel and emergency services may have been overwhelmed. A higher density of bombing also increases the number of UXBs actually occurring in a given area.

The type and specific location of recorded bomb strikes is also an important consideration. If a stick of bombs (one individual aircraft's bomb load) is plotted in line with a site or is shown to straddle a site, then this raises the possibility that an unrecorded UXB from the same stick struck that site.

Density of Bombing Assessment	
Based on wartime records or secondary source information, what was the bombing density over the site?	Moderate
Was the site ever subjected to one or more large-scale (>100 tons of ordnance) night time Blitz raids?	x
Were any HE bomb strikes recorded on site?	x
What is the distance between the site boundary and the closest recorded large bomb strike?	40m north-east
How many HE, Parachute Mine, Oil Incendiary, Phosphorus Incendiary or Fire Pot bombs (large bombs) were recorded within a 300m radius of the site?	At least 4, likely more

Were any nearby sticks of large bombs recorded in line with the site?	Possibly
Were any 1kg incendiary bomb showers recorded over the site?	Possibly
Additional comments:	n/a

8.8.2 Bomb Damage Assessment:

In Blitzed cities / towns throughout Britain, bomb sites were often not cleared of rubble until after the war and mid-war repairs to buildings were only carried out on the most vital facilities (power stations, gas works, weapons factories etc.). However, if a building only sustained bomb damage to its upper floors, any subsequent UXB strike to the structure will still have caused obvious damage, at ground floor level, which would have been reported and dealt with at the time.

HE bomb strikes to open ground will have resulted in a large crater and local soil disturbance. Any subsequent UXB strike will not have resulted in an easily identifiable entry hole and as such is likely to have gone unnoticed amongst the disturbed ground.

In London and south-east England, the German V1 Flying Bomb and V2 Long Range Rocket campaigns caused widespread devastation. However, as these weapons began to be utilised after the final significant Luftwaffe air raids had occurred, any serious damage caused by such weapons does not necessarily indicate an increased risk of Luftwaffe freefall UXB contamination. However, it is quite possible that serious damage inflicted during the 1940-1944 campaigns by Luftwaffe freefall bombs could have been erased by a subsequent V Weapon strike.

Bomb Damage Assessment	
A comparison of the historical records confirms that buildings within the site boundary sustained serious bomb damage.	See additional comments
Direct or indirect evidence of HE bomb craters in open ground (within the site boundary) has been found.	See additional comments
Buildings on site were seriously damaged by a V1 and / or V2 strike.	✗
Buildings on site could have been seriously damaged prior to the nearby V1 or V2 strike?	n/a
Additional comments:	Unfortunately, due to the poor quality and resolution of the WWII-era photography available, an assessment of ground conditions and building integrity on site is not feasible.

8.8.3 Frequency of Access Assessment:

A UXB strike at a site where human access was infrequent would have had a lower chance of being observed, reported and recorded compared to a site which was developed and subject to regular access. UXB strikes during night time raids (when German planes could more easily evade anti-aircraft defences) are also more likely to have fallen unobserved than ones dropped during a daylight attack.

In frequently bombed cities / towns, ARP Wardens were tasked with carrying out searches for UXBs within recently bombed residential areas and schools. Similarly, many important home front facilities (factories, gas works, power stations, docks etc.) had their own dedicated ARP teams or Fire Watchers tasked with observing local air raids. Fire Watchers were mainly responsible for extinguishing 1kg incendiary bombs as well as reporting any UXB strikes. Anecdotal evidence however indicates that Fire Watchers did not always turn up for their shifts and therefore such UXB mitigating activities should not be assumed in the absence of site-specific evidence. Less important buildings sustaining bomb damage would have been abandoned until after the German bombing campaign in that area had ceased and repairs could be made, greatly decreasing the level of access to that site.

Schools closed due to the evacuation of children were often requisitioned by the Civil Defence authorities to be utilised as night time First Aid posts and reception centres (providing emergency accommodation for bombed out civilians). Therefore, an increased level of access is likely at these locations.

Frequency of Access Assessment	
The site was situated in a densely populated urban area during WWII and therefore would have been accessed at the outbreak of WWII.	✓
The site was exclusively or partially developed during WWII.	✓
Buildings on site survived WWII intact and therefore likely remained inhabited or in use, suggesting these localities and their immediate environs were accessed throughout the war.	✓
The site was crossed by roads / pavements or footpaths which would have been regularly used / subject to daily footfall.	✗
The site was occupied by small residential back yards / gardens, likely to have been put to use for cultivation as a result of the government's Dig for Victory Campaign.	✓
The site was occupied by a school during WWII.	✗
Part of the site is likely to have been subject to post-raid searches for UXO.	✗
Buildings on site sustained serious bomb damage and as a result were likely abandoned (along with any associated gardens / open ground) for the remainder of the war.	✗
The site was occupied by peripheral open ground / wasteland, with no apparent use, which may have been neglected.	Possibly
The site may have been occupied by recreational land / sports fields which may have only experienced seasonal access.	✗
The site was occupied by a graveyard which would have experienced limited access.	✗
The site was occupied by agricultural land, rural countryside or woodland which would not have been accessed in full, either regularly or frequently.	✗

The site was occupied by railway sidings which may not have been as regularly checked for buckling as mainline railway tracks.	x
The site was occupied by soft railway embankments which are likely to have been neglected during the war.	x
Additional comments:	n/a

8.8.4 Ground Cover Assessment:

The entry hole of a 50kg UXB (the most commonly deployed German HE bomb) could have been as little as 20cm in diameter. Wartime records also confirm that small German Incendiary Bombs, weighing just 1kg, were capable of significant penetration into soil, resulting in very small entry holes (5cm) or complete burial.

The quantity and type of ground cover present on a site during WWII would have had a significant effect, at ground level, on the visual evidence of buried UXO.

Evidence of UXO could be obscured in dense vegetation, soft ground, rubble, railway ballast or amongst stockpiled material (such as aggregate, coal or refuse heaps). A UXB strike to waterlogged ground or open water would have been immediately obscured from view beneath the waterline. Had such an incident occurred within a tidal mudflat or river bank, the resulting entry hole will have remained only temporarily, before becoming in-filled by water and sediment. Any HE UXB strike to elevated risk ground cover could potentially have come to rest beneath neighbouring undamaged buildings or hard-standing due to the 'J-Curve' Effect.

UXB strikes to undamaged/superficially damaged buildings and hard-surfaced ground will still have caused substantial damage or an easily identifiable and persistent entry hole. Similarly, it is unlikely that an HE UXB entry hole on well-maintained / manicured lawns (tennis courts, bowling greens, golf course fairways / greens, gardens in affluent areas etc), would have been overlooked. Such incidents would have been reported and the UXB subsequently removed.

Ground Cover Assessment	
The site was partially or entirely abandoned, due to bomb damage, resulting in associated open ground likely becoming overgrown.	x
The site was occupied by dense, inaccessible vegetation during WWII.	Unknown
The site may have been susceptible to waterlogged conditions during WWII.	x
The site was occupied by (possibly) unmaintained grass field during WWII.	x
The site was part occupied by a canal, river, dock basin, lake or reservoir during WWII.	x
The site was occupied by tidal mud or marshland during WWII.	x

The site was occupied by railway tracks crossing soft ground during WWII.	✘
The site was occupied by stockpiled material during WWII.	✘
The site was occupied by buildings, hard-standing or other manmade structures that did not sustain any degree of bomb damage.	✓
A comparison of the historical records confirms that buildings on site sustained inconsequential minor / moderate damage.	✘
The site was occupied by well-maintained, manicured lawn during WWII.	✘
Undamaged, developed parts of the site would have been vulnerable to the J-Curve Effect.	✓
Additional comments:	n/a

8.8.5 Bomb Failure Rate Assessment:

Based on empirical evidence, it is generally accepted that 10% of the German HE bombs dropped during WWII failed to explode as designed.

Note, due to manufacturing fault or failure of the bomber crew to correctly arm their munitions, whole bomb loads often failed to detonate. Therefore, the presence of reported UXBs increases the likelihood of an additional unrecorded UXB in the vicinity.

Bomb Failure Rate Assessment	
Evidence has been found which suggests that the bomb failure rate in the vicinity of the site would have been different from the "approximately 10%" figure normally used.	✘
Additional comments:	n/a

9 The Threat from Allied Military Ordnance

The following potential historical and modern sources of UXO contamination on site or in the surrounding area have been considered:

Potential Source of Contamination on Site	
Army, Navy and RAF Bases / Installations	✘
Military Training Areas / Weapons Ranges	✘

Ordnance / Explosives Factories and Storage Depots	✗
Sites Requisitioned for Military Use	✓
Military Fortifications and Coastal Defences	✗
Locations of Army Explosive Ordnance Clearance Tasks	✗
WWII Anti-Aircraft Batteries	✓
WWII Pipe Mined Locations and Beach Minefields	✗

The risk of contamination from Allied UXO on site is discussed below.

9.1 Home Guard Activity

The Home Guard (HG) was a defence organisation of the British Army, operational between 1940 and 1944. It comprised 1.5 million local volunteers, otherwise ineligible for military service and acted as a secondary defence force in case of enemy invasion. The HG guarded the coastal areas of Britain and other important facilities such as airfields, factories and explosives stores. They were also active in county towns and cities.

Official records were rarely kept by the HG and therefore any present-day evidence is usually anecdotal. However, it is known that HG personnel often carried out training (including weapons training) in open countryside on the outskirts of cities / towns. Today, items of ordnance related to the HG are occasionally encountered by members of the public and the construction industry in the British countryside. This suggests a culture of ill-discipline regarding live ammunition within HG units.

HG personnel are known to have purposefully buried caches of ammunition and weapons in tactical positions, to be exhumed and used in case of invasion. Records of such caches were not rigorously kept, and some were therefore forgotten about. This is substantiated by several recent HG UXO finds (see Annex I).

Home Guard Activity	
Nearest HG Battalion to the site.	Unknown
Site Specific Details:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No known registered HG battalion for the Southwold area could be found during the timeframe of the report. However, it is likely that due to the towns coastal position, that a battalion operated the defensive fortifications in the surrounding area, which included pillboxes in addition to several anti-tank cubes on the beach. The closest of these is located 80m north. These pillboxes were often manned and defended by armed personnel with either LSA or SAA, protecting key points of infrastructure for the war effort, likely in preparation for a possible invasion. Anecdotal and in-house evidence confirms the presence of coastal defence batteries on the Southwold coastline, in addition to at least two camps located 80m and 550m south respectively. One of these is confirmed to have been a camp

	<p>for Operation Overlord, specifically constructed during 1943/44 for the purpose of accommodating Allied troops prior to the June 1944 invasion of continental Europe (D-Day). As such, it is likely that there was a significant military presence within Southwold.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The nature and volume of any ordnance storage at the overlord camp is unknown, however during the lead up to D-Day and the Normandy Invasion, it is conceivable that a wide range of equipment and ammunition would have been stored and potentially used within the perimeter of the camps. • HG battalions and the army would typically take part in training exercises in recreational, open areas during WWII. The site, however, appears to have been occupied by several buildings including residential properties inclusive of rear gardens. As such, it is unlikely that any training exercises occurred within its perimeter. 	
There is evidence to suggest an elevated risk of land service / small arms ammunition contamination on site.		x

9.2 Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries

At the start of the war two types of AAA guns were deployed: Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery (HAA) and Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery (LAA). The LAA batteries were intended to engage fast low flying aircraft and were typically deployed around airfields or strategic installations. These batteries were mobile and could be moved to new positions with relative ease when required. With four guns per battery firing several rounds per minute, AA batteries could expel numerous shells in even the shortest engagements. Numerous unexploded AAA shells were recovered during and following WWII and are still occasionally encountered on sites today.

The maximum ceiling height of fire at that time was around 11,000m however, as the war progressed, improved variants of the 3.7" gun were introduced and, from 1942, large 5.25-inch weapons were brought into service. These had significantly improved ceiling heights of fire reaching over 18,000m.

When the supply of clockwork fuses from Switzerland was cut off, Britain was forced to make its own. After four years of war, the country still lacked the engineering skills to produce a reliable fuse. This resulted in a considerable number of AA projectiles exploding prematurely, killing the gunners or failing to explode at all and falling to the ground as UXBs. In January 1944, more people in London were killed by HAA shells than by German bombs.

Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries		
Number of HAA batteries within 5km of the site.		Unknown
Additional Comments:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secondary evidence confirms the existence of coastal defence batteries within the surrounding area, defending the Southwold coastline. It is likely that due to the towns location, that further anti-aircraft batteries were located in the surrounding area. At least one was located on The Common, in addition to trenches, barbed wire and pillboxes, located 240m south.¹² It is possible that during air raids in the surrounding area, AA fire may have occurred over the site in retaliation. AA shells were high explosive (HE) projectiles, fitted with a contact fuze to make them explode on impact. If these shells failed to strike an aircraft, they would eventually fall back to earth. This type of ordnance is not likely to have had great penetration ability, and the majority of unexploded AA shells are found close to WWII ground level or in made ground. However, given that the site was occupied predominantly by buildings, any AA shells (UX or not) falling on the site would likely have been noticed immediately and subsequently dealt with. 	
There is evidence to suggest an elevated risk of unexploded AA shells contamination on site.		x

9.3 The Threat Posed by Allied Unexploded Ordnance

9.3.1 Land Service Ammunition (LSA)

9.3.1.1 General

The term Land Service Ammunition covers all items of ordnance that are propelled, placed or thrown during land warfare. They may be filled or charged with explosives, smoke, incendiary or pyrotechnics. They can be broken into five main groups:

- Mortars
- Grenades
- Projectiles
- Rockets
- Landmines

Unexploded or partially unexploded Mortars and Grenades are among the most common items of UXO encountered in the UK and therefore the possibility cannot be discounted that they were stores on site.

¹² <https://heritage.suffolk.gov.uk/Monument/MXS19280>

They are commonly encountered in areas used by the military for training and are often found discarded on or near historic military bases. Examples of Grenades, Mortars and Home Guard weapons are presented in **Annex J**.

9.3.1.2 Mortars

A mortar bomb is a fin-stabilised munition, normally nose-fuzed and fitted with its own propelling charge (primary cartridge). Range is increased by adding extra propellant (augmenting charges). They are either HE or Carrier and generally identified by their tear-dropped shape (older variants however are parallel sided) and a finned 'spigot tube' screwed or welded to the rear end of the body housing the propellant charge.

A mortar relies on a striker hitting a detonator for explosion to occur. It is possible that the striker may already be in contact with the detonator and that only a slight increase in pressure would be required for initiation. Discarded augmenting charges are often encountered around mortar firing areas/bases.

9.3.1.3 Grenades

A grenade is a short-range weapon which may be thrown by hand, fired from the end of a rifle or projected/propelled from a special purpose grenade launcher. They are divided into two categories; HE and Carrier (generally smoke). As with mortars, a grenade striker may either be in contact with the detonator or still be retained by a spring under tension, and therefore shock may cause it to function. A grenade can have an explosive range of 15-20m. Common older variants have a classic 'pineapple' shape; modern grenades tend to be smooth-sided.

9.3.2 Small Arms Ammunition (SAA)

The most likely type of ordnance to be encountered on site are items of SAA (bullets), especially .303" ammunition which was the standard British and Commonwealth military cartridge from 1889 until the 1950s.

However even if an item such as this functioned, the explosion would not be contained within a barrel and detonation would only result in local overpressure and very minor fragmentation from the cartridge case.

Some LAA guns and RAF fighter cannons in use with British forces during WWII utilised the 20mm round. These bullets had a small fuse and a ~4gram HE or incendiary charge. Although small, this fill quantity still has the potential to cause serious injury. Images of SAA are presented in **Annex K**.

9.3.3 Anti-Aircraft Shells

At the start of the war two types of AAA guns were deployed: Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery (HAA) using large calibre weapons such as the 3.7" QF (Quick Firing) gun and Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery (LAA) using smaller calibre weapons such as 40mm Bofors gun which could fire up to 120 x 40mm HE shells per minute to over 1,800m. During the early war period there was a severe shortage of AAA so older WWI 3" and modified naval 4.5" guns were also deployed.

These shells are frequently mistakenly identified as small German air-delivered bombs but are differentiated by the copper driving band found in front of the base. Although the larger unexploded projectiles could enter the ground they did not have great penetration ability and are therefore likely to be found close to WWII ground level. With a HE fill and fragmentation hazard these items of UXO also present a significant risk if encountered.

The smaller 40mm projectiles are similar in appearance and effect to small arms ammunition and, although still dangerous, present a lower risk. Pictures of AAA projectiles are presented in **Annex L**. Details of the most commonly deployed WWII AAA projectiles are shown below:

Gun type	Calibre	Shell Dimensions	Shell Weight	HE Fill Weight
3.7 Inch	94mm	94mm x 438mm	12.7kg	1.1kg
4.5 Inch	114mm	114mm x 578mm	24.7kg	1.7kg
40mm	40mm	40mm x 311mm	0.84kg	70g

10 Ordnance Clearance and Post-WWII Ground Works

10.1 General

The extent to which any ordnance clearance activities have taken place on site or extensive ground works have occurred is relevant since they may indicate previous ordnance contamination but also may have reduced the risk that ordnance remains undiscovered.

10.2 EOD Bomb Disposal and Clearance Tasks

SafeLane Global holds a number of official records of explosive ordnance disposal operations during and following WWII, obtained from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Archive Information Office at 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD), British Army.

Records were found to indicate that Army EOD tasks have taken place on / in the vicinity of the site.		✗
Further Comments:	n/a	
Records of recent local ordnance finds were found.		✓
Further Comments:	An unexploded mine was found on Southwold beach on 29 th July 2010. ¹³	
SafeLane Global have encountered UXO in the local area.		✗
Further Comments:	n/a	

10.3 Post War Redevelopment

The nature of post-WWII ground works, redevelopment and construction has been considered. Significant structural redevelopment on site can, in some cases, provide a level of mitigation, particularly

¹³ <https://www.lowestoftjournal.co.uk/news/bomb-disposal-team-arrive-in-southwold-285464>

from shallow buried items. However, if a site has not undergone any extent of redevelopment, the likelihood of UXO remaining within its boundaries can remain.

The site has been redeveloped post-WWII.		✓
Further details:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An investigation into post-war OS mapping shows that the site remained consistent with pre-war conditions until the 1970's when a Bus Station was developed in the north of the site, in addition to the remainder of the site being redeveloped.¹⁴ Currently, the northern buildings appear to be in use commercially, including a motor works, cycle shop and a corner shop. The uses of the rear buildings to the south include a garage and an open fronted structure. 	

11 The Overall Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment

11.1 General Considerations

Taking into account the quality of the historical evidence, the assessment of the overall risk to any intrusive works from UXO must evaluate the following factors:

- That the site was contaminated with unexploded ordnance
- That UXO remains on site
- That such items could be encountered during any intrusive works
- That ordnance may be activated by the works operations
- The consequences of encountering or initiating ordnance

11.2 The Likelihood that the Site was Contaminated with Unexploded Ordnance

The below is a generalised table of factors used to determine the level of UXO risk on a site. Note that additional site-specific information can increase UXO risk beyond these criteria:

Low Risk	Medium Risk	High Risk
German Air Dropped Ordnance / Allied Anti-Aircraft Shells		
No evidence of bombing / bomb damage on site coupled with low local bombing density.	Moderate to High local bombing density or evidence of bombing / bomb damage on or close to the site.	High local bombing density or evidence of bombing / bomb damage on or adjacent to the site. Confirmed finds of WWII UXB.
Ground conditions that would prevent UXB penetration or lead to easily identifiable entry holes.	Ground conditions that allow for bomb penetration.	Ground conditions that would have immediately and completely obscured the existence of UXB.

¹⁴ <https://www.old-maps.co.uk/#/Map/650475/276598/12/100954>

Site was occupied and accessed fully throughout the bombing campaign.	Site located in an area that was infrequently observed or accessed, with a low likelihood that a UXB strike would have been noticed.	Site may be completely obscured from view or subject to very infrequent access.
Allied Ordnance		
No evidence of Allied military activity on or near the site.	Evidence of military activity on or near the site. This can include Home Guard activities, ground defence structures, munitions factories or military sites such as airfields.	Evidence of weapons testing or disposal on or adjacent to the site.
Developed areas that are unlikely to have been used for military exercises.	Open or unmaintained ground that may have been used for disposal or caching of munitions.	Evidence of UXO finds on or in the vicinity of the site.

For the reasons discussed in *Section 8 and 9* SafeLane Global believes that there is a minimal likelihood that UXO contaminated the study area. This is based on the following:

GERMAN AIR-DELIVERED UXO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By the end of WWII, the Municipal Borough of Southwold (within which the site was located) had experienced a moderate bombing density, as confirmed by official statistics. The town itself was not host to any significant industry or military targets for the Luftwaffe, as such the majority of raids in the surrounding rural area therefore likely consisted of opportunistic 'Tip and Run' bombing incidents. These incidents occurred when enemy aircraft under heavy AA fire or fighter interception would prematurely / indiscriminately jettison their bomb loads in order to escape the combat zone. These apparently random incidents also occurred when pilots became lost / disorientated over enemy territory. Anecdotal evidence confirms that most of the raids over Southwold were likely intended for Lowestoft. Anecdotal and secondary evidence confirms that Southwold suffered from several raids throughout WWII owing to its location on the eastern coast of England, making it an easy target for Luftwaffe pilots coming from the continent. At least 4 x HE bomb strikes fell within 300m of the site, however there is likely to be more, owing to the lack of precise details, such as the exact number of strikes and their locations, from each raid. Numerous incendiary bombs were also scattered across the town. The site was located within a predominantly urban setting on the outskirts of the coastal town of Southwold, comprised predominantly of residential buildings inclusive of private rear-gardens. However, the north-eastern corner of site may be undeveloped open ground, though this could not be confirmed. No evidence of clearance, ruins or significant redevelopment was observed between pre-war and post-war OS mapping of the site and local area. WWII-era aerial photography of the site confirms that the site comprised residential buildings that do not appear to have suffered from bomb damage. However, due to the low-resolution of the image, an accurate assessment of the buildings and ground conditions on site cannot be made.

- Had a UXB strike fell on undamaged buildings / areas of hard-surfacing on site, it would have caused substantial / obvious damage (even without detonating) or a persistent, easily identifiable entry hole, which would have been noticed immediately, reported and exhumed at the time.
- However, had an UXB fell within gardens or the area of open ground on site, the entry hole could easily have become obscured within soft ground or unmaintained vegetation. Note the entry hole of an SC50 (the most commonly deployed German HE bomb) could be as little as 20cm in diameter.
- However, owing to the lack of evidence to suggest that the site suffered from any bomb damage, the likelihood of this occurring is considered low.

BRITISH / ALLIED UXO

Land Service Ammunition / Small Arms Ammunition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No known registered HG battalion for the Southwold area could be found during the timeframe of the report. However, it is likely that due to the towns coastal position, that a battalion operated the defensive fortifications in the surrounding area, which included pillboxes in addition to several anti-tank cubes on the beach. The closest of these is located 80m north. • Anecdotal and in-house evidence confirms the presence of coastal defence batteries on the Southwold coastline, in addition to at least two camps located 80m and 550m south respectively. • HG battalions and the army would typically take part in training exercises in recreational, open areas during WWII. The site, however, appears to have been occupied by several buildings including residential properties inclusive of rear gardens. As such, it is unlikely that any training exercises occurred within its perimeter.
Anti-Aircraft Projectiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary evidence confirms the existence of coastal defence batteries within the surrounding area, defending the Southwold coastline. It is likely that due to the towns location, that further anti-aircraft batteries were located in the surrounding area. At least one was located on The Common, in addition to trenches, barbed wire and pillboxes, located 240m south.¹⁵ • It is possible that during air raids in the surrounding area, AA fire may have occurred over the site in retaliation. • AA shells were high explosive (HE) projectiles, fitted with a contact fuze to make them explode on impact. If these shells failed to strike an aircraft, they would eventually fall back to earth. This type of ordnance is not likely to have had great penetration ability, and the majority of unexploded AA shells are found close to WWII ground level or in made ground. • However, given that the site was occupied predominantly by buildings, any AA shells (UX or not) falling on the site would likely have been noticed immediately and subsequently dealt with.

¹⁵ <https://heritage.suffolk.gov.uk/Monument/MXS19280>

11.3 The Likelihood that Unexploded Ordnance Remains on Site

The threat of UXO contaminating the site has been assessed as minimal and therefore the likelihood of UXO remaining on site is also minimal.

11.4 The Likelihood that Ordnance may be Encountered during the Works

The threat from UXO remaining on site has been assessed as minimal and therefore the risk of UXO being encountered during the proposed work is also minimal.

11.5 The Risk that Ordnance may be Initiated

Items of ordnance do not become inert or lose their effectiveness with age. Time can indeed cause items to become more sensitive and less stable. This applies equally to items submerged in water or embedded in silts, clays or similar materials. The greatest risk occurs when an item of ordnance is struck or interfered with. This is likely to occur when mechanical equipment is used or when unqualified personnel pick up munitions.

11.5.1 Initiation of Unexploded Bombs

In the case of unexploded German bombs discovered within the construction site environment, there are a number of potential initiation mechanisms:

- Direct impact onto the main body of the bomb: Unless the fuze or fuze pocket is struck, there needs to be a significant impact to initiate a buried iron bomb.
- Re-starting the clock timer in the fuze: Only a small proportion of German WWII bombs employed clockwork fuzes. It is probable that significant corrosion has taken place within the fuze mechanism over the last 60 years that would prevent clockwork mechanisms from functioning, nevertheless it was reported that the fuze in a UXB dealt with by 33 EOD Regiment in Surrey in 2002 did re-commence.
- Induction of a static charge, causing a current in an electric fuze: The majority of German WWII bombs employed electric fuzes. It is probable that significant corrosion has taken place within the fuze mechanism over the last 60 years such that the fuze circuit could not be activated.
- Friction impact initiating the (shock-sensitive) fuze explosive: This is the most likely scenario resulting in the bomb detonating.

11.5.2 Activities that may Result in the Initiation of Unexploded Ordnance

Unexploded bombs do not spontaneously explode. All high explosive requires significant energy to create the conditions for detonation to occur. The risk that UXO could be initiated if encountered will depend on its condition, how it is found and the energy with which it is struck. However certain activities pose a greater risk than others.

The most violent activity on most construction sites is percussive piling or deep mechanical excavations. If an item is struck with a significant enough impact, be it direct or through friction/vibration, it risks detonation. Drilling of boreholes or similar activities also have the potential to initiate ordnance in this manner, either through impact or vibration.

Soil levelling and shallow excavation such as trial pits can pose a similar risk, since UXO can be found at any depth between ground level and the maximum bomb penetration depth. In addition to risk of initiation by violent impact or vibration, detonation can also occur if discovered items are mishandled

by unqualified personnel. This is particularly common when onsite personnel are not trained in the recognition of ordnance.

For works that are not intrusive, little risk is posed by items of UXO that are buried beneath the ground. However, risk can arise from unburied munitions, particularly items of ordnance discarded in periphery areas of military sites. These items are frequently discovered by onsite personnel and remain live and liable to activate if mishandled.

11.6 The Consequences of Encountering or Initiating Ordnance

Clearly the consequences of an inadvertent detonation of UXO during construction operations would be catastrophic with a serious risk to life, damage to plant and a total site shutdown during follow-up investigations.

Since the risk of initiating ordnance is significantly reduced if appropriate mitigation measures are undertaken, the most important consequence of the discovery of ordnance will be economic. This would be particularly so in the case of high-profile locations and could involve the evacuation of the public.

The unexpected discovery of ordnance may require the closing of the site for any time between a few hours and a week with a potentially significant cost in lost time. Note also that the suspected find of ordnance, if handled solely through the authorities, may also involve loss of production since the first action of the Police in most cases will be to isolate the locale whilst awaiting military assistance, even if this turns out to have been unnecessary.

Annex M-1 details UXB incidents where intrusive works have caused UXBs to detonate, resulting in death or injury and damage to plant. Whilst these recent incidents occurred internationally, there is still reason to believe that such incidents are possible in the UK without the implementation of suitable risk mitigation measures. **Annex M-2** details incidents on construction sites in the UK, at which delays, site shut-downs, evacuations and disruptions have occurred.

11.7 SafeLane Global's Assessment

Taking into consideration the findings of this study, SafeLane Global considers the UXO risk at the site to be **Low**.

Type of Ordnance	Level of Risk		
	Low	Medium	High
German High Explosive Bombs	✓		
German 1kg Incendiary Bombs	✓		
Allied Anti-Aircraft Shells	✓		
British / Allied Small Arms and Land Service Ammunition	✓		

12 Proposed Risk Mitigation Strategy

Although the site has been assessed as Low Risk, the risk of encountering UXO during the proposed works cannot be completely ruled out and therefore SafeLane Global recommends the following minimum risk mitigation measures be deployed to support the proposed ground works at the site:

Scope-Specific Recommended Risk Mitigation Measures	
<p>Site Specific Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness Briefings (UXO Toolbox Briefing) to all personnel conducting intrusive works</p> <p>These briefings are intended to make site operatives aware of the nature of explosive ordnance that may be encountered on their project site.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delivered by a specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal Engineer. • Provides information on the site-specific explosive ordnance risk • Basic ordnance identification. • What to do in the event of an encounter with a suspicious object. • Provide UXO response procedures. 	✓
<p>Site Specific Safety Instruction (SSSI)</p> <p>For longer term projects that require Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness Briefings as part of the Explosive Ordnance Risk Mitigation measures for the project, SSSIs can be provided to allow nominated site representatives to deliver these briefings after initial training.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2-3 hour presentation and training course. • Delivered by a fully qualified senior EOD Engineer. • Suitable for Project Site Manager HSE representative and supervisors. • Includes briefing pack. <p>This provides a cost-effective solution to ensure that the Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness Briefings can be delivered effectively and efficiently to the required standard.</p>	✓
<p>Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer On-Site Support</p> <p>In areas where the risk posed by the potential presence of explosive ordnance is low or where the conditions are not suitable for pro-active survey, EOD On-Site Support can provide a reactive response to any suspicious object that may be encountered during open excavation works.</p> <p>The presence of the EOD Engineer on-site in support of shallow intrusive work allows for a direct monitoring of works using visual recognition and instrumentation and provides an immediate response to reports of suspicious objects or suspected items of ordnance that have been recovered by ground workers.</p>	✗

<p>SafeLane Global EOD personnel on-site also have the additional benefit of providing Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness briefings (UXO TBB) to any staff that have not received them earlier and can advise staff of the need to modify working practices to take account of the ordnance threat. The EOD Engineer will also aid potential incident management which would involve liaison with the local authorities and police should ordnance that presents an explosive hazard be identified.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal Engineer. • Maintains a watching brief over all excavations. • Provides safety and awareness briefings to construction personnel as required. • Provides immediate identification of any suspicious item that is encountered. • Identifies whether any UXO item is live or inert. • Provides liaison assistance with the relevant authorities when dealing with any live UXO. • Avoids on site delays which can be caused by the incorrect identification of a suspect item being potential UXO. 	
<p>Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer to support site investigation works</p> <p>For cost effective Explosive Ordnance Risk Mitigation for site investigation work, the EOD Engineer can survey ahead of trial pits, monitor excavations when the ground conditions are not suitable for a pro-active survey and conduct intrusive surveys for borehole and window sample locations working in conjunction with the site investigation team. The On-Site Support will also provide a reactive response to any suspicious object that may be encountered during open excavation works.</p> <p>SafeLane Global EOD personnel on-site also have the additional benefit of providing Explosive Ordnance Safety and Awareness briefings to any staff that have not received them earlier and can advise staff of the need to modify working practices to take account of the ordnance threat. The EOD Engineer will also aid potential Incident Management which would involve liaison with the local authorities and police should ordnance be identified and present an explosive hazard.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal Engineer. • Maintains a watching brief over all trial pit excavations. • Provides safety and awareness briefings to construction personnel as required. • Works in conjunction with the drilling team to survey all borehole and window sample locations in real-time using a staged drilling and magnetometer survey procedure. • Provides immediate identification of any suspicious item that is encountered. • Identifies whether any UXO item is live or inert. 	<p style="text-align: center;">x</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides liaison assistance with the relevant authorities when dealing with any live UXO. Avoids on site delays which can be caused by the incorrect identification of a suspect item being potential UXO. <p><i>Technical Information</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> In optimum ground conditions each survey using the borehole technique will have a 1 metre look ahead capability. Any steel casing used for borehole surveys will need to be retracted by 3 metres to allow the magnetometer survey to be conducted. Non-ferrous pipe will be required to support the borehole during the survey minimum diameter 60mm (to be supplied by the client). 	
<p>Search & Clear</p> <p>Where a non-intrusive magnetometer survey is not possible (e.g. wooded areas) SafeLane Global can deploy a two-man Explosive Ordnance Disposal Engineer team using handheld magnetometer equipment who will proactively survey either in search lanes or boxes, investigating each reading with the support of an operated excavator. The survey is suited to detecting suspicious ferro-magnetic buried objects that may be munitions and/or explosive ordnance related.</p> <p>All SafeLane Global personnel involved with the Search and Clearance Works will be former military personnel who have gained formal NATO Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Qualifications, having completed training at the Defence Explosive Ordnance Disposal School (DEODS) Chattenden, Kent or similar establishment throughout their military service.</p> <p>The client will be responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demarcating the areas to be searched. Providing services clearance and permit to dig. Providing operated excavator to access deeper targets if required (SafeLane Global can provide this service at additional cost). Providing coordinates of positions where debris have been identified (if information required in report). Providing storage for recovered debris. Output will depend upon terrain and contamination (number of readings to be investigated). 	<p style="text-align: center;">x</p>
<p>Non-Intrusive Magnetometer Survey and Target Investigation (greenfield land only)</p> <p>Non-Intrusive Survey</p> <p>This survey type is designed for use on magnetically 'clean' land commonly referred to as 'greenfield'. Brownfield land is often described as that which has had previous industrial or commercial use. In this context it specifically encompasses sites with are underlain by 'made ground' which may contain metallic contamination. Non-intrusive magnetometry or electromagnetic</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">x</p>

equipment which is used in the search for buried UXO relies upon the detection of small changes between clear ground and that containing UXO.

The technique operates very successfully in environments where there is minimal ground contamination from other sources such as fired bricks, reinforced concrete, discarded scrap metal and buried services. There are also man-made ambient effects on magnetic and electromagnetic non-intrusive survey systems which include moving plant vehicles, power cables, electric trains etc.

Non-Intrusive survey is carried out using either total-field or gradiometer magnetometry, dependent upon site conditions. Data is recorded and then interpreted using advanced AGSPRoc software in order to map magnetic fields and model discrete magnetic anomalies (variations in the Earth's magnetic field caused by ferro-magnetic objects electrical fields or geology). The location of such anomalies is determined, and mathematical modelling used to estimate their mass and depth. The survey will also locate any buried services with a magnetic signature and indicate any areas of gross magnetic "contamination" which may indicate the presence of unknown obstructions. Additionally, the survey can provide information on archaeological features.

The system can detect the magnetic field from a 50kg WWII air-dropped bomb at a depth of 4m and smaller items such as Land Service Ammunition to depths of up to 1.5m in ground with a low ambient magnetic field. In the case of soft geology, it should be noted that a 50kg high explosive bomb may be buried greater than 4 metres below ground level and therefore may not be detected by the survey. In this instance intrusive surveys may be required.

The non-intrusive survey system will be deployed utilising the pedestrian survey frame. The output for the pedestrian frame is estimated at up to 2Ha per day.

Technical information:

- Client to clearly demarcate area to be surveyed prior to start and highlight any known services/underground obstructions.
- Ground must be level, free of obstacles / obstructions and clear of undergrowth. Height of any crops should be no more than 400mm and where crops are present SafeLane Global would require written approval from the landowner or client to walk over the site area.
- When working adjacent to existing infrastructure the survey may be ineffective due to the ferro magnetic interference caused by passing vehicles and the presence of underground buried services. A site visit may be recommended prior to commencement.
- Note: the survey will be ineffective on Brownfield sites due to the magnetic nature of building rubble, which typically masks the weaker magnetic signatures of buried objects. If parts of the site are contaminated, then alternative risk mitigation measures may need to be considered.

Target Investigation

If a buried anomaly is detected that cannot be discounted as a potential UXO / UXB then the object will need to be investigated to positively identify the item.

The process will include:

- Specialist two-man Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combination of manual and mechanical excavation techniques. • Excavator shafting, shoring and dewatering equipment can be provided by SafeLane Global if required. • Excavation techniques will be defined and agreed prior to the commence. • A factual report with clearance certificate will be issued on completion of the investigation. 	
<p>Intrusive Magnetometer Survey of all pile locations down to the maximum bomb penetration depth</p> <p>SafeLane Global can deploy a range of intrusive magnetometry techniques to clear ahead of all the pile locations. The appropriate technique is governed by a number of factors, but most importantly the site's ground conditions. The appropriate survey methodology would be confirmed once the enabling works have been completed. A site meeting would be required between SafeLane Global and the client to determine the methodology suitable for this site. Target investigation or avoidance will be recommended as appropriate.</p>	<p>x</p>
<p>In making this assessment and recommending these risk mitigation measures, the proposed works outlined in the 'Scope of the Proposed Works' section were considered. Should the planned works be modified, or additional intrusive engineering works be considered, SafeLane Global should be consulted to see if re-assessment of the risk or mitigation recommendations is necessary.</p>	

SafeLane Global

12th May 2021

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

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
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





— Approximate site boundary




Approximate site boundary



— Approximate site boundary



Approximate site location



Most Commonly Deployed German HE Bombs

SC 50

Bomb Weight: 40-54kg (110-119lb)

Explosive Weight: c25kg (55lb)

Fuze Type: Impact fuze/electro-mechanical time delay fuze

Bomb Dimensions: 1,090 x 280mm (42.9 x 11.0in)

Body Diameter: 200mm (7.87in)

Use: Against lightly damageable materials, hangars, railway rolling stock, ammunition depots, light bridges and buildings up to three stories.


Remarks: The smallest and most common conventional German bomb. Nearly 70% of bombs dropped on the UK were 50kg.



50kg bomb, London Docklands



50kg bomb, minus tail section



SC 50 JA (Guteklasse 1)

SC 250

Bomb weight: 245-256kg (540-564lb)

Explosive weight: 125-130kg (276-287lb)

Fuze type: Electrical impact/mechanical time delay fuze.

Bomb dimensions: 1640 x 512mm (64.57 x 20.16in)

Body diameter: 368mm (14.5in)

Use: Against railway installations, embankments, flyovers, underpasses, large buildings and below-ground installations.



250kg bomb, Hawkinge



SC250 attached to undercarriage
of Messerschmitt Bf109




SC 250 JA (Guteklasse I)

1kg Incendiary Bomb

Bomb weight: 1.0 and 1.3kg (2.2 and 2.87lb)
Filling: 680gm (1.3lb) Thermite
Fuze type: Impact fuze
Bomb dimensions: 350 x 50mm (13.8 x 1.97in)
Body diameter: 50mm (1.97in)
Use: As incendiary – dropped in clusters against towns and industrial complexes
Remarks: Jettisoned from air-dropped containers. Magnesium alloy case. Sometimes fitted with high explosive charge



- 1. Ordinary scaffold pipe
- 2. 1kg incendiary bomb
- 3. Incendiary bomb recently found on site in UK



1kg German Incendiary Bomb next to a 30cm ruler

EveningStandard.

Pictured: Unexploded World War II bomb found in Brondesbury Park



EveningStandard.

Bomb disposal expert reveals dramatic details of how huge WW2 bomb found in Thames was detonated



Top Left: 500lb UXB found in Brondesbury Park, London – March 2017.

Bottom Left: UXB discovered in the Thames near the Houses of Parliament – February 2017.

Top Right: The discovery of a 250kg UXB near Kingston University resulted in the closure of the University and nearby homes – May 2019

Middle Right: A 400m cordon was established after a 1,000lb UXB was found in Grange Walk, Bermondsey – March 2015

Bottom Right: 500lb UXB discovered in Lansdown, Bath – May 2016

BBC

NEWS

Kingston University campus evacuated over 'WW2 bomb'



The Telegraph

Giant WWII bomb dug up by builders in London



MailOnline



Hundreds of people evacuated after a massive WWII bomb was found in the grounds of a Bath school face a weekend away from their homes



Path of UXB in soft ground

1. **Ricochet resulting from low level attack:** UXB stays perpendicular to ground and rests at surface.
2. **Buried UXB with J-Curve:** Bomb curves horizontally and rests perpendicular to surface.
3. **UXB returning to surface due to J-Curve:** Bomb points towards surface but may remain partially or completely below ground level.
4. **UXB deflected by buried objects:** Results in unpredictable path and unusual shaft.

Below: UXB can come to rest beneath undamaged buildings due to the J-Curve effect if it lands in nearby soft ground.





..... Approximate site boundary

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23 July 2010 Last updated at 18:28

Covert British troops 'could have buried' WWII devices

World War II incendiary devices found on a building site in Gloucestershire could have been left by covert British troops, according to researchers.

More than 20 phosphorus bombs were unearthed in Birdlip after a digger hit one, causing it to burst into flames.

A former worker at the site said he saw a Home Guard officer burying objects there 65 years ago.

The Coleshill Auxiliary Research Team said auxiliary officers often used Home Guard uniforms as cover.



The bombs were put into vats of water to make them safe

Thursday, September 10 2015



KentOnline

The UK's fastest-growing regional news network

Army bomb disposal team called to Blacksole Bridge in Herne Bay

Comments 13

by Aidan Barlow abarlow@thekmgroupp.co.uk

Twitter Facebook

08 July 2015

It was like a scene from Dad's Army when Army bomb disposal experts found wartime explosives made by the Home Guard in makeshift bottles.

A team was called to the Blacksole Bridge in Herne Bay after the wartime bombs were found.

The team from the Royal Logistics Corps set up a 30 metre exclusion zone for pedestrians around the railway embankment after the suspected homemade phosphorous bombs were found.



EAST ANGLIAN DAILYTIMES

WATCH: Bomb squad detonate 24 Second World War grenades found buried in Suffolk field

Adam Howlett adam.howlett@archant.co.uk @EADTadam
PUBLISHED: 12:08 28 May 2019 | UPDATED: 13:39 28 May 2019



SIP Grenades were discovered and detonated in Sibton by British Army Bomb Disposal Experts, Suffolk Police and Suffolk Fire & Rescue Picture: SUFFOLK FIRE & RESCUE SERVICE

The bomb squad safely detonated dozens of incendiary grenades found buried in a field in Sibton near Saxmundham on Bank Holiday Monday.

Eastbourne Herald

10/09/15 11°C to 21°C Sunny

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VIDEO: Explosion after 80 grenades detonated in Eastbourne




16:31 Monday 13 April 2015

Marked 'AW Bomb 1940' the grenades were thought to have been phosphorus incendiary grenades created as improvised anti-tank weapons when Britain was facing invasion following the army's evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940.

He said, "I remember the grenades being buried. It was part of the Home Guard stash, it was put there in case we were invaded. It had to be in 1943. There were a lot of them [stashes], they were all over the place."


Self Igniting Phosphorous (SIP) Grenades

The grenade comprised a glass bottle with a total volume of approximately one pint. It was filled with White Phosphorus, benzene, a piece of rubber and water. Over time the rubber dissolved to create a sticky fluid which would self ignite when the bottle broke. Fired by hand or Northover Projector. Sometimes called the "A & W" (Albright & Wilson) grenade.




No 74 Grenade (Sticky Bomb)

Designed as an anti-tank grenade and used by the Home Guard. The grenade consisted of a glass ball on the end of a Bakelite (plastic) handle. Inside the glass ball was an explosive filling whilst on the outside was a very sticky adhesive covering. Until used, this adhesive covering was encased in a metal outer casing.




Flame Fougasse Bomb

A Flame Fougasse was a weapon in which the projectile was a flammable liquid, typically a mixture of petrol and oil. It was usually constructed from a 40-gallon drum dug into the roadside and camouflaged. Ammonal provided the propellant charge which, when triggered, caused the weapon to shoot a flame 3m (10ft) wide and 27m (30 yards) long. Initially a mixture of 40% petrol and 60% gas oil was used, this was later replaced by an adhesive gel of tar, lime and petrol known as 5B.



Typical 2 inch High Explosive Mortar

- Bomb Weight: 1.02kg (2.25lb)
Type: High Explosive
Dimensions: 51 x 290mm (2in x 11.4in)
Filling: 200g RDX/TNT
Maximum Range: 457m (500yds)
Remarks: Fitted with an impact fuze which detonates the fuze booster charge (exploder) and, in turn, the high explosive charge. The main charge shatters the mortar bomb body, producing near optimum fragmentation and blast effect at the target.




Typical 3 inch Smoke Mortar

- Type: Smoke
Dimensions: c490 x 76mm (19.3in x 3in)
Filling: Typically white phosphorous
Maximum Range: 2515m (2,750yds)
Remarks: On impact, the fuze functions and initiates the bursting charge. The bursting charge ruptures the mortar bomb body and disperses the white phosphorous filler. The white phosphorous produces smoke upon exposure to the air.




Typical 2 inch Illuminating Mortar

- Type: Illum.
Dimensions: 51 x 290mm
Filling: Various
Remarks: The expulsion charge ignites and ejects the candle assembly. A spring ejects the parachute from the tail cone. The parachute opens, slowing the descent of the burning candle which illuminates the target.



No. 36 'Mills' Grenade

- Weight: 0.7kg filled (1lb 6oz)
Type: Hand or discharger, fragmentation
Dimensions: 95 x 61mm (3.7 x 2.4in)
Filling: Alumaton, Amatol 2 or TNT
Remarks: 4 second hand-throwing fuse with approximate 30m range. First introduced May 1918.



Grenade, .303 inch rifle, No. 36M, Mark I.


No. 69 Grenade

- Weight: 0.38kg filled (0.8lb)
Type: Percussion/Blast
Date Introduced: December 1940
Remarks: Black Bakelite body. Blast rather than fragmentation type. After unscrewing the safety cap, a tape is held when throwing the grenade releasing the safety bolt in the throwing motion. Detection is problematic due to its very low metal content.





Typical Smoke Grenade

- Dimensions: Approx. 65 x 115mm (2.5 x 4.5in)
Type: Smoke
Date Introduced: Current MoD issue
Remarks: Smoke grenades are used as ground-to-ground or ground-to-air signalling devices, or landing zone marking devices, and screening devices for unit movement.



20mm Hispano HEI Ammunition


- Type: Live cannon round
- Markings: Upper half of projectile painted 'buff' colour, lower half is red.
- Cartridge Weight: 256 grams
- Dimensions: Total cartridge / projectile length - 182mm
- Fuzed: Contact fuze - No.253, No.254 or No.917
- Filling: 108 grains of contact explosive + 68 grains of SR.379 incendiary composition.
- Threat: Explosives within unspent cartridge as well as the projectile.
- Deployment: Royal Navy, RAF and British Army Light Anti- Aircraft guns. Also RAF aircraft canons.
- Remarks: Cartridges are belted or supplied lose in cartons.



COLOUR IDENTIFICATION		
BRITISH		
NATURE OF SHELL	H.E. FILLING	COLOUR
H.E. TRACER	T.N.T.	Blue
H.E.	T.N.T.	Orange
PROJ. PRACTICE		Purple
PROJ. TRACER		Green
H.E. INCENDIARY	T.N.T.	Red
H.E. INCENDIARY TRACER	T.N.T.	Green

.303" Ammunition

- Type: Rifle / machine gun round
- Markings: Regular round - none. Tracer round - red Primer
- Bullet Weight: 150 - 180 grams
- Dimensions: Total cartridge /projectile length - 78mm
- Filling: Regular round - none. Tracer round - small incendiary fill
- Threat: Explosive cordite within unspent cartridge
- Deployment: Royal Navy, RAF and British Army Light Anti-Aircraft guns, machine guns and rifles. Standard British and Commonwealth military cartridge from 1889 until the 1950s.
- Remarks: Cartridges are belted or supplied lose in cartons.



3.7 inch Anti-Aircraft Projectile

Weight:	12.7kg (28lb)
Dimensions:	94 x 360mm (3.7 x 14.7in)
Carriage:	Mobile and Static Versions
Rate of Fire:	10-20 rounds per minute
Ceiling:	9-18,000m (29-59,000ft)
Muzzle Velocity:	792m/s (2,598ft/s)
Remarks:	4.5 inch projectiles were also commonly utilised




3.7 inch AA Projectile, Minus Fuze.



Hyde Park 1939 3.7 Inch QF gun on mobile mounting.



This AA shell was uncovered on a construction site in North London in February 2009.




Layout plan for a typical HAA battery site.

Rockets / Un-rotating Projectiles

Weight:	Overall: 24.5kg (54lb)
Warhead::	1.94kg (4.28lb)
Dimensions:	1930mm x 82.6mm (76 x 3.25in)
Carriage:	Mobile - transported on trailers
Ceiling:	6770m (22,200ft)
Maximum Velocity:	457mps (1,500 fps)




Rocket Battery in action.



MK II HE Shell (3.5kg).



Home Guard soldiers load an anti-aircraft rocket at a 'Z' Battery.



2" U.P AA Rocket.

40mm Bofors Gun Projectile

Weight:	0.86kg (1.96lb)
Dimensions:	40mm x 310mm (1.6in x 12.2in)
Rate of Fire:	120 rounds per minute
Ceiling:	23,000ft (7000m)
Muzzle Velocity:	2,890 ft/s (881m/s)
Remarks:	Mobile batteries - normally few records of where these guns were located



Unexploded 40mm Bofors projectile



40mm Bofors gun and crew at Stanmore in Middlesex, 28 June 1940.





RESCUE workers search for survivors after a Second World War bomb exploded at a building site in Berlin, killing three people and injuring at least eight others.

A fire brigade spokesman said he feared the final death toll could be higher. One worker was still missing, believed to be trapped under a machine. "We've

Blown up by history

found human remains 190 metres away but we can't tell if they belong to the dead already found," the spokesman said.

The blast, set off by drilling work on Frankfurter Allee, one of east Berlin's busiest avenues, trapped

workers under building machinery and sent huge chunks of concrete tumbling through the air.

A large office block was being built on the site of the explosion which sent shoppers scrambling for shelter and paralysed

dense afternoon traffic. One eyewitness said: "There was a bang, then silence, and then it started raining stones and dirt." Dozens of cars within a 250-metre radius were wrecked and the top two floors of a nearby apartment block caved in. Radio reports claimed that the total number of injured stood at 14.

World War II bomb kills three in Germany

Three people have been killed and six injured trying to defuse a World War II bomb in central Germany.

Workers building a sports stadium had earlier unearthed the bomb in the town of Goettingen.

It was not immediately clear why the bomb, reportedly weighing 500kg (1,100lb), had detonated.



A World War Two bomb has exploded at a construction site near a west German town, killing a man and injuring eight others, police say.

The explosion occurred after a digger accidentally struck the device during excavation work in Euskirchen in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Top Left: WWII bomb killed 3 and injured 8 in Berlin - 1994.

Middle Left: WWII bomb killed 3 in Goettingen, Germany - 2010.

Bottom Left: Excavator operator killed by WWII bomb in Euskirchen, Germany - 2014.

Top Right: A highway construction worker in Germany accidentally struck a WWII bomb, killing himself and wrecking several passing cars - 2006.

Middle Right (Top) : Destroyed piling rig and dump truck after detonation of WWII UXB in Austria - 2006.

Middle Right (Bottom): WWII bomb injures 17 at construction site in Hattingen, Germany - 2008.

Bottom Right: A buried WWII-era bomb exploded during construction works in Bandar Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur - 2017.

I dead, 2 critical after explosion at Malaysia MRT construction site caused by WWII bomb


London City Airport shut: Flights cancelled after Second World War bomb found in River Thames dock

London City Airport has been closed after the discovery of an unexploded Second World War bomb, affecting tens of thousands of passengers.

All flights into and out of the airport, in east London, will be stopped on Monday after the device was found nearby in the River Thames on Sunday.

The closure led to the cancellation of more than 100 departures and was affecting up to 16,000 passengers, according to a spokeswoman. A 700ft (214-metre) exclusion zone was put in place on Sunday evening to ensure the device could be dealt with safely.

People living inside the zone were evacuated from their homes overnight, while police said a number of road cordons have been put in place in Newham.



Unexploded WW2 bomb found in Birmingham

An unexploded Second World War bomb was found in Birmingham this afternoon, causing a construction site to be evacuated.



Aston Expressway bomb: Controlled explosion carried out on Second World War shell

A Second World War bomb found near the Aston Expressway has been safely detonated, bringing 30 hours of drama to an end. The explosion meant a gradual return to normality for the 200 residents who had been evacuated from the 1,600ft (500 metre) cordon put in place on the advice of explosives experts.

However, although the M6 was reopened after the blast, the key Aston Expressway stayed shut until 6pm - extending traffic disruption which had added 90 minutes onto many people's journeys.

The A38(M) and slip roads off Spaghetti Junction had all been shut since the large German bomb was found on Monday morning, while nearby rail services were also disrupted.



Bath WW2 bomb scare: Hundreds of homes evacuated

Up to 1,000 homes have been evacuated and a 300m exclusion zone is in place following the find in Lansdown Road.

According to reports, a 500lb (228kg) bomb was found just a metre beneath a playground at the former Royal High Junior School.

