



# Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

## CALL DOWN CONTRACT

**Framework Agreement with:** Cowater International Inc.  
**Framework Agreement for:** Global Development Delivery Framework (GDD)

**Lot 7 – Governance and Conflict**

**Framework Agreement ECM Number:** ECM\_5847

**Call Down Contract For:** Programme d'Appui à la Redevabilité et l'Inclusion (PARI) Programme to provide Technical Assistance and Civil Society Support (TAC) to support accountability and inclusion in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

**Contract ECM Number:** ECM\_6714

I refer to the following:

1. The above-mentioned Framework Agreement dated 18/12/2023.
2. Your proposal of 08/04/2024

and I confirm that FCDO requires you to provide the Services (Annex A, Terms of Reference), under the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement which shall apply to this Call Down Contract as if expressly incorporated herein.

### 1. Commencement and Duration of the Services

- 1.1 The Supplier shall start the Services no later than 12/12/2024 ("the Start Date") and the Services shall be completed by 31/03/2027 ("the End Date") unless the Call Down Contract is terminated earlier in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement.

### 2. Recipient


- 2.1 2.1 FCDO requires the Supplier to provide the Services to the FCDO (the "Recipient").

### 3. Financial Limit

- 3.1 Payments under this Call Down Contract shall not exceed £9,550,000 ("the Financial Limit") and is inclusive of any government tax, if applicable as detailed in Annex B.

### 4. FCDO Officials

- 4.1 The Project Officer is:
- 4.2 The Contract Officer is:



### 5. Key Personnel




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- 5.1 The following of the Supplier's Personnel cannot be substituted by the Supplier without FCDO's prior written consent:

**Job Role**

Team Leader  
Programme Manager  
Finance Manager  
Tax Expert  
Service Delivery PFM Expert  
Civil Society and Government Advocacy Expert  
Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Expert



### **6. Reports**

- 6.1 The Supplier shall submit project reports in accordance with the Terms of Reference at Annex A.

### **7. Duty of Care**

- 7.1 All Supplier Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Agreement) engaged under this Call Down Contract will come under the duty of care of the Supplier:

- I. The Supplier will be responsible for all security arrangements and Her Majesty's Government accepts no responsibility for the health, safety and security of individuals or property whilst travelling.
- II. The Supplier will be responsible for taking out insurance in respect of death or personal injury, damage to or loss of property, and will indemnify and keep indemnified FCDO in respect of:
  - II.1. Any loss, damage or claim, howsoever arising out of, or relating to negligence by the Supplier, the Supplier's Personnel, or by any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with the performance of the Call Down Contract;
  - II.2. Any claim, howsoever arising, by the Supplier's Personnel or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with their performance under this Call Down Contract.
- III. The Supplier will ensure that such insurance arrangements as are made in respect of the Supplier's Personnel, or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier are reasonable and prudent in all circumstances, including in respect of death, injury or disablement, and emergency medical expenses.
- IV. The costs of any insurance specifically taken out by the Supplier to support the performance of this Call Down Contract in relation to Duty of Care may be included as part of the management costs of the project, and must be separately identified in all financial reporting relating to the project.
- V. Where FCDO is providing any specific security arrangements for Suppliers in relation to the Call Down Contract, these will be detailed in the Terms of Reference.

### **8. Call Down Contract Signature**

- 8.1 If the original Form of Call Down Contract is not returned to the Contract Officer (as identified at clause 4 above) duly completed, signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within **15 working**



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**days** of the date of signature on behalf of FCDO, FCDO will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Call Down Contract void.

No payment will be made to the Supplier under this Call Down Contract until a copy of the Call Down Contract, signed on behalf of the Supplier, returned to the FCDO Contract Officer.

Signed by an authorised signatory  
for and on behalf of

Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth  
and Development Affairs

Name:

Position

Signature:

Date:

Signed by an authorised signatory  
for and on behalf of the Supplier

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

Including:

1. Annex A – PARI-TAC TERMS OF REFERENCE
2. Annex B - SCHEDULE OF PRICES
3. Annex C - COWATER COMMERCIAL COST-PROFORMA
4. Annex D – COWATER TECHNICAL PROPOSAL (PART B)



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**Annex A**

**PARI-TAC TERMS OF REFERENCE**





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## Annex B

### SCHEDULE OF PRICES

1. It is a requirement that all invoices are presented in the format of the payment basis, and in the case of Fees and Expenses only those categories defined are separately identified. Only one invoice per period, as defined in the Framework Agreement Terms and Conditions of Section 2, Clause 22, should be submitted.

#### 2. Milestone Payments

The amount to be paid for the completion of the services is fixed at £14,325,000.

3. Payment will be made on satisfactory performance of the services, at the payment points defined below (schedule of payments):

(i) at relevant points throughout the contract period.

At each payment point set criteria will be defined as part of the schedule of payments. Payment will be made if the criteria are met to the satisfaction of FCDO.

Schedule of Payments:

Criteria for payment	Phase	Amount of payment
<i>Inception Phase workplan</i>		
<i>Civil society engagement report</i>		
<i>Workplan</i>		
<i>Baseline Study</i>		
<i>Financial Management forecast</i>		
<i>Risk register</i>		
<i>Value for Money Strategy</i>		
<i>Stakeholder Mapping</i>		
<i>Monitoring and evaluation</i>		
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q3</i>		
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q3</i>		
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q3</i>		
<i>Annual Progress Report (Feb 2025) Q4</i>		
<i>Annual Work Plan Q4</i>		
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q1</i>		
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q1</i>		
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q1</i>		
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q2</i>		
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q2</i>		
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q2</i>		
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q3</i>		
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q3</i>		
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q3</i>		
<i>Annual Progress report Q4</i>		



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<i>Annual Work Plan Q4</i>
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q1</i>
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q1</i>
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q1</i>
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q2</i>
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q2</i>
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q2</i>
<i>Quarterly performance Report Q3</i>
<i>Quarterly Financial forecast and expenses report Q3</i>
<i>Quarterly Risk Matrix Update Q3</i>
<i>Annual Progress report Q4</i>
<i>Final activities Report</i>
<i>Final Financial Report</i>
<i>Transitional/ Exit Report</i>
<i>Final Evaluation</i>

4. Price Ceiling Uplift from the Agreed Framework Rates for Requirements with On-the-ground Programme Delivery in an Extremely Fragile Country (as defined in the GDD Terms of Reference)



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**Annex C**

**COWATER COMMERCIAL COST-PROFORMA**

**Volume 2:**  
**Terms of Reference**

**Programme to provide Technical Assistance and Civil Society  
Support (TACS)**

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## Acronym List

AXES-Filles	Accès et Égalité pour l'Éducation des Filles
BEK	British Embassy Kinshasa
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CENI	Commission Electoral Nationale Indépendante
COREF	Comité d'Orientation des Reformes des Finances Publiques
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
ENCORE	Enhancing Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management
ETD	Entité territoriale décentralisée (translated decentralized territorial entity)
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GESI	Gender and Social Inclusion
GovDRC	DRC Government
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MEL	Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
PACS	Programme d'Appui pour la Consolidation de la Stabilité en RDC
PARI	Programme d'Appui à la Redevabilité et l'Inclusion
P-DDRCS	Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program
PDIA	Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation
PDS	Plan de Developpement Sanitaire
PEA	Political Economic Analysis
PFM	Public Financial Management
PRO	Programme Responsible Owner
PROVED	Province éducationnelle
SEMI	Essential Services for Maternal and Child Health
SRO	Senior Responsible Owner
STAREST	Stabilisation and Recovery in Eastern DRC
TA	Technical Assistant
TAC	Technical Assistance and Civil Society Support
ToC	Theory of Change
ToRs	Term of References
VfM	Value for Money
WB	World Bank

## Introduction

1. The British Embassy Kinshasa (BEK) is seeking a Supplier to deliver the largest component of the DRCs governance programme, Programme d'Appui à la Redevabilité et l'Inclusion (PARI). This Contract will be called the Technical Assistance and Civil Society Support Contract (TACS), and hereafter this component of the governance business case will be known as PARI-TACS.
2. This Terms of Reference outlines the objectives, requirements and, expectations of the Supplier to successfully deliver the Contract.

## Background

3. The PARI Programme aims to respond to three interlinked governance challenges in DRC:
  - 1) The relatively weak accountability in institutions and weak participation in DRC<sup>1</sup>, which leads to limited incentives for elites and citizens to work together to solve common problems.
  - 2) DRC's poor public financial management, which impacts the ability to deliver services. Challenges in budget allocation, budget execution and budget monitoring are directly affecting poor access to healthcare and education.
  - 3) The limited implementation of the DRCs decentralised constitution which means provincially, and locally elected officials have limited funds and capacity at a decentral level to deliver services associated with electoral promises.
4. Full analysis of governance challenges in DRC can be found in the PARI business case<sup>2</sup>, and a summary is included in Annex A. **The overarching impact objective of the PARI business case Theory of Change (ToC) is 'DRCs citizens benefit from more democratic, accountable, inclusive and effective governance to deliver pro-poor services and support lasting stability in DRC at central level and in selected provinces.'**
5. The PARI business case consists of five workstreams with PARI-TACS being the largest. The workstreams are as follows -
  - 1) An accountable grant agreement focussing on supporting domestic election observation, the initial elections observation project is closing in March 2024.
  - 2) A MoU focussing on supporting the capacity of the DRC electoral commission, ending November 2024
  - 3) A World Bank (WB) Trust Fund focussing on supporting delivery of the WB PFM programme, ENCORE, with a specific focus on an analysis on public spending through a climate lens, ending March 2025.
  - 4) Gendered Political Economic Analysis (PEA) studies were commissioned, and completed November 2023
  - 5) The PARI-TACS Contract to support the governance of services and aid civil society to hold governing bodies accountable.

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<sup>1</sup>SLRC, [Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage](#), 2019

<sup>2</sup> [PARI Business Case](#)

6. PARI-TACS aims to improve public financial management (PFM) and the governance of service delivery at a provincial level, by improving provincial and local government capacity to deliver services and improving the ability of civil society to hold provincial and local government accountable to deliver these services. Evidence shows that in order to support improvements in service delivery and PFM, it is necessary to support both supply (Government) and demand (Civil Society) side interventions. PARI-TACS will focus proactively on improving the inclusion of women and other marginalised groups in PFM and the governance of service delivery.
7. PARI-TACS will focus primarily on a decentral level in two regions, Kasai province in central DRC and South Kivu, with a call-down facility in Kinshasa with national level institutions, and the potential to extend to two further provinces of North Kivu and Kasai Central under conditions elaborated in the geographical scope section.
8. The sectors that PARI-TACS will primarily focus on are governance of health and education sectors with the possibility to include green growth relevant governance interventions under certain conditions as elaborated in the sector scope section.

## PARI-TACS Objectives

9. The PARI-TACS objectives are based on the PARI business case ToC (Annex B) and an analysis of the main governance challenges in DRC are elaborated in the PARI business case (Annex A).
10. The overarching outcome for the PARI-TACS Contract is: *improved capacity of decentral and national institutions to be more accountable and effective in the management and delivery of public services.*
11. The supplier will provide technical assistance to deliver the **three output objectives**. The output objectives are identified as either supply side (support to government capacity) or demand side (capacity of civil society to hold government accountable) interventions, in line with the structure of the overarching PARI business case ToC:
  - **Output objective 1:** Improve public financial management (PFM) and governance of service delivery capacity in provincial government and provincial control and oversight institutions (i.e., provincial assemblies, ECOFIN commission)
  - **Output objective 2:** Enhanced citizen and local community governance mechanisms, including woman and other marginalised groups participation in national, provincial, and local financial management and delivery systems (demand-side interventions).
  - **Output objective 3:** Influence and support national government and international partners towards financial decentralisation to improve effective and transparent service delivery (supply-side output).

## Recipients

12. The primary recipients are DRC citizens, local governments, and the DRC central government.



13. This includes, the:

- 1) DRC provincial government, including the governor's office, provincial ministries, and provincial parliament in the focus provinces.
- 2) DRC local governments, referred to as ETDs (Entites Territoriales Decentralisees), in the focus provinces.
- 3) DRC national government (primarily the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Decentralisation, Ministry of Budget)

14. The secondary recipients are the World Bank and the FCDO teams in Kinshasa.

## Beneficiaries

15. Beneficiaries

- DRC civil society organisations in the focus provinces with a specific focus on women led civil society organisations.
- Marginalised groups including (but not limited to) people living with disabilities, ethnic minorities, indigenous people and young people.

## Scope of PARI-TACS

16. PARI-TACS will be delivered through three components that map onto the three PARI-TACS output objectives.

17. The three components are:

- 1) **Component 1:** Technical assistance in PFM and service delivery governance for provincial government.
- 2) **Component 2:** (Technical assistance supporting) Civil society capacity building and lobby/advocacy support.
- 3) **Component 3:** Call down facility for PEA, national level TA and funding for strategic engagement.

18. See the components mapped into the output objectives and expected % value of the overall Contract in the table below.

Component	Output Objective	% Proposed Value of Overall Contract
Component 1: Technical assistance in PFM and service delivery governance for provincial government	<b>Output 1:</b> improve public financial management and governance of service delivery capacity in Provincial government and provincial control and oversight institutions	30-40%
Component 2: Civil society capacity building and advocacy support	<b>Output 2:</b> To enhance citizens and local community governance mechanisms including woman and other marginalised group's participation in national, provincial and local financial management and delivery systems.	40-50%

Component 3: Call down facility for Political Economy Analysis national level TA and funding for strategic engagement	Output 3: To support National government and international partners towards financial decentralisation to improve effective and transparent service delivery.	10-20%

## Governance Scope

19. This Contract will focus primarily on a decentralised level, with some implementation of activities at a national level. The initial focus provinces are South Kivu and Kasai with interventions in Kinshasa at a national government institution level. The supplier is expected to establish a presence in the DRC if not yet established and preferably in the focus provinces.
20. There are conditions under which North Kivu and Kasai Central can be included in the Contract are elaborated below.
21. The province of North Kivu is currently under military rule/Etat-de-Siege, because of a particularly high level of insecurity. If the operational environment changes, as decided by the SRO and PRO monitoring of the situation, FCDO will seek to widen the geographical scope to include this province. **The overall budget for PARI-TACS will not increase with the inclusion of North Kivu as an intervention province.**
22. FCDO will continue to monitor the operational and political environment (military rule/Etat-de-Siege) in North Kivu. And any change to the geographical scope will be undertaken in consultation with the supplier.
23. The province of Kasai Central may also be included in the Contract, in the event, the budget is increased. If this occurs the SRO and PRO will request a full proposal for activities in Kasai Central. **Work will not commence until a Contract variation is concluded.**

The conditions for the geographic scope are summarised in the table below:

	Kasai	Kasai central	North Kivu	South Kivu	Kinshasa/ national level
Year one implementation	X			X	X
Year one implementation (with scope increase)	X		Subject to changes in operational environment	X	X
Year two implementation (with scope increase and contract variation)	X	Subject to budget increase	Subject to changes in operational environment	X	X

24. The supplier is encouraged to deliver the activities using strong partnerships with local Congolese organisations. Delegating responsibilities where appropriate. This will have the

advantage of ensuring that the supplier can draw on the required local knowledge, that local capacities are built, and local ownership is promoted.

## Sector focus

25. PARI-TACS will support improvement in the governance of service delivery in several priority sectors. PARI-TACS will focus on improving the governance of sectors that other BEK programmes focus on, and any successor programmes. BEK has a health and an education programme in Kasai, and a conflict programme and Green Growth programme in the East of DRC. See Annex D for more details on BEK sectoral programmes.

26. See below a table outlining the provincial focus of other BEK programmes.

	Kasai	Kasai Central <sup>3</sup>	North Kivu <sup>4</sup>	South Kivu	Kinshasa
Health programme Essential Services for Maternal and Child Health programme in DRC (SEMI).	X	X			X
Education programme Accès et Égalité pour l'Éducation des Filles (AXE- FILLES).	X				X
Green growth programme Business case in development, focus sectors agriculture, carbon markets, energy sector			X	X	X
Conflict programme (PDDRCS) Programme d'Appui pour la Consolidation de la Stabilité en RDC (PACS)			X	X	X

27. The supplier will focus on health and education sector interventions in each intervention province throughout the lifetime of the Contract.

28. Green growth sector governance (including agriculture, energy and the governance of carbon markets) are possible in the green growth programme intervention provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. Inclusion of green growth interventions will be conditional on the relevance of governance and service delivery interventions for the Green Growth business case once it is operational, as decided by the PRO and SRO. The overall budget of PARI-TACS will not increase with the inclusion of green growth interventions in South Kivu and North Kivu.

<sup>3</sup> Subject to budget increase

<sup>4</sup> Subject to changes in the operational environment

29. The PRO and SRO will decide, in consultation with the supplier, whether to include green growth service delivery interventions in the focus provinces at any point during the term of the Contract.
30. Kinshasa based interventions with national government institutions, which fall under component 3 only and will include all sectors (health, education, conflict, and green growth).

Sector implementation per province of relevant BEK programmes

	Kasai	South Kivu	North Kivu <sup>5</sup>	National level
SEMI	X	X	X	X
AXE-FILLE	X	X	X	X
PACS				X
Green growth (agriculture, carbon markets, energy sector)		If there is operational relevance for green growth business case	If there is operational relevance for green growth business case	X

31. Elaboration of proposed sector specific interventions can be found in each component below:

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<sup>5</sup> Subject to changes in the operational and political environment.

## Component 1: Technical assistance in PFM and service delivery governance for provincial government

32. This component will deliver Outcome objective 2 of the PARI theory of change, which is: “improved capacity of decentral and national institutions to be more accountable and effective in the management and delivery of public services reinforcing UK strategic priorities”.
33. This component will provide technical assistance, training, and other capacity building activities for provincial government in public financial management and governance of service delivery. We expect this will be formed of a team of long-term technical experts working with the provincial government, the SRO and PRO to identify and deliver key reform processes within provincial government.
34. Scoping research and stakeholder dialogue with the provincial government by BEK showed that PFM capacity at a provincial level in Kasai, South Kivu and North Kivu is low, particularly in the areas of tax and revenue management, budgeting, and budget monitoring. We propose three sub-output objectives (see table below).
35. There are different PFM capacities within each province – with reform processes developed further in South Kivu and North Kivu than in Kasai (see details in Annex 2). Interventions in each province should align with provincial government capacities. For example, South Kivu has introduced a digital tax collection process, therefore, interventions should work with established systems to improve them. Kasai does not have a digital tax collection system, but one may be introduced by a new World Bank programme.
36. The supplier is expected to assess and prioritise improving current systems rather than introducing new systems. The sector focus for year one will be health and education, with the option to include relevant green growth sector governance interventions as described in the sector scope section.
37. There is a focus on ensuring that gender inclusion is embedded in improvements to PFM systems, in particular improving gender responsive tax, budgeting and budget monitoring.
38. This component of PARI-TACS in particular has overlap with the World Bank (WB) PFM programme, called ENCORE<sup>6</sup> and the WB stabilisation programme called STAREST<sup>7</sup>. Both programmes have components focussing on provincial PFM, ENCORE in Kasai and STAREST in North and South Kivu. The PFM objectives for ENCORE and STAREST at a provincial level are increased Resources and Enhanced Budget Management at Provincial Level, focussing tax revenue, budget planning and participatory budgeting.

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<sup>6</sup> [ENCORE](#)

<sup>7</sup> [STAREST](#)

39. The supplier is expected to coordinate with the Comité d'Orientation des Reformes des Finances Publiques (COREF) (the implementing partner of the WB) at a national and provincial level. This will be to ensure that interventions are mutually reinforcing and complementary. In addition, this component is expected to work with FCDO implementing programmes in the provinces.

40. Below are the activities required during Inception, Implementation and proposed areas of Implementation. Proposed interventions are not required, and additional or alternative proposals are encouraged based on expertise of the supplier. Innovative solutions are encouraged, particularly in embedding gender responsive PFM reforms. The work plan will be further developed during the inception period and throughout the programme.

Deliverables and Proposed Activities:

Sub-output objective	Inception phase deliverable	Description/ Required interventions	Proposed interventions
1.1 Provincial tax revenue	Provincial Tax Revenue Work Plan	Produce a work plan for activities on <b>consultations with Revenue Authority and Provincial government</b> and the World Bank ENCORE and STAREST programmes tailored to the needs of each implementation province. The work plan should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFM systems training for provincial tax revenue authorities.</li> <li>- Improve the effectiveness and transparency of the fund management of tax incomes.</li> <li>- A complaints system for citizens to raise concerns on tax collection practices (focus on women).</li> <li>- Processes to raise awareness of citizen on provincial taxes.</li> <li>- Processes to raise awareness of businesses on provincial taxes.</li> <li>- Mapping of properties designing and implementing of progressive property tax collection.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rationalisation (focus on most productive taxes) of the list of taxes collected at a provincial level including conducting an audit of taxes collected at a provincial level.</li> <li>- Implementing the 5% payment to the service d'assiette policy.</li> <li>- Introduce/improve mobile payments to tax systems.</li> <li>- Analysis of implications of climate relevant taxations such as forest tax and carbon credit at a provincial level.</li> <li>- Code of Ethics for tax collection.</li> </ul>
1.2 Budget planning for sectors	Budget Planning Work Plan	Produce a work plan for activities on <b>consultations with the governor and provincial minister of budget and finance, health, and education</b> and the World Bank ENCORE and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Budget planning processes that include accurate revenue forecasts and budgeting, and incorporate health and education sector analysis.</li> </ul>

		<p>STAREST programmes tailored to the needs of each implementation province.</p> <p>The work plan should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFM systems training for provincial ministry of budget, finance and governor's office staff.</li> <li>- Improving the provincial development plan, through annual analyses of the health and education sectors in cooperation with relevant health and education institutions (including deconcentrated health and education institutions PDS and PROVED).</li> <li>- Participatory budgeting processes to allow for wide and inclusive participation, provision of budget information in advance and incorporation of civil society feedback in the budgets.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Including gender-based budgeting in budget processes</li> <li>- Include analysis of climate relevant sectors including energy and agriculture in sector analysis and budgets</li> </ul>
1.3 Budget execution and oversight	Budget Execution Work Plan	<p>Produce a work plan for activities on <b>consultations with the provincial government and parliament</b> and the World Bank ENCORE and STAREST programmes tailored to the needs of each implementation province.</p> <p>The work plan should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFM system training for provincial parliament</li> <li>- budget execution data and publish reports to support the provincial ministry of budget.</li> <li>- Support the provincial parliament to scrutinise budget execution document and publish analysis.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to the court of audit if established at provincial level for Kasai in improving the quality of audit reporting.</li> <li>- Support improved procurement systems at a provincial level.</li> </ul>

## Component 2: Civil society capacity building and advocacy support

41. This component will deliver output objective 2.3 of the PARI-TACS ToC. This is: **‘enhanced citizen, and in particular woman’s participation in provincial and local financial management and delivery systems’**. It is designed to be complementary to the support provided in component 1.
42. This component will support capacity building of DRC civil society, to hold the DRC government accountable for delivery of services and PFM. In particular, support civil society to hold the government accountable to the reforms they deliver through component 1. This is the largest component of the PARI Contract.
43. Scoping research on civil society and women’s role in civil society at a provincial level was undertaken to inform this ToRs, the research is attached in Annex 3. Based on scoping analysis we propose three sub-output objectives:
  - 1) Supporting civil society engagement to be more inclusive, coordinated, evidence based and citizen-informed in holding provincial government to account for improvements in service delivery and public financial management improvements in revenue collection, budget planning for sectors and budget oversight.
  - 2) Supporting improvements to service delivery at a local government level through introducing problem driven iterative adaptation approaches (PDIA)
  - 3) Supporting women’s inclusion in provincial and local PFM and service delivery systems.
44. The geographical focus will be in the same provinces as component 1, in line with the focus provinces at time of implementation.
45. The sector focus for year one will be health and education, with the option to include relevant green growth sector governance interventions as outlined in the sector scope section.
46. **Sub-output 2.1** is designed to improve civil society’s capacity to hold the government at a provincial level to account for the reform areas under component 1, which are revenue collection, budget planning and budget execution and oversight. Civil society should be supported to form a coalition that is able to effectively lobby in a coordinated manner or improve the capacity of a coalition that already exists
47. Below some criteria for the **civil society coalition**:



- 1) The coalition should work through existing civil society structures when available and seen as credible by the local population and do not have strong political and funding allegiances to current politicians. A coalition can be formed if there is *not* yet a coalition assessed to be credible and operational.
  - 2) The coalition should be designed for the provincial context, including the capacity of civil society in the context.
  - 3) The coalition of civil society organisations that participate in lobbying do not need to be exclusively those with expertise of public financial management but rather should include a broad set of civil society with focus areas in service delivery, gender, and include groups that are seen to be legitimate by citizens in the province.
  - 4) FCDO encourages inclusive membership of the coalition that should not exclude less formally organised groups such as Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and other social movements.
  - 5) The coalition should include membership that represents women, young people and people with disabilities in a proportionate manner, including aiming for 50% membership of women in the coalition.
  - 6) The coalition should function as a cross learning platform where civil society learns and supports each other's capacity building.
48. **Sub-output 2.2** will focus on local government and community-based solutions of governance and service delivery challenges. The supplier is required to support the establishment or established working groups of local government and citizens. These working groups will use a problem driven iterative approach (PDIA) to raise service delivery and PFM challenges and work through low-cost, achievable solutions to these challenges. The Supplier should aim to work with every ETD in the implementation provinces unless they're compelled operationally or for security reasons, not to do so. The supplier is required to have knowledge and experience of PDIA approaches and be able to teach and support PDIA approaches at a local level.
49. **Sub-output 2.3** will focus on the role of civil society in promoting greater analysis of how PFM and service delivery impacts women and how to advocate for more inclusive PFM and service delivery systems. This sub-output will focus specifically on 1) supporting women's civil society groups organisational capacity, particularly in Kasai where the overarching capacity of these groups are more limited than in South Kivu and North Kivu and 2) supporting the analysis by civil society of how gender issues interact with public financial management and service delivery.
50. In addition to the points outlined above, the supplier will be expected to:
- Analyse the DRC civil society landscape in implementation provinces and identify groups that represent marginalised populations including women, young people, and people with disabilities.
  - Select DRC civil society groups that represent women, youth, people with disabilities and marginalised groups representatively to collaborate and form collective advocacy strategies. This means civil society groups should aim to include 50% gender inclusion, and include other marginalised populations represented in the intervention provinces.

- Coordinate DRC civil society by bringing members of civil society across the province together and facilitating collective advocacy points.
- Coordinate interventions relevant to government collaboration (e.g. participatory budgeting, budget execution) with the technical experts in component one.
- Provide relevant training to civil society in e.g. budget analysis, gender responsive budgeting, tax complaints mechanisms, sector analysis, PDIA approaches.
- Provide funding to allow DRC civil society to organise citizen engagement sessions across implementation provinces.
- Should coordinate with the technical team implementing component one to coordinate on relevant activities such as participatory budgeting.
- Assess the capacity of civil society organisations and design interventions to improve organisation capacity.

51. Below are the activities required during inception and implementation and additional proposed areas of implementation. Proposed interventions are not required, and additional or alternative proposals are encouraged based on expertise of the supplier. Innovative solutions are encouraged. The work plan will be further developed during the inception period and throughout the length of the programme.

Deliverables and Proposed Activities:

Sub-output objectives	Inception phase deliverable	Implementation Phase Deliverables Description/ Required interventions	Proposed interventions
2.1 Civil society holding provincial government accountable on service delivery in health and education and PFM	Report that identifies the provincial level civil society groups that will be included in the civil society coalition in each intervention province. – Must represent at least 40% women, and young people, people with disabilities and represent the minority communities in the province (with considerations to the particularities of each province). Must conduct due diligence research to understand political allegiances of civil society and perceptions of legitimacy by citizens.	Civil society coalition plan should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Formation of/cooperation with a civil society coalition based on criteria in paragraph 42.</li> <li>- Capacity building of civil society on PFM and sector delivery including training by CSOs in the coalition of other CSOs</li> <li>- Support civil society to engage with citizens to understand and produce evidence-based reports on service delivery challenges in the province, including health and education (green growth sectors if included in sector scope)</li> <li>- Support civil society to raise awareness to citizens in the province on taxes and tax collection (in collaboration with component 1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- use of scorecards to collect input on tax revenue authority improvements and challenges in relevant sectors.</li> <li>- Civil society monitoring on procurement Contracts and the selling of forest concessions in the province.</li> <li>- Capacity building exchanges between civil society coalitions in intervention provinces (e.g. Kasai civil society groups traveling to South Kivu to conduct learning missions from South Kivu civil society coalition)</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support the civil society coalition to analyse and constructively advocate towards provincial government about concerns around tax collection based on citizen engagement by civil society.</li> <li>- Support the civil society coalition to analyse and coordinate civil society inputs into participatory budgeting processes to provincial government, with a focus on identifying needs in the health sector and education sector and green growth sectors depending if included in sector scope</li> <li>- Support the civil society coalition to analyse, understand and form advocacy strategies to improve budget execution.</li> <li>- Intervention plan that shows how the bidder will include Green Growth service delivery interventions in the selected provinces when FCDO decides this thematic extension of activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Please see Annex E Civil Society Landscape Mapping in South Kivu and Kasai, for context.</li> </ul>
2.2 Local government service delivery	Report that identifies which ETDs will be supported as part of this sub-output	Forming local level consultation frameworks with local government and citizens in ETDs to identify and solve local level governance challenges through the use of problem driven iterative adaption (PDIA) approach.	
2.3 Supporting women's participation and inclusion in provincial and local PFM and service delivery systems particular	Analysis report on the capacity and capacity gaps of women's civil society groups in each province	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- supporting the capacity of women's based civil society according to needs based analysis conducted during the inception phase.</li> <li>- Supporting analysis and advocacy on the impact of tax collection on women, gender focussed analysis on needs of province, including gender-based budgeting and gender focussed provincial development plans.</li> </ul>	

### Component 3: Call Down Facility for PEA

52. Component 3: Call Down Facility for PEA, national level TA and funding for strategic engagement is required to access expertise in the areas outlined below at short notice to deliver short term pieces of work. The work the call-down facility delivers is demand-driven work from FCDO, the supplier and any delivery partners.
53. This is the only component of PARI TACS that allows for activities in Kinshasa with national level government, which includes Technical Assistance at a national level, but also the possibility to commission PEA studies on national level reform processes and to support the organisation of events in Kinshasa. PEA, M&E and outreach and engagement can also be commissioned for the other intervention provinces.
54. The sectoral focus of this component includes **public financial management and governance support delivery** in all sectors discussed in the sectoral focus section, including health, education, conflict/PDDRCS and green growth.
55. There are three sub-output objectives:
  - **Sub-output 3.1 PEA analysis of reform and implementation bottlenecks:** This component recognises that the political economy context influences the success of the PARI theory of change. This component provides the ability to conduct political economy analysis on bottlenecks to reform and implementation and propose ways forward to achieve PARI-TACS output and overarching outcome objectives. This includes analysis of bottlenecks in PARI-TACS interventions at a provincial level, but also analysis of reforms at a national level, to improve financial decentralisation and service delivery governance that are relevant to the delivery of the PARI theory of change. Wider sectoral programming at BEK is also likely to run into governance and political economy challenges in implementing sectoral governance improvements. This component allows for the possibility to do a PEA analysis for other programming when it is sectoral governance or PFM related.
  - **Sub-output 3.2 National TA:** This component recognises that central DRC government plays a key role in improving the implementation of fiscal decentralisation and improving the governance of service delivery. The main focus of PARI-TACS is at a provincial level. This is because the main partners working at national level on PFM capacity are the World Bank and the IMF, who have significantly larger budgets than PARI-TACS. However, this call down facility is designed to respond at pace when there are ad hoc short pieces of strategic technical assistance at a national level that would be of added value. It also recognises that other BEK programmes implementing in Kinshasa may benefit from targeted PFM and governance expertise that the supplier has access to. Proposals from sectoral teams implementing the health, education, green growth and conflict

programmes may propose interventions and will go through the approval process as described below. These should be interventions working specifically on public financial management or governance challenges related to improving sector implementation.

- **Sub-output 3.3 Strategic, targeted policy outreach and engagement:** PARI-TACS achievement of its theory of change is contingent on close engagement with the government of DRC, and lobbying efforts to improve public financial management and service delivery. One method of improving the BEK platform for engagement is to support the funding of strategic and PARI-TACS relevant policy engagement sessions by GovDRC. This would give BEK access to GovDRC counterparts, allow BEK to be part of agenda setting and design for conferences and roundtables, and bring ministerial departments or different ministries together that would not ordinarily collaborate.

56. Below are the types of deliverables and activities proposed for this component, however given this is a call down framework these specific requirements are demand led. The supplier will be expected to be able to secure expertise at short notice.

Sub-output objectives	Inception phase deliverables	Example deliverables (actual deliverables will be demand driven during implementation phase)
3.1 PEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A standard template finalised in discussion with FCDO for proposal and budgets for TA, PEA and engagement funds.</li> <li>- A finalised method for procuring required expertise when a proposal for work is accepted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political Economy Analysis report on retrocession bottlenecks (financial transfers to the provinces) to Kasai province</li> <li>- Political Economy Analysis report on participatory budgeting at a provincial level</li> <li>- Political Economy Analysis report of managing funds from carbon credits/other climate funding</li> <li>- Political Economy Analysis report of budget execution processes in the ministry of health</li> </ul>
3.2 National level TA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Technical assistance to the ministry of finance team working on decentralisation to deliver a redrafted financial decentralisation action plan.</li> <li>- Technical assistance to the equalisation fund to support operationalisation of the fund.</li> <li>- Technical assistance to the PDDRCS team on implementing a transparent accounting system to manage government funding.</li> </ul>
3. Strategic engagement		<p>Funding of an Atelier by the ministry of finance on implementation of the decentralisation strategy (e.g., venue costs, food, transport costs).</p> <p>Funding a cross ministry roundtable on progress of the equalisation fund.</p>

Governance and programme management of call down facility (Component 3)

57. **Budget and timeline guidelines:**

- **PEA/TA:** There is budget for short term technical assistance at a national level and PEA research up to a value of £200,000 and for a length of up to 6 months.
- **Strategic, targeted policy outreach and engagement:** There is also a fund for strategic engagement such as the funding of appropriate and influential events for up to £20,000 per outreach event.
- **Extension of short-term TA:** For any technical assistance, once the budget or the time-period for the short-term TA has finished, TA support can be extended twice (meaning two more terms of 6 months). Extension is not possible for PEA, M&E or policy outreach and engagement.

58. **Governance:** governance structure and exact process for proposing and approving work under component 3 is outlined below. The governance structure must include:

- ToRs for proposed work, can come from the PARI-TACS PRO and SRO, and the PROs and SROs of the BEK health programme, education programme, conflict programme and the green growth programme, the supplier or any lead of the delivering of component 1 and 2.
- A ToR is approved by the SRO and may include others.
- Once a ToR is approved the supplier will identify an expert who will write a full proposal based on the ToR, which is approved by a panel that includes the SRO, PRO, two advisers including one governance adviser.

c. The ToR for the call-down facility must include:

- Details and reasoning for the proposed intervention
- Which sub-output this activity falls under and how the activity contributes to meeting the overarching outcome objective of PARI TACS, Output 3 and the relevant sub-output objective.
- Proposed deliverables and results

Proposals from experts to deliver ToRs must include:

Expertise	To include:
<b>Technical Assistance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Details and reasoning for the proposed intervention</li> <li>- The deliverables and results of the proposal</li> <li>- CV of the expert</li> <li>- Activity timeline detailing submission dates of all reporting</li> <li>- budget for the length of the TA including expenses and milestone payment forecasts</li> <li>- Activity risks, including likelihood and impact of the risk being realised and mitigation activities</li> </ul>
<b>PEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Details and reasoning for the proposed research</li> <li>- The deliverables and results of the proposal</li> <li>- CV of expert</li> <li>- Research timeline detailing draft and final report milestones</li> <li>- Financial forecast for the length of the research including expenses and a milestone payment forecast</li> <li>- Research risk and mitigations</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic Engagement Funding</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Details and reasoning for the proposed event</li> <li>- The deliverables and results of the event</li> <li>- A budget of what will be paid for</li> <li>- Risks associated with disbursing this payment</li> </ul>

## Supplier Responsibilities

### General Governance and oversight requirements

59. The supplier will be responsible for the delivery of the Contract as per this ToR and will be accountable to the FCDO. The supplier is encouraged to set up strong collaborative relationships with local organisations. The supplier will be responsible for due diligence, risk analysis, monitoring and evaluation of the downstream partners of the ToR.
60. The PARI TACS Contract will be managed by FCDOs Political Governance, Inclusion and Communication (PGIC) team at BEK. The Senior Responsible Owner is the team leader of the PGIC team, who holds overall responsibility for the programme. Day to day management of the programme and the Contract will be ensured by the Programme Responsible Owner (PRO) who will be the main contact for the supplier. Two governance advisers and one social development adviser will be responsible for providing technical support of the PARI TACS Contract.

The supplier will be responsible for the following areas:

61. Contract management: ensuring that the Contract and its components are managed according to best practices and in line with FCDO programme management principles including financial management which require development programmes to be delivered by making risk-and evidence-based decisions, learn and share lessons and ensure value for money for UK taxpayers.
62. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning: the supplier will ensure that the Contract's activities are properly monitored, and results fed back to FCDO regularly and at least quarterly at set check-in meetings and allowing room for learning and adaptation to changing contexts and circumstances. More details on MEL and reporting requirements to be found below.
63. Coordination: the Supplier is responsible for making sure that activities and results between the Contract's components, larger PARI business case components and relevant FCDO programmes and other external partner programmes are coordinated and aligned in order to ensure a coherent delivery approach.
64. Inclusion and politically aware programming: as a cross-cutting theme, the supplier will make sure that gender and inclusion considerations are streamlined in programme activities and that the programme remains sensitive and responsive to political changes.

### Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

65. Responsibilities for the MEL aspects of this Contract will be shared between the Supplier and FCDO. The Supplier will provide regular progress reports and learning elements to FCDO. FCDOs programme management team will provide quality assurance through regular monitoring visits and making sure that reported results meet expected quality. The Supplier will be required to commission an external mid-term evaluation and final impact evaluation of the Contract.



66. The Supplier will design a results framework for the duration of the implementation period which will outline what results will be achieved and how success will be measured. The results framework will align with the theory of change. The validity of the results framework and theory of change will be reviewed and if necessary, adapted every six months.
67. The Supplier will develop and propose a monitoring, evidence and learning strategy (MEL strategy). The MEL strategy should set out the approach for data collection and analysis and clearly set out how lessons will be gathered and inform implementation of activities. The MEL strategy should be aligned with the Theory of Change, results framework, PARI logframe and VFM monitoring. The MEL strategy should be reviewed every six months and shared with the FCDO team.
68. The Supplier records and monitoring of the progress made towards the results while keeping track of shortfalls as well as successes in a “learning log” which should be presented to the FCDO. The “learning log” will be part of the MEL strategy. The supplier will be required to collect ‘impact stories’ on results coming from implementation, and support CSO’s to write these impact stories if applicable.
69. The Supplier will do a baseline study during Inception phase to have robust baseline data which will underpin later assessment of progress.
70. The Supplier is required to use third party organisations in assessing progress at the mid-term point of the contract and during the close-down phase. Alternative methods of MEL to support analysis of results are encouraged, such as outcome harvesting or the use of polling data. FCDO will be involved in drafting and approving the ToR for the Final third-party Evaluation, including performance evaluation questions. FCDO will be on the panel selecting the individual/team leading the evaluation and have the right of refusal. FCDO and supplier will receive milestones/report drafts at the same time as the supplier does. The final evaluation report will be validated by FCDO and subsequent payments will hinge on a satisfactory basis.

#### Flexibility and Adaptive programming

71. This Contract requires varying levels of flexible and adaptive programming strategies per component. Below outlines some guiding principles on how to approach flexibility in PARI-TACS.

#### Component 1 and 2

72. The yearly workplan and log frame will outline the main activities to be undertaken. The Supplier will mention in the quarterly reports which log frame milestones have not been met. In addition to lessons learned and a detailed explanation for the shortfall, the supplier will propose a way forward to meeting the milestones.
73. Quarterly check-ins will be used to discuss next steps. It is possible at this point to adjust and change activities. It is also possible for the supplier, BEK and beneficiaries in provincial government to identify and propose new areas of activity which fall under the theory of change and will achieve the overall outputs. In situations where the political context has changed and the theory of change no longer works as is, it is possible to adjust the theory of

change with express approval from FCDO. Examples of this change could be when there is a change to political staff at a provincial level and that this impacts the ability to work together.

74. The components should make use of pause and reflect sessions. These should be designed to consider activities and the linked theory of change. They should test whether the interventions are likely to have an impact on the theory of change, and the likelihood there will be political will from the provincial government to implement the intervention. Pause and reflect sessions can be organised during regular quarterly sessions, or organised ad-hoc as required by FCDO, the supplier, the TAs and downstream partners.

### Component 3

75. This component is designed to be flexible and responsive to opportunities within the DRC and intervention context. There is a description in the scope of work section component 3 on how this component will be governed.

### Coordination

76. The Supplier will coordinate between the different components of the programme and ensure that activities are aligned, and results delivered in accordance with the programme's results framework and Theory of Change (ToC) as mentioned in the Inception phase deliverables. Below are some considerations with regards to coordination:
- The Supplier will be responsible for ensuring that the three components in the scope of work and those that lead the delivery of them coordinate their interventions.
  - The Supplier will ensure that PARI-TACS interventions coordinate with the other components that fall under the larger PARI business case, including but not limited to the World Bank Trust Fund component.
  - The Supplier will coordinate in provinces with the implementing partners of BEK programmes including SEMI the health programme, AXE FILLE the education programme, the Green Growth programme (if included in the Contract as outlined in the sector scope section) and PACS, the Conflict programme where relevant through regular meetings.
  - The Supplier will join cross province development coordination efforts (e.g. in South Kivu) and where there are no cross office donor coordination efforts (e.g. Kasai) to support the establishing of a coordination body.

### Inclusion and Political Sensitive programming

77. Inclusion and political sensitive programming will be cross-cutting approaches in the implementation of this Contract. Besides making sure that women led CSOs are included in the programme's activities (see Component 2), the supplier will further make sure that results reporting is designed so as to be able to report disaggregated data by gender, age and disability, and show how gender equality and inclusion have been mainstreamed across all aspects of implementation. Please see for more information - Annex F for Gender and Social Inclusion Political Economy Analysis for South Kivu and Kasai Report.
78. The supplier will be responsible for monitoring whether the implementation of the three components are politically aware and informed. Each component should be continuously monitoring of the political will of beneficiaries to introduce reforms. The main supplier is required to monitor and raise FCDO awareness for challenges of particular concern for the

delivery of activities and required reforms. Quarterly reports should include a chapter outlining any political bottlenecks and other PEA challenges.

79. Component 3 is available to the supplier and the components when additional political economy analysis is required to understand and take next steps to resolve bottlenecks and other challenges to implementing activities and achieving the Theory of Change.

## Core Team

80. The Supplier will provide personnel that have the technical expertise and language skills (French speaking) to fully deliver this Contract and ensure effective day-to-day management of the programme. Details of expected roles and responsibilities are to be found in the technical evaluation criteria.

## Contract Duration and Budget

81. The estimated start date of the Contract is May 2024, the Contract will run for 35 months, ending 31<sup>st</sup> March 2027.
82. The value for this Contract is up to £9,550,000. The budget is exclusive of VAT. It is the Supplier's responsibility to understand their tax obligations.
83. The budget is subject to FCDOs annual budget allocations and cross-HMG Spending Reviews therefore the budget may increase or reduce during the lifetime of the Contract. The Budget will be confirmed between the FCDO and the supplier on an annual basis.

The percentages per component are indicative of allocation and structuring purposes. The Supplier

Suggested yearly profiling:

Financial Year	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27
Indicative budget	£2,500,000	£3,650,000	£3,400,000

Delivery Phases:

- After Contract award the **Inception** phase will run for 4 months
- The **Implementation** phase will run for 2 years 4 months
- The **Exit** phase will run for 3 months

## Scale up/Extensions

84. The Contract may be extended, at the discretion of the FCDO, for up to 1 year (12 months) with a maximum financial increase of up to £4,775,000. Total value including extension is £14,325,000. And subject to FCDOs commercial governance process.
85. The Contract geographical scope can be extended to include:
- a. North Kivu if the operational landscape allows, no additional funding will be available for this; and
  - b. Kasai central subject to the availability of funds and a contract amendment.

86. The sector scope may be increased to include Green Growth following the commencement of the Green Growth Programme and with approval of the SRO and PRO and in consultation with the supplier. No additional funding will be available for this scope increase.

Review points:

87. The Contract will have two formal review points:
1. Following the Inception phase there will be a break point. Progression to the Implementation phase is subject to satisfactory performance on the delivery of the Inception phase KPIs.
  2. At the end of the current HMG spending review period, March 2025. At this review point the FCDO programme management team will confirm availability of funding for the contract to proceed with implementation.

## Phases and Deliverables

### Inception phase

There will be an Inception phase at the start of the Contract. It is expected that the inception phase will last 4-months. During the Inception period the Supplier will engage with the FCDO team at least fortnightly to discuss and agree requirements before the finalisation of the Inception report and associated plans.

88. Deliverables per components during the Inception phase will be as follows:

Inception phase deliverables	
Component 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Produce a (final) work plan for activities to achieve each sub-output objective based on consultations with Revenue Authority and Provincial government and the World Bank ENCORE and STAREST programmes tailored to the needs of each implementation province</li> </ul>
Component 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Report providing overview of the provincial level civil society groups that will be included in the civil society coalition. Must represent 40-50% women, and young people, people with disabilities and represent the minority communities in the province.</li> <li>- Analysis report of the capacity and capacity gaps of women's civil society groups in each province.</li> <li>- Report that Identifies which ETDs will be supported as part of this sub-output.</li> </ul>
Component 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A standard template finalised in discussion with FCDO for proposal and budgets for TA, PEA and engagement funds.</li> <li>- A finalised method for procuring required expertise when a proposal for work is accepted (a proposal should be part of the bid).</li> </ul>

Cross cutting

89. The supplier will provide the deliverables for the following cross cutting themes:

Deliverables on cross-cutting themes	
Workplan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Produce a detailed and comprehensive work plan covering the inception phase and the first year of the implementation phase of the Contract per component and output following the indicative workplan provided during the tendering process. A broad workplan for the remaining period of the implementation period will also be required. This will be reviewed and revised regularly in close collaboration with the FCDO team.</li> </ul>
Theory of change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- An updated theory of change that builds on the FCDO PARI theory of change and adds further detail under each output (a first draft of the more detailed theory of change should be included in the bid).</li> </ul>
Logframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A detailed logframe to correspond to the workplan and the theory of change including detailed output indicators. (some suggested indicators in annex C)</li> </ul>
Financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A detailed and finalised financial forecast based on the financial proforma provided in the tender. Financial forecast should cover first two years of the Contract.</li> <li>- A final budget based on the budget provided as part of the bid.</li> </ul>
Risk register	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A detailed risk register and risk mitigation framework. The detailed risk register and risk mitigation framework as well as a delivery chain risk map showing the risks associated with the flow of funds will be required as part of the deliverables at the end of the inception phase.</li> </ul>
Value for money	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A Final VFM strategy</li> <li>- Develop value for money indicators and baselines</li> </ul>
Stakeholder mapping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A PFM mapping and engagement plan – in consultation with political governance and inclusion team – which maps out who the key stakeholders are, how they will be engaged with and by whom. This should include a strategy on internal stakeholder collaboration between component one, two and three. This should also include stakeholder engagement with BEK health, education and conflict programme partners.</li> </ul>
Monitoring, evaluation and learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MEL strategy</li> <li>- Flexible and adaptive programming strategy</li> </ul>

90. Activities for implementation will not begin until FCDO has approved these documents.

Implementation phase

91. During the implementation phase the supplier will be expected to deliver on the commitments agreed in the logframe and workplan finalised during the inception phase and updated every quarter throughout the implementation phase.

92. Weekly activities summary of activities and main political context challenges to be shared during implementation; this will be particularly relevant in periods of high political risks (e.g major political events, tensions between communities and conflict risks etc.)

93. The key deliverables expected from the implementation phase will include but not be limited to the following.

Deliverables within Implementation phase	
Timing	Specific deliverables
Yearly	<b>Annual report on progress</b> , which will coincide with the FCDO Annual Review period. The structure of the report will be agreed by both parties and will be designed to mirror the FCDO annual review template. These annual reports will contain impact stories. The report will include a section on political economy analysis approaches.
	<b>Annual work plan</b> , detailing how the Supplier will deliver the key results of the contract. The workplan for year 1 of implementation will have to be submitted to FCDO before the end of the inception phase and provide a detailed account of how the Supplier intends to deliver year 1 results. It should contain key milestones, indicators, activities, planned resources amongst other. These yearly workplans will be reviewed and if necessary, adjusted on a quarterly basis during quarterly review meetings between the supplier and FCDO.
	<b>Asset register</b> updated once a year when submitting the annual report
	Safeguarding strategy to be updated once a year
Quarterly	Quarterly narrative performance reports (template to be provided by FCDO). If reports are written by downstream partners the supplier will quality assure these reports. The report will include a section on political economy analysis approaches (bi-annually). The report will include impact stories. The quarterly narrative report will contain a section on VfM and provide an assessment of progress made against VfM indicators.
	Quarterly financial forecasts and expenses reports
	Results framework reviewed and updated in case milestones need to be changed.
	Risk matrix updated for any changed risks including specific attention to potential fraud risks
	An updated Delivery Chain Map to capture any changes
	Update on impact cases
Monthly	Monthly progress updates during monthly meetings with the main supplier.
	Monthly updates on forecasts for the subsequent month and confirmation of estimated spend of current month.
	If requested by FCDO, ad hoc meetings with downstream partners and/or with beneficiaries.
Weekly	<i>Possibility to provide ad hoc and weekly short summaries of activities and main political context challenges</i> ; this will be particularly relevant in periods of high political risks (e.g major political events, tensions between communities and conflict risks etc.)

94. The supplier will send reports to the FCDO SRO and PRO. The SRO and PRO will provide comments and request clarifications within 10 working days. Once these are addressed the report will be validated and where relevant a payment will be released. In case the reports are not validated by FCDO because their quality is not deemed satisfactory, the supplier will have five working days to respond to FCDO comments and resubmit adjusted reports.

#### Close down/Exit phase

95. There will be a 3-month close down period before the contract ends to ensure responsible programme closure including the hand-over of all technical and intellectual property. The supplier will deliver a final report covering the results and lessons learned over the life of the contract. An asset disposal plan will also be required if any assets were procured with the programme funds, the service provider will provide a disposal proposal guided by the UK asset disposal guidelines.

Deliverables for Closure phase		
Deliverable	Details	Due date
Final activity report	The template and structure will be provided by FCDO before the report is written. The report will be structured along the FCDO Programme Completion Report template.	End of Contract
Final financial report	This report should provide an overview of all expenses made under this project	End of Contract
Transition/exit report	Based on the exit strategy developed during inception, this report will cover sustainability, exit or handover strategies for each intervention including a section on lessons learned.	End of Contract
Final evaluation	The supplier is expected to commission an external evaluation of the project.	End of Contract

## Contract Management

### Payment Structure and Performance Management

96. Payments will be made using a milestone payment process for the duration on the Contract and expenses will be paid on actuals. Invoices will be paid quarterly in arrears. The maximum budget for this Contract will be up to £9,550,000.
97. Payment for all Milestones will be subject to the approval of the report.
98. Please see Milestone with deliverables for the duration of the Contract in the table below:

Milestone	Milestone Deliverables	Description	Verifier	Due date	Invoice value (excluding expenses) – to be agreed
1	Inception Phase workplan	Produce a plan for activities to achieve each sub-output objective based on consultations with Revenue Authority and Provincial government and the World Bank ENCORE and STAREST programmes tailored to the needs of each implementation province.	SRO	Month 4	
2	Civil society engagement report	Report providing overview of the provincial level civil society groups that will be included in the civil society coalition. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Must represent 40-50% women, and young people, people with disabilities and represent the minority communities in the province.</li> <li>- Analysis report of the capacity and capacity gaps of women's civil society groups in each province.</li> <li>- Report that Identifies which ETDs will be supported as part of this sub-output.</li> </ul>	SRO	Month 4	
3	Workplan	Produce a detailed and comprehensive work plan covering the Inception phase and the first year of the Implementation phase of the contract per component and output following the indicative workplan provided during the tendering process.  The Workplan is also expected to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theory of Change approach- an updated theory of change that builds on the FCDO PARI theory of change and adds further detail under each output</li> <li>- A detailed Log-Frame to correspond to the workplan and the theory of change including detailed output indicators. (some suggested indicators in Annex C)</li> </ul>	SRO	Month 4	
4	Baseline Study	Provide a baseline study that clearly establishes the current capacity level of provincial and local stakeholders, from which progress will be measured. This baseline study should refer to the results frame indicators and provide an accurate snapshot of the current situation in the areas covered by the Contract and in the focus provinces.	SRO	Month 4	
5	Financial Management forecast	A detailed and finalised financial forecast based on the financial proforma provided in the tender. Financial forecast should cover first two years of the contract. A final budget based on the budget provided as part of the bid.	SRO	Month 4	
6	Risk Register	A detailed risk register and risk mitigation framework–The detailed risk register and risk mitigation framework as well as a delivery chain risk map showing the risks associated with the flow of funds will be required as part of the deliverables at the end of the inception phase.	SRO	Month 4	



7	Value for Money (VfM) Strategy	A detailed a final VFM strategy. Develop value for money indicators and baselines.	SRO	Month 4	
8	Stakeholder Mapping	A stakeholder mapping and engagement plan – in consultation with political governance and inclusion team – which maps out who the key stakeholders are, how they will be engaged with and by whom. This should include a strategy on internal stakeholder collaboration between component one, two and three. This should also include stakeholder engagement with BEK health, education and conflict programme partners.	SRO	Month 4	
9	Monitoring and evaluation	MEL Strategy, and approach to flexible and adaptive programme strategy.	SRO	Month 4	
10	Annual Progress Report	<p>Coinciding with the FCDO Annual Review period. The structure of the report will mirror the FCDO annual review template. The report will include following sections and themes to report against:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Executive Summary</li> <li>- Current situation analysis</li> <li>- Context update</li> <li>- Theory of Change</li> <li>- Programme Progress including impact stories</li> <li>- Strategic Partnership and Coordination</li> <li>- Gender equality and Women’s empowerment</li> <li>- Disability Inclusion</li> <li>- Value for Money</li> <li>- Programme Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</li> <li>- Due Diligence</li> <li>- Sustainability/Impact</li> <li>- Risk Matrix</li> <li>- Delivery Chain Risk Maps</li> <li>- Comprehensive Budget</li> <li>- Asset Register</li> </ul>	SRO	Month 16	
11	Annual Work plan	<p>Detailed plan in how the Supplier will deliver the key results of the contract. The workplan for year 1 of implementation will have to be submitted to FCDO before the end of the inception phase and provide a detailed account of how the Supplier intends to deliver year 1 results.</p> <p>The Work Plan will include: key milestones, indicators, activities, planned resources amongst other. These yearly workplans will be reviewed and if necessary, adjusted on a quarterly basis during quarterly review meetings between the supplier and FCDO.</p>	SRO	Month 16	

12	Quarterly Performance Reports	Quarterly narrative performance reports. If reports are written by downstream partners the supplier will quality assure these reports. The report will include a section on political economy analysis approaches. The report will include impact stories. The quarterly narrative report will contain a section on VfM and provide an assessment of progress made against VfM indicators.	SRO	Month 8 and quarterly thereafter	
13	Quarterly financial forecasts and expenses reports	The financial forecasts and expenses reports Including monthly updates on forecasts for the subsequent month and confirmation of estimated spend of current month.	SRO	Month 8 and quarterly thereafter	
14	Quarterly Risk Matrix update	Risk matrix updated for any changed risks including specific attention to potential fraud risks	SRO	Month 8 and quarterly thereafter	
15	Final activities Report	The template and structure will be provided by FCDO before the report is written. The report will be structured along the FCDO Programme Completion Report template.	SRO	Month 35	
16	Final Financial Report	To include Final Financial Report – Overview of all expenses made under the project, total spend including audited accounts.	SRO	Month 34	
17	Transitional/Exit Report	Based on the exit strategy developed during inception, this report will cover sustainability, exit or handover strategies for each intervention including a section on lessons learned.	SRO	Month 34	
18	Final Evaluation	The Supplier is expected to commission an external evaluation of the project. This evaluation report will respond to the question of the overall impact of the contract implementation, identify main lessons to be learned and provide recommendations for successor interventions.	SRO	No later than 2 months before project completion.	

Key Performance indicators (KPIs) table:

<b>KPI 1 Quality</b>	Quality reporting and compliance – 100% of reports and forecasts issued in accordance with Terms of Reference.
<b>KPI 2 Timelines</b>	Timely reporting and compliance – 100% of reports and forecasts issued in accordance with Terms of Reference.
<b>KPI 3 Financial management</b>	Accurate financial management by assessing the variance between budget forecast and actual spend. This should be no more than a 10% variance.

99. Payment structure and application of KPI process

- Only fees will be subjected to the KPI process.
- KPIs 1 and 2 will be applied to all milestones.
- 10% of fees for each Milestone Payment is at risk against the KPIs 1 and 2 (with the exception of Milestone 16).
- KPI 3 will **only** be applied to Milestone 16 (Final Financial Report) with 15% of the fees for the milestone at risk (KPI 1,2, at 10% and 5% for KPI3).
- **The measure for the KPIs is Pass or Fail.**
- Where several Milestones are completed in the same reporting period, invoices may be consolidated.

100. The Supplier must inform the FCDO as soon as possible if they anticipate missing the deadlines for any deliverables. In this circumstance, the Supplier will provide to the FCDO a justification for the anticipated delay in delivery and propose a new deadline for FCDO's consideration. FCDO may, as its sole discretion, agree to extend the deadline for completion of a milestone – this approval will be provided in writing and will not be unreasonably withheld.

## Risk and Constraints

101. The key risks and challenges that FCDO has identified, and which the Supplier is expected to address in addition to other risks they identify:

Types of Risks	Description of risk that should be considered (not limited to)
<b>Delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Identifying and engaging with populations at risk and responding to their specific needs;</li> <li>- Delivery challenges associated with safety working in fragile or conflict areas;</li> <li>- Need to work through local actors on the ground who may not have the skills and tools required to achieve minimum standards of monitoring / research etc.</li> <li>- Lack of complementarity between partners', compromising value for money and creating a potential data collection burden on beneficiaries.</li> </ul>

<b>External Context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased fragility or political instability in donor and partner countries makes it impossible to continue supporting practices and/or development interventions.</li> <li>- Grant activities disrupted due to events beyond grantees control - e.g., conflict, extreme climate event, changes in government policy;</li> <li>- Programme execution and / or activities hindered by host government unwillingness to collaborate with or license programme efforts;</li> </ul>
<b>Data</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The limitations in available, reliable and comparable data;</li> <li>- Risks to data confidentiality, transportation and security;</li> <li>- Risks of identifying beneficiaries in data analysis and reporting.</li> </ul>

### Delivery Chain Mapping

102. Delivery Chain Mapping (DCM) is a process that identifies and captures, usually in visual form (on one page), the name of all partners involved in delivering a specific good, service or charge, ideally down to the end beneficiary. Addressing this is the actions /activities required to manage regular and exceptional risk throughout the network to reduce exposure and vulnerability. Bidders are required to produce an initial delivery chain risk map which should, where possible, identify all partners (funding and non-funding e.g, legal/contributions in-kind) involve in delivering a specific product or service, ideally down to the end beneficiary, including financial values. An updated version of this will be needed by the end of the inception phase. Updates will be required whenever the delivery chain changes and/or quarterly and may result in contract amendment.

103. As a minimum, it should include details of:

- 1) The name of all downstream delivery partners and their functions;
- 2) Funding flows (e.g., amount, type) to each delivery partner;
- 3) Accountability lines
- 4) High level risks involved in programme delivery, mitigating measures and associated controls.

104. Access to the FCDO DCM Guide can be found [here](#).

### Asset Registers

105. During the inception and delivery of the programme, the Supplier will need to record the details of any purchased assets with a value of over £500 or equivalent in local currency. An asset is described as any equipment purchased with programme funds which has a useful life of more than one year. Attractive assets (such as mobile phones, laptops, satellite phones) should be grouped as they might individually have a value of less than £500. An 'attractive asset' is equipment which is mobile and attractive to a potential perpetrator. Assets should be recorded and managed in accordance with FCDO's rules. Procured items will remain the property of FCDO for the lifetime of the programme. The Supplier(s) should ensure that there is a complete, accurate inventory of all programme assets and facilitate physical checks by the SSERJ SRO annually.

### Transparency

106. FCDO requires Supplier(s) receiving and managing funds, to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate subcontractors, sub-agencies and partners.

107. It is a contractual requirement for all Supplier(s) to comply with this, and to ensure they have the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this FCDO. Further information is available from: <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

108. In accordance with clause 34.1 of Section 2 of Terms and Conditions no publicity is to be given to this Contract without the prior written consent of FCDO. There may be locations where the use of the UK Aid logo will not be appropriate. Any exceptions to the rule above must be discussed with FCDO on a case-by-case basis.
109. Transparency, value for money, and results are top priorities for the UK.
110. FCDO has a duty to show UK taxpayers where their money is being spent, its impact, and the results achieved. FCDO has guidance on the use of its logos, which will be shared with the Supplier(s) as necessary.

#### Do No Harm

111. The Supplier must have in place, safeguarding policies and procedures to ensure that everyone, regardless of age, gender religion or ethnicity can be protected from harm. This includes sexual exploitation or abuse but should also be taken to be understood as all forms of physical or emotional abuse and financial exploitation. The Supplier will carry out the requisite due diligence on consortium and other downstream partners including around their approach and policies to ensure safeguarding of beneficiaries and other programme stakeholder and appropriate training and vetting of staff.

## Appendix 1: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

### Appendix 1 of Call-down Contract

#### Schedule of Processing, Personal Data and Data Subjects

This schedule must be completed by the Parties in collaboration with each-other before the processing of Personal Data under the Contract.

The completed schedule must be agreed formally as part of the Contract with FCDO and any changes to the content of this schedule must be agreed formally with FCDO under a Contract Variation.

Description	Details
Identity of the Controller and Processor for each Category of Data Subject	<p>The Parties acknowledge that for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation, the following status will apply to personal data under this Call-down Contract:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The Parties acknowledge that Clause 33.2 and 33.4 (Section 2 of the contract) shall not apply for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation as the <b>Parties are independent Controllers</b> in accordance with Clause 33.3 in respect of the following Personal Data: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal Data associated with staffing and recruitment for the supplier and sub-contractors</li> </ul> </li> <li>2) The Supplier is the Controller and FCDO is the Processor in accordance with Clause 33 (Section 2 of the contract) of the following Personal Data: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal Data associated with Implementing Partners</li> <li>• Personal Data associate with beneficiaries of Implementing Partners</li> </ul> </li> <li>3) For the avoidance of doubt the Supplier shall provide <b>anonymised data sets</b> for the purposes of reporting on this project and so FCDO shall not be a Processor in respect of Personal Data.</li> </ol>
Subject matter of the processing	The programme is to provide Technical Assistance and Capacity building to DRC government and DRC civil society in relation to the DRC FCDO Governance programme, PARI
Duration of the processing	Data processing will be required through the duration of the project
Nature and purposes of the processing	<p>This programme aims to support through technical assistance and training, DRC provincial governments to improve their public financial management (including tax collection, budgeting, oversight) and to support the capacity of civil society through training, technical assistance and funding DRC civil society organisations in advocacy on public financial management and service delivery.</p> <p>The nature of processing will involve collection, recording, organising, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,</p>

	<p>disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction of data.</p> <p>The purposes are for employment, contracting, recruitment, processing, statutory obligation, training, assessment, review, monitoring, learning, audit and evaluation.</p>
<b>Type of Personal Data [and Special Categories of Personal Data]</b>	<p>The type of personal data including the controller and processor of each type are listed below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Personal identifiers of the international and national consultants who will be working with the Supplier:</li> <li>- Primary data obtained by the Supplier and sub-contractors from trainings and capacity building activities</li> <li>- Secondary data obtained from the DRC government including e.g. tax data databases with personal information</li> <li>- Secondary data obtained from DRC civil society organisations about citizens in DRC</li> </ul> <p>Special categories of personal data that may be collected:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Age</li> <li>- Religious background</li> <li>- Clan affiliation</li> <li>- Gender</li> <li>- Information about any disabilities</li> <li>- Political affiliation</li> </ul>
<b>Plan for return and destruction of the data once processing complete</b>	<p>There will be a 3-month close down period before the contract ends. 12 months before the end of the contract the supplier will submit an updated exit strategy to complete the assignment and close the project. This will include the handover of all technical and intellectual property. The supplier will be responsible for ensuring a plan for the handover of all key data sets and EPR reports in an appropriate transferable format to FCDO and/or the destruction of data before the end of the programme.</p>

## Annex A: Background to PARI business case

This section outlines the three main challenges in the DRC context that PARI aims to respond to, and the geographic and decentralised focus of PARI. The PARI business case argues that there three interlinked factors which shape the governance context in the DRC <sup>8</sup>.

**Weak democracy:** DRC is a relatively new democracy with limited areas for accountability and public participation. There are incentives that work against elites and citizens working together to solve common problems or promote the public good<sup>9</sup>. According to Freedom House, there is weak government accountability on decisions and budgets<sup>10</sup>. This results in a lack of inclusive and transparent institutions, faced with difficulties in meeting people's needs. Women's political empowerment is limited by social norms that inhibit women's ability to participate in decision-making.

**Incomplete decentralisation:** DRC's 2006 constitution is highly decentralised, giving provinces exclusive responsibilities over health and education and the right to retain 40% of all taxes collected (retrocession). In 2015 DRC created 26 provinces from 11, which created many provinces that have nascent governance systems. In practice, DRC retains a highly centralised governance system. Given limited decentralisation (both financial and in terms of responsibilities) elected officials at the sub-national level are limited in their ability to deliver on electoral promises. This in turn inhibits government legitimacy at sub-national level<sup>11</sup>.

**Poor service delivery and PFM:** Public services such as health and education are directly affected by challenges in the budget, complex tax systems and a lack of transparency. According to the most recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment low health and education expenditure is influenced by the lack of spending capacity and responsibility allocated to the ministries of health and education and a reliance on emergency spending procedures<sup>12</sup>. For example, in the health sector, the 2019 allocation represented only 10% of the national budget, lower than the 15% agreed by African countries in the Abuja agreement<sup>13</sup>. Budget execution was even lower, at only 57% in 2019<sup>14</sup>. Poor public financial management percolates to the decentralised level, especially in newly created provinces, which have lower capacity than the national level to manage funds effectively, accountably and transparently<sup>15</sup>.

**Geographic and decentralised focus of PARI.** This Business Case will focus primarily at a decentral level on two regions, Kasai province in central DRC and one or two provinces in the East of DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu). This means the bidder is expected to propose interventions in Kasai and in one or both of the provinces in North Kivu and South Kivu (further explanation in the scope of work section and in the PARI business case).

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<sup>8</sup> The full PARI business case will be available to bidders

<sup>9</sup>SLRC, [Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage](#), 2019

<sup>10</sup> Freedom House, [Freedom in the World report](#) DRC, 2022

<sup>11</sup>SLRC, [Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage](#), 2019

<sup>12</sup>PEFA, [Democratic Republic of Congo | Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability \(PEFA\), 2019](#)

<sup>13</sup> DRC ministry of Health and WB, [Financement de la Sante en RDC](#), 2019

<sup>14</sup> DRC ministry of Health and WB, [Financement de la Sante en RDC](#), 2019

<sup>15</sup>SLRC, [Basic Service Delivery and Governance Processes in South Kivu](#), 2019




## Annex B: PARI Theory of Change

The overarching impact objective of PARI is for *'DRCs citizens benefit from more democratic, accountable, inclusive and effective governance to deliver pro-poor services and support lasting stability in DRC at central level and in selected provinces'*. See the full theory of change below.

This is to be achieved through two outcome objectives.

- **Outcome 1** is *'DRC holds more peaceful, transparent and inclusive elections through enhanced citizen's and in particular women's, oversight in democratic processes'*.
- **Outcome 2** is *'improved capacity of decentral and national institutions to be more accountable and effective in the management and delivery of public services reinforcing UK strategic priorities'*.

**Outputs:** The outputs under each of these outcomes require supply and demand side interventions. **Supply side** means interventions that work on the capacity of government to deliver services. **Demand side** means interventions that support the capacity of civil society to hold government to account for delivery.



## Annex C: Proposed Log-frame Indicators

Components	Proposed Log-frame indicators
<b>1</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % increase in tax collection</li> <li>- % increase in complaints on tax collection</li> <li>- % execution rate of provincial budget (excluding transfers from Kinshasa)</li> <li>- % increase in actual expenditure in health and education</li> </ul>
<b>2</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of targeted CSOs feeling adequately included in participatory budgeting processes and budget monitoring</li> <li>- % of civil society proposals from civil society/government consultations on budget used in provincial budget</li> <li>- % of civil society supported that are women and from other marginalised groups</li> </ul>
<b>3</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of PEA analyses conducted</li> <li>- Number of short-term TA projects at a national level related to PFM and decentralisation</li> <li>- Number of policy relevant events supported by the UK</li> </ul>

## Annex D: Summary BEK sectoral programmes

### **Health Programme (implementing)**

**Title:** [Essential Services for Maternal and Child Health](#) / Fr. Services Essentiels de Santé Maternelle et Infantile en RDC (SEMI)

**Value :** £37mn 2022 – 2025

**Implementing partner:** IMA World Health

**Impact statement:** To support essential maternal, child and infant health services to end preventable deaths in one of the poorest provinces in DRC and strengthen the health system at national and provincial level.

**Summary of the programme:** This programme focusses on improving health outcomes for 1.6 million women, girls and children and on ending preventable deaths in Kasai, one of the poorest provinces in DRC, with the highest maternal mortality rate in the country. It will support the implementation of the DRC Government's Universal Health Coverage strategy and empower women and girls, especially on sexual and reproductive health and rights. Its two-pronged approach, based on global and DRC evidence of what works, will: i) Strengthen health systems and improve access to quality, effective and affordable health services by improving the skills of health personnel and increasing the use of health information for better decision-making. ii) Deliver basic maternal, child health, nutrition and family planning services to meet immediate, often lifesaving needs in Kasai province. By joining up this programme with our girls' education work, we will deliver mutually-reinforcing benefits to DRC's human capital and accelerate the drivers of a demographic transition in a fragile, post-conflict context, contributing to stability.

### **Education Programme (implementing)**

**Title:** AXE-FILLES – Access and qualité in girls education/ Accès et Égalité pour l'Éducation des Filles  
**value :** £35mn 2022 - 2026

**Implementing partner:** Save the Children UK

**Impact statement:** Increased number of empowered & educated girls that benefits wider society and contributes to SDG 4

**Programme summary:** This programme aims to **increase girls' access to quality education** in DRC, which has the highest percentage of children out of primary school in the DRC, as well as being among the poorest regions in DRC.

Building on lessons from a one-year pilot on girls' education, this programme will improve:

- **Access:** Supporting **60,000 children (at least 60% marginalised girls)** to attend school by tackling the barriers at the school, home and community level that restrict them from attending school and, specifically for girls, from equally participating in education, such as gender discrimination, family pressure to work, child marriage, social norms and attitudes, and a lack of girl-friendly facilities in schools.
- **Retention:** Educating and empowering girls about their rights to education, including education on sexual health and reproductive rights, tackling sexual and gender-based violence at school, and providing scholarships to support girls remaining in secondary school.
- **Quality:** Improving education assessments and data quality for better decision-making in the sector, promoting better teacher training and more comprehensive recruitment of female teachers to reduce gender disparities and improve learning outcomes.

The programme will primarily operate in Kasai, one of 26 provinces of DRC, in the centre of the country, but will include specific assistance at the national level to support gender-sensitive policies and reform.

### **Peace and Stability Programme (Implementing)**

**Title:** PACS – [Programme d’Appui pour la Consolidation de la Stabilité en RDC](#) , Conflict and Stability support Programme for DRC

**Value:** £16mn 2022 – 2026

**Implementing partner:** TBA

**Impact statement:** strength and stability is strengthened in targeted areas in DRC

**Programme summary:** This four-year programme aims to reduce violence and support the Government of DRC (GoDRC) to deliver its national strategy for conflict resolution and prevention. In doing so this programme will help create the conditions for MONUSCO withdrawal. The programme will seek to:

- i) Support Government of DRC efforts to address the persistence of armed groups through mediation and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), by delivering multi-sectoral stabilisation programming which benefits conflict-affected communities in priority areas and by providing technical and programme support to mediation with armed groups and the design of DDR initiatives.

Support GoDRC efforts to deliver its national strategy for conflict resolution and prevention and to prepare for MONUSCO drawdown. We will offer technical assistance to GoDRC and international actors to improve the quality and impact of GoDRC and international community investments in conflict resolution.

### **Humanitarian Action and Recovery after Crisis (HARC)**

**Title:** Humanitarian Action and Recovery after Crisis (HARC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

**Value:** £98 million over three years

**Implementing partners:** ICRC, WFP, UNICEF, SAFER and EAST

**Programme summary:** The Humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is extreme and requires both an immediate and a longer-term response to meet the growing needs. During the next 3 years, FCDO in concert with our partners aims to shift the trajectory; towards a better humanitarian response that contributes to building resilience, provides protection and reduces future humanitarian needs.

To do this the UK needs a holistic approach to address new humanitarian needs, support household ability to cope with shocks and help survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) recover.

The HARC PROGRAMME proposes to spend up to £98 million over three years and support an estimated 1.09 million people in the most conflict-affected provinces of Eastern DRC: Ituri, North and South Kivu and potentially Tanginika.

UK funding will cover: emergency humanitarian lifesaving activities, support to survivors of SGBV, and livelihood and nutrition recovery activities. This is set out more fully in the theory of change below.

### **Green Growth DRC programme (at business case development stage)**

**Title:** TBA

**Value:** TBA

**Implementing partner:** TBA

**Impact statement:** Safeguarding DRC’s globally significant forests, biodiversity, and supporting DRC in its pursuit of clean energy and low carbon growth and livelihoods, including through creating conditions for enhanced, responsible UK investment in priority sectors.

**Summary of the programme:** the International Finance (ICF) programme will support Small

and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) working in energy and/or agriculture - two sectors at the heart of DRC's national low-carbon development plan. In DRC, SMEs constitute 90% of all businesses, employ 50% of the workforce, but contribute less than 20% of GDP. SMEs have the potential to deliver significant economic growth, reduce poverty and influence the spread of innovation outside of major urban centres, where larger enterprises cluster. This makes them critical for any intervention seeking transformative, economy-wide change. Yet there is a financing gap of \$9.3billion to SMEs. Without support, development in these sectors is likely to be slow, ineffective and create significant climate and environmental risks. This programme will work across the investment lifecycle to help businesses tackle barriers to growth improving their access to finance and expertise to expand their operations and improve their environmental and social impacts. We will aim to deliver the following results:

- Creating jobs and alternative energy sources to charcoal through the growth of sustainable agriculture and energy SMEs;
- Crowding in private & donor capital into sustainable economic diversification initiatives through co-investment and market discovery;
- Working flexibly with the DRC government to improve the business-operating environment and to support work on government priorities, such as carbon markets and payments for ecosystem services.



# Civil Society Landscape Mapping in South Kivu and Kasai, the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Final Report

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Prepared by Triple Line and FHI360 UK | November 2023



## Document Control

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Date	3/11/23

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## List of abbreviations

BEK	British Embassy Kinshasa
CENI	Commission Electorale Nationale Independante
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GESI	Gender and Social Inclusion
HR	Human Resources
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo
KII	Key Informant Interview
PARI	Programme d'Appui a la Rédevabilité et l'Inclusion
PFM	Public Financial Management

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Report

This Civil Society Mapping report draws on primary and secondary qualitative data gathered in Kasai and South Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) Political Economy Analysis (PEA) was also conducted in the same provinces. The report is intended to support the implementation of the British Embassy Kinshasa's (BEK) Governance Business Programme to Support Accountability and Inclusion (Programme d'Appui à la redevabilité et l'inclusion (PARI) where outcome two is "Building planning, financial management and delivery systems in national and provincial government institutions." Activities under PARI outcome two will challenge corruption and strengthen accountability and effectiveness in the management and delivery of public services such as strengthening citizen participation, including for women, people with disabilities and youth. The governance business case presents interventions on both the demand and supply sides of governance. This mapping informs the UK government demand-led engagement.

The mapping also aims to strengthen FCDO's understanding of which civil society groups exist and the interests they represent, their relationship with government, the dynamics amongst civil society groups, and which groups are included and excluded from discussions and debates. The mapping is based on an understanding of power, and how marginalisation in voice and accountability processes happens in the two specific provinces, Kasai and South Kivu.

In parallel to the Civil Society Mapping, and to inform PARI, BEK commissioned two additional studies in Kasai and South Kivu provinces: a Gender and Social Inclusion Political Economy Analysis on women's political participation, and a study on public financial management (PFM). BEK considers the role of civil society in holding government accountable to be a core part of interventions aimed at improving PFM, including from a GESI perspective. The mapping therefore includes recommendations on how to improve civil society inclusion in PFM.

# 2 Methodology

The research draws on nine interviews with civil society organisations and government officials in Kasai and 11 in South Kivu (see [Annex 2](#)). It also draws on a review of secondary data which includes earlier mapping studies (see [Annex 1](#)). Key informant interviews used semi-structured questionnaires with leaders of influential civil society organisations (CSOs), under-represented groups, local and provincial government officials, religious leaders and journalists in the provincial capitals Tshikapa and Bukavu. These were conducted by an international consultant of FHI 360 and locally-recruited researchers in South Kivu and Kasai throughout July and August 2023, logistically supported by FHI 360's extensive operational presence in the DRC.

The research questions posed during interviews with civil society were:

1. What types of CSOs are working on governance and accountability and what is their level of influence?
2. What are their strategies and approaches for holding government to account and the factors that affect the success or failure of those approaches?
3. What is the relationship between provincial government and CSOs and what is the dynamic between CSOs? What support do CSOs receive and what are the obstacles they face in advancing accountability?
4. What are FCDO's entry points to support these CSOs?

For this research we used the definition of ‘civil society’ provided by the Commission on Civil Society:

*“At its broadest, civil society is the connections that exist between different individuals and institutions. We engage in civil society when a group of people find common interests and make their voice heard, when we debate about the sort of future we want to see, when we help our neighbours and friends, or when we make our communities better places to live. A narrower concept of civil society would be the set of organisations that provide the infrastructure for those connections, from charities to trade unions and from housing associations to social enterprises.”<sup>1</sup>*

The civil society landscape is complex and varies across different parts of the DRC. It is important not to assume civil society is a homogenous group in any of the provinces or nationally. Our research, with a focus on civil society organisations working on governance issues, especially those advancing accountability, found that:

- **South Kivu** has a well-developed and diverse civil society landscape.
- CSOs in **Kasai** province are more nascent and have received less access to international funding and training.

In **both provinces** there are many CSOs who have a primary focus on social services. For example, education sector faith-based organisations and other CSOs are responsible for managing the largest number of schools and education institutions, filling the vacuum left by the state.

Historically, the development of modern CSOs in the DRC began in 1994 with the influx of refugees into Eastern DRC, after the first Congo War. From 2006 CSOs became more professional and technical. Thematic groups were established within the overall structure of civil society (especially in South Kivu). CSOs became implementing partners of the larger international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which distanced them from their original mandate to hold government to account. From 2014, Congolese society became largely polarised in political terms, including civil society<sup>2</sup>, as CSOs were often associated to political parties and their agendas. Today, many political parties create their own CSOs to support their political agenda and do in some instances use these ‘created’ groups to undermine the effectiveness of other CSOs’ interventions and advocacy.

The DRC is a resource-rich country which creates difficult dynamics between the state and society as well as the state and its citizens where they organise as civil society groups.<sup>3</sup> According to a study by Salamon and Anheier, the relationship between the government and civil society in countries which are resource-rich is routinely undermined by the government’s access to resources. A key concern is that governments’ lack of reliance on taxation revenue undermines the ‘social contract’ whereby ordinary citizens and civil society are motivated, and have the right to question how public money is being allocated and spent there. This is very much the case for the DRC.<sup>4</sup>

The 2006 Constitution and the laws of the DRC guarantee citizens’ rights to freedom of association, expression, assembly, and opinion. In theory, CSOs are free to discuss any topic, criticise the government, and participate in demonstrations if they respect the law and do not violate public order, morality, or the rights of others. However, according to a report by Human Rights Watch, this is not true in practice. The reports indicates that in 2021 the DRC national government repeatedly restricted freedom of expression, suppressed peaceful demonstrations using lethal force, and arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted activists, journalists, and members of the opposition.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <https://civilsocietycommission.org/publication/what-is-civil-society/>.

<sup>2</sup> For a full historical context of the development of civil society in the DRC, see pp.14 – 33 of DFID DRC Evidence, Analysis and Coordination Programme (EACP): Civil society barriers to collective action. 12

## 4.1 Civil Society Organisations: Types and Levels of Influence

### 4.1.1 Types of CSOs

In both provinces, our research found that there are four distinct types of CSOs:

#### Box 1: Types of CSOs

- Governance CSOs (e.g., those working to secure better use of public funding etc.);
- Human Rights defenders;
- CSOs working on thematic issues such as women and children, education and health;
- Social movements i.e., groups of individuals advocating on single issues that matter to specific communities (e.g. high energy bills). Such social movements have the capacity to mobilise large numbers of people.

### 4.1.2 Spheres of influence

A CSO can be considered “influential” where it has the potential to bring about change in public policy at local and provincial levels as well as influence attitudes and behaviour; overall, having an impact on advancing accountability. The level of influence of a CSO is also very much linked to the charisma and network of its leader.

In **South Kivu**, there are many issue-based CSOs which are members of the umbrella of Le Bureau de la Coordination de la Société Civile au Sud Kivu, headed by Adrien Zawadi in Bukavu. The Bureau is considered to be effective and productive. Its leadership is independent from the government and clearly understands the role of civil society and its purpose. Its membership organisations are categorised by themes and working groups. They have access to funding due to their proximity to the international humanitarian effort. CSOs who wish to join the Bureau de la Coordination provide details of their organisations – including their key thematic areas – after gaining CSO status through the formal procedures. A document that was created in 2003 is updated by hand<sup>6</sup> when a new organisation joins:



Figure 1 : Annuaire des associations membres de la Société Civile du Sud-Kivu (2003)

In comparison to Kasai, CSOs in South Kivu are well-funded and many have received training as part of their funding arrangements on issues including project management, evaluation, budgeting, human resources, etc. A group of more established CSOs often tend to receive most of the funding, but small CSOs partner with the larger ones to work on issues for which their members have expertise. South Kivu has a small number of well-established influential CSOs, led by individuals with significant influence and popular support (see [Table 1](#)).

**Table 1: South Kivu: coordination body and influential CSOs (September 2023)**

Civil society organisation	Name of leader	Remit / key issues	Typology
Le Bureau de Coordination de la société civile du Sud-Kivu	Adrien Zawadi	Coordinates CSOs in South Kivu. Monitors government actions, educates and informs people about their rights and duties, encourages participation of all citizens in political life. Advocates and lobbies for good governance.	Coordination body
La nouvelle société civile congolaise (NSCC)	Mireille Birembe	Promotes human rights, lobbies and advocates for good governance.	Human Rights defenders
Groupe Jeremie	Jean-Baptiste Mulengezi	Promotes human rights, raises awareness on good governance, lobbies government on good governance.	Human Rights defenders Thematic CSO: Governance
(ICJP) Initiative Congolaise pour la Justice et la Paix	Eric Kajemba/	Works on exploitation of mining resources, advocates for good governance in mining.	Thematic CSO: Mining
Action Communautaire pour les droits de l'Homme de Shabunda (ACADOSHA)	Blaise Bubala	Promotes human rights and good governance	Human Rights defenders
Lutte pour le Changement (LUCHA)	Judith Maroy	As an active social movement, works on governance and political change/democracy	Human Rights defenders (established social movement)
Fondation Panzi	Debby Guiters (Exec. Sec.)	Supports victims of gender-based violence (GBV) (organisation founded by Nobel prize winner Denis Mukwege)	Thematic CSO: GBV
Caucus des Femmes	Solange Lwashiga	Promotes rights of women and girls, supports women's political participation	Thematic CSO: Women's rights
Héritiers de la Justice	Gerard Kwigwasa	Promotes human rights and peace	Thematic CSO: Peace

CDJP (Commission diocésain justice et paix)	Abbé Nkunzi	Promotes human rights and peace	Faith-based human rights defenders
Observatoire de la Bonne Gouvernance (OBAPG),	Amosi Bisimwa	Monitors and advocates for good governance	Thematic CSO: Governance
Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix (OGP),	Eric Kajemba	Works on exploitation of mining resources, advocates for royalties due in mining areas	Thematic CSO: Mining
Max Impact	Safanto Lukendo Bulongo	Monitors and evaluates budget implementation at provincial level, works on mineral traceability, maps mining sites (the current leader is a candidate at the 2023 elections)	Thematic CSO: Economic rights
Dynamique pour la cohésion sociale et le développement (DYCOD)	Patinant Bashombe	Promotes peace and sustainable development, human rights and democracy	Thematic CSO: Peace
SOCINE (Société Nouvel Espoir)	Faustin Katanga	Protects and defends human rights, builds capacity of civil society on good governance and human rights	Human Rights defenders
Dynamique des peuples autochtones (DYPA),	Adolphine Muley	Promotes and advocates for rights of indigenous populations	Thematic CSO: Rights of indigenous populations
RRN (Réseau Ressources Naturelles)	Roger Muchuba	Protects the environment including from illegal exploitation of natural resources	Thematic CSO: Natural resources

In **Kasai**, the civil society landscape is less developed than in **South Kivu**. There are fewer CSOs, funding is limited due to the lack of presence of international partners, and groups have low technical and professional capacity. Just a handful of Kasai CSOs can be considered “influential” and all struggle to hold government to account.

The coordination platform in Kasai is the Cadre de Concertation Provinciale de la Société Civile, which is led by Corneille Mbombo. However, according to the respondents of this study, this platform is ‘very ineffective’ at coordination and ‘corrupted’ by provincial government officials.<sup>7</sup> Respondents from the most influential CSOs noted that the platform is neither representative nor supportive (see **Table 2**).

**Table 2: Kasai: influential CSOs (September 2023)**

Civil society organisation	Name of leader	Remit / key issues	Typology
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<sup>7</sup> Findings from KILs conducted in Kasai and observations from the researchers.

LUCHA (Lutte pour le Changement)	Joel Minga	Active social movement (Kasai chapter of country-wide CSOs) (see South Kivu as well)	Established social movement: Human rights defenders
Nouvelle Société Civile Congolaise	Alain Nkashama	Works on good governance, campaigns for better political leadership (Leader is a current political candidate for the 2023 elections)	Thematic CSO: Governance
COPAX	Paul (The Best) Kabongo	Works on justice and fights impunity, raises awareness on good governance	Thematic CSO: Peace, human rights defenders
AFEJUCO	Felicien Mbembe	Promotes human rights, rights of women and girls, justice, and builds capacity for good governance	Thematic CSO: Women's rights
Fondation Mwetu mua Kele	Francis Kalala	Promotes human rights, monitors governance, campaigns for good governance	Human rights defenders
ECC (Eglise du Christ au Congo)	Michée Tshibungu Mimpuala	Works on development and good governance (Influential since they have church backing)	Faith-based thematic CSO: Governance
UNPC (Union de la Presse Congolaise)	Mac Laurin Tshimanga	Supports journalists, campaigns for freedom of press	Thematic CSO: Journalists' rights, freedom of press

## 4.2. CSO Strategies and Approaches

Strategies for advancing accountability vary according to each CSO. However, the mapping identified four common approaches:

- Direct advocacy to government through letter writing with multiple signatories;
- Indirect lobbying through informal channels of personal relationships between CSO leaders and political or public representatives;
- Protests, marches, sit-ins or “ville morte”<sup>8</sup>; and
- Violent protest, such as stone throwing (this strategy is more prevalent in Kasai).

### 4.2.1. Key contributors to success

Our research in both provinces shows that the following factors contribute to the success of CSOs' interventions aimed at holding government to account:

- **CSO interventions based on single issues** that matter to a significant group of people;

<sup>8</sup> CSOs broadcast messages to all sectors of the economy to shut down and not operate anymore for an entire day (including closing schools and offices).

- **Activities that threaten the reputation of government members or groups;**
- **Active networking and collaboration between CSOs**, for example by pooling evidence and using it collectively;
- **Evidence-based interventions or advocacy and lobbying;**
- **Media coverage from independent outlets** such as La Prunelle<sup>9</sup>, MediaKivu<sup>10</sup>, MediaCongo<sup>11</sup>, 7sur7.cd<sup>12</sup> or Congopress.<sup>13</sup>
- **Support from international organisations.** This mainly applies to **South Kivu** CSOs, some of which gain both financial resources that enable them to organise advocacy events and also benefit from the protection and leverage with government officials that this international connection affords them. This type of support is, however, not available to CSOs based in **Kasai**.

#### 4.2.2. Examples of successful campaigns

We define a successful campaign as one leading to change in policy or behaviour. Examples by each province include:

##### South Kivu

- **Marches against the illegal exploitation of minerals in the territory of Mwenga by Chinese companies. Key actors included:** Le Bureau de Coordination de la société civile du Sud-Kivu and the CSO “DYCOD.” **Results:** closure of companies;
- **Advocacy for primary school teachers** to receive their unpaid salaries. **Results:** Teachers received their salaries;
- CSO efforts for the **reconciliation of the executive (the governor) and legislative branches (the provincial assembly) of South Kivu** during the tense period of 2022 when these branches were in conflict. **Results:** Meetings and reunions between the governor and the assembly brought more peaceful relations and the governor remained in his current position;
- **CSO efforts to ensure the provincial government published the electoral calendar in 2017.** **Results:** the electoral calendar was published;
- **CSO campaign to prohibit public energy costs being added to household electricity bills.** **Results:** street lighting costs were removed from private bills;
- CSO action to **denounce the abuse of voter registration** from February to April 2023, etc. **Results:** CENI (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante) invited CSOs to share information on the issue, which led to increased transparency in registration processes.

##### Kasai

- **2021 campaign to remove the governor and the mayor** from office for corruption and mismanagement, called “Balayons les médiocres.” **Results:** The governor was removed;<sup>14</sup>
- **2022 campaign to remove tax barriers on the Kasai and Tshikapa rivers.** **Results:** illegal barriers were removed;

<sup>9</sup> [LaPrunelleRDC.CD - Actualité - La Prunelle RDC.](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Mediakivu – Liberté d'Ecrire. Devoir d'Informier.](#)

<sup>11</sup> [mediacongo.net - Infos - Actualité - Offres d'emploi, Appels d'offres, Petites annonces en RD Congo | RDC.](#)

<sup>12</sup> [\[le plus grand site d'information en république démocratique du congo, actualité politique, économique, éducation, santé, culture, sport et société en RDC\] | \(7sur7.cd\).](#)

<sup>13</sup> [MediaCongo Press - L'actualité en RD Congo \(congo-press.com\).](#)

<sup>14</sup> This was a short-lived success as the governor was subsequently reinstated by Kinshasa, showing the often limited power of civil society in influencing lasting change.



- Campaign to reduce the **price of renting prepaid electricity meters**. **Results:** cost reduced from 10 to five USD;<sup>15</sup>
- Pressure on **local municipal officials in Tshikapa to justify spending**.<sup>16</sup> **Results:** awareness raised of the misuse of public funds.

The research found that the issues raised most by influential CSOs are often PFM-related, that is, they relate to the use of public funds in the delivery (or absence) of services.<sup>17</sup> For example, in **South Kivu**, the Bureau de Coordination de la Société Civile has participated in provincial budget development and related debates. During the preparation of the 2023 budget, the Bureau met with the governor to discuss fuel and other taxes paid by companies in the province. CSOs argued that these taxes should be better used to the benefit the population.

### 4.3. Government – CSO relations

**Co-option by mainstream political actors:** The KIs for this study indicated that the relationship between provincial government and CSOs is often complex, fractious and site-specific. Many CSO interviewees mentioned that CSOs in both provinces are vulnerable to being co-opted by powerful actors and groups. A general concern was around many CSOs' close relationship with government and that many are "infiltrated" by politicians. Lack of funding for CSOs also renders their members vulnerable to political co-option and bribery. Informants noted that some CSOs have been purposely established by political parties to undermine actions and counter messages by other CSOs. This strategy of co-option can seed distrust of CSOs, and create divisions between them. This, in turn, undermines information sharing and collective action and voice. Furthermore, many respondents said the voices of CSOs are often highly constrained by government officials and political parties and there is a vested interest in silencing them. However, there is often little transparency about CSOs, making their actions difficult to monitor.

Most CSO respondents interviewed for this study as well as the wider population<sup>18</sup> believe that politics and public office are fundamentally corrupt and immoral and a means to increase one's individual and family wealth. CSO leaders who have used their position within their organisation to become elected officials are often perceived by the CSO community as having "gone to the other side", no longer representing the values and beliefs of civil society. For example, in **Kasai**, some respondents said that the leader of a CSO platform called Nouvelle Société Civile was co-opted by certain political individuals as a strategy to remove him of the CSO sphere and thereby weaken his voice and influence as an activist.

**Collaboration and cooperation versus protest:** Some interviewees said that individual informal relationships between CSO leaders and officials have yielded policy and practice change (see examples of successful campaigns in **sub-section 4.2.2**). However, government officials often accuse CSOs who organise protests and sit-ins for example, of violating the rules and procedures of action. These CSOs are then considered enemies who need to be curtailed. This is the case in **Kasai**, in particular. Many CSO leaders interviewed for this study in both provinces noted that they feared threats and harassment by security forces, for example if they denounced officials for the mismanagement of public funds. Journalists said they also face the same threats.

CSO and media interviewees largely recognise that these issues have resulted in shrinking space for voice and accountability in both **Kasai** and **South Kivu**. Interviewees noted that the 2023 election period has worsened this problem, with politicians instrumentalising CSOs or attempting to co-opt their leaders. Indeed, political parties often encourage "political alliances" between themselves and CSOs to undermine their leverage.

<sup>15</sup> [Tshikapa: la Lucha envisage des actions pour exiger la suppression des frais de location du compteur électrique \(mediacongo.net\)](https://mediacongo.net)

<sup>16</sup> [TSHIKAPA : 21.600.000fc équivalent de 10.800\\$ portés disparus a la commune de KANZALA – Mediakivu](https://mediakivu.net)

<sup>17</sup> With regards to public financial management, in Kasai, no CSO claims to be working directly on PFM while in South Kivu, only the CSO "Max Impact" until recently, worked closely with the provincial government on developing the budget and supported the various divisions in managing public finances. However, its leader, Safanto Bulongo has left the CSO and presented his candidature for the 2023 legislative elections.

<sup>18</sup> The Gender PEA conducted in parallel to this study found that most interviewees expressed this sentiment as well.

Certain groups in the DRC are excluded since their tribe is not represented in provincial or national government by any clan member in a position of power. Two examples include the CSO representing the Kete community in Mweka territory in **Kasai**, as well as CSOs representing people with disabilities.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4.4. Barriers and Enablers for CSO Accountability

This section looks at factors, organisations or groups that enable or block CSOs from being able to hold governments accountable.

##### Enablers

The research indicated that many larger CSOs in **South Kivu** have access to international partners and their funding, such as 11.11.11, USAID, UN, EU, MONUSCO (UN peacekeeping mission), etc. However, this is much less the case in **Kasai**. In both provinces, CSOs have strong unwavering support from the local population and independent media outlets.

##### Barriers

Respondents in both provinces indicated that CSOs face a number of key challenges when trying to effectively hold government to account. These include lack of funding, lack of capacity, and restrictions on demonstrations and citizen action, including freedom of expression, i.e., a general weakening of civil society.

Government officials' misperceptions on the value of advocacy approaches for informing policy development and change also create barriers. The perceived negative impacts often over-ride the potential contribution of CSOs. For example, their inputs on particular issues related to accountability may be ignored or sidelined due to the reputational risk to provincial assembly members or the governor himself.

The repression by police and military of CSO leaders, as well as journalists and others who support them, often limits CSOs' capacity to advance accountability as well as putting journalists' lives in danger.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, many of the interviews revealed the police and army are often mobilised by people of influence to threaten journalists and CSO leaders when denouncements are made against them.

Competition and disagreements between CSOs themselves, especially prevalent in Kasai, weakens their collective action. Moreover, there is a fatigue of civil society actors as well as the population in face of calls to action. See **Table 4** for a summary of barriers and enablers for CSOs in South Kivu and Kasai.

**Table 4: Summary of barriers and enablers for CSOs in South Kivu and Kasai**

Enablers	Barriers
International funders, particularly in South Kivu but less for Kasai (11.11.11, USAID, UN, EU, MONUSCO (UN peacekeeping mission))	Lack of funding
Local population (unwavering support in both provinces)	Lack of capacity (regarding their role, range of strategies, good organisational practices including relating to gender and social inclusion)
Local independent media (see above)	Closing space for civil society voice, including restrictions on demonstrations and citizen action

<sup>19</sup> Political positions are informally given quotas for the various tribal groups living in each province. Positions such as provincial governor, certain ministers, and the mayor of the provincial capitals, are assigned to a particular tribe. If a particular community lacks an individual from their tribe in a position of power (both provincial and national), the interests of their community will not be represented in power, and thus, they are excluded from governance.

<sup>20</sup> **Kasai: dix militants de la LUCHA arrêtés en plein sit-in à Tshikapa** | Election-net

	Issues that go beyond local concerns and touch on big business, vested interests, resource extraction etc.
	Repressive action from government agencies including police and military
	Competition, in-fighting and disagreements within CSOs (Kasai in particular)
	Civil society fatigue

## 5 Conclusion and Recommendations

### 5.1. Conclusion

CSOs in DRC include: those working on governance, human rights, access to social sector services, single issues that affect particularly populations, and the media. There is a vibrant CSO community in the DRC that includes different types of CSOs and the media; more so in **South Kivu**, however, than in **Kasai**. CSOs in **South Kivu** are more developed and evolved than those in **Kivu**, receiving more funding and capacity building support from international agencies.

Some CSOs are using successful strategies and approaches and these include: protest, violence, and evidence-based advocacy on single issues. **South Kivu** CSOs are more nuanced in their use of strategies (including constructive engagement with the government) than **Kasai** CSOs, who focus solely on protest. Successful CSOs tend to work on single issues that matter to specific communities and where they are able to leverage coverage from the independent media.

In both provinces, CSOs face internal and external threats to their sustainability and effectiveness. They often lack central governance systems, instead centring around charismatic leaders. This means that their legitimacy and power can be significantly weakened when these leaders enter the formal political sphere. Additionally, former leaders rarely use their new positions of power to champion the issues they were representing in civil society spaces. Research for this study indicates that some CSO leaders have been actively co-opted into formal politics as a way to weaken voices of dissent. These factors are contributing to an increasingly strained relationship between CSOs and government and shrinking space for civil society voice and accountability.

CSOs in both province often lack the structures, processes and financial resources that contribute to sustainability and successful outcomes. The research for this study indicated a lack of capacity in areas such as evidence gathering, knowledge sharing and strategic advocacy approaches. A key challenge identified by most respondents is the lack of secure, multi-year funding, particularly in **Kasai**, where the lack of international presence means funding opportunities are scarce. Where funding is available, it tends to reach a relatively small number of larger, more established CSOs, leaving smaller and more nascent CSOs vulnerable.

Many of the respondents noted the urgent need to address these issues in both regions, but particularly in **Kasai**, where the enabling environment is far weaker than in **South Kivu**. CSOs would benefit from improved governance systems and an understanding of different strategies for influencing, including dialogue and technical assistance to government for developing pro-poor and inclusive policies and practices. At the same time, there is a need for government at all levels to understand the role of civil society actors and their legitimate right to protest and to hold government to account. If trust is built between CSOs and government, there could be a clear role for CSOs in contributing to a pro-poor change agenda and policy.

## 5.2. Recommendations for FCDO

### CSO-Government relations

- **Strengthen dialogue and mutual accountability:** the UK government should work with both government and CSOs to enable this in both provinces, but particularly in **Kasai**, due to the lack of trust and broken relationship between CSOs and provincial government;
- **Recognise and support CSOs' roles in local elections:** there has been much discussion about national elections and the role of CSOs but local elections are critical and often far more relevant to local communities. It is vital for the UK government to recognise the importance of CSO influence at this level and programme for it;
- **Provide capacity building support to CSOs** to widen their knowledge and use of strategies and approaches. For example, introduce the WRITE TO THEM approach where elected representatives are obliged to respond to the electorate.<sup>21</sup>
- **Conduct more research to understand CSOs' political allegiances and ensure those that are not legitimate do not receive support:** for example, a growing number of CSOs have been established by political parties or political individuals to undermine CSO action in both provinces;
- **Provide funding and support to CSOs that represent marginalised groups;**
  - In **Kasai**, these would be underrepresented communities at provincial level such as the Kete in Mweka, and women and girls in general;
  - In **South Kivu**, these are the indigenous communities such as Batwa (pygmy).
- **Ensure all interventions to support CSOs individually are based on strong due diligence research;**
- **Conduct contextual analysis** in areas of intervention to ensure it is relevant and in line with local priorities.

### Capacity building

- **Build capacity of CSOs** while doing the same for government. Work on CSO capacity building in areas such as internal governance policies and practice, including human resources (HR) considerations such as equal pay, equal promotion, equal benefits, policies and practices on sexual harassment, bullying, and corruption. This is particularly needed in **Kasai** where CSO capacity is very weak;
- **Support capacity building with government on PFM** (including budget transparency and GESI budgeting). Work with government to ensure budget transparency and ensure this is part of the FCDO advocacy agenda with government and that it is built into FCDO technical assistance processes;
- **Promote capacity building within FCDO:** for example ensure UK diplomats and aid professionals are aware of the need to facilitate meetings between government and CSOs and on ways to manage this facilitation role;
- **Provide core funding for CSOs rather than challenge funds.** With challenge funds, there is a danger of being too prescriptive on outcomes in thematic/sectoral areas as this is likely to undermine communities advocating for what matters to them. The challenge is how to **monitor and evaluate core funding**;
- **Support targeted action to improve CSO approaches to gathering and using data for evidence-based advocacy.** Many campaigns in **South Kivu** were successful because they were supported by a strong evidence base;
- **Improve the enabling environment for CSOs by widening funding opportunities.** The research indicates that the same CSOs often receive funding from the same partners. CSOs also need to be supported through capacity building on applying for funding and meeting reporting

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.writetothem.com/>.

requirements. This is relevant for both provinces, but is particularly pertinent for **Kasai**, where access to funding is much more limited;

- **Engage with CSOs on issues of inclusion and gender equality.** Support those who are without a voice in formal decision-making processes.

#### **Inclusive consultation**

- In commercial bids, **ensure that suppliers consult with CSOs**, by including a consultative process in the terms of reference;
- **Use FCDO's convening power to create consultative space for CSOs.** Donors that include the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) hold learning consultations with CSOs who they support in order to understand their agenda and to provide capacity support in areas determined by CSOs themselves;
- **Engage with overarching networks or coordination structures** so that they act as gatekeepers to working with CSOs;
  - In **South Kivu**, the structure is well established and independent. In **Kasai**, the current structure is inefficient and corrupt, so FCDO should approach their work there strategically;
- **Introduce conditionalities around funding** to ensure CSOs do not engage in corrupt behaviour. Support smaller CSOs who do not have access to international partnership to be viable organisations

# Annexes

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## Annex 1. Bibliography

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## Annex 2: Key Informant Interviews

South Kivu	
Name	Role and Organisation
Jean Moreau Tibubu	Groupe Jérémie, Coordinateur des noyaux droit de l'homme et bonne gouvernance
Mihigo Namire Kantitima	Président de l'Association des citoyens engagés contre la discrimination des handicapés (ACEDH)
Adrien Zawadi	Coordinateur du Bureau de la Société Civil Sud Kivu
Nicolas Kyangalilwa	President federal du parti politique d'opposition LGD au Sud-Kivu
Paul Masilya Shindano	Chargé de développement de la CEPAC, Pasteur d'Eglise 8eme CEPAC
Theophile	Chef de Division, SAEMAPE Sud-Kivu
Kalugusha Fiaka	Militant de l'organisation LUCHA (lutte pour le changement)
Raphael Wakenge	Coordinateur ICJP
Honneur David Safari	Coordinateur media La Prunelle
Blaise Bubala	Coordinateur ACADOSHA
Patrick Nyamatomwa	Coordinateur ACPS/Peuple
Kasai	
Scarpe Mbuyamba	Influential journalist
Joel Minga	Point focal Kasai LUCHA (Lutte pour le changement)
Fernand Tshibamba	Coordinateur PAAC (Appui aux Abinos au Congo)
Claude Swana Mulumba	President de la communauté Kete dans le territoire de Mweka
Michée Tshibungu	Leader religieux, Eglise Brahmaniste
Gaston Nkole Tshimuanga	Vice-Gouverneur Province du Kasai
Paul the Best Kabongo	Coordinateur COPAX
Emmanuel Matadi	Coordinateur DEKED
Michel Okenge Loyamba	Point focal de FENAPHACO (Federation nationale des personnes handicapées)



# Gender and Social Inclusion Political Economy Analysis for South Kivu and Kasai, the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Final Report

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Prepared by Triple Line and FHI 360 UK | November 2023





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## List of abbreviations

ANCE	The Alliance des Nationalistes pour un Congo Emergeant
BEK	British Embassy Kinshasa
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GESI	Gender and Social Inclusion
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
ISP	Institute Supérieur Pédagogique
KII	Key Informant Interview
M23	March 23 Movement
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo
PARI	Programme d'Appui a la Rédevabilité et l'Inclusion
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PEPA	Political Economy and Power Analysis Approach
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Research

This report is based on primary and secondary qualitative data gathered for a Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) Political Economy Analysis (PEA) on women's political participation in Kasai and South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The study is intended to inform the implementation of the British Embassy Kinshasa's (BEK) Governance Business Programme to Support Accountability and Inclusion (Programme d'Appui à la redevabilité et l'inclusion (PARI)).

The main purpose of the study is to:

1. Generate evidence on the barriers and enablers to women's participation in local governance and women's roles within formal and informal local governance systems and structures in South Kivu and Kasai.
2. Based on this evidence, provide guidance on how women's participation and roles as agents of change in local governance can be strengthened through FCDO's new governance programming in Kasai and South Kivu provinces.

## 2 Approach and Methodology

### 2.1 GESI PEA Framework

The design and implementation of the study is informed by a gender and socially inclusive political economy analysis framework. A PEA examines the ways in which power and resources are distributed and contested within institutions and the societies in which they are located, and the implications for development outcomes. A core aim is to better understand the underlying interests, incentives and relationships that enable or frustrate change. Traditional PEAs routinely overlook how these processes are affected by gender and other intersecting characteristics. Therefore, a GESI PEA centres on the importance of ensuring democratic processes are inclusive and facilitate the equal participation of those who have been routinely excluded, including women, those living with disability and those who are vulnerable and marginalised. A gendered and socially inclusive PEA critically analyses inequitable systems, and reflects on why these inequities exist, the power dynamics that underlie them, and how they can be shifted.<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of the study, we adapted the useful problem-based PEA framework developed by Harris<sup>2</sup> by applying elements of a gender-responsive political economy and power analysis approach (PEPA) to better understand how power operates and shapes state-society relations in general, and the nature of gender and social inclusion within society.<sup>3</sup> Harris' framework has three dedicated, but related, phases: 1) problem identification, 2) problem diagnosis and 3) consideration of plausible change processes. We consider these phrases through a GESI lens (see [Annex 1](#) for a diagram and more detailed explanation of the research framework).

#### 2.1.1 What is the problem/question to be addressed?

In the case of this study, the starting point was the relatively low women's political participation in the DRC as compared to men's, specifically in South Kivu and Kasai, and questions around how FCDO can contribute to improving this situation.

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that gender is about more than women – it is also about gendered roles, expectations and power relations that affect people of all genders and sexual orientations. Gender also intersects with forms of difference and disadvantage that include disability, ethnicity, race, age and sexual identity. However, due to the complex challenges associated with these intersections and the limited time and space to explore them fully, the main focus of the study is women.

<sup>2</sup> ODI for UK Aid 2013.

<sup>3</sup> UN Gender and Development Network 2018; Green 2018.

### 2.1.2 What is the diagnosis of the problem?

1. Structures – the institutions, processes and rules, and the social norms (written/formal and unwritten/informal) that constrain or enable women’s political participation.
2. Agency - the behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and practices that maintain or challenge the status quo with regard to political participation and decision-making.

### 2.1.3 What are the pathways of change for addressing the problem?

Change pathways should build on what is already working and draw lessons from what is not working, as well.

## 2.2 Methodology

The research for the study addressed the related questions and sub-questions through a mix of qualitative primary and secondary research. The primary research component included key informant interviews (KIs) using semi-structured questionnaires, focus group discussions (FGDs) using guided and semi-structured questions and participatory exercises, and collecting life stories of women leaders from South Kivu and Kasai.

Sampling was purposive. A conscious choice was made to include only women in the sample, given that their voices are often absent from PEAs. Efforts were made to identify a fairly diverse sample of female informants that, for example, included women of different ages and representatives from disability organisations. However, the limited scope of the study meant that it was not possible to include members of lesbian, gay and transgender organisations, or of groups representing ethnic minorities. Informants included municipal and provincial government actors, local leaders, influential women, and representatives from women’s rights organisations – including women’s lobby groups at provincial level - and networks. See [Annex 5](#) for a list of informants.

In South Kivu KIs were conducted with nine women of influence, and participatory FGDs were held with one group of 12 and another group of 11 female representatives from civil society and media organisations. Care was taken to ensure a diverse range of voices and experiences in each FGD. In Kasai KIs were conducted with eight women of influence and one participatory FGD was held, with 12 from local women’s organisations.

## 3 Context

At the provincial level of governance in the DRC, the capital is the “chef-lieu” of the province: Tshikapa in Kasai, and Bukavu in South Kivu. In these towns, the three arms of government are represented: legislative, executive and judiciary. The executive authority is represented by the governorate, the Governor of the Province, the provincial government and provincial ministers. The provincial assembly, made up of elected (in the 2018 elections) “députés” from the territories of the province, holds the legislative authority, and is also based in the provincial capital. The judicial authority is upheld by the tribunals and the courts of appeal are based in the provincial capitals. These “chef lieux” are thus the centre of political life of the province. At the local level, due to incomplete decentralisation and the lack of municipal elections, territorial administrators and assistant territorial administrators are appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, who appoints them on the recommendation of the provincial governor and customary affairs since most territories (eight in South Kivu and five in Kasai) have parallel customary governance systems with “chefferies” governed by hereditary (male lineage) customary chiefs or Kings (Mwami).

### 3.1 Snapshot of Kasai and South Kivu

#### 3.1.1 Kasai province

Kasai province is one of the provinces created in 2015. It is one of the poorest provinces in the DRC with a population of 4.5 million. Due to its recent creation, the relatively new provincial institutions face significant administrative and capacity issues. Kasai has limited political and financial autonomy from

Kinshasa, and its weak public financial government systems are vulnerable to corruption. Local government roles in Kasai are male-dominated and the participation of women in political leadership is low, with even less representation of disabled women – estimated at around 1% of women leaders.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.1.2 South Kivu province

South Kivu is an older province (created in 1989 from the larger Kivu province). The East of the DRC has experienced protracted violence over the last 25 years and the resurgence of conflict since the end of 2021 by the March 23 Movement (M23). Unlike North Kivu and Ituri, South Kivu still has a civilian government. In South Kivu, female political participation is significantly lower than male participation, but nonetheless it is slightly better than in Kasai.<sup>5</sup>

## 4 Research Findings and Analysis

### 4.1 The Problem: Non-inclusive Political Decision-making

Against a background of conflict and the emerging promise of peace, women and girls' rights, opportunities and wellbeing have always come far behind those of men and boys in the DRC. These inequalities are reflected in the available gender-disaggregated data on critical areas that include educational attainment, health provision and employment (see **Annex 2** for the most recent gender-disaggregated statistics).<sup>6</sup>

**Women's political representation in the DRC is low, both globally and regionally.** According to the Interparliamentary Union, in 2023 the country ranked 155 out of 186 countries,<sup>7</sup> with only 64 women out of 500 (12.8%) in the lower House and 26 of 109 in the upper House (23.9%).<sup>8</sup> Rwanda ranked number one globally, with 49 women out of 80 in the lower house (62.3%) and nine out of 26 in the upper house (43.6%). Within the Africa region, the DRC sits far below the 24% regional average for women in parliament (see **Annex 3**).

**Political decision-making in the DRC is dominated by men.** A key site of gender inequality and the one most pertinent for this study is decision-making – specifically within the political arena at state, provincial and municipal levels, but also within communities and households. Consistent with other areas of gender inequality, the political landscape in the DRC has traditionally been extremely male-dominated. There was little or no representation of women in formal political institutions until the promulgation of the 2006 national constitution, when the new Constitution was established as part of the peace process which highlighted the need to eliminate gender-based discrimination and promote women's rights.<sup>9</sup> Key clauses in the new Constitution, called for the “full participation of women in the development of the nation” particularly guaranteeing the “right to significant representation in national, provincial and local institutions.”<sup>10</sup>

The elections in 2006 set two linked precedents: **the first possibility for citizens to vote for female politicians coincided with the first democratic elections to be held in the DRC for over 41 years.** Women accounted for only 8.4% of parliamentarians elected, but this represented a positive step forward. Another key shift was the relatively large number of female voters, largely due to awareness-raising and

<sup>4</sup> There are no formal statistics available to reflect the number of female leaders at local level but respondents interviewed indicated that fewer than 10% of provincial and local politicians are female.

<sup>5</sup> There are no formal statistics on women's political participation at provincial and local levels but information gathered in the field indicated that there are more women in political positions in South Kivu.

<sup>6</sup> UN Women note that the DRC only has one third of the indicators required to monitor the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from a gender perspective (<https://data.unwomen.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-cong>).

<sup>7</sup> Ranking as of January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023, accessed August 2023.

<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that many women in national politics are believed to be there due to family connections rather than their own agency (see section 4.2.2).

<sup>9</sup> The process of drawing up the constitution involved significant female representation – including under the auspices of a humanitarian, social and cultural commission headed by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, former president of Liberia (Kvinna Tel Kvinna 2012; EURAC 2021).

<sup>10</sup> Mtundu Mmambi and Faray-Kele 2010: 1.

mobilisation efforts led by women's organisations during the peace process. This high political participation of women has been sustained in subsequent elections - for example, in 2018, 50.6% out of the 40 million registered voters were women.<sup>11</sup> However, **barriers to women's registration as voters still exist** including women's lack of formal identification and documentation and their lack of awareness about voting procedures, especially in remote, rural areas.<sup>12</sup>

Since 2006, the DRC's progress towards achieving its goal of 30% women's representation in formal leadership positions has been very slow.<sup>13</sup> The number of elected women increased slightly from 8.4% in 2006 to 9% and to 10% in 2018 at national level, 6.8% to 10.2% at provincial level, and 4.6% to 19% at senatorial level. A key reason for these negligible increases is that **each election following 2006 has seen a decline in the number of women running as electoral candidates**. The relatively low proportion of female candidates running in the 2006 (13.6%) election dropped to 12.8% in the 2011 elections. In national legislative elections of 2018, only 11.7% of candidates were women.<sup>14</sup> There was little change to this pattern in the most recent elections in 2023, where only 17% of candidates were female.<sup>15</sup>

At the presidential level, this decline is even more stark: in 2006 only four out of 33 presidential candidates were female, in 2011 there were no female candidates and only one in 2018.<sup>16</sup> There has been an increase in the numbers of women to elected provincial and municipal/chief magistrate (burgomaster) level posts – for example the proportion of women elected to provincial government rose from 6.8% to 10.2% in 2018. City councillors and burgomasters should – under the 2006 Constitution – be elected by commune councils. However, these elections have not previously taken place.

**Achieving a higher number of women in government would address only part of the problem:** enabling effective women's political representation also means ensuring the *quality* of their participation (i.e., that they are equipped and motivated to support the needs and rights of citizens, and – ideally – to play a key role in representing gender equality and social inclusion issues at ministerial level). Both the secondary literature and interviews with female leaders revealed that **simply involving more women in governance in the DRC does not automatically result in their promotion of women's and girls' rights or in improved gender equality outcomes**.<sup>17</sup>

## 4.2 The Diagnosis

### 4.2.1 Structural constraints to women's political participation in the DRC

The architecture of inclusive, democratic governance is present in the DRC, underpinned by internationally recognised language on rights and democracy. The political arena is changing slowly but significant tensions remain between the formal institutional governance structures and processes and the informal rules and ways of working that are often perpetuated by the men who predominate in these institutions. Their discretionary power mean that the formal laws and sanctions are only selectively applied, which often have the most resonance. As a result, the informal systems are dominant. This increases the reliance on personalised rules and networks and decreases the relevance of legal and regulatory frameworks.

These informal – often tacit, unspoken – rules have strong implications not only for *who* can enter political structures, but also for the extent to which they are able to participate once they are officially part of them. DRC citizens interviewed for this PEA noted continued resistance to women's political

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<sup>11</sup> This figure is estimated. Although there are available statistics on the number of registered voters, the actual number who voted cannot be verified.

<sup>12</sup> EURAC 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Set out in the Constitution and in the Beijing Platform for Action.

<sup>14</sup> UN Women 2023.

<sup>15</sup> RDC-élections : les femmes politiques s'expriment sur le taux des candidatures féminine ([RDC-élections : les femmes politiques s'expriment sur le taux des candidatures féminines | Actualite.cd](#))

<sup>16</sup> EURAC 2019.

<sup>17</sup> See Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 2019; see also Brody 2009.



participation by those with the strongest hold on power and who perceive they might lose their influence in truly democratic, transparent processes – who are often men.

The analysis below sheds light on structural constraints to inclusive governance, first focusing on the institutions and the formal and informal rules that govern them, before moving onto the ways in which social norms and rules drive and contribute to these structural constraints

## **Institutional structures, rules and processes**

### **Poorly implemented GESI laws and commitments**

In theory, there is an enabling environment for women's political participation in the DRC – including in Kasai and South Kivu. However, the literature review and findings from the primary research show that the laws are often “just words on paper.”<sup>18</sup>

Under the 2006 Constitution women have the right to enter formal politics and play key roles as elected candidates. By law, women should be involved in a substantial way. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees women “significant representation in national, provincial and local institutions.” This technically means that 30% of Congolese institution representatives must be women.<sup>19</sup> In line with the law, **mechanisms were introduced to promote gender parity through quota systems** that require political parties to have 50% male and 50% female candidates, a critical step because women are restricted from running for office if they are not affiliated with a party.

However, **the electoral law was vague and lacked teeth, failing to penalise or disqualify parties for not including women on their lists**. Also, the law also called for a non-reimbursable deposit for candidates, which would preclude many female candidates who lacked funds.<sup>20</sup> Electoral reforms were introduced in 2022, renewing the principles and mechanisms of parity. Article 13 of the revised electoral law stresses the importance of the 50/50 representation and includes reforms to promote it, including the abolition of registration fees for political parties which have included at least 50% of women in their party lists, and the abolition of measures that discriminate against women and people living with disability.<sup>21</sup> However, barriers to its implementation persist, as the continued low political representation of women in light of the 2023 election demonstrates.

The **Constitution calls for elections to be held at all levels. However, so far only national and provincial elections have taken place**. This has resulted in lost opportunities to ensure more female representation at local and municipal levels, where predominantly male leaders have – until now – been nominated by the men who already dominate the leadership. This situation is set to change, with the local-level elections due to take place in 2024.

### **Structural barriers within political parties**

The primary and secondary research indicates that **electoral reforms introduced to promote gender parity are ignored by many (male) party leaders**. The legal obligation to waive their fees for female members rarely happens in practice. A critical problem raised in South Kivu in particular is the **lack of incentives for political parties to implement the law** actively promoting female party membership. Currently, parties that fail to comply with these provisions in the electoral law are not penalised in any way.

As many women in the DRC have little or no financial autonomy, these monetary constraints to party membership remain a key structural barrier. Many of the respondents from both South Kivu and Kasai cited **lack of finances** as a key constraint to women's political participation, as money is needed not only for party membership, but also for running campaigns. One issue raised is **women's difficulty in**

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<sup>18</sup> Kvinna Tel Kvinna 2012: 6.

<sup>19</sup> Kvinna tel Kvinna 2012.

<sup>20</sup> EURAC 2019.

<sup>21</sup> UN Women 2023.



**getting a bank loan or credit.** Until the 2016 statutory law (the Family Code), limited women's access to bank accounts or loans by requiring signed permission of a spouse or male family member. In theory, this barrier should no longer exist. In 2016 the Family Code was updated, legally allowing women to open an account or take out a loan without this requirement. Yet, there is no evidence to indicate the extent to which this has resulted in gender equitable distribution of finances.<sup>22</sup>

### **Barriers to women's leadership in customary structures**

Statutory laws and institutions do not hold all the authority in the DRC. In both provinces there is a 'hybrid' political order whereby customary leaders also have significant decision-making power, particularly within communities.<sup>23</sup> The Constitution formally recognises traditional kings (mwamis), chiefs and leaders as custodians of culture and tradition, and some of these chiefs also serve in state government. Women are excluded from these customary institutions that, arguably, often have more influence on issues such as gender equality and rights than formal state institutions. Customary laws often take precedence over statutory ones, or they strongly influence discriminatory statutory laws. The precedent of customary law can have direct or indirect implications for women's access to, and realisation of decision-making power and leadership.

Typically women are not permitted to be customary leaders, although primary research revealed one case where a Mwami who died had been replaced by his wife.<sup>24</sup> If customary law continues unreformed it will effectively **undermine constitutional measures to enhance women's political participation**, given that customary institutions often have more influence – including on issues such as gender equality and rights - than formal state institutions.

A **better understanding of the relationship and tensions between customary and state institutions** is needed to argue for, influence and help design interventions that enable women's political empowerment across both spheres of influence.<sup>25</sup>

### **Social, cultural and economic structures, rules and norms**

Social, cultural, religious and economic structures are perpetuated and maintained through embedded rules and norms that are largely unwritten, but which have enormous power because of the social sanctions often associated with failure to observe them.<sup>26</sup> These structures are also usually underpinned by strong values and beliefs that shape the behaviours and relationships of individuals, families and communities. This section considers the ways in which these social, cultural and economic structures constrain or enable women's political participation in particular.

#### **Gender-biased and discriminatory social and cultural norms, beliefs and behaviours**

Both primary and secondary GESI PEA research reveal that gender-biased and discriminatory social and cultural norms, beliefs and behaviours create the most pervasive barriers to women's political participation in South Kivu, Kasai and other regions of the DRC. Even if the law recognises women's rights and equal status, customary rules (usually implicit and unwritten) do not: in contrast they consider and expect women to be subordinate to men. One of the FGD participants from South Kivu said “*Culture violates women's rights.*” Examples of how cultural norms, beliefs and behaviours affect women's political participation are outlined below.

**Cultural/customary rules and beliefs about masculinity and femininity prescribe appropriate and acceptable roles and behaviours for women and men.** These rules are often informal but they are deep-rooted. There is a strong pervasive cultural narrative<sup>27</sup> in the DRC that women and girls are and should

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<sup>22</sup> Women, Business and the Law report cited in <https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/womensadvancement/articles/2018/03/30/88-of-countries-restrict-womens-economic-opportunity-world-bank>.

<sup>23</sup> Kyamusugulwa et. Al. 2019.

<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that this practice is not an isolated case.

<sup>25</sup> Kyamusugulwa et. Al. 2019.

<sup>26</sup> World Bank 2022; Secure Livelihoods 2019.

<sup>27</sup> These norms are also influenced by traditional Catholic values in some cases.

be pure, moral and honest – and that these are innate female qualities.<sup>28</sup> This was reflected in the interviews with the female leaders from South Kivu, many of whom stressed that a key difference women-in-power bring is a strong moral compass – for example, a woman leader noted: *“Women rarely undermine political processes or embezzle money. They are more likely to apply morals to their work.”* According to these rules, women and girls are also not expected or encouraged to speak out or demonstrate confidence, and this seemed especially true in Kasai where there are fewer challenges or alternative narratives to these entrenched ideas.

There is also an assumption that women are more naturally caring and that their natural and appropriate role is within the domestic/private realm as mothers and wives, rather than in professional and/or leadership roles.<sup>29</sup> This belief was reflected by several of the women of influence from South Kivu – for example one said: *“Women leaders are more sensitive to the problems faced by their constituents, and are more likely to take into account the (positive and negative) implications of policies and actions for families/communities.”*

Neither the primary or secondary data touches significantly on notions of masculinity in the DRC but there is a clear gendered division of labour and roles which is widely understood from an early age. The Social Livelihoods Research Consortium noted, for example, that married men are not allowed to cook or harvest and will be publicly shamed if they do so.<sup>30</sup> Under this logic men are expected to be the providers and protectors of their wives and families, but also **are considered less naturally moral and more prone to dishonesty, corruption and being unfaithful**. There is an unwritten assumption or rule that men are natural leaders because they have the right qualities but also because they are more suited to the immorality of political game playing. They are also believed to be more suited to a political landscape that has been created by men and which is therefore innately immoral and corrupt.<sup>31</sup>

**Marriage rules and norms create strong social sanctions for aspiring female politicians.** Implicit and explicit rules and ideas about marriage create a gendered catch-22 for women in the DRC where women cannot win: if they are not married they are judged harshly and socially excluded, but once they are married it is not considered appropriate to also be in politics. A married woman who seeks a political career may be perceived as unfeminine because she doesn't put marriage and motherhood first. Consequently, she risks threatening both her marriage and her status in society. These points came out very strongly in both South Kivu and Kasai, with respondents citing women's fear of jeopardising their marriage as a key constraint to their political participation. One female leader from Bukavu said: *“Women are judged based on their marital status and professional ambition is usually detrimental to a happy marriage. Risking their marriage is another obstacle.”*

#### **Gender inequitable access to financial resources constrains women's political participation**

Lack of funds for campaigning and party membership was identified as a key barrier to women's political participation. Financial exclusion is also a key driver of gender inequality, deepening women's poverty, undermining their agency and constraining their autonomy. The primary data from both South Kivu and Kasai indicated that, despite constitutional commitments to gender equality, the customary practice of restricting women's access to finances still has considerable traction. Women in the DRC have no inheritance rights to land or property, no access to household finances and no control over their own income. Gender norms define men as the financial decision-makers at all levels and prevent women from having any power over even money they have made. This is true even for female political leaders. Female leaders interviewed in South Kivu reported that they, too, expected to hand their salaries to their husbands to manage. A participant in Kvinna Tel Kvinna's study noted: *“Poverty is the big thing that blocks women from participating in decision-making spaces. It is because men have understood that in order to subordinate women they have to keep them poor.”*<sup>32</sup>

#### **Women's and girls' low education levels create a key social barrier to women's political empowerment**

<sup>28</sup> Cuvelier and Bashwira 2016.

<sup>29</sup> See Mott MacDonald 2022, Appui au Suivi du Projet Pilote pour l'Éducation des Filles au Kasai (page 2).

<sup>30</sup> Secure Livelihoods Consortium 2012.

<sup>31</sup> Cuvelier and Bashwira 2016.

<sup>32</sup> Kvinna Tel Kvinna 2012.

Respondents in both Kasai and South Kivu mentioned the fact that many girls do not complete secondary or tertiary education, while the lack of basic education and low female literacy levels were raised as issues for Kasai. There is no recent gender-disaggregated data on education available for South Kivu and Kasai, but according to the 2017-2018 DRC Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), 33% of girls aged 14 – 17 were not in school, and of these 7% had never attended school, 16% dropped out before reaching lower secondary, 6% dropped out before reaching upper secondary, and 4% dropped out during upper secondary.<sup>33</sup> One study indicated that in 2013 only 11% of university students were female.<sup>34</sup> The lack of primary, secondary and higher education precludes many women from running for office, given that a university degree is often a key requisite for candidacy. The failure to deliver quality education means that both men and women, boys and girls are not being exposed to different ideas about women's potential roles in decision-making. Opportunities are being missed to build confidence and leadership skills – for women but also men.

The problem is even more pronounced in Kasai, as there are high levels of school drop-out among adolescent girls at secondary level. Compound economic and socio-cultural factors contribute to girls being taken out of school. Even though school fees for primary education are no longer required, financial constraints remain as parents are often responsible for a set of costs that include a contribution towards teachers' salaries.<sup>35</sup> Secondary school is fee paying, and for every 10 boys there is only one girl enrolled. Education is also often not fit for purpose, with poorly equipped, gender-biased teachers and inadequate basic infrastructure.<sup>36</sup> Another reason cited by respondents is parents' concern that their daughters will be abused or harassed by boys in the mixed school environment, potentially resulting in pregnancy and dishonour for the girl and her family. Girls are, therefore, often taken out of school and married early to avoid pregnancy out of wedlock and this means their education is cut short. Girls who fall pregnant are also not permitted to continue studying.<sup>37</sup> There is also a perception in Kasai that educating girls is a waste of money as they are destined to become wives and mothers. According to the statutory law, the legal age of marriage has risen from 15 to 18 for both boys and girls, but it is not clear whether this is being respected in practice.<sup>38</sup>

#### **Lack of female role models**

Several respondents in both regions noted that persistent structural constraints to women's political empowerment results in a vicious cycle. The relative lack of women in influential positions means that young women cannot imagine themselves in positions that are synonymous with men.

### **4.2.2 Structural enablers to women's political participation in South Kivu and Kasai**

#### **Family/tribal/business connections are pre-requisites to women's political participation**

One of the main enablers to political participation mentioned by informants in both South Kivu and Kasai is family, tribal or business connections. A respondent from South Kivu noted that a well-known female leader had taken the place of her husband, who had been a minister. Another female leader explained that she was the wife of a Mwami and that he had played a key role in her appointment. Notably, in South Kivu the need for family, tribal or business connections was mentioned as one of several routes to power, but in Kasai it emerged as the main enabler. Three women there had been appointed by the provincial governor, all of whom had business interests in the diamond sector.

#### **Education matters**

A critical structural enabler identified by many respondents in both South Kivu and Kasai and in the secondary literature is girls' and young women's education, especially at secondary and tertiary levels. For some of the female leaders from South Kivu, a bachelor's degree, and in some cases post graduate qualifications, had been essential levers of success, enabling them to rise to senior positions and

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<sup>33</sup> Empowering Girls and Enhancing Learning in DRC. World Bank.

<sup>34</sup> This data was collected by a women's rights organisation in Kasai.

<sup>35</sup> Mott MacDonald, 2022, Appui au Suivi du Projet Pilote pour l'Éducation des Filles au Kasai.

<sup>36</sup> Mott MacDonald, 2022, Appui au Suivi du Projet Pilote pour l'Éducation des Filles au Kasai.

<sup>37</sup> JICA 2017.

<sup>38</sup> JICA 2017.

compete with male colleagues. For example, Ms. A had studied for a Bachelor's degree in accountancy, but wanted to increase her chances of achieving a senior position. She obtained a scholarship for a master's degree in Senegal and a second one to study for a doctorate, also in Senegal. She was then hired as the only female professor at the Institut Supérieur Pédagogique (ISP). Furthermore, Ms. B gained a degree in entrepreneurship and project management. She became the only woman elected as president of the trade union delegation.

### **Leadership within civil society organisations facilitates entry into politics**

Moving from leadership positions in civil society organisations (CSOs) to politics was cited as another key route to political power by many of the respondents in South Kivu. For example, Ms. C from South Kivu was president of the youth branch of the JMPR during the presidency of Marshal Mobutu and this motivated her to be a political activist and then a political candidate. She entered into politics in the 2006 elections.

### **New electoral opportunities at local/provincial levels could enable women candidates**

The 2006 Constitution calls for local elections to take place but in practice this has not yet happened. However, elections at municipal levels are planned for 2024, following the 2023 presidential and legislative elections. These elections could provide an important entry point for more women candidates and elected leaders. Until now, holders of these posts were nominated rather than elected – and so have been largely male. The upcoming local elections could provide a platform for women already occupying positions of power at the local level in academia, civil society or municipal administrations to galvanise their existing local support and win votes. A key structural enabler is the fact that candidacy does not rely on party membership.

## **4.2.3 Agency: people, behaviours and attitudes that constrain inclusive political empowerment**

### **Gender- discriminatory norms, myths and stereotypes are perpetuated by both women and men**

The KIs and FGDs in both regions indicate that men and women are often complicit in perpetuating the notion that **women are not meant to be in politics** and that they do not make good leaders. These discriminatory norms are often an accepted, unquestioned part of cultural and/or religious identity.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, not conforming to them could risk social disapproval or being ostracised.<sup>40</sup>

### **Negative perceptions of female leaders prevail**

It is widely believed that women who want to enter politics must possess negative male characteristics and are therefore not true women. There is an assumption that women who seek power in the public realm are sexually available, or that they will become corrupted once they enter the political sphere. These perceptions were reflected by respondents in both South Kivu and Kasai. In South Kivu many respondents talked about women's struggle to be taken seriously as leaders. One woman of influence said that a woman who enters a political party "*est regardé d'un mauvais œil*" (considered in a negative light).

Common themes raised by women interviewees in South Kivu was women's lack of confidence and capacity to lead, and their "weak expertise." A women's organisation representative talked about women's "imposter syndrome" when it came to leadership. **The acceptance of gender discriminatory stereotypes about female leaders seems stronger in Kasai than in South Kivu**, probably due to the relative lack of progress on rights, equality and inclusion, the lack of an established international development presence and consolidated women's movement compared with South Kivu, and the consequent lack of alternative models.

<sup>39</sup> Kyamusugulwa, et. al. 2019.

<sup>40</sup> This is particularly critical in the DRC, where there is very strong group mentality (see Mott MacDonald 2022).

### Women's lack of belief in their ability to lead is widely expressed and compounded by male attitudes, including at a very public level

For example, when Kasai's governor was criticised for not having any female members in his administration, he responded that women do 'not have political capacity'. Some female CSO FDG participants echoed his belief. They also voiced suspicions about influential women in politics who they felt were only self-interested. However, other FGD participants highlighted the important role of women's organisations in campaigning and marching for greater female representation in provincial government.

### Women fear social judgement and harassment.

There are **double standards for men and women in politics**, in both South Kivu and Kasai. Even if women do make it into leadership positions, their **performance is judged much more harshly** than men's. One female leader from South Kivu said that everything women of influence do is followed in detail and men look for them to slip up. She said: *"we have to work very hard, double the amount men have to, to convince people."* Attitudes are much more lenient towards men who transgress acceptable behaviour such as having concubines and demonstrating corrupt behaviours. Cuvelier and Bashwira argue that women politicians in the DRC are only accepted if they can prove there are more ethical and peaceful than their male colleagues. In order to move beyond this double standard they call for a **rights-based approach** that stresses that participation in politics is a fundamental right of all women.<sup>41</sup>

A key theme in South Kivu particularly was **women's fear of joining political parties**, because they would be judged negatively. Another was fear of being abused, harassed or publicly discredited by women as well as men. **Online trolling** was also cited as a common problem.

This creates a very tough, almost impossible environment for women to enter politics but also to remain in politics. One respondent from South Kivu said: *"Women are afraid to join political parties yet you cannot become a political representative without being in a political party."* A female leader from Bukavu said that she wanted to see more women in politics but at the same time she did not want her daughter to become a politician because of the challenges she would face. Another shared the story of a female leader whose reputation had been discredited through vicious rumours, with devastating consequences: *"Ms. E was mayor of the city and wanted to apply. A few weeks before the elections, her rival accused her of sleeping with a Rwandan and thus she lost her electorate. She couldn't stand the shock and death ensued."*

In Kasai FGD participants felt that female leaders were often complicit in this abuse – using their sexuality to gain favour with key politicians. For example, one Kasai respondent commented that: *"Husbands do not want their wives to work in politics because women at the national level sleep with the authorities to gain trust."*

### Husbands also fear social judgement

In both South Kivu and Kasai the weight of social pressure means that the masculinity of men who encourage their wives to enter politics is likely to be questioned and judged. They will be seen as weak, dominated by their wives and worse, married to a woman who must have loose morals. This point about lack of support from husbands came out most strongly in data from Kasai, where patriarchal norms seem to be more deeply embedded than in South Kivu. Several respondents mentioned that husbands prevented their wives from working because of concerns they would be harassed by other men in the workplace.

### Divisions between women hamper political participation

A key theme raised by respondents from South Kivu was the lack of solidarity between women, particularly between women working in civil society and those in formal politics. Class and age were reported as contributors to these divisions. Some respondents from women's organisations noted that female politicians did not represent their interests, aligning instead with male party members. These points are echoed in research on women's political participation in the DRC from Kvinna Tel Kvinna

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<sup>41</sup> Cuvelier and Bashwira (2016).



where one of their respondents said: *“The elite doesn’t come from the women’s movement. They don’t even speak the local language. They are there [in power positions] because their families are influential, because their husbands have a lot of money. Many women have never struggled for gender issues, or peace processes. So the women at the grassroots don’t have any confidence in them.”*<sup>42</sup> Respondents talked about inter-generational divisions between women. One of the FGD participants noted: *“older women judge girls according to their age and status.”*

### **Male-centric political culture, attitudes and behaviour in political institutions exclude women**

Respondents in Kasai and South Kivu noted political party members and leaders are key gate keepers in enabling women’s political participation. Male members are favoured and there has been little attempt to change this behaviour. One woman leader from South Kivu said *“as men lead political parties they rank their male colleagues first and the women last.”* There is often a **lack of support for women from male party members**. Interviews with female leaders in South Kivu indicated that having a mentor or sponsor who can support women to enter parties is vital, but that this was a difficult or impossible process for many aspiring women politicians who do not have existing party affiliations, for example through family connections.

Respondents from both South Kivu and Kasai said that women are also sidelined or excluded by default, because of men’s failure to challenge and change the practice of holding meetings and other activities late at night. For example one female leader from South Kivu said: *“Often political meetings are held at night and in hotels. Prejudices limit women from participating in these meetings.”* Social norms prohibit women from participating in these activities. There are also practical considerations, such as childcare responsibilities and lack of transport.

A number of the women of influence from South Kivu implied that the failure to challenge male-centric party culture is a deliberate tactic to exclude women. Many respondents from both South Kivu and Kasai talked about the lack of political will (*“une manque de volonté politique”*) among male political leaders and the fact that men do not want to share power or give up their places for women. Another noted: *“some men don’t like women leading.”* There were complaints of male party members closing ranks to prevent women from gaining power or rising to prominence. A female leader from South Kivu said: *“This solidarity of men prevents women from accessing certain positions. Four years ago a woman who was in the senate, was vilified by men.”* Respondents from Kasai talked about political party failure to share information beyond their immediate members as a key constraint. It was also noted that, even when women were able to join parties and run for office this did not translate into winning sufficient votes.

Women from both Kivu and Kasi talked about how, even when they have a place at the table, **women are too often left out of decision-making processes**. A women’s organisation representative from South Kivu noted: *“women [are] in power but without power.”* In Kasai many of the respondents talked about the **active silencing of female politicians through threats and blackmail**. They noted that women were only included in the Kasai administration to fulfil an external obligation concerning gender balance, but that as soon as these women tried to raise issues, including on women’s rights, they were warned that the same men who had enabled them to get into government could also remove them from their posts. One respondent from Kasai noted: *“the woman does not have any real say, despite the position of authority she has.”*

## **4.2.4 Agency: people, behaviours and attitudes that enable inclusive political empowerment**

### **Women’s organisations are key enablers**

The **majority of respondents from South Kivu said women’s rights organisations (WROs) are the most important enabler of women’s empowerment and political participation**. This reflects a very

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<sup>42</sup> Kvinna Tel Kvinna 2012

established women's movement in the region, particularly in and around Bukavu. Women's organisations, including international organisations such as the Swedish Kvinna Tel Kvinna, and women's civil society networks such as Rien Sans les Femmes and the Caucuse des Femmes have been actively engaged in promoting women's political participation for over a decade. Their activities have included awareness-raising and capacity building to enable understanding of electoral processes, build leadership skills and support female candidates to run successful campaigns.

In contrast, **in Kasai, there are very few WROs and those that exist are, far less well-established and organised,** and receive very little funding. Consequently, in discussions in Kasai multilateral international actors such as UN Women were more often mentioned as enabling agents for women's political participation than international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) or CSOs. However, two local women's organisations – ADEDEFO de Philomène and AFEJUCO – were mentioned by at least one respondent from Kasai as having mobilised women around the complete absence of women in provincial government, organising marches and other protests to demand that women's voices be heard. The respondents noted that this strategy had led to the governor's appointment of two female ministers (although they were hand-picked by him, rather than democratically elected).

### **International/multilateral and bilateral organisations**

Respondents from both South Kivu and Kasai noted the influence of international organisations in enabling women's political participation, including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), UN Women, UNICEF, UNOCHA, UNDP, UNHCR and the gender department of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). **Notable interventions** included SDC's provision of support on good governance, civic education and implementation of gender-responsive laws, contributing to a large increase in electoral enrolment of women in South and North Kivu; UN Women and UNFPA's support to survivors of gender-based violence, provision of education and training on gender equality.

### **Political allies**

Respondents from South Kivu mentioned the support to existing or aspiring female political candidates from some political party leaders, for example the President of the Alliance des Nationalistes pour un Congo Emergeant (ANCE), who was keen to include women in his party.

## 5 Pathways of Change to Women's Political Empowerment in South Kivu and Kasai

**Section 5.1** provides a summary table of the discussion above. It highlights key issues, structural barriers and key actors, behaviours and attitudes that contribute to blocking women's political participation in South Kivu and Kasai, and in the DRC more widely. Column 4 indicates a broad set of responses that are needed to challenge these barriers. **Section 5.2** goes on to provide targeted recommendations for FCDO.

### 5.1 Summary of Key Findings

**Table 1** summarises findings from the report and provides a general set of proposed responses. Specific recommendations for FCDO are outlined in **Section 6**.

**Table 1: Summary of key findings**

Institutions			
Issue	Structural barriers	Change resistors: people, behaviour and attitudes	Responses should include:
Poor implementation of laws and processes that promote women's rights and voices	<b>Political institutions, laws and processes:</b> Vagueness of language, lack of monitoring and sanction for non-compliance; lack of reward or recognition for those who do	<b>Male-centric political culture:</b> Lack of political will; informal rules - failure to change party practices that exclude women; exclusion of women from decision-making  Power holders in government and political parties (usually male)	Fostering of political will of male political leaders  Increased human and financial resources (and tracking of deployment)  Penalties for flouting the law/incentives for complying  Technical support  Gender training for women and men  Zero tolerance to active discrimination, abuse and sexual harassment.
Hybrid/two-tier political order	<b>Powerful customary institutions that promote men's interests</b>  <b>Women's exclusion from customary leadership</b>	Customary leaders have significant decision-making power, particularly at community level	Better understanding of the relationship and tensions between customary and state institutions  Working with customary leaders



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**Social, cultural and economic structures, norms and rules**


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Gender-biased and discriminatory social and cultural norms, beliefs and behaviours	<p><b>Powerful (informal) customary rules</b> that influence attitudes about gender (for example women expected to be subordinate to men), and contradict statutory laws.</p> <p><b>Informal but powerful cultural/customary rules</b> prescribe appropriate roles and behaviours for women and men.</p> <p>Politics not deemed suitable place for women/unfeminine.</p> <p>Double standards for women and men in politics.</p>	<p>Perceptions that women do not make good leaders</p> <p>Men's and women's of social sanctions – including abuse, harassment and being ostracised/socially embarrassed</p> <p>Fear of threatening marriage status</p>	<p>Shifting public mindset through interventions such as long-term media campaigns and other targeted strategies at the national, provincial, municipal and community levels.</p>
Low leadership capacity of women and girls	<p><b>Lack of secondary and tertiary education for girls.</b> High drop-out rates due to early marriage (especially in Kasai).</p> <p>Lack of provision of quality education</p> <p><b>Lack of confidence and resilience</b></p>	<p>Financial barriers for families</p> <p>Parents' concern that adolescent girls will be abused or harassed by boys in the mixed school environment, potentially resulting in pregnancy and dishonour for the girl and her family</p>	<p>More and better quality education for girls and boys</p> <p>Bursaries for girls and boys at secondary and tertiary levels</p> <p>Initiatives to promote school retention</p> <p>Awareness-raising for parents</p> <p>Sex education for girls and boys</p> <p>School facilities appropriate for girls</p> <p>Safeguarding for girls in school</p> <p>Leadership training and confidence building for girls</p>
Lack of financial resources for female politicians	<p><b>Low financial autonomy of women:</b> male dominance of financial decision-making (women not</p>	<p>Customary rules often take precedence over statutory law</p>	<p>Implementation of revised Family Code</p>

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permitted to manage even their own money); lack of land or inheritance rights.					Ensuring that Electoral law changes are implemented
<b>Revised Family Code not implemented</b>					Supporting banks to deliver appropriate funds and loan facilities for female political candidates
					Promotion of women's financial literacy

## 5.2. Pathways of Change/Recommendations for FCDO

**Table 2** outlines six pathways of change alongside recommendation for FCDO to address them.

**Table 2: Recommendation for FCDO**

**Goal: Inclusive political participation/more women in politics and in government bureaucracy at all levels.**

**Pathway 1: Better implementation of existing gender-responsive laws and commitments**

**Ensuring that gender-responsive laws and commitments – including the Constitution, electoral law and revised Family Code are upheld and translated into practice is a key lever of change.** This requires the allocation of human and financial resources and the introduction of measures such as penalties for flouting the laws, regular reporting on gender indicators, technical support, and gender training for both women and men.

### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy level	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces	In routine dialogue with national and provincial government <b>promote the need for better implementation of legislation</b> , and also <b>support women's organisations to hold governments to account</b> through process such as CEDAW shadow reporting and reporting on SDG 5. Provide orientation to FCDO interlocutors on women's political participation and on how to frame questions, to influence and to negotiate.	<b>Invest in and build the capacity of DRC's women's rights organisations and/or international organisations to support gender awareness and training in government agencies.</b> This should include training on gender-responsive budgeting and accountable spending.	Ensure that UK Aid investments in public financial management interventions include technical assistance for <b>gender budgeting</b> to ensure adequate allocation of financial resources and to track spending against gender budget lines
Kasai	Use FCDO's convening and influencing power to <b>connect government with WROs</b>	Ensure the <b>smaller, less well-connected Kasai-based WROs</b>	Actively <b>promote and support gender budgeting</b> as a good practice in Kasai, where

**in Kasai** as a means for them to report on progress against gender indicators

**have access to capacity-building**, not only those in South Kivu

there is a less gender-responsive governmental environment

**Use FCDO's convening power to bring together WROs** to share knowledge and create alliances. Consider supporting the establishment of a platform to enable these connections on an ongoing basis. Currently this does not exist in Kasai.

### Pathway 2: Inclusive, gender-responsive political institutions and policies

It is **important to foster the political will of male political leaders. and to incentivise them not only to comply with rules on parity but to also actively support female colleagues**, for example by ensuring meetings do not happen late at night. At the same time there should be zero tolerance to active discrimination based on gender, disability or other intersectional dimensions, and to abuse and sexual harassment.

#### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy level	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces	Work with government at all levels to <b>encourage the introduction of incentives for parties complying with the electoral law on parity</b> – i.e, for those that actively support the 50% inclusion of female party members, for example by waiving the joining fees for women, offering mentorship, and ensuring party meetings are held at convenient times for women. Incentives could include formal	Support women's organisations to work with government to provide training and information on <b>non-discrimination, inclusiveness and safeguarding/harassment</b> for political institutions at national and provincial, including parties  Host events that <b>bring women's rights organisations and government actors</b> together on the	

	recognition through gender equality markers, for example.	issue of developing more inclusive political institutions
Kasai		<b>Conduct a mapping of WROs</b> in Kasai to understand their different strengths in terms of advocacy and supporting training
South Kivu		<b>Partner with effective international organisations</b> such as Kvinna Tel Kvinna, which have strong connections with local WROs

### Pathway 3: Build women's and girls' leadership capacity and capability

- a. **There is an urgent need for more and better targeted investment into inclusive education for girls at secondary and tertiary levels, focusing on quality of education, not only on access.** The UK Government Development and Women's and Girls' Strategy both foreground the importance of universal education as a critical lever of change.
- b. **Women's organisations and networks in the DRC should drive change in both South Kivu and Kasai.** They have excellent convening power, knowledge of and relationships of trust with local communities, and skills to mentor future leaders, run leadership training, mobilise female voters, lobby existing female leaders and hold government to account for ensuring increased women's representation at all levels of governance. Networks and platforms such as the women's caucus in South Kivu increase solidarity, efficiency and knowledge sharing. However, women's organisations and networks are often chronically under-funded. This is particularly true for women's organisations in Kasai. There is also currently no platform linking women's organisations in Kasai.
- c. It is **vital to improve women's access to financial resources in the DRC.** Funds and loan facilities should be established aimed at supporting aspiring female political candidates. Legal revisions permitting women to independently open bank accounts and take out loans should also be effectively implemented.

### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces	a. <b>Foster dialogue and consultation with departments of education at all levels</b> , from central to provincial and district-level government to identify gaps in girls' education and map out strategies for	a. <b>Work with female leaders, teachers and relevant international partners</b> such as UNICEF and UN Women, and local WROs in South Kivu and Kasai to generate a clear picture of the	a. <b>Expand existing funding of girls' education in South Kivu and Kasai and the DRC more widely</b>  <b>Consider extending the Girls' Challenge Fund, or GIRL into the DRC and other countries</b>

<p>improving their access and retention at primary secondary and tertiary levels</p> <p>Work with government to develop school curricula includes measures to address gender inequalities and gender-biased norms, for example through sex and relationship education, and <b>confidence building/leadership training for girls</b></p> <p><b>Support the systematic collection and sharing of gender-disaggregated data</b> on retention as well as enrolment</p> <p>c.</p> <p><b>Work with national and provincial government and banks to ensure women have better access to finances</b> - for example, work with and fund banks to develop accessible, low interest credit and loan products for women and to enable them to open savings accounts</p>	<p>problems and solutions with regard to girls' education</p> <p><b>Fund scoping studies</b> to gain a better understanding of the barriers and enablers to girls' education in both provinces</p> <p>c..</p> <p><b>Support WROs in their efforts to change mindsets around women's access to finances</b>, as one way to promote implementation of the changes to the Family Code</p>	<p>Funding should be allocated for the maintenance of school facilities, and for ensuring <b>facilities are appropriate for girls' needs</b> – for example by ensuring male and female toilet facilities are available</p> <p>b.</p> <p><b>Provide more funding to DRC-based women's organisations, networks and platforms</b></p> <p>Funding modalities should be flexible, multi-year and not require onerous reporting. They should allow for small amounts of funds to be mobilised without a lot of administrative costs for the organisations.</p> <p><b>Collaborate with international organisations and local networks</b> who can act as intermediaries for funds. Ensure due diligence and monitoring are conducted to ensure reliability.</p> <p>c.</p> <p><b>Support local initiatives</b> such as the mutuelles de solidarité, which support women to be financially independent</p> <p><b>Support financial literacy training</b> at provincial and local levels – including in online banking</p>
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Kasai	<p>a.</p> <p><b>Ensure local WROs, female leaders are actively involved</b> in knowledge sharing and solution identification around education in Kasai</p>	<p>a.</p> <p><b>Ensure girls' education is a priority in Kasai</b>, where retention is particularly low. Mobilise/increase funding to existing interventions such as the UK Aid-funded Pilot Programme for Girls' Education.</p> <p>b.</p> <p>Ensure <b>funds are accessible to and appropriate for WROs in Kasai</b>, where there are significant financial gaps</p>
South Kivu		<p>b.</p> <p>Fund existing influential WROs and networks in South Kivu but <b>ensure that smaller/newer organisations are not excluded</b></p>

#### Pathway 4: Social norm change - change mindsets of the public on roles women and men play

To achieve the goal of advancing women's political participation in South Kivu, Kasai and the DRC more widely, it is vital to **change mindsets and promote alternative norms and ideas**. Shifting public attitudes takes time – and there are no quick fixes - but it is achievable through interventions such as long-term media campaigns and other targeted strategies at the national, provincial, municipal and community levels.

#### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces	<p><b>Leverage the DRC's government commitments to international agreements</b> that include CEDAW, the SDGs and the Maputo Protocol, as instruments to actively promote women's rights and political participation</p>	<p><b>Build partnerships with other agencies</b> such as UN Women and UNDP to run public awareness campaigns on issues such as sexual harassment using strategic platforms such as International Women's Day</p>	<p><b>Support WROs to strengthen their capacity in behaviour change communications and campaigning</b> to challenge public perceptions around gender roles</p> <p>Support outreach activities with organisations that <b>engage men and boys</b>, particularly young men through youth groups and sports</p>

Encourage and support processes such as CEDAW reporting and shadow reporting	<b>Support WROs and networks</b> to build awareness among women and local communities of government commitments on gender equality/women's rights, to undertake CEDAW shadow reporting, and to support the monitoring of SDG indicators
Monitor and report against SDG 5 and cross-cutting GESI elements of other SDGs	
Mobilise the Maputo Protocol	

### Pathway 5: Improved evidence and learning

#### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces	Invest in strengthening DRC's (including South Kivu and Kasai's) capacity to <b>monitor and report on SDG 5</b> (Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment) and all other SDGs from a gender perspective. Of key importance is SDG indicator 5.5.1a on women's representation in parliaments and 5.5.1b in local government  Ensure findings of GESI PEA are shared with government in a way that encourages active engagement with the data	Identify <b>champions of women's political rights within government</b> at all key levels  Invite key champions to a joint donor/government working group on women's political participation	

### Pathway 6: Identify realistic opportunities for short-term change

**Local elections as a platform for women's political participation:** It will take time to see shifts in both the level and quality of women's participation in provincial and national government institutions. However, a more immediate entry point could be local level elections at territorial and municipal level, which are due to take place for the first time in 2024, according to constitutional law.

#### Recommendations for FCDO

	Policy	Advocacy	Programming
Both provinces			<b>Support women's organisations to prepare women candidates</b> and male and female

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voters in the context of this local election process

Support the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** as a useful route for increasing women's participation in local elections

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
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## Annex 2: Gender and Social Inclusion Political Economy Framework



## 1 The problem

### 1.1 The diagnosis

**1.** The structural analysis asks: 'how do political, social, cultural, religious and economic structures and norms constrain or enable women's political empowerment? Areas of exploration include:

a) Formal and informal rules and rights: rules that are written down in constitutions, law and regulations and which official bodies oversee and enforce;

- Informal rules of the game (including behaviour) - informal – often unwritten - rules and practices that exist alongside formal rules, allowing them to be bent or reinterpreted.

b) Social, cultural and economic structures and norms: implicit or explicit rules and norms that shape shared expectations about how people (male/female) should behave. These are often enforced through social sanctions or self-censorship. Shared norms may or may not be consistent with formal/statutory rules and rights. They can undermine the enforcement and realisation of formal rules and rights, and they can also drive behaviour that is not governed by formal rules.

- Values and beliefs: the things that people (male/female) think are true or right. Where a person's values and beliefs contradict social norms or laws, a person may not act on them for fear of social or official sanction.

**2.** The agency analysis focuses on the ways in which structural constraints and enablers are mediated by people. It asks 'how and why individuals and groups – both male and female – maintain or challenge institutional and social structures, norms and values?' 'What are their interests and motivations?' 'What factors influence their behaviours, beliefs and norms; and how

do these relate to their networks of influence and social recognition?’ Areas of exploration include:

- The stakeholders, Who are the individuals and organisations that contribute to the shaping of (gendered) norms, beliefs and behaviours?
- The motivations: what are these individuals’ interests and what are their channels and networks of influence, (financial, social, cultural, personal, ideological)? To what extent do explicit or implicit social sanctions incentivise them to protect the status quo or seek changes, however small?
- The types of relationships and balance of power between those actors (male/female) . How do relationships of power between these actors create further barriers or enablers to change - and particularly to women’s political participation?

### **1.1.1 Pathways of Change**

- 1.** What is already being done to promote women’s political participation in South Kivu and Kasai – how successful are these and what factors contribute to success?
  - To what extent are women already playing a key role in formal decision-making processes and institutions?
- 2.** What policies, systems, procedures, processes, attitudes, and behaviours at multiple levels need to change?
  - What are potential drivers of change, at different levels?
- 3.** What can and should FCDO do to promote women’s participation in formal political systems and to be agents of change in communities and other micro-level spaces?

## Annex 3: Gender Inequality: Key Statistics for the DRC

In December 2020 UN Women noted only a third of the indicators required to monitor the SDGs from a gender perspective are available (footnote Country Fact Sheet, UN Women Data Hub <https://data.unwomen.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>). Key gaps include: unpaid care and domestic work; labour market indicators such as the gender pay gap and women in local governments. In many areas methodologies are not comparable such as gender and poverty, physical and sexual harassment, women's access to assets, including land, and gender and the environment.

### Education

DRC has significant gender gaps in school attendance, progress and learning outcomes which disadvantage women and girls.

- In 2018, the primary school completion rate was 67% compared with a global average of 90%).<sup>43</sup>
- 86% of 10-year-olds in the DRC were unable to understand a simple, age appropriate text. However, a Government Education Reform from September 2019 introduced free primary education providing an additional 2.5 million children from the most disadvantaged backgrounds the opportunity to attend school.<sup>44</sup>
- The 2017-2018 DRC Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) shows that 33 % of girls aged 14 – 17 were not in school, and of these 7% had never attended school; 16 % dropped out before reaching lower secondary; six % dropped out before reaching upper secondary, and four % dropped out during upper secondary.<sup>45</sup>
- Enrollment rates and gender gaps in DRC vary significantly. Secondary Net Enrollment Rate favoured boys in 21 of 26 provinces, and nine of these provinces had a double-digit gender gap. Rural girls were 23% less likely than rural boys, and 46 % less likely than urban boys, to enter grade 12.<sup>46</sup>

Key barriers to girls' education include gender-based violence and social norms that encourage early marriage and motherhood for girls.

- Among girls aged 15 – 19, just over 38 % experienced physical violence by the age of 15 and just over 16.4 % experienced acts of sexual violence (footnote *ibid*). This abuse was most often perpetrated by a husband or partner, or a male family member but violence was also perpetuated by teachers, and police, soldiers, or armed groups. One percent of women who experience violence said the perpetrator was a teacher.<sup>47</sup>
- Amongst women aged 20-24: 8.4 % were married before 15 years; 29.1 % were married before the age of 18 years; 25 % gave birth before the age of 18 years.<sup>48</sup>

### Health

- Expenditure on health is low: Between 2008 and 2012 it was US\$ 12 – 13 per capita per year.<sup>49</sup>
- 48% of women walk for more than an hour to reach a health facility.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>43</sup> UNICEF 2020 <https://www.unicef.org/media/100616/file/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-2020-COAR.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>45</sup> Empowering Girls and Enhancing Learning in DRC. World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2023/05/18/empowering-girls-and-enhancing-learning-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>47</sup> MICS 2017-18.

<sup>48</sup> MICS 2017-18.

<sup>49</sup> Hyppolite Kalambay Ntemba and Wim Van Legberghe. 2015 WHO. Improving Health System Efficiency. DRC. Improving aid coordination in the health sector. [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/186673/WHO\\_HIS\\_HGF\\_CaseStudy\\_15.4\\_eng.pdf?sequence=1](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/186673/WHO_HIS_HGF_CaseStudy_15.4_eng.pdf?sequence=1).

<sup>50</sup> WHO data base.

- Top causes for death for women and men: neonatal conditions (87.2% females; 111.8% males).<sup>51</sup>
- Malnutrition: 42% of children are malnourished (stunted).<sup>52</sup>
- Only 43% of households have access to drinking water and only 20% have access to appropriate sanitation.<sup>53</sup>

#### Maternal and newborn health<sup>54</sup>

- Just half of women (50%) aged 15 – 49 received postnatal care within 2 days of giving birth
- 25% of women gave birth before the age of 18.
- Maternal mortality ratio (unavailable). However, an estimated MMR for 2015 was recorded at 693/100,000 live births.<sup>55</sup>
- 85 percent of women gave birth attended by skilled health personnel
- 43% of women (aged 15 – 49) received antenatal care 4+ visits

#### Family planning and safe abortion

- Access to contraception: In Kinshasa access amongst married women is 26.7% as of 2013-14, and only 7.8% at the national level. Of the 16,465 health facilities reporting to the national health information system in 2017, only 40% offer family planning.<sup>56</sup>
- In March 2018 DRC published the Maputo Protocol in the country's national legal journal following concerted advocacy efforts by women's rights groups, researchers, and nongovernmental organizations. The protocol overrides local laws and reinforces the legality of abortion in the cases of sexual assault, rape, incest and fetal anomalies, and to protect the mother's mental and physical health or her life.<sup>57</sup>
- Women's access to legal abortion remains limited: it is donor driven; there is a lack of access to medical care to prevent and end unwanted pregnancies. Women who seek and have abortions face stigma. Access is constrained by medical providers' lack of knowledge about the law and fear of punishment/discrimination.<sup>58</sup>
- A study in North and South Kivu analyzing contraceptive use among sexually young women aged 15-24 in health zones where the Ministry of Health were supported by CARE, IRC, Save the Children, RAISE, Columbia University and others to provide good quality contraceptive services shows: adolescent and young women will use modern contraception, including long-acting methods. Meaningful engagement of adolescent and young women would likely contribute to even better outcomes. Creating an enabling environment by addressing gender and social norms is key to reducing stigma and meeting demand.<sup>59</sup>

#### Internal Displacement

- DRC has the second largest displaced population in the world due to protracted conflicts. 5.2 million people are internally displaced (50% displaced in the last 12 months of 2020).<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> MICS 2017-18.

<sup>53</sup> World Bank 2020.

<sup>54</sup> UNICEF 2020 <https://data.unicef.org/country/cod/>.

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26739016>.

<sup>56</sup> Dieudonne Kwete et al. Family Planning in the DRC: Encouraging Momentum, Formidable Challenges. Global Health Science and Practice. 2018 Mar 21; 6(1): 40-54 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5878077/>.

<sup>57</sup> [https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SAFE-ENGAGE-DRC\\_Medical-Fact-Sheet.pdf](https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SAFE-ENGAGE-DRC_Medical-Fact-Sheet.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Sara E. Casey et al. Published online 2020 Mar 31. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7108687/>.

<sup>60</sup> UNICEF 2020 <https://www.unicef.org/media/100616/file/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-2020-COAR.pdf>.

- The eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Ituri and the central Kasai region have experienced large scale-displacements in recent years.<sup>61</sup>
- Women are often more than 50 percent of those who are internally displaced and can represent as many as 62%.<sup>62</sup>

#### Gender based violence

- In 2018, 35.6 % of women aged 15 – 49 years reported that they had been subject to physical and/or sexual violence by a former or current intimate partner in the previous 12 months.<sup>63</sup>

#### Gender and the labour market

Significant gaps in data, including: unpaid care and domestic work; labour market indicators such as the gender pay gap

- Employed population below the international poverty line: 69.4% women; 66.4% men.<sup>64</sup>
- Only 62 percent of women in the DRC participate in the labour market. Only 6.4% of women work in wage employment compared to 23.9 percent of men.<sup>65</sup>
- Within agriculture (the largest sector) female farmers produce 17.8% – 10.9% less than men per hectare. Women's lower yields are driven by their concentration in food crops (that feed families) versus higher-value crops that can be exported.<sup>66</sup>
- Women have 77.3 percent lower wage earnings than men and 66.5% lower business profits than male entrepreneurs. The gender division of labour, lower education attainment, skills and concentration in lower-paying sectors are the primary drivers of women's lower wage earnings.<sup>67</sup>

The Women, Business and the Law index tracks the legal barriers that women face globally. DRC receives a score of 78.8 out of 100, which is above the legal average.<sup>68</sup> Although women make up 48% of the work force in DRC they face onerous legal barriers. Eighty percent of women work in agriculture with only 16 percent employed in services and 4 percent industrial sectors.

#### Decision making

Women have limited power in households and communities to make decisions on issues that affect them. The EMAP Impact Evaluation Study.<sup>69</sup>

- 44.6% of men make decisions about how women's income is spent versus 18.3% women and 36.5% for joint decision-making.
- 67.1% men make decisions on women's health versus 15.1 percent women and 15.5% for joint decision-making.
- 45.3% of men make decisions on major household investments versus 21.1% of women and 33.1 for joint decision-making.
- 51.9% of men make decisions on 'making visits' versus 16.6% of women and 31.2% for joint decision-making.

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<sup>61</sup> Women and girls in internal displacement. Christelle Cazabat et al March 2020 p. 8. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/202003-twice-invisible-internally-displaced-women.pdf>.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Country Fact Sheet, UN Women Data Hub <https://data.unwomen.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

<sup>64</sup> UN Women Fact Sheet: (footnote: Country Fact Sheet, UN Women Data Hub <https://data.unwomen.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

<sup>65</sup> World Bank <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/obstacles-and-opportunities-womens-economic-empowerment-drc>.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.


<sup>67</sup> For more information see: Obstacles and opportunities for women's economic empowerment in the DRC <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/obstacles-and-opportunities-womens-economic-empowerment-drc>.

<sup>68</sup> Women, Business and the Law 2022 <https://wbl.worldbank.org/en/wbl>.

<sup>69</sup> Cited in: Obstacles and opportunities for women's economic empowerment in the DRC <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/obstacles-and-opportunities-womens-economic-empowerment-shows>.



Figure 1

**World and regional averages of women in parliaments, 1995 and 2021**

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) data for all houses combined, figures correct as of 1 July 1995 and 1 January 2021 respectively.

## Annex 5: List of Participants for KIIs and FGDs

**Table 1 (Annex 5): South Kivu interviewees**

	Name	Role/Organisation
1.	Hon. Dr. Blandine KALAFULA	Questeur, Assemblée provinciale
2.	Madame Justine NAMVURA	Advisor, Ministry of Health
3.	Madame Marie Gorette KUSINZA	Présidente provincial, Fédération des femmes protestantes
4.	Maitre Néné BINTU	Coordinatrice, COSIC, collectif Simama Congo
5.	Madame MASOKA WANTU Bibish	Directeur général académique, ISC, Institut Supérieur de commerce
6.	PRUDENCE KANINGINI	Coordinatrice adjoint, CELD
7.	Toto SAFARI CHIMANUKA	Bourgmestre adjoint, Commune
8.	Son Excellence Geneviève	DIRCABA, Gouvernorat
9.	Madame Pétronie KANGELA	Cheffe de division, Div. des affaires sociales

**Table 2 (Annex 5): South Kivu FGD participants**

	Name	Role/Organisation
1.	Prisca Bukaraba	Journalist, AFEM
2.	Yvette Bushenyula	Programme officer, Caucus des Femmes
3.	Viviane Kafumba	Coordinator, AFEJUCO
4.	Jolie Bufale	Programme officer, Uwezo Afrika
5.	Mema Mapenzi	Coordinator, Centre Olame
6.	Yvette Mushigo	Coordinator, SPR/GL
7.	Georgette Nkunzi	Researcher, AFEM
8.	Judith Maroy	Journalist, La Prunelle
9.	Oyawinba Batanga August	Focal point, Youth for Peace
10.	Dorcas Shabini	Coordinator, Ladies and Future
11.	Nelly Bintu	ECKA
12.	Annie Binja	Activist
13.	Aime Matabaro	Coordinator, Wanawake Shujaa
14.	Limba Nyakura	Coordinator, Femmes leader pour le développement communautaire
15.	Divine Kashali Iragi	Communications officer, Action pour la lutte contre l'injustice sociale (ALCIS)



16.	Jeanne Namunezero	Programme officer, Mama Shujaa (SAFEKO)
17.	Martha Naloise	Mobilisation officer, Action pour le développement integral des personnes vivant avec handicap (ADIPD)
18.	Cecilia Foussiakda	Centre d'Excellence Denis Mukwege
19.	Viviane Sebahire	Coordinator, SEBAHIRE
20.	Lydie Mukasekuru	Programme officer, Kvinna Tel Kvinna
21.	Clarisse Abedi	Programme officer, KTK

**Table 3 (Annex 5): Kasai KIs**

	Name	Role/ Organisation
1.	Clémence Kenda	Influential woman
2.	Sanctifiée NGALULA	Coordonnatrice, AJEVODI
3.		Présidente provinciale, Fédération des femmes protestantes
4.	Maitre Néné BINTU	Coordinatrice, COSIC, collectif Simama Congo
5.	Madame MASOKA WANTU Bibish	Directeur général académique, ISC, Institut Supérieur de commerce
6.	PRUDENCE KANINGINI	Coordinatrice adjoint, CELD
7.	Toto SAFARI CHIMANUKA	Bourgmestre adjoint, Commune
8.	Son Excellence Geneviève	DIRCABA, Gouvernorat
9.	Madame Pétronie KANGELA	Cheffe de division, Div. des affaires sociales

**Table 4 (Annex 5): Kasai FGD participants**

	Name	Role /Organisation
1.	Christine Luange Mbalo	Coordinator, DYNAFET
2.	Noella Misenga Musungula	Coordinator, SADEF
3.	Carine Hputu Kanyinda	Coordinator, Vision Kasaienne
4.	Marlene Tshibayi Malengu	Finance officer, AFEJUCO
5.	Dahida Mavula Kapela	Coordinator, UCOFEN
6.	Marie Nedi Diema	Coordinator, WIFID
7.	Bilenga-Ayou Bilonda	Coordinator, AFDDK
8.	Josee Boni Mianda	Project officer, DYNAFET
9.	Berthine Biakabomba	President, AEFID

# Race to the bottom

A political economy analysis of contemporary provincial public financial management in South Kivu and Kasai provinces

Written by

[REDACTED]

With research input from:

[REDACTED]

October 2023

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# Acronym List

AFDC	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques du Congo
CODEP	Convention Démocratique du Peuple
DGRAD	Direction Générale des Recettes Administratives, Judiciaires, Domaniales et De Participations
DGKRAS	Direction Générale des Recettes – Kasaï
DPMER	Direction Provincial de Mobilisation et Encadrement des Recettes
ETD	Entité Territoriale Décentralisée
FCC	Front Commun pour le Congo
MP	Majorité Présidentielle
NA	National Assembly
PA	Provincial Assembly
PFM	Public Financial Management
PPP	Private Public Partnership
UDPS	Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social
UNC	Union pour la Nation Congolaise
USN	Union Sacrée pour la Nation

# 1. Introduction

In preparation for the proposed launch of a new Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)-financed programme to reform public financial management (PFM) in South Kivu and Kasai, the FCDO commissioned a political economy analysis of the current state of PFM in the two provinces. An initial inception report framed the research largely in terms of analysis of the interactions within and between personal networks of the powerful and institutions, and particularly institutions of state, as they impact on PFM. Through this research, we were hoping to answer the following questions:

- Who exactly is in the networks that wield political power in South Kivu and Kasai? How are the people in each network connected and how did they come to have this power?
- What are the connections between these social/political networks and national political networks?
- What are the key institutions with regards to PFM in both provinces? What are their roles?
- Where are the members of these networks placed in these institutions (or in others)? How did they come to be there? What is their role in PFM?
- How does the provincial revenue authority function and to whom does it answer? How does it interact with other institutions, including national revenue authorities?
- In what ways does the PFM status quo suit these networks, and in what ways might it be in their interest to support reform?
- What are the key gaps and challenges in South Kivu and Kasai's PFM? What causes these gaps and challenges?
- To what extent is there a clash in PFM between computerisation and digitisation of processes, and the retention, including for the purposes of advancing the interests of a network, of person-to-person interaction?
- FCDO reform is intended to improve PFM outcomes. Who might be allies, and who might be opposed? How might FCDO work successfully with potential allies, while mitigating the impact of the efforts of those opposed?
- Is it possible for FCDO to work with allies within institutions and not finance these allies' network patronage flows?
- What in the network and institutional arrangements and relationships outlined above might change after elections, and what would we expect to remain the same? How might this influence FCDO's approach?

A subsequent literature review was conducted, starting with a review of the broader Congolese political economy. A particular focus was first placed on how appointments to Congolese state institutions are made. We then shifted our focus to the "rapportage"<sup>1</sup> obligations that typically ensue from appointees to those that appointed them. The review cited recent works that explore the complex interplay between Congolese national and provincial networks and institutions in these matters, further arguing that the country's citizenry are not mere victims of these arrangements, but play a more nuanced, interactive, and (sometimes) empowered role.

The review looked at the political economy of computerisation in the context of PFM, observing that Congolese state institutions and their senior leadership both desire and resist computerisation in PFM. The former do so because of the promise of higher revenues and the latter for fear of losing their own parallel revenue mechanisms. This proved highly relevant to subsequent research, as can be seen in Chapters One and Two of this report.

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<sup>1</sup> Rapportage is the upward flow of money from appointees to positions of official authority to those who have appointed them. It is also sometimes referred to as 'la pompe ascendante'.

The review considered recent PEA studies on South Kivu that portray the national authorities in Kinshasa as ‘meddlers’ in provincial institutions. Notably, this also revealed that successive provincial governors have granted themselves the authority to extend customs duty exonerations to selected economic operators. For Kasaï, the reviewed literature noted that the provincial headquarters of the three national tax authorities have still not been transferred to Tshikapa, eight years after the decentralisation that created the province, but have remained in Kananga in neighbouring Kasaï Central. Political economy studies of the Kasaïs, and of Kasaï in particular, meanwhile, have identified ethnicization and politicisation across the provincial administration, and provided detailed political analysis on the network of Governor Pieme Tutokot.

What follows are two chapters, the first on South Kivu and the second on Kasaï. They present the findings of fieldwork completed in September and October 2023 in the two provinces to discern the political economy of PFM in each by seeking answers to the questions posed earlier, informed by the literature review summarised above.

## 2. Chapter One: South Kivu

The basic story outlined below is that the provincial PFM envisaged in the Constitution has been abandoned in South Kivu. The Provincial Assembly (PA), which is supposed to exercise PFM oversight, was prevented by the Governor from functioning. A digital payments system called EGov was introduced for the provincial revenue authority. The system, while functional, has been prevented from being fully effective through a variety of approaches, outlined below. As a result, EGov and the provincial revenue authority have a partial, obstructed view of provincial revenues. The Governor, meanwhile, has access to revenue streams that are captured neither by EGov nor the provincial authority. These funds are being deployed to shore up his political position and to deliver *rapportage* to Kinshasa. The central government is, in general, showing a keen interest in strengthening its power and ability to extract revenues from South Kivu. It is in this context that the controversial Primera gold deal should be understood – a bid by the Presidency to reshape the artisanal gold supply chain in its favour, in alliance with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

### 2.1 Networks

Governor Théo Ngwabidje Kasi is from the Havu community of the island of Ijldwi in Lake Kivu. During the presidency of Joseph Kabila, Ngwabidje was a member of the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques du Congo* (AFDC), a party headed by fellow South Kivutian Bahati Lukwebo, and at the time a prominent member of Kabila's *Majorité Présidentielle* (MP) coalition of political parties. The MP later morphed into the *Front Commun pour le Congo* (FCC) and its members, including the AFDC, contested the 2018 elections under this banner. In South Kivu, President Felix Tshisekedi's *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS) performed poorly in the 2018 elections, winning no Provincial Assembly (PA) seats and only one in the National Assembly (NA). Ngwabidje was elected Governor of South Kivu in April 2019 by PA deputies as the candidate of an uneasy coalition between FCC and a Tshisekedi-aligned coalition called CACH.

In December 2020, Bahati quit the FCC and joined Tshisekedi's *Union Sacrée pour la Nation* (USN). He was one of the first Kabilist political leaders to do so, and was later appointed by Tshisekedi to the powerful position of President of the National Senate. The UDPS, meanwhile, has wanted from the outset to improve its weak political representation and influence in the province. Seizing the opportunity to give the UDPS what it wanted and keep his job in the process, Ngwabidje quit the AFDC and joined the UDPS in October 2022.<sup>2</sup>

Ngwabidje's political conversion has helped him to withstand opposition from the PA, and ultimately to retain his Governorship, despite efforts to remove him. In November 2022, the PA voted another motion *de censure* against Ngwabidje (its fourth such motion since he came into office), legally requiring him to step down. Ngwabidje ordered the police to close the PA to try to stop deputies from considering the motion, but the deputies selected a new temporary location for their deliberations, Bukavu's Ruzizi Hotel. On the day of the vote, state security forces attempted to kidnap Bisimwa as he entered the Ruzizi. He was saved by the intervention of his supporters, who managed to hustle him into a friendly taxi. He and the deputies managed to vote through the motion the following day.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, Ngwabidje was forced to step down, and Fiston Malago Kashekere was temporarily named interim Governor. Malago is from Vital Kamerhe's *Union pour la Nation Congolaise* (UNC), and he immediately got to work to disrupt Ngwabidje's revenue streams, cancelling a number of Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) that the Governor had installed, ostensibly to increase provincial revenue collection (see below). Ngwabidje appealed to the Constitutional Court, and on March 17, 2023, the UDPS came out in public

<sup>2</sup> <https://7sur7.cd/index.php/2022/10/30/sud-kivu-le-gouverneur-ngwabidje-quitte-lafdc-de-bahati-et-adhere-ludps>

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Norbert Bisimwa Yabe Ntinda, Bukavu, September 2023.



support of him, appealing to the Constitutional Court to annul the motion and reinstate Ngwabidje.<sup>4</sup> On March 22, the Constitutional Court did just that, controversially ruling, to the outrage of not only PA deputies but many jurists too, that the process had been somehow invalid and that Ngwabidje should return to office.<sup>5</sup> Ngwabidje did so and in late April carried out a major reshuffle, removing all but one of the province's AFDC and UNC ministers, replacing them with people from the UDPS and satellite parties.<sup>6</sup> The new provincial Minister of Finance was formerly a member of Kabila's PPRD, but subsequently joined the UDPS.

In October 2022, Ngwabidje changed the entire top management of the *Direction Provinciale de Mobilisation et Encadrement des Recettes* (DPMER), putting in place Cigo Mihigo as the new head of the organisation, Theodore Museme Ndarabu as the deputy director, and Francois Mutambala as the head of the DPMER's Inspection Division. The previous incumbents, reportedly, were UNC and AFDC-aligned.<sup>7</sup> The new team is said to be pro-UDPS, even if only for convenience's sake. At any rate, they owe their positions to Ngwabidje.

Ngwabidje has been unable to change the composition of the PA, whose deputies continue to torment him. 26 deputies, a majority of its 48 members – most of whom are former members of the FCC – including the AFDC and UNC, have formed an anti-Ngwabidje block and have made repeated attempts to get rid of the Governor. To push back, Ngwabidje has fostered a smaller parliamentary block that supports him, which has controversially created its own bureau to direct proceedings at the PA, contesting the right to do so of the existing bureau, dominated by Ngwabidje's foes. The result has been, as Ngwabidje presumably had hoped, institutional paralysis at the PA as the two blocks have fought it out, literally as much as metaphorically. In April 2023, the national Minister of the Interior Peter Kazadi, [REDACTED], ordered that the South Kivu PA be closed. The PA has been closed since and is guarded by police and soldiers.

### 2.1.1 Possible network reconfiguration after elections

Ngwabidje is seeking re-election as Governor next year by the newly elected PA. The Governor has the support of [REDACTED] which may prove decisive if the electoral commission (CENI) hands the President and his party a result in South Kivu that gives the UDPS more seats in the PA than it has rightfully won. If the result reflects the vote, however, there is likely to be a strong showing for the UNC and the AFDC, which have traditionally been the most popular political parties in the province. Ngwabidje has been openly hostile to the AFDC and UNC and can expect the same when the gubernatorial vote comes, [REDACTED] to instruct their deputies to vote for him at the national level. Should this transpire, and Ngwabidje is re-elected Governor, there is likely to be continued contestation and tension between the provincial executive and legislature, particularly concerning PFM in its various guises.

If after the election newly elected PA deputies install someone other than Ngwabidje as Governor, a reconfiguration of networks will occur which will impact provincial PFM. The heads of the DPMER would be replaced before long, probably accompanied by a media campaign denouncing the corruption of the previous leadership. A new deal between the PA and the executive branch would likely be sought and possibly struck, which may result in improved access to provincial revenue streams for the PA. However, these are all reasons why this outcome will be strongly resisted [REDACTED]. A provincial powerbase for Kamerhe or Bahati, or both of them in South Kivu runs counter to [REDACTED] and his team's ongoing bid to extend the

<sup>4</sup> <https://actualite.cd/index.php/2023/03/17/sud-kivu-ludps-reclame-le-retour-en-fonction-de-theo-ngwabidje-en-attendant-larret-de-la>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/03/22/actualite/politique/sud-kivu-la-cour-constitutionnelle-rehabilite-le-gouvernement>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/29/actualite/politique/sud-kivu-le-gouverneur-theo-ngwabidje-remanie-son-equipe>. The sole surviving UNC minister is Marie Jeanne Zihaliwa, the Minister of Culture.

<sup>7</sup> <https://actualite.cd/2022/10/21/sud-kivu-prise-de-fonctions-de-nouveaux-mandataires-de-la-direction-provinciale-de>



UDPS [REDACTED] political and 'rent'-extraction capabilities in the province. Presidential interference will either prevent the election of a different Governor happening in the first place, or will render his or her term in office permanently unstable through endless interventions from Kinshasa.<sup>8</sup>

## 1.2 Provincial Government Revenue Collection

Like all Congolese provincial governments, South Kivu derives its official revenues from:

- *retrocession* from Kinshasa,
- the collections of its own revenue authority, and
- donor assistance.

It is common that Kinshasa is in arrears with its *retrocession* payments everywhere, which are supposed to be around 40% of what the national tax agencies collect in the provinces. These arrears are said by provincial government officials to have worsened during the Tshisekedi presidency. According to one official in the South Kivu Ministry of Budget:

“ We had a delegation visit us from the Ministry of Budget not long ago. They told us that we should really forget about *retrocession*. That they are phasing it out without saying so. It confirms what we thought as we are seeing less and less coming.”<sup>9</sup>

In the absence of *retrocession*, and apart from donor assistance, the provincial government relies on the DPMER. The DPMER and its counterparts in other provinces have the right to collect a range of taxes and levies. In South Kivu, their collection could, in principle, deliver many millions of dollars per month to the provincial coffers. However, in practice, the DPMER's revenues are a little over US\$1m/month, which is not enough to run and remunerate the provincial government, let alone deliver services to the population.<sup>10</sup>

In 2019, the provincial government signed an agreement with Verditra, a Norwegian company, to incorporate a software system and app called EGov into provincial revenue collection. The idea was to digitise taxpayer interactions with tax collection agents, thereby theoretically reducing fraud and increasing transparency.

Now, when the DPMER issues a *note de perception* to a taxpayer, this is automatically registered in EGov. When the taxpayer settles the bill at a commercial bank, an invoice is issued to the taxpayer as proof of payment and the bank is then supposed to register the payment on the EGov app, using the same reference number as was issued with the *note de perception*. This enables EGov automatically to tally the two and close the transaction.<sup>11</sup>

This transparency poses a challenge to intra-network *rapportage* which prevails at every level of the DRC's PFM and depends on a lack of transparency in the collection and spending of public funds. One of the *rapportage* workarounds to the EGov challenge is the establishment of so-called parallel accounts at the commercial banks where taxes are paid. EGov officials say they have seen multiple instances of taxpayers with invoices showing proof of payment, but there being no record entered by the commercial bank into EGov of the *note de perception* in question having been settled.<sup>12</sup> It seems that money intended for the provincial

<sup>8</sup> E.g., Kinshasa delivering no *retrocession*, or the Minister of the Interior ordering the recall of the Governor for months at a time, as has happened in Kasai.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with official, Ministry of Budget, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with leadership of DPMER, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with EGov director of DRC operations and South Kivu branch manager, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with EGov director of DRC operations and South Kivu branch manager, Bukavu, September 2023.

account has been diverted to other bank accounts. PA deputies and several civil society leaders have alleged that many (though not all) of these “parallel” accounts are linked to the Governor.

Another *rapportage* workaround to EGov is the establishment by the Governor of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) with a selection of companies, giving them the right to collect some of the DPMER’s taxes on the authority’s behalf. The PPPs have all been assigned revenue collection targets, and their revenues must all be recorded on EGov. The workaround is that the PPPs consistently fail to meet their revenue targets, often by substantial margins, and yet remain in place. The PA has accused the Governor of establishing the PPPs for corrupt purposes, with deputies alleging in one of their motions against Ngwabidje that the companies share with him and his close political confidantes the money that was collected but not paid into the DPMER and registered on EGov.<sup>13</sup> It has been alleged by some in civil society that other civil society activists have been induced into ending their public criticism of the provincial government by their covert inclusion in PPPs.<sup>14</sup> Other provincial revenue streams elude EGov entirely, including tax contributions from Bralima, an industrial brewer and a major contributor to South Kivu’s coffers.

Another opaque revenue stream comes from taxes and levies taxes paid by fuel importers. Curiously, these funds are handled via different mechanisms in Bukavu and Uvira. In both cases, however, the funds appear to be being paid into dedicated commercial bank accounts which are outside the EGov system.<sup>15</sup> PA deputies and DPMER officials say that the banks in question, [REDACTED] deduct interest payments on their loans to the provincial government from these accounts. The balance in the accounts is meant for the upkeep and repair of roads used by fuel transporters. There appears, however, to be substantial and largely unexplained leakage from these accounts, (particularly from the [REDACTED] account in Bukavu), with most of this leakage allegedly for the Governor’s benefit.<sup>16</sup>

A significant South Kivu revenue stream beyond the purview of both EGov and the DPMER are the opaque agreements between the provincial government and international (particularly Chinese) mining operators for permission to carry out mining activities, often in contravention of Congolese law.<sup>17</sup> Another, allegedly, is the money collected from the sale of artisanal mining licences and permits<sup>18</sup> as well as the proceeds from the alleged illegal sale of state assets by the Governor.<sup>19</sup>

Beyond the deliberately manufactured failings in EGov, there are other systemic and structural ones in the provincial revenue collection system. These include:

- DPMER agents are meant to receive salaries and primes from the provincial government. However, few DPMER agents actually receive salaries. That is normal enough in the Congolese civil service. However many DPMER agents experience lengthy arrears too in the payment by the province of their primes, on which most Congolese civil servants survive. Many agents have responded by keeping tax payments for themselves, particularly outside Bukavu. The principal reason for this non-payment appears to be the very low prioritisation of DPMER remuneration by the provincial government, combined with a general shortage of funds.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> We have accumulated considerable information on which companies exactly have PPPs and for what which we are able to share on request but have not included here for want of space.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with civil society activists, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>15</sup> Interviews with fuel importers, DPMER officials, PA deputies, civil society, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>16</sup> Interviews with civil society and PA deputies, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>17</sup> Chinese semi-industrial mining operations are active in several parts of South Kivu, often on permits that allow for exploration only. These operations pay separately for Congolese army and police protection.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with civil society activist turned political candidate, Bukavu, September 2023.

<sup>19</sup> The allegations are contained in the four motions by the PA against the Governor.

<sup>20</sup> Interviews with DPMER leadership, Bukavu, September 2023.

- The DPMER is increasingly packed with agents installed by politicians allied to the Governor, with no clear job description, and whose apparent function is to remit funds to whoever installed them. Agents installed in this way are considered “untouchable” by the DPMER leadership.
- Where the DPMER is collecting a levy that originates in a *service d’assiette*,<sup>21</sup> it is supposed to remit 5% of this levy to this *service d’assiette* but does not. As a result, many services d’assiette prefer to have their levies collected by the *Direction Générale des Recettes Administratives, Judiciaires, Domaniales et De Participations* (DGRAD), a national tax collection agency that does pay this 5%. The remainder of these funds then enter national rather than provincial coffers.
- There is a systematic under-collection of what should be the province’s main source of revenue, property taxes. This is in large part because of a lack of technical capacity. It is also said that many influential people are large property owners and are disinclined to pay what they owe.

## 2.3 Provincial Government Expenditure and its Control

The theoretical methodology for provincial government expenditure and its budgets appears feasible. Under the orientation of the Governor, the provincial Ministry of Budget drafts an annual budget and brings it to the PA for debate. The PA amends as it sees fit and votes on the text, which then goes to the Governor to be signed into law. Implementation follows, with a four stage process with oversight mechanisms built-in required for all expenditure. Should the executive wish to make expenditures outside of the budget, it may only do so with the approval of the PA. At the end of the financial year, the provincial government reports to the PA on the rate of execution of its budget, and only once this is accepted will the PA review and approve its budget for the following year.

The practice in South Kivu is different. The Ministry of Budget assembles a budget, using in its *retrocession* column the figures provided to it by the Ministry of Budget in Kinshasa. Since the rate of realisation of *retrocession* is low, this renders the provincial government budget fictive from the start. In 2022, the central government paid 125% of what had been budgeted for to South Kivu’s health and education sectors,<sup>22</sup> but only 36% of what it had been budgeted to pay the provincial administration and Entités Territoriales Décentralisées (ETDs).<sup>23</sup>

This issue is compounded by consistent weakness in recorded DPMER revenues, for the reasons described in the previous section. In 2021, for example, the DPMER collected only 16% of the funds it had been targeted to achieve.<sup>24</sup> In 2022, it managed to collect 23.8% of its target.<sup>25</sup>

The result is that recorded expenditure is always less than what has been budgeted for. Recorded expenditure in 2021, for example, was CF159bn (US\$64m), 58% of what had been budgeted. This overall

<sup>21</sup> Multiple governmental departments and organisations are classified as services d’assiette. This means they are entitled to charge fees for goods and services related to their mandate. Examples include the Department of Health charging for sanitary inspections, The Ministry of Communications charging for broadcasting licences, the Ministry of Transport charging for vehicle licences. A reform instituted in the mid-1990s created the DGRAD, which is empowered to collect these fees on behalf of the services d’assiette. After decentralisation in 2015, the authority to collect some of these fees was transferred to provincial revenue authorities.

<sup>22</sup> Provinces are constitutionally meant to pay for health and education services but cannot do so because they have not been accorded the tax base from the national tax authorities with which to do so. The (apparently endless) interim compromise agreed between the central and provincial governments is that the former will continue to pay for health and education in the provinces until such time as the decentralisation process is completed. Much of health and education service delivery in reality, meanwhile, comes from churches. It has been reported, meanwhile, that 93% of the 2022-2023 national health budget was consumed by remuneration costs.

<sup>23</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Reddition des Comptes, Exercice 2022 CLOS*.

<sup>24</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Tableau Récapitulatif des Recettes Réalisées de la Province de Sud Kivu pour l’Exercice 2021*.

<sup>25</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Reddition des Comptes, Exercice 2022 CLOS*.



figure masks considerable discrepancies between expenditure categories. Personnel expenditure for 2021 was 117% of the budgeted figure, while spending on vaccines, for example, was just 8% of what had been budgeted, and capital expenditure was 16% of the budgeted figure.<sup>26</sup> In 2022, expenditure was CF188bn, 47% of what was budgeted for, again with overspending on personnel and a drastic underspend elsewhere, this time with a larger number of budget lines, including those for medical products registering zero realisation. Provincial transfers to ETDs came in just US\$600,000, 2.7% of the budgeted figure. By contrast, one intriguing budget line in 2022 was “frais secrets de recherche”, under the heading “Autres Services”. South Kivu managed to spend CF1.84bn (US\$740k) on this mysterious item during 2022, a large sum making up 67% of its budget allocation.<sup>27</sup>

Because of the stand-off between the PA and the provincial government, the former has not voted on and approved the administration's 2021 and 2022 budgets. And because the national government has since April 2023 forbidden the South Kivu PA to convene, it has been unable to consider executive government requests for expenditure not contained in the budget. For the same reason, the PA is also unable to consider and vote on the provincial government's budget for 2024, which it should have begun reviewing in October 2023.

However, the new structure of provincial PFM is not the only obstacle allowing the PA to not provide adequate oversight. Generally, awareness of what constitutes good governance in PFM among PA deputies appears to be weak and there are few ‘best practice’ examples or notions that are recognised. Civil society sources report that on several occasions, the results of “missions of control” by the PA's Economy and Finance Committee (Ecofin) on various aspects of provincial PFM have gone unpublished, leaving civil society to surmise that the deputies who conducted the investigation had been paid to keep quiet or have their own hidden interests to protect.

It seems that a growing proportion of current provincial government expenditure, particularly by the Governor's office, was not envisaged and is not contained in the official provincial budget. This tendency is only intensifying as the 2023 elections near. This spending includes *rapporpage* to the UDPS and national government politicians in Kinshasa, election campaign spending, personal enrichment, and payments to PA deputies who are cooperating with the executive. Some of this expenditure is financed by the revenue streams uncaptured by EGov and the DPMER that are referenced in the previous section. Some is financed by the redirection of provincial government funds that have gone through EGov and the DPMER.

One of the many consequences of this redirection of funds is that the South Kivu province consistently fails to invest and spend on the many social projects that the provincial government has repeatedly promised it will deliver. This failure irritates tax payers and discourages “tax morality”. Another consequence, as indicated above, is that the non-payment of DPMER agents exacerbates misdeclaration and corruption in the agency. Another is that other provincial government employees at every level, including government ministers, experience long arrears in the payment of their salaries and primes, exacerbating corruption everywhere.

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### 2.3.1 Provincial government debt

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The provincial government has borrowed several million US dollars [REDACTED]. These loans were supposed to have been for social projects, but much of the money has been spent instead on cash transfers to members of the PA and provincial government. Civil society sources say they have seen no visible impact from the loans. [REDACTED] apparently ensure the province services their loans by

<sup>26</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Tableau d'Execution des Depenses, Exercice 2021*.

<sup>27</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Reddition des Comptes, Exercice 2022 CLOS*.

collecting interest payments from provincial bank accounts paid into by fuel importers. The provincial accounts show that CF427m (US\$172k) was paid in financing internal debt during 2022.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ministry of Finance, South Kivu, *Reddition des Comptes, Exercice 2022 CLOS*.

## 3. Chapter Two: Kasai

In Kasai, in contrast to South Kivu, the Governor has been forced into a political accommodation with the PA, which has significantly impacted PFM. After successive PA attempts to depose him, chronicled below, the Governor for several years installed PA deputies as heads of the provincial revenue authority. The PA has also been receiving a substantial percentage of the revenue the authority receives monthly. The Governor, provincial ministers, successive directors of the provincial revenue authority, and members of the PA have all since worked hard – and with considerable success - to establish autonomous revenue streams for themselves by diverting the flow of funds to the provincial revenue authority. The result is a multitude of competing personal provincial revenue-harvesting networks at work, all to the detriment of the province's coffers which are, as a result, too depleted to deliver services or much in the way of salaries.

### 3.1 Networks

As was explained in a 2019 PEA commissioned by DFID,<sup>29</sup> Governor Pieme Tutokot owes his position to Evariste Boshab. Both are from the Kuba community in Mweka. Boshab was for many years Kabila's Minister of the Interior. Boshab acquired notoriety during this time for the disastrous impacts of his intervention in the succession process of a traditional lineage in Kasai Central, which led to the outbreak of the bloody Kamuina Nsapu rebellion there in 2016.<sup>30</sup> Kabila's FCC took 25 out of the Kasai PA's 29 seats in the 2018 election, and voted in Pieme as Boshab and Kabila's candidate in April 2019. In Pieme's initial provincial government, all but one minister was from the FCC. The Finance Minister was François Tshitenge.

Aside from naming his government, one of Pieme's first actions was to fire the head of the *Direction Générale des Recettes* – Kasai (DGRKAS). François Mukanyimi. Mukanyimi was dismissed in June 2019, but only replaced by Marcel Didier Ndjoku in January 2020 six months later.

Tshitenge hired a company called Flash Info to collect revenues from the province's various toll points on transport routes, a task otherwise conducted by the DGRKAS. Tshitenge has defended his initiative, saying it introduced transparency and boosted provincial revenues.<sup>31</sup> Tshitenge's critics have said that while the system worked well at first, it became increasingly untransparent and resulted in a select few politicians linked to Flash Info unduly benefiting, to the detriment of the province.<sup>32</sup>

In November 2020, a majority of the PA passed a motion *de censure* against Pieme. Both he and the President of the PA were summoned to Kinshasa, where Pieme was obliged to stay until January 2021. Upon his return, Pieme reshuffled his administration, removing Tshitenge as Finance Minister, replacing him with Hubert Ngulandjoko. Ngulandjoko ended the Flash Info system at toll points and returned the task of revenue collection there to the DGRKAS.<sup>33</sup>

The PA voted against the Governor in April 2021, forcing Pieme to step down and giving way to Vice Governor Gaston Nkole Tshimuanga. Ntshumuanga almost immediately suspended Ndjoku as the director of DGRKAS. Like Ngwabidje in South Kivu, Pieme took his case to the Constitutional Court. Lobbying behind

<sup>29</sup> ESAAP, 2019, Political Economy Analysis of Kasai and Kasai Central provinces. Final Report.

<sup>30</sup> Gregory Mthemba-Salter, *Wars and Rumours of Wars: Contemporary Conflict Dynamics in the Kasais*, DFID EACP, 2017.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with François Tshitambala Tshitenge, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>32</sup> Among the most prominent critics we encountered was another former finance minister, Hubert Ngulandjoko. Also critical was Jean Calvin Mingashanga, a PA deputy and former director of DGRKAS.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Hubert Ngulandjoko, Tshikapa, September 2023.



the scenes for Pieme's success in this matter, reportedly, was Simon Mulamba Mputu.<sup>34</sup> Mulamba is the National Assembly deputy for Tshikapa and used to be a member of Dely Sesanga's opposition ENVOL party, but earlier this year launched his own party, the *Convention Démocratique du Peuple* (CODEP), which has since joined the President's USN. This weakening of ENVOL has gratified the national government and given Mulamba political clout in Kinshasa, which he deployed in this instance to save Pieme's position as Governor.

Once back in office, Pieme restored Ndjoku to the head of DGRKAS, but not for long. In October 2021, Pieme replaced him with Jean Calvin Mingashanga, a PA deputy from the Governor's home town of Mweka, also linked to Boshab. Mingashanga brought a number of people with him into the DGRKAS, apparently despite the objections of Ngulandjoko. Pieme fired Ngulandjoko in July 2022, replacing him as Minister of Finance with Muller Milambo. Milambo soon fell out with Mingashanga, and Mingashanga resigned as DGRKAS director in October 2022.

Pieme then replaced Mingashanga at DGRKAS with another PA deputy, Joseph Kalombo. Like Mulamba, Kalombo had been in ENVOL but then switched to CODEP and the two are politically allied. Kalombo registered as a candidate for the NA in July 2023 and, as the law requires, tendered his resignation as head of DGRKAS. Pieme, however, did not accept Kalombo's resignation until October 2023, and Kalombo continued to run the agency from his house in a Tshikapa suburb in the meantime. High on Kalombo's list of priorities throughout his tenure at DGRKAS was placing friends, relatives, and political allies at road toll points, allegedly to divert funds and supply him and his political associates with *rapportage*.<sup>35</sup>

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### 3.1.1 Possible network reconfiguration after elections

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Pieme hopes to return as Governor in PA elections, which are likely to take place during the first quarter of 2024. Opinion is divided on whether he will succeed. If Boshab can retain his position as a provincial powerbroker, perhaps working alongside Mulamba and both give Pieme their backing (with the blessing of the President), the Governor could return to power. If he does so, however, Pieme's relations with the new PA will also likely prove rocky, with friction generated – as of now – by incessant rivalries over who controls which provincial revenue streams. If a new Governor does emerge, a change in the provincial government and the leadership of the DGRKAS is inevitable. However, in contemplating whether the USN should back a different candidate for the Governor's office, Tshisekedi and his team will be mindful that similar friction and rivalry will also face a new arrival, since the province's recorded revenues are simply too low both to run the administration and provide liquidity for *rapportage*.

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## 3.2 Provincial Government Revenue Collection

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As in South Kivu, the Kasai provincial government gets its revenues from Kinshasa, the DGRKAS, and donors. The points about *retrocession* and the disparity between budgets and reality which were made concerning South Kivu apply equally in Kasai. There are, however, particular features of the relationship between the nation's capital and Tshikapa concerning the revenue side of PFM which do merit consideration.

First, as has been detailed in previous PEAs, the provincial headquarters of the national tax collection agencies are not in Tshikapa but have remained in the old Kasai Occidental provincial capital of Kananga. At the *Direction Générale des Impôts* (DGI), the *Direction des Grands Entreprises* (DGE) deals with large companies, provincial *Centres des Impôts* (CDI) deal with medium-sized companies, and *Centres des Impôts Synthétiques* (CIS) deal with small businesses. A frustration for the DGI in Tshikapa is that many of the city's

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with local journalist, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>35</sup> Interviews with DGRKAS agents, Tshikapa, September 2023.

diamond traders are registered as provincial offices of Kinshasa-headquartered businesses, which deal exclusively with the DGE. This means the DGI in Tshikapa has no right to inspect the books or to tax the city's diamond traders.

Because of the stalled decentralisation process in the national tax agencies, there is no CDI in Tshikapa. Instead, medium-sized taxpayers are supposed to be managed by the Kananga CDI. This is impractical, not least because of the dire state of the road between the two cities, and so the DGI has invented a structure in Tshikapa it calls a *Siège Modernisé et Modelisé* (SMM), which is supposed to act as a liaison between the Kananga CDI and Tshikapa's medium-sized taxpayers.

Pieme has repeatedly expressed his displeasure at the fact that the DGI and the other national tax agencies still have their provincial headquarters in Kananga. Relations between the provincial government and the DGI worsened significantly in March 2020, when Patrick Bakankunda wa Bakankunda, who was head of the DGI's Tshikapa CIS at the time, ordered the freezing of the province's commercial bank accounts for its repeated non-payment of income tax for provincial government employees. Pieme accused Bakankunda of putting the security of the province at risk and ordering that he be dismissed..<sup>36</sup> The DGI backed down, removing Bakankunda and unfreezing the provincial bank accounts, while provincial employee income tax continues to remain largely unpaid.<sup>37</sup>

The final political economy feature of Kinshasa's PFM relationship with Tshikapa highlighted, concerns an alleged CF696m (US\$267,000) *retrocession* payment made by Kinshasa for Kasai's investment budget for the first semester of 2023. Statistics from the national Ministry of Budget show that Kasai was one of only four provinces to receive investment *retrocession* from Kinshasa during this period.<sup>38</sup> However, according to the coordinator of Pieme's financial cell, the money never arrived in Tshikapa. The coordinator explained that upon learning of this, Pieme sent [REDACTED] to Kinshasa to investigate. [REDACTED] later reported that the *directeur du cabinet* of the Ministry of Budget appeared to know about the situation, but neither he nor the *directeur du cabinet* of the Ministry of Finance was prepared to explain it to him.<sup>39</sup> The available evidence suggests that these transfers from the national government are being diverted into private accounts instead of those belonging to the provinces.

Repeated changes at the top of the DGRKAS were outlined in the previous section, including that Pieme's recent picks as directors of the agency have all been deputies in the PA. This is a markedly different approach to that pursued by Ngwabidje who (as we saw in the previous chapter) has – in collusion with the national government – excluded the South Kivu PA from oversight of the provincial revenue authority. Pieme's approach has meant a higher level of PA scrutiny of provincial government finances, but has also led to the significant extraction of provincial revenues by the PA and its deputies.

Another big difference is that in Kasai, as a result of a formal agreement between the executive and legislature, and as one of the latter's conditions for continuing to work with Pieme, the PA receives 20% of the takings of the DGRKAS for its own functioning. The justification for this unusual arrangement is the continued failure of Kinshasa to pay its share of the salaries of PA deputies. The DGRKAS money paid to the PA is, reportedly, split between deputies as cash, apparently usually amounting to around US\$1,500 each per month. Deputies were at pains to point out to us that the percentage had originally been 30% but they had agreed to reduce it, and that without the cash payment, they would have no funds.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> <https://actualite.cd/2020/03/19/Kasai-le-gouverneur-pieme-proteste-aupres-de-la-dgi-contre-la-saisie-des-comptes>

<sup>37</sup> Interviews with the DGI and Governor's office, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>38</sup> South Kivu, North Kivu, Haut Katanga, Kasai.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with [REDACTED] Financial Cellule Coordinator, Governor's Office, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>40</sup> Interviews with PA deputies, DRKAS officials, former ministers of finance, Tshikapa, September 2023.



Another feature of the influence PA deputies have on the DGRKAS is the number of people they have reportedly been able to place within the agency, particularly at its road toll stations. It is unclear whether these agents have been formally registered with the DGRKAS. Kalombo, the recently departed DGRKAS director, is reportedly one of the main culprits, but he is by no means alone. Numerous sources depicted something approaching a free-for-all currently in the DGRKAS, with agents placed by different political networks competing with each other for access to the most lucrative stations, and with no one really clear anymore how many agents the DGRKAS even has.<sup>41</sup>

One of the largest food importers and wholesalers in the province reported that DGRKAS agents at road toll stations routinely refuse the company's trucks the option of paying their provincial levies at a commercial bank in Tshikapa, insisting that the payment be made in cash at the station.<sup>42</sup> During our fieldwork, we saw how, as a result, two types of receipts are issued for toll road station payments. One is computer generated, arising when those liable to pay are permitted by DGRKAS agents to do so at the Afriland Bank in Tshikapa. The other is when the agents demand payments in cash at the toll road station, and is handwritten.

Ethnic contestation is never far from the surface in Kasaiian political economy, and the DGRKAS is no exception. Kalombo is Lubaphone, as are the people Kalombo has placed at road toll stations. In September 2023, a group of disgruntled DGRKAS agents publicly denounced what they said was tribalism and nepotism in the agency. The group are all of Kuba, Lele, and Dekese origin, as are many of the original DGRKAS agents.<sup>43</sup> The protestors say they are not protesting out of ethnic chauvinism but from concern for the state of the DGRKAS.<sup>44</sup> During the Kabila era, there is reported to have been a general exclusion of Lubaphones from positions in public administration in Kasai in favour of people of Kuba, Lele, and Dekese origin. There has been a push to reverse this since the coming to power of Tshisekedi, who is himself a Lubaphone.

Challenged on the deployment by PA deputies of their people as DGRKAS agents at road toll stations, one deputy said it was necessary because big taxpayers were "in the pockets" of the Governor. As evidence, the deputy showed us printouts of the province's bank account over several months in which there were no large payments by businesses in the province. A former Minister of Finance told us that there is a safe in the Governor's office in which cash payments are made by selected businesses, in lieu of bank transfers to the provincial bank account.

DGRKAS revenues from outside Tshikapa are reported to have all but dried up during the past twelve months, apparently due to the diversion of funds by politically connected DGRKAS agents. Recorded DGRKAS monthly revenues reportedly hover today between US\$4250,000 and US\$400,000.<sup>45</sup> The DGRKAS raised CF5.05bn (US\$2m) in 2022.<sup>46</sup> DGRKAS receives 5% of this sum, amounting to roughly US\$100,000, to pay all its agents for the year. With the senior leadership taking the lion's share of what is available, DGRKAS agents say they are being paid neither salaries nor primes, which is encouraging corruption among them.<sup>47</sup>

How much cash is really collected at Kasai's toll road stations every month is unknown but it is likely to be substantial. The road from Kinshasa to Tshikapa has been significantly upgraded and is now good enough for

<sup>41</sup> In one instance, at the end of September, our research team witnessed Kasai Minister of Finance Muller Milambo (who had been unavailable to meet us during our time in Tshikapa) sitting in a *paellotte* by the Kinshasa toll road station, apparently to oversee the collection of takings.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with General Manager of commercial food importer, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>43</sup> The three ethnic communities are all said to derive from a common ancestor, Bakana Bakota.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with DGRKAS agents, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with PA deputy on the PA Ecofin, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>46</sup> Government of Kasai, *Projet d'Edit Budgétaire Portant Reddition Des Comptes, Exercice 2022 Clos*.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with DGRKAS agents, Tshikapa, September 2023.



goods to travel from the capital quickly and reliably. By contrast, all other roads out of Tshikapa are problematic, and the towns and cities at the other end of them, such as Kananga, have markedly less easy access to imported goods as compared to Tshikapa. This makes Tshikapa a regional trading hub and the toll road station on the outskirts of the town on the Kinshasa road a particularly lucrative one.

### 3.3 Provincial Government Spending and its Control

In the previous section, it was stated that 20% of the revenues generated by the DGRKAS are spent on the PA and its deputies. A further 5% goes to the DGRKAS itself. Much like in South Kivu, the DGRKAS does not pay out the 5% it should pay to *services d'assiette* for the taxes it collects on their behalf. As in South Kivu, the services typically prefer their levies to be collected instead by the DGRAD, which has a much better track record in handing back the 5%.

Looking at the composition of provincial government spending, the 2022 budget outturn shows total expenditure at CF116.6bn (US\$47m). Of this, CF70.3bn went on personnel, leaving CF46bn for everything else. This represented a 97% execution rate of the provincial budget for personnel. Capital expenditure was recorded at CF35.1bn, only 32% of the budgeted amount.<sup>48</sup> According to members of the PA Ecofin, there is currently zero or near-zero expenditure on social projects. Meanwhile, the funds being diverted from toll road stations appears to be being funnelled – for now at least – into the election campaigns of the Governor and recipient PA deputies.<sup>49</sup>

#### 3.3.1 The [REDACTED] loan

Piame took out a US\$2m loan from [REDACTED] Bank early in his tenure as Governor, with much of the money intended to purchase large vehicles that could clear bush and help restore the province's ailing road network. The loan was also supposed to be used to purchase vehicles for PA deputies, and to rehabilitate the Governor's mansion. Funds were transferred to Congo Motors, a private company, to purchase all the vehicles. Congo Motors duly bought the large land-clearing vehicles, which were to be imported into the DRC at the Kasumbalesa border post. On arrival at Kasumbalesa, however, it emerged that no money had been budgeted for the vehicles' customs clearance. The matter has still not been resolved, and the vehicles are said to still be at Kasumbalesa. A similar challenge arose for the purchase of vehicles for PA deputies, but in this case the matter was resolved by Congo Motors buying back the vehicles and the resulting cash distributed between the deputies. It has not been precisely established the amount spent on the refurbishment of the Governor's mansion, which was carried out by a little known company called Master Info.<sup>50</sup> Sums of between US\$300-500,000 have been alleged, with some deputies saying that the real amount spent was much less, with the difference being shared between Master Info and the Governor.<sup>51</sup>

Servicing the loan is a heavy drain on provincial public finances, particularly since for a period the provincial government stopped servicing the debt in a dispute [REDACTED], which resulted in the bank imposing

<sup>48</sup> Government of Kasai, *Projet d'Edit Budgetaire Portant Reddition Des Comptes, Exercice 2022 Clos*.

<sup>49</sup> Interviews with PA deputies, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>50</sup> The similarity of Master Info's name with Flash Info is regarded as uncoincidental by many of the civil society activists and PA deputies we spoke to, who regard the two companies as two components of a Governor-linked strategy to extract provincial public resources.

<sup>51</sup> Interviews with PA deputies and civil society activists, Tshikapa, September 2023.

penalties on the province.<sup>52</sup> In 2022, the cost of servicing provincial debt was officially given as FC1.35bn (US\$544,000),<sup>53</sup> a quarter of the total DGRKAS raked in for the year.

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### 3.4 Encore

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In 2021, The World Bank launched Encore, a five-year follow up programme to its earlier Profit Congo programme. The aim of Encore is to boost government revenues in selected provinces, and to improve PFM. So far, Encore has trained around 100 DGRKAS agents, using DGRAD and DGI agents from Kinshasa to assist, and has issued a tender for the supply of equipment to the DGRKAS. It is also working, it says to train civil society in PFM.<sup>54</sup>

DGRKAS agents alleged to us that many of the genuine agents among their number were excluded from the Encore training by the DGRKAS management in favour of agents put in place by politicians and those who were willing to split their US\$40 per diem with the management team.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Interviews with PA deputies, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>53</sup> Government of Kasai, *Projet d'Edit Budgetaire Portant Reddition Des Comptes, Exercice 2022 Clos*.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Boenga Efonze Beauregard, Provincial coordinator, Encore, Tshikapa, September 2023.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with DGRKAS agents, Tshikapa, September 2023.

## 4. Conclusion & Recommendations

Our study of provincial PFM in South Kivu and Kasai highlights the key issues affecting these areas.

On the revenue generation side, in both provinces, transfers from the national government are irregular and insufficient, while the efforts of provincial revenue authorities are compromised by issues, including:

- Multiple parallel provincial revenue streams that do not enter the provincial coffers but instead benefit connected individuals, particularly in the political leadership of the provinces.
- The positioning of provincial revenue authorities with agents placed there for their political connectivity who syphon funds for their benefactors.
- A lack of salaries for provincial revenue authority agents which encourages corruption.
- Incomplete computerisation of processes, intentionally engineered by the political elite in order to preserve *rapportage*.
- Systemic under-collection of property taxes, which should be the main source of provincial revenue. In Kasai, there is instead a heavy reliance on collections from road tolls, which has not only encouraged corruption, but is also a *retrogressive* tax on consumer spending, since the fees and levies paid out by companies bringing in goods to the province are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.

On the spending side, our study shows:

- The disparity between reality and theoretical budgeting in both provinces,
- some of the ways in which funds allocated for social spending and the like are diverted into *rapportage* and the maintenance of political networks,
- the high cost of servicing loans in each province, whose funds also failed to advance development but were instead largely used for consumption by the political elite.

South Kivu and Kasai have all this in common. Where they differ is largely in the nature of the arrangements regarding PFM between the provinces' executive and legislature. In South Kivu, there is a highly adversarial relationship between the two, and the latter has been excluded from oversight of provincial PFM, in a context where the national government is seeking to increase its influence, power, and 'rent' collection from the province. In Kasai, the Governor has been forced into accommodation with the PA, which includes the PA receiving 20% of DGRKAS revenues, and – until very recently – featured the installation of PA deputies as heads of the provincial revenue service.

The PA is the constitutionally mandated body to exercise oversight and control over provincial PFM, but in both South Kivu and Kasai, the PA's implementation of its brief has been weak. In South Kivu, even when the PA was sitting there were major shortcomings in its budgetary oversight, as our study shows, and the performance of the PA Ecofin in Kasai has been little better.

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### What is to be done?

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First, a focus on provincial PFM in the DRC rather than national PFM enables a stronger approach as national *retrocession* is becoming less and less certain, and provinces are being increasingly forced to rely on their own resources.

Secondly, there is genuine scope for boosting provincial government revenues, particularly through technical assistance to improve the administration's capacity to calculate and collect property taxes.

Third, there is scope and considerable value in providing training on PFM to a range of stakeholders. PA deputies in particular need to understand PFM better, especially given the new intake after this year's elections, who may be anticipated to have less of an idea than the incumbents. Provincial revenue authority agents also need training, along with the executives and the civil society of both provinces.

Fourth – and this is crucial – there has to be some form of *quid pro quo* for technical assistance on boosting provincial revenues in the form of the effective reform of selected provincial government spending issues. A *quid pro quo* of merely improving taxpayer rights, for example via complaint mechanisms, is not enough. Without concurrent reforms in provincial government spending, donor initiatives that successfully boost provincial government revenues may fairly be accused of being mainly effective in boosting the incomes and election campaign war chests of incumbent political networks.

Some humility, evidently, is required from external donors. It is not possible for external donors to transform the Congolese political economy of PFM from one in which *rapportage* is embedded into one where it is not. What donors can and should do is to exercise the leverage generated by the powerful incentive of potentially higher provincial government revenues, for which everyone in the provincial government from top to bottom is crying, to push for reform in selected areas where impact might be possible.

Based on our research, work in South Kivu can be undertaken, inter alia, to improve the effectiveness of EGov, particularly in regards to coordination with commercial banks. It is possible to address the exclusion of important revenue streams like Bralima's, and to reform the governance of the fuel importers' account so that its funds might actually be used to repair road infrastructure. In Kasaï, urgent reform of the revenue collection system at toll road points must be implemented. There needs to be a return to a digitised system, that allows traders to pay their dues into commercial banks in advance of arrival rather than forced to pay cash at the toll point. All staff at the toll road points should be properly registered with the DGRKAS and have job descriptions.

Such measures, if adopted, would not solve the challenges of PFM in South Kivu and Kasaï, but they would improve spending, thus mitigating the risk of FCDO assistance success in boosting provincial government revenues largely translating into boosting the revenues of Congolese political networks.



Foreign, Commonwealth  
& Development Office

**Annex D**

**COWATER TECHNICAL PROPOSAL (PART B)**

March 2024



Programme d'Appui à la Redevabilité et l'Inclusion (PARI) Programme to provide Technical Assistance and Civil Society Support (TAC) to support accountability and inclusion in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

## PART B - Technical Proposal

ITT 6165 PARI-TACS DRC

April 8<sup>th</sup> 2024



ACCELERE!	Programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de l'éducation en RDC (Accès, Lecture, Rétention, Redevabilité); Accelerating Equitable Access to School, Reading, Student Retention and Accountability Programme
ACCELERE2!	Programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de l'éducation en RDC (Accès, Lecture, Rétention, Redevabilité); Accelerating Equitable Access to School, Reading, Student Retention and Accountability Programme Phase 2
ADFTAS	Association pour le Développement des Femmes Travailleuses des Affaires Sociales
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
AXE-FILLES	Accès et Égalité pour l'Éducation des Filles (Equal access for girls' education)
BL	Baseline
CA	Conflict Analysis
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CGA	Common Ground Approach
CGA2A	Common Ground Approach to Advocacy
CIG Zambia	Cities and Infrastructure for Growth Zambia
COREF	Comité d'Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques en RDC (DRC Public Finance Reform Steering Committee)
CPEDD	Provincial Coordination for the Environment and Sustainable Development
CSGA	Civil Society and Government Advocacy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DPMER	Provincial Directorate for Revenue Mobilisation
DPS	Division Provinciale de la Santé (Provincial Health Division)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRM	Domestic Revenue Mobilization
ENCORE	Enhancing Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project
EOI	Expression of Interest
ETD	Entité Territoriale Décentralisée
EU	European Union
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FEC	Federation of Enterprises of Congo
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GBA+	Gender-Based Analysis Plus
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GEDSI	Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRP	Intervention-level Review Points
KJN	Karibu Jeunesse Nouvelle
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LOOP	Learning, Oversight and Operations Pack
MAMPU	Empowering Women in Indonesia
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MEDD	Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development)
MERL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Research and Learning
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSME	Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAARIB	Support to the Increase of Internal Revenues in Benin



PARI-TACS	Programme to provide Technical Assistance and Civil Society Support to Support Accountability and Inclusion in the DRC
PASIE	Promoting Accountable and Inclusive Institutions in Francophone Africa
PbR	Payment by Results
PDIA	Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Financial Management
PM	Programme Manager
PNDS	Plan National de Développement Sanitaire (National Health Development Plan)
PROFIT-CONGO	Strengthening PFM and Accountability Programme in the DRC
PROVED	Provincial Education Divisions
PROGRESS	Programme de Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (Security Sector Reform Programme)
PRP	Portfolio Review Points
RACOJE	Réseau des Associations Congolaises des Jeunes
REFAM	Women's Economic Empowerment in the Argan Sector in Morocco
RM	Risk Management
SfCG	Search for Common Ground
SEAH	Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
SEMI	Essential Care for Maternal and Child Health in DRC
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIGRA	Strengthening Investments in Gender-Responsive Climate Adaptation in Ghana
SIM	Syria Independent Monitoring
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SRS	Strategic Review Sessions
SSAPR	Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme
STAREST	Projet de Stabilisation et de Relèvement de l'Est de la RDC (Eastern DRC Stabilisation and Recovery Project)
STTA	Short-Term Technical Assistance
SV	Social Value
TA	Technical Assistance
TADAT	Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool
TAF2+	Trade and Advocacy Fund
TL	Team Leader
TOC	Theory of Change
TORs	Terms of Reference
TPU	Tax Policy Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value Added Tax
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VfM	Value for Money
VSCE	Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise
WB	World Bank
WRO	Women's Rights Organisation

## T1 Conflict Sensitive Programming

To deliver PARI-TACS in a way which maximises improvement in Public Financial Management (PFM), accountability, and service provision from a citizen perspective in South Kivu and Kasai while ensuring that interventions Do No Harm, we have built a consortium which brings the key expertise together. **Cowater International** leads the consortium and the government reform output, bringing 35 years of PFM and governance reform experience and politically-smart technical assistance (TA) methodologies, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and especially designed for Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS). **Search for Common Ground** (SfCG), with its long-standing presence in DRC and which specialises in peacebuilding through opening opportunities for collaboration between communities and government actors, will lead on the citizen and community governance output as well as on Conflict Analysis. **IES**, a Congolese research consultancy based in Goma and Bukavu, will lead on Political Economy Analysis (PEA) and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL).

### 1.1 How conflict sensitivity will ensure no interventions increase the risk of conflict

Conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm are at the heart of our programming. In the context of PARI-TACS, to be conflict sensitive is to understand conflict dynamics and their interactions with governance, service delivery, and government-civil society relationships in South Kivu and Kasai, to avoid contributing to negative dynamics, and maximise the stabilising potential of our interventions.

The success of our interventions will rely on a granular understanding of conflict dynamics that will help us identify and mitigate their potential negative effects. In South Kivu and Kasai, weaknesses in governance and state institutions are illustrated by pervasive clientelism, a lack of effective service delivery, and the contradictory legal and customary rules for managing access to land and its resources, and figure among the root causes of conflicts. Conversely, communities face systematic informal taxes despite being left to fend for themselves by the State, while also facing limited livelihoods opportunities, deprivation, and recurring violence and insecurity, and will consequently exhibit limited trust toward formal institutions or other communities, providing additional root causes. In this charged context, identity, whether tribal, clan, or “indigenous” versus “foreign” based provide a key divider and conflict vector instrumentalized by politicians in the struggle to access resources, whether land, mineral, or state resources, at the local, provincial, or national levels. This creates an often volatile environment in which hyperlocal conflict drivers and proximate causes can erupt into conflict that can quickly escalate. The Kamuina Nsapu conflict of 2016 which was sparked by controversy around the nomination of a customary chief in Dibaya territory of Kasai Central provides a good example. This was rooted in the contradictions between local customary rules versus State power and the clientelist gatekeeping nature of the executive power in Kinshasa. While President Tshisekedi’s initial election and subsequent re-election have been stabilising factors, these root causes have not been resolved and continue to frame the engagement environment for PARI-TACS.

Through province-specific **Conflict Analysis (CA)**, led by SfCG’s senior conflict specialist *Laurent Kasindi*, we will build up a deep understanding of conflict dynamics, its main actors, and most importantly, how these interact and actually impact the dialogue between citizens and government around accountability and service provision. The conflict drivers mapped through this assessment will be carefully analysed and monitored. During Inception we will launch baseline research activities against top priority research questions related to CA and stakeholder mapping to inform geographic targeting, partnerships strategy, intervention design and conflict sensitivity and risk management. For each research question we will first exploit available all-source, secondary information and research teams will then go to selected field locations and use a combination of investigative and qualitative research methods, including structured observations, in-depth interviews, key informant interviews – and potentially focus group discussions and micro-surveys where wider perception research might be necessary. Once our initial CA is carried out in Inception, we will keep this updated through constant **conflict monitoring** through Implementation, supplemented with periodic on-demand deeper dives into key emerging areas and topics. Conflict monitoring will include monitoring key trends across both provinces to detect, and potentially predict, the emergence of new hotspots, but also key political economy and social networks dynamics within and across civil society, provincial governments, and other stakeholders’ groups.

This CA will directly inform our **Conflict Sensitivity Strategy**, including how this will be mainstreamed in all programme activities. Importantly, conflict sensitivity will focus on the way in which we understand, approach, inform and engage with stakeholders, as well as a focus on GEDSI in all work. For example, when working with communities, SfCG will begin with delivering Common Ground Approach (CGA) Training for conflict transformation, which prepares Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from across dividing lines to coordinate constructively and prevent competition from undermining collaboration, and builds their capacity to engage in coalition building and government consultations without additional conflict risk. When supporting citizens to engage with government, Search’s Common Ground Approach to Advocacy training (CGA2A) has been instrumental in supporting CSOs in conflict-affected areas in DRC (as well as Somalia, Sudan, Niger, and beyond) to address sensitive issues in cooperation with all levels of government. The CGA2A trainings will be delivered to all participating CSOs prior to direct consultation with local authorities. With local government, TA will be informed by PEA, ensuring that we truly work with political will, build trust-based relationships, and that we are acutely aware of institutional dynamics, issues related to resistance to change and legitimacy for action.

### 1.2 How conflict sensitivity will inform programme implementation: building CA and PEA into Intervention Selection and Design

To build a portfolio of context-appropriate and conflict-sensitive interventions, we will identify the most relevant governance and service-delivery problems through a politically-smart and community-centred selection process in each province. **Cowater’s Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)-based problem selection process** will drive

problem identification and the design of the related interventions. This approach is especially suitable for delivering governance reform in conflict-affected contexts, given its clear and practical focus on centring contextual analysis and stakeholder engagement. The process is the same for all provinces and all workstreams, providing clarity and coherence across the programme, yet resulting in differentiated supply-side and demand-side activities in each, allowing considerable diversity of programming tailored to the context and incentives of key stakeholders. It works cyclically, meaning that activities will be added or changed over time depending on shifts in the context and their effectiveness.

**Interventions informed by PEA and CA:** Our process, shown in Fig 2, begins with **stakeholder engagement and PEA** and CA, including a focus on **Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI)**, carried out initially during Inception and at regular intervals thereafter. This first step also includes technical diagnostics, gap analyses, as well as CSO engagement and mapping. In later cycles, MEL data and the programme's lessons learned will also feed in to step 1. Coordination with other key development actors and FCDO programmes informs the analysis and forms a standalone input into problem selection. Step 1 results in a longlist of potential problems to focus on per province.

Once problems are longlisted, step 2 focusses on selecting a set of **province-specific interventions through a conflict-sensitive and community-centred problem selection mechanism** based on **Change Space Analysis**. This tool assesses the extent of the opportunities for reform by identifying which factors might facilitate or block progress and make decisions about which opportunities to prioritise. Each problem is graded against three factors: Authority, Acceptance, and Ability. These are summarised as questions below:

1. **Authority** (a measure of political will): who are the potential reform leaders and blockers within key provincial (and national) institutions (Ministries of Finance, Health, Education), and ETDs to improve service delivery? Do we have the support needed to enable and authorise change (political, legal, organisational)? Where are the gaps? This assessment will draw on PEA, technical diagnostics, and stakeholder engagement to assess the power and influence of individuals and institutions, formal and informal norms, and how this maps against the incentives for and against change. Our PEA Advisor, IES senior staff *Dora Muhuku Salama*, will lead the team to assess authority and acceptance.

2. **Acceptance** (a measure of community and institutional backing): which agents (individuals, institutions, civil society) are interested in solving the problem or maintaining the status quo? Are citizens, communities, and institutions affected by the problem interested in change, and do they agree on what needs to happen? What is the potential for this work to create, fuel, or reduce conflict? In addition to PEA and CA, this factor will be assessed using **participatory community problem-identification**, in which communities, CSOs and civil society actors will be asked to identify the most important and urgent governance and service delivery problems they are facing.


3. **Ability** (a capacity measure): are the appropriate resources (human and financial), and technical skills and organisational functions, in place to enable change? This assesses the organisational capabilities and skills of provincial government institutions, ETDs, and civil society and their staff to ensure any TA is at the right level and can be absorbed.

Each factor is assessed as low, moderate, and high for a given problem. The change space then represents the intersection of the three factors, and the bigger the change space, the better the opportunity for reform. The smaller the change space, the more work is needed on analysing the factors driving the enabling environment before committing resources to expanding it. Within each province, the problems with the largest change space will be prioritised.

In the third step, we will **design interventions** to address the problems selected for each province. Each intervention will contain supply-side and demand-side activities addressing the same problem through complementary approaches. For example, an identified problem might be 'Service delivery fees are collected in or on behalf of health or education facilities, but they are not used transparently, and a portion of those fees is captured by higher level authorities'. Supply side activities might involve budgeting and tracking fees at the facility level and reporting transparently on how they are used to improve services. In parallel, demand side activities might involve working with local CSOs and school/health management committees at the facility level to engage in participatory budgeting and tracking of those funds along with service delivery quality assessments. The results and learning from these initiatives could be consolidated through a CSO led 'provincial service delivery observatory' that could advocate for policy changes at provincial and national levels.

Through the design process, technical experts will support counterparts to design the solutions and activities which will involve them. For example, the CSGA Expert and his team will support CSOs to design their own activities and support, while the tax and PFM expert teams will support provincial government officials to co-design their activities. Once interventions are designed, these will then be piloted, with regular check-in points to evaluate performance and impact, and adapt approaches where needed. These review points will involve a fresh assessment of PEA and CA, allowing us to adapt, scale up, scale down, or (in case of significant conflict risk) pause or terminate them. This ensures that conflict sensitivity continues to drive decision-making right through implementation of each intervention.

Figure 1 Conflict Sensitive Process for Province-Specific Interventions





## T2. Flexible and Adaptive Programming

South Kivu and Kasai both exhibit complex, dynamic contexts. To ensure PARI-TACS' impact, we will employ a PDIA-based process which Cowater has developed to enable governance reform in conflict-affected contexts, and which allows us to flex and adapt our work based on **continuous iterative analysis**. The process is a cycle, repeating the analysis, problem selection, intervention design, implementation, and regular review steps. Box 1 describes our core tools for monitoring and analysing contextual changes. Below we set out how these core tools will allow each component of PARI-TACS to adapt to changing circumstances.

### Box 2.1. Key Toolkits for Continuous Analysis: PEA, CA, GEDSI Analysis

To monitor and analyse changes in the context, we will employ three interconnected core toolkits, feeding into intervention design and risk management. We will analyse changes in the political economy context and political will through PEA (T4). We will monitor and analyse evolving conflict dynamics to better understand its contextual drivers through Conflict Analysis (CA, T1). We will track the differential impacts of a changing context on women and marginalised groups by integrating GEDSI Analysis in both PEA and CA (T8). Our Contextual Analysis team (PEA Advisor, CA Advisor, and GEDSI Experts) will coordinate to ensure we monitor and understand the context effectively.

**Feedback mechanisms and learning elements within Components 1 and 2:** T1 describes how we flow CA, PEA, and GEDSI Analysis into the selection of initial interventions. However, with a dynamic context, utilising these tools in initial intervention design is no guarantee they will remain relevant. Therefore, our process is also dedicated to sharpening the impact of these interventions by focussing on analysis-driven adaptations. To do this, we have integrated **responsive feedback loops** to drive learning and adaptation in our implementation cycle. **The intervention feedback loop** is a short, tighter loop for each intervention in which we monitor results flowing from our MEL Dashboard and Portal at regular review points, either monthly or quarterly, and leverage them in continuous analysis (including CA and PEA) of technical outcomes. We then combine this with stakeholder consultation and coordination to adapt and improve intervention design, methodology, and stakeholder engagement. The review point may recommend that an intervention is adapted, scaled up, scaled down, or (if insufficient evidence of impact or significantly adverse shifts in political will or Change Space) paused or terminated. This feedback loop is governed by an Intervention Monitoring Plan. **The portfolio feedback loop** further involves a longer cycle which takes evidence generated from each intervention's monitoring data and wider cross-portfolio learning on a six-monthly and annual basis and provides input into future cycles (i.e. starting the problem longlisting process again). The length of cycles will depend on the nature of individual interventions and will be agreed in workplans in advance with FCDO and stakeholders. Recognising that not every intervention will conclude exactly at the end of the cycle, the 6 month-long initial cycle will be modulated on a needs basis. This overall cycle is governed by the Learning Plan, which sets out the overarching learning objectives for each intervention.

### Box 2.2 Responding to sectoral governance improvements in health and education

With PARI-TACS actively learning from itself and from the context to improve over time, it is ideally suited to capitalise on contextual opportunities, such as improvements in health and education governance. Regular PEA will reveal such increases in political will and Change Space, prioritising related interventions. For example, if in Kasai AXE-FILLES were to generate evidence and understanding of the impacts of poor quality operational expenditure in schools on education quality, PARI-TACS could build on the improved political will to build better tools and processes for monitoring education budget execution and its last mile delivery.

**Expanding into Green Growth sectors:** If FCDO elects to focus on **green growth sectors**, we will run a rapid, shorter cycle to identify key problems in the governance of these sectors, including in agriculture, clean energy, and the governance of carbon markets, and design interventions to address these. We will work with provincial governments and ETDs to map out their current role in these sectors, and carry out technical assessments to understand weaknesses, while working with civil society to identify their priorities as per T1. We will use Service Delivery PFM Expert Alain Lemba Gisunda, who has experience in green growth, to support this, alongside our in-house expertise in these sectors. For example, in green energy governance, Cowater works with Zambia's Ministry of Energy and its national utility ZESCO to improve governance of green energy transition, especially hydropower (FCDO's CIG Zambia). We also work with Jordanian municipalities to expand renewable energy use in poor and vulnerable communities, by improving their green energy strategies and working with communities on livelihood opportunities in the renewable energy sector.

### Box 2.3. If notified that PARI-TACS will expand into North Kivu, our **Intervention Plan** will include:

**Week 1-2:** Contextual Analysis team begins PEA, CA, GEDSI analysis scoping of North Kivu, with PEA partner IES based in Goma. TL and Core Team meets with FCDO, and plan North Kivu stakeholder engagement. CSO mapping updated. **Week 3-4:** PARI-TACS can be hosted within SFCG's large Goma base immediately. Using the expert pool within our flexible budget we will create and recruit 3 new North Kivu-focused roles: Civil Society Coordinator, PFM Expert, and Tax Expert. TL and Core Experts deploy to Goma. **Month 2:** Stakeholder and community engagement begins. **Month 4:** Interventions selected, designed, and implementation begins.

**Strategy for Flexible, Adaptive and Rapid Programming of Component 3:** we will set up this call-down facility by designing Terms of Reference (TOR) and proposal formats with FCDO. Approved TORs will then be developed into full proposals within two weeks, justifying each investment. Our local specialist partner, IES, will help us deliver rapid, **flexible PEA assessments**, with their comprehensive network of Congolese PEA, MEL, and contextual analysts that can usually begin a PEA within 48h of call-down. As needed, we will supplement their expertise through an EOI during Inception to identify other firms well-placed to deliver rapid PEAs in DRC. To deliver **national-level TA**, our TL will ensure access for short-term advisors to the Comité d'Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques en RDC (COREF), the ministries of finance, budget, health, education, and others. Such TA will help unlock the provincial reforms we are supporting. Similarly for policy outreach events, they will focus on issues where the change space is promising and aim at influencing national actors towards a stronger implementation of decentralization and PFM reform commitments.



## T4 Methodology and PEA Approach

Our approach seeks to drive collaboration across programme activities and in the way we stimulate engagement between government, CSOs and citizens. Addressing gaps in PFM and service delivery is crucial to building collaboration and trust between communities in the DRC and government. In practice this means working on one side to strengthen accountability and oversight and the other, building capacity and motivation of provinces and ETDs to provide services. In view of the endemic *rapprochement* within the PFM systems in both provinces, we will also ensure that where our support leads to increases in provincial revenue, which all actors within the system desire, this is used to fund (and incentivise) improvements in service delivery. It is critical that improvements in revenue collection are tightly linked to improvements in expenditure so that citizens truly benefit from the additional revenue.

### 4.1 Approach to delivery as a whole

**Integration across the three programme components** is paramount to delivering meaningful change in the DRC. We recognise the fragility of the relationships between communities, civil society, and different levels of Government and have designed our technical approach around building constructive engagement and avoiding conflicts through programme implementation. Our problem selection and intervention design approach (see T1) is devised to ensure seamless cooperation between supply and demand components of the PARI-TACS programme. Additionally, incorporating the Central Government into our delivery approach is essential, given the highly centralised system that persists both formally and informally in the DRC. While *de jure* provinces and local governments have power over the management of 29 decentralized sectors (including primary education and health services administration), and entitlement to the retrocession of 40% of the taxes collected by the national level, this autonomy does not play out in reality. Uncertain rules between centralization and decentralization create space for corruption, fiscal leakages and *rapprochement*, and informal fees and taxes. Based in Kinshasa, *Rufin Baghana*, our Team Leader (TL) will be our link to Central Government, in particular the Ministries of Budget and Finance, Education and Health, along with COREF. He will support the **creation of a feedback loop from provincial to central Government level**, identifying gaps in central PFM TA that the programme could successfully address through the PEA/TA Facility. He will further hold **regular stakeholder meetings** and **organise policy events to raise the profile of key issues**.

#### Box 4.1: Project Steering Committees

We plan to bring together key government and CSO partners into provincial and national-level steering committees for constructive, semi-annual reviews on planning and results of the project. The intention of the Steering Committees is also to drive local, multi-stakeholder ownership over the project and its direction, and lessons derived from that group will be fed into our learning and planning processes set out in T2 and T9.

While we will drive differentiated delivery in each province that responds to the different political economies and conflict profiles, we also recognise the value in identifying areas for **coordination and learning across South Kivu and Kasai, as well as across the health and education sectors**. We recognise that our problem-driven Intervention process may identify similar technical areas of PFM or health and education service delivery, and that there is value in bringing together provincial government staff to discuss common challenges and share effective practices. The same applies to our engagement with civil society, where we recognise the value in organisations sharing expertise and ideas across provincial lines. To this end, we will establish a **cross-province learning platform** that will operate both in person and online. It will provide separate confidential discussion spaces for CSOs and governments, as well as a number of self-service resources that will be developed as part of capacity building support by our PFM, Tax, and Civil Society and Government Advocacy (CSGA) Experts. We have allocated some **budget to support travel and events to bring delegations together across provinces**. The learning platform will also allow for sharing across sectors, where common service delivery or accountability challenges are recognised. Bringing together CSOs together to network can also seed longer-term engagement and collaboration. In implementing the Together for Security (STD, £780,740, 2019-2021) project, SfGC organised formal networking events for their CSO partners, which indirectly resulted in the creation of informal communication channels, with CSOs independently creating WhatsApp groups to maintain contact between their peers, providing an avenue for sharing ideas and good practice.

**Sustainability** is the focus of our delivery model and given the relatively short programme timeline, we must build this in from the outset. We understand that the predecessor project to the World Bank's existing ENCORE programme implemented in provinces including South Kivu, PROFIT CONGO, was successful in building stakeholder capacity and engagement. However, once the project ended, provincial government staff reverted to old ways – opaque management of revenues, creation of multiple bank accounts for receiving taxes, and removing the recruitment process that identified tax collectors with relevant skills. In recognition, we will drive sustainability through:

- Building **CA and PEA** into Cowater's PDIA-based problem selection process which will drive a **politically-smart and community-centered problem identification** and the design of related interventions in each province (see T1). This will result in our team working with the grain to embed reforms that can be absorbed and sustained.
- A Technical Assistance (TA) approach grounded in **Provincial Expert Hubs** – teams of experts based in Bukavu and Tshikapa (and Kananga) who will provide longer-term support (see 4.3). They will work closely with provincial governments and ETDs on organizational capacities and skills, and support CSOs on government engagement and accountability, informed by political economy and conflict dynamics they observe on a daily basis.



- iii. Our **capacity building approach relying on an organizational development methodology** which we have implemented in a number of FCAS on issues of PFM and accountability (see 4.4). This will ensure ownership and institutionalisation of reforms and that capacity building is driven by the government entities and CSOs.

Our approach focuses on **increasing trust between communities and the State** by strengthening the ability of provincial and local governments to respond transparently and accountably to citizens' basic service delivery needs, thereby weakening a key conflict driver. On the supply side, this will start by improving the capacity of provinces and ETDs to transparently raise revenues and allocate them toward community service delivery. This will further involve both increasing State capacity to meet citizen's demands as well as its capacity to be accountable to these demands. On the other hand, this will entail working with local CSOs and communities to articulate realistic demands based on accurate information and engage in dialogue with the State to monitor and hold them accountable on key engagements. Since a large share of the community-level service delivery gap is explained by the diversion of resources away from services caused by corruption, including the imposition of irregular fees and taxes, a key focus to build trust will be on improving the traceability of these revenues and demonstrate how they are used to improve service delivery. For example, in South Kivu improving the effectiveness of EGov, including to reduce the possibility of workarounds where it interfaces with commercial banks, would give communities much greater assurance that their taxes are not immediately diverted. In Kasai, improving the transparency of road toll collections would result both in greater revenues for DGRKAS (critical for the payment of salaries) and a reduced cost and time burden for traders and transporters using the roads. If carried out in parallel with visibly increased spending on services, such reforms would demonstrate to citizens the practical benefits of advocating for increased transparency. Given vested interests who benefit from corruption and informal fees and taxes across the public sector, identifying areas of common interest between key state and community stakeholders to improve PFM and service delivery through will be key to our methodology, and driven by our working group coordination mechanism (see T5).

#### Box 4.2: IES – Our Political Economy Partner

Consortium Partner and PEA and MEL experts, IES Congo has extensive experience in the preparation of PEA to support and strengthen programming. They have carried out PEAs on product value chains, understanding the effects of regulations, policies, taxation, and formal and informal levies. In South Kivu, they delivered a problem-driven Water Sector PEA exploring the constraints to promoting community-based approaches to water service delivery. Spearheading PEA for the project is IES staff member, Dora Muhuku Salama, who has extensive PEA and research expertise. She has notably prepared PEAs for the World Bank and UN in the fields of gender and public health.

## 4.2 PEA Methodology

PEA allows us to identify interventions that will be politically and technically feasible, given the motivations and incentives of our key stakeholders in civil society and government in the DRC. Our research will use literature reviews, technical assessments, key informant interviews, and focus groups to identify practical and realistic entry points at local, provincial, and national levels. This will help identify the most feasible entry points for improving upon practices and institutions that are already working to some extent. All PEAs will de facto have a conflict sensitivity lens. Leading on PEA in our consortium is IES, a Congolese organisation with expertise in research and strong networks across many provinces with both CSOs and government (See Box 4.2). Our methodology for PEA combines three strands:

The **Macro-PEA** will be delivered by PEA Expert, *Dora Muhuku Salama* during Inception and inform intervention design (see T1). It will capture the political, social, and economic dimensions of revenue and expenditure management, service delivery, and accountability problems in South Kivu and Kasai that hinder trust between communities and government. It will recognize that engagement between communities and their government takes primarily place at the local level, but that the service delivery chain goes from the national, to the provincial and to the local levels, despite the nominal decentralization. With IES' extensive experience in these provinces, Dora will be able to rapidly access relevant documents, data, and informants, identifying the formal and informal norms and institutions as well as the incentives and structural features which ultimately affect the access and quality of service delivery. It will be framed by an overall country context section that will rely more on a literature review that will frame the problem driven PEA focusing on PFM, accountability, and the related service delivery issues. The Macro PEA will also have a specific section on **GEDSI** in the provinces, including in the public and CSO sectors, in light of the deeply engrained gender inequality and exclusion in the DRC, and that sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH) are among the most common types of Gender-Based Violence (GBV). It will further identify entry points for increasing the influence of women and vulnerable groups in decision-making. This will inform intervention design and seek to mitigate the vulnerabilities faced by women and vulnerable groups across programme components.

**Ad-Hoc PEAs** will be commissioned throughout the programme's lifetime to inform development or adaptation of interventions during Implementation and are designed to drill-down into the specific interventions we are running and their overall coherence. They will be commissioned from IES, or where appropriate, led by members of our team with relevant expertise. These will include more focused **Issue-based and In-Depth PEAs** building on our problem-driven methodology. For example, why are women-run CSOs absent from service delivery monitoring coalitions in Kasai province? Or how are service delivery fees in health and education facilities in South Kivu managed and used? Given



the potential opportunities for expanding the programme's geographical or thematic scope, we would also commission **Context and Sector Level PEAs** to inform proposals for new interventions. These could also be carried out at an ETD level if we found opportunity for intensive engagement. IES can access broad thematic and geographic expertise to support mobilisation. Ad-hoc PEAs will be formalised into reports. Where an ad-hoc PEA may add substantial value to FCDO cross-DRC-programmatic learning, we will flag it as an opportunity under the PEA/TA Facility.

We will integrate **ongoing PEA** into our day-to-day TA and engagement with CSOs and government. Building on the Macro and Ad Hoc PEAs, ongoing analysis will monitor the changing context of decision-making and influence and identify how that impacts programme decision-making to adapt our interventions. All team members who engage with stakeholders will have this responsibility. Our TL will be responsible for monitoring ongoing PEA, coordinating the work of the Service Delivery PFM Expert, Tax Expert and CSGA Experts, all with extensive experience in working politically. Ongoing PEA will be captured in intervention logs and key issues integrated into our MEL systems, to discuss activity results, problems, blockages, and how they are affected by the evolving context. The PEA Advisor will oversee this and review key issues on a quarterly basis, ensuring they are integrated in our PDIA process.

### 4.3 Approach to Technical Assistance to Government

With Tax Expert *Gadi Munyentwali* and Service Delivery PFM Expert *Alain Lemba Gisunda* driving strategic direction, oversight and coordination cross provinces, in South Kivu and Kasai, we will establish **Provincial Expert Hubs** – teams of **long-term experts based in Bukavu and Tshikapa** (expanding to **Kananga** where required). Each provincial hub will include one Tax Expert (for South Kivu, *Jean Sezibera Nyakare*) and one Service Delivery PFM Expert (for Kasai, *Dada Bia Liandja*) who will be responsible for working with their Provincial CSGA Coordinators (see 4.4). These experts will be our **long-term contact points with our counterparts**, building and maintaining strong and trusting relationships that will foster our ability to bring together stakeholders on the supply and demand sides. They will also be instrumental in carrying out ongoing PEA analysis, ensuring that the **interventions are working with the political grain**, and can adapt where situations change. From Cowater's history of programme delivery in DRC (see Box 4.3), we understand that **building trust with key stakeholders is fundamental** to gaining traction, and part of building that trust is giving our counterparts access to programme staff. Where possible, we will embed our PFM Service Delivery and Tax provincial experts in the relevant institutions (office of the Provincial Governor, Ministries of Budget or Finance, General Directorates of Revenue, or Provincial Health and Education Divisions (DPS and PROVED)). This placement will be confirmed during Inception, once we have built a clearer picture of the interventions and type of engagement in each province. Proposals for TA approaches in each province are discussed below, though note that these will be verified and subject to detailed PEA and Conflict Sensitivity Analysis, as well as further technical scoping during Inception.

**South Kivu** faces some stark challenges in its PFM oversight arrangements, with the closure of the provincial assembly due to inter-institutional conflict between the Governor and the provincial assembly. We also see challenges reflected elsewhere in the PFM institutions, with institutional instability at the Head of the Provincial Directorate for Revenue Mobilisation (DPMER), with new management teams being nominated almost on an annual basis since 2021. With a 32-month delay in retrocession to the province, and an actual revenue mobilisation rate of just 36% of planned levels<sup>1</sup>, the province is working in a diminishing fiscal space. On the revenue side we will support expansion of revenue streams (including to key businesses such as Bralima). On the expenditure side, we will focus on supporting the Provincial

#### Box 4.3: Reform success through PEA-based trust and relationship building: Cowater's PROGRESS programme

On Cowater's PROGRESS project (EU, 2015-2021, GBP 11m, DRC), we supported DRC's armed forces to increase accountability, improve trust with citizens, decommission soldiers to civilian life, and ensure effective disbursement of funds to army widows and children. Gaining buy-in and confidence from key Generals was paramount to being able to operate and support reforms. We took a patient approach to relationship-building, with a stakeholder engagement strategy based on careful PEA led by long-term embedded Team Leader who took time to understand the political and cultural dynamics of the military personnel and their concerns around confidentiality. This enabled the project to succeed by stimulating dialogue between the army and civil society, and strengthening collaboration with parliament to promote external accountability.

#### Box 4.4: Cowater's PFM and Revenue Capabilities

Cowater's expertise on PFM and Revenue reform across Sub-Saharan Africa is extensive, and incorporates not only core supply-side FCDO projects in Ethiopia (**Tax Transformation Programme**, £27m, 2019-26) and Mozambique (**Taxing Efficiently for Developing Inclusively**, £12m, 2020-25), as well as key projects working across supply and demand sides. In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Madagascar, we have supported Supreme Audit Institutions and CSOs to enhance the transparency and accountability of the extractives sector, seeking to increase sustainable domestic revenue sources (**Promoting Accountable and Inclusive Institutions in Francophone Africa (PASIE)**, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), £11m, 2016-23). Our work in Ghana for the **Strengthening Investments in Gender-Responsive Climate Adaptation in Ghana (SIGRA)**, GAC, £6.1m, 2023-28) provides TA and support to PFM and governance systems, including gender budgeting, and provides grants to five District Assemblies for engagement with communities on financing for climate change adaptation.

<sup>1</sup> According to Cowater's scoping research, based on provincial government statistics and interviews with provincial officials



Ministries of Budget and Finance to focus on preparing budget implementation and activity reports, strengthening data accuracy to produce reports that transparently show their tenuous fiscal and budgetary position, both reporting on actual funding received from central government, as well as providing an accurate picture of actual health and education spending. We may also look to support the revival of the internet platform for publishing these reports. This could create space for increased lobbying and engagement with Central Government.

In **Kasai**, there is a crisis of confidence between citizens and their provincial government. This has led to an extremely weak tax culture, exacerbated by political placement of tax agents who are untrained. The DGRKAS struggles to collect revenues, though support from the ENCORE programme has generated a small increase in revenue mobilisation over the last three years. Initially, we would seek to support staff registration with DGKRAS, development of job descriptions and provide basic training. We can engage with existing consultation mechanisms in Kasai, including with the Federation of Enterprises of Congo (FEC), an employers association which already engages with the government in campaigns to raise awareness on the importance of tax collection for economic and social development in the province. As there are currently no public fiscal and budgetary reporting mechanisms in place, strengthening reporting and establishing a website providing this information for taxpayers and civil society could offer potential benefits in this particular context.

#### 4.4 Approach to Capacity Building for Civil Society

Despite the numerous challenges they face, CSOs in Kasai and South Kivu remain motivated and dedicated, and in the absence of oversight from effective provincial assembly mechanisms, their role becomes even more significant. In Kasai province in particular, they play an instrumental role in bridging the gap between Customary Tribal Chiefs and political authorities. However, we recognise that we must **ensure CSOs are sufficiently resourced and motivated** to engage as partners and stakeholders in the PARI-TACS programme. This requires both a focus on their **organizational capacity development** as well as **leveraging their expertise and capacities** through the programme. To that end, we have set aside a proportion of the budget to allow us to support key CSOs to deliver key programme activities. We recognise that fiduciary risk in the DRC is high, so where support is required, we favour **providing organisational and skills-based trainings, or in-kind support** (advocacy events, citizen engagement events, publishing leaflets, or space for a radio advert or broadcast) to strengthen the voice and effectiveness of CSOs. Speaking to **sustainability**, SfGC have extensive experience providing Fundraising **training** to CSOs, which we will offer to all CSOs engaged in the programme. We also intend to facilitate a network of CSOs in each Province who are capable of providing training to peer organisations, covering organisational development as well as skills and technical training. This has the benefit of not only creating provincially-based CSO experts who can provide training after the lifetime of the programme, but furthermore build a sustainable financing model for themselves through providing training. Our CSO capacity building approach emphasises **inclusion of women, youth, and minority-led organisations**, as well as Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and other groups. Given this, there is likely to be significant differentiation in the capacity needs of the entities we engage with. SfGC bring a breadth of skills in a range of capacity building approaches, from hands-on capacity building for women-led organisations in Cameroon to obtain administrative documents, to technical training on fiscal transparency for experienced CSOs in Rwanda.

**How will we implement our approach?** Joining the PFM and Tax Experts in our Provincial Expert Hubs in South Kivu and Kasai will be two Provincial Civil Society and Government Accountability Coordinators, SfGC's Experts, *Mick Mutiki Kilumba* in South Kivu and *Sosthene Serge Nsimba* in Kasai. They will be managed and overseen by CSGA Expert, *Deogratias Rukeba*. The **Provincial Expert Hubs** provide a space for **supply and demand-side experts to convene and collaborate**, share lessons, and identify entry points for CSOs and provincial government engagement. Based in the provincial capitals, Mick and Sosthene will be able to **build long-term relationships with our civil society partners** in these provinces, holding regular meetings, providing strategic inputs to coalition building and supporting linkages with government. This long-term model of support is particularly important for building CSO capacity, since we know from SfGC's experience in delivering programmes including the Power of Civic Space (SIDA, £4.3m, 2021-2024) project, that building the organizational and technical capacities of CSOs in South Kivu and Kasai takes time and focused long-term attention.

#### Box 4.5: Cowater's Capacity Building Methodology

Our capacity building approach focuses on building local ownership through an organizational development methodology to ensure sustainability. Based on the problems and interventions identified, the CSO and government organizations supported will then drive their own capacity building and reform priorities. Our experts will support them to carry out their own assessment of their organizational capacities, and formulate performance improvement plans with the support of the project, around which TA and organizational development will be provided. In this way, the ownership and institutionalisation of the reforms will be driven by the provincial governments, ETDs, and CSOs we support. Organizational capacity and development plans will be updated on a semi-annual basis to track progress and blockages and adapt the related interventions. This approach is built on four complementary pillars:

1. **Iterate to learn:** use our Provincial Hub Experts to build capacity through our iterative three-pronged learning approach: formal learning (including on the job-training), practicing (individuals changing behaviours and practicing new approaches); and reflecting (creating space to discuss and debrief on learning).
2. **Harness existing mechanisms** to engage decision makers, rather than creating parallel structures - engaging with the COREF in Kasai, or with existing coalitions e.g. *Réseau des Associations Congolaises des Jeunes (RACOJE)*, a Youth CSO coalition in education and advocacy.
3. **Taper our support**, gradually reducing days for embedded advisors to emphasise local ownership of work.



## T4 Annex - Inception Workplan

Inception Activities and Deliverables		Submission n date	May				June				July					August					
			6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26		
1 Mobilisation Phase																					
1.1 Mobilisation and contracting of Key Personnel																					
1.2 Completion of office and ops setup (Kinshasa & Bukavu) using SfCG office																					
1.3 Office and ops setup (Tshikapa), new PARI-TACS office																					
1.4 Draft inception workplan submitted		20-May																			
1.5 Final inception workplan submitted, following FCDO feedback		31-May																			
1.6 Initial Security Risk Analysis exercise carried out																					
1.7 Security Risk Management Plan, Safeguarding Strategy finalised		20-Aug																			
1.8 Monthly progress dashboard submissions (August's within Inception Report)																					
1.9 Fortnightly meetings with FCDO																					
2 Contextual Analysis and Stakeholder Mapping																					
2.1 Stakeholder and consultations (govt, civil society, intl partners)																					
2.2 Civil society mapping and capacity assessment																					
2.3 Carry out initial Conflict Analysis (CA) and conflict baseline		05-Jul																			
2.4 Carry out initial Political Economy Analysis		05-Jul																			
2.5 Carry out GEDSI Analysis and feed into CA and PEA																					
2.6 Finalise and agree Conflict Sensitivity and GEDSI Strategies		18-Jul																			
2.7 Submit draft PFM mapping and engagement plan (final in Inception Repor		26-Jul																			
3 Design and Launch of Components 1, 2, and 3																					
3.1 C1: PFM System Diagnostics and gap analysis																					
3.2 C1: Service delivery diagnostics and gap analysis																					
3.3 C1: Draft C1 Workplan (per province), final reflected in overall workplan		05-Aug																			
3.4 C2: CSO capacity analysis report, esp. women's groups (per province)		31-Jul																			
3.5 C2: ETD selection report		08-Aug																			
3.6 C2: Civil society group selection report		13-Aug																			
3.8 C3: Agreed TA, PEA, engagement Draw-Down template (ToRs & proposal)		05-Jul																			
3.9 C3: Agreed method for procuring C3 expertise		05-Jul																			
4 MEL and Programme Tool Design																					
4.1 Finalise and agree Flexible and Adaptive Programming Strategy		12-Aug																			
4.2 Create Risk Register, Risk Mitigation Framework, and Delivery Chain Map		04-Jul																			
4.3 Finalise and agree VFM Strategy, incl VFM indicators and baselines		19-Aug																			
4.4 Finalise and agree Theory of Change		28-Jun																			
4.5 Design Learning Strategy and Logframe		26-Jul																			
4.6 Finalise all tools and templates (incl LOOPS)																					
4.7 Set up online MEL Dashboard																					
4.8 MEL Strategy: submit all finalised elements with methodology for approv		31-Jul																			
5 Technical and Financial Workplanning																					
5.1 Year 1 interventions (C1, 2, and any initial work under C3) agreed																					
5.2 Intervention Plans designed with stakeholders																					
5.3 Y1 & 2 Financial Forecast developed																					
5.4 Final budget developed																					
5.5 Project exit strategy developed																					
5.6 Draft Year 1 Workplan (incl broad Y2-Y3 plan), forecast, and budget submit		16-Aug																			
6 Inception Report																					
6.1 Draft Inception Report submitted		20-Aug																			
6.2 Final Inception Report, Workplan, Budget submitted		30-Aug																			

	Activity
	Meeting
	Deliverable

## T4 Annex – Implementation Workplan

Implementation Activity	Year 1: FY 24/25				Year 2: FY 25/26				Year 3: FY 26/27										
	2024				2025				2026										
	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3
1 Contextual Analysis and Stakeholder Mapping																			
1.1 Update GEDSI, PEA and Conflict Analysis																			
1.2 CSO Landscaping Mapping updated																			
1.3 Civil society capacity assessments																			
1.4 Stakeholder engagement (govt, civil society, international partners)																			
2 C1 & C2: Demand and Supply of PFM and Service Delivery Reform																			
2.1 Provincial govt and CSO capacity-building and TA																			
2.2 Provincial and national-level coordination with govt																			
2.3 Intervention cycles (rough, some overlap)																			
2.4 Problem Selection (for next cycle)																			
2.5 Intervention Plans co-designed with stakeholders																			
2.6 Intervention Review Points																			
2.7 Portfolio Review Points, Strategic Review Sessions																			
2.8 Coordination forum with ENCORE, STAREST, FCDO programmes																			
3 Component 3: Flexible TA and PEA Call-Down Facility																			
4.1 TORs and proposals received for call-down work																			
4.2 PEAs commissioned and carried out (as agreed)																			
4.3 TA to national government (as agreed)																			
4.4 Strategic engagement events held (as agreed)																			
5 MEL																			
5.1 Logframe reviewed and updated																			
5.2 Annual/ project completion review																			
5.3 Development of intervention MEL frameworks (LOOPS)																			
5.4 TOC re-evaluation/ adaptation (within PRPs and SRS)																			
6 Reporting and Workplanning																			
6.1 Monthly progress updates within monthly meeting																			
6.2 (If req'd) weekly short summaries																			
6.3 Monthly financial forecast updates																			
6.4 Quarterly and Annual Progress reports (incl PEA, VfM, impact stories)																			
6.6 Risk matrix updated (with Delivery Chain Map)																			
6.7 Quarterly Financial Reports (incl forecasts)																			
6.8 Asset register and Safeguarding Strategy updated																			
6.9 Develop and submit Annual Workplan																			
7 Exit Phase																			
7.1 Finalise initial project Exit Phase Plan																			
7.2 Develop Intervention Exit Plans																			
7.3 Update Exit Phase Plan																			
7.4 Asset handover period, staffing phase out, field activities closed out																			
7.5 Safe handover of information: documents, systems, comms material																			
7.6 Close out all contractual commitments; project audit																			
7.7 Lessons Learnt Document																			
7.8 Lessons Learnt workshops and seminars																			
7.9 Project Completion Report																			

## T5 Coordination and Communications

### 5.1 Coordination and Communication between Lead Supplier and Downstream Delivery Partners

Cowater will use a **One Team Approach** to delivery of PARI-TACS, building unifying processes around team meetings, coordination, and communications for all project staff, regardless of consortium contractual arrangements. All project staff will be PARI-TACS team members, highlighting our collective identity to stakeholders. We will establish **clear team communication protocols** which are robust to situations or locations affected by conflict or poor internet, including through a team WhatsApp on key project and security information. We will hold **fortnightly check-ins** with consortium partners to ensure they are aware of project developments, challenges, and opportunities. Recognising the individual thematic strengths of our organisations, we will provide training opportunities to all team members on areas of common interest. Our Provincial CSGA Coordinators will lead **coordination and communication with potential downstream CSO partners** that we will confirm in Inception (e.g. specialised PFM monitoring CSO, *Observatoire de la Dépense Publique*). We will prepare a Ways of Working Agreement, alongside ToRs with measurable objectives, hold fortnightly meetings for mutual accountability and 3 cross-provincial learning meetings with project partners annually.

### 5.2 Coordination with other actors in governance reform

While emphasising provincial-level identification and ownership of project interventions, we recognize that challenges for provincial governments in PFM and service delivery are often attributable to challenges at central level (i.e. provincial governments receiving irregularly only a portion of retrocession funds). We will use **established platforms to engage with national and provincial government counterparts** – namely COREF (at national level and in Kasai) to discuss financial decentralisation, fiscal transfers, revenue sharing, and participatory budgeting. Our TL will organize **quarterly meetings** with these actors to share lessons and understand opportunities for strategic engagement, escalating issues identified at provincial level and ensuring feedback and information from the centre is shared in the provinces (see T4 for details on national government engagement). In South Kivu, where no such cross-provincial coordination body exists, we will **establish a working group of PFM actors** (provincial and central government) to share lessons on the issues above, and feed up to the central government level. T4 presents our approach to **multi-stakeholder national and provincial steering committees** that increase buy-in from actors.

Coordination and communication with FCDO DRC programmes and other donor programmes is crucial to ensure our interventions avoid interfering with other initiatives, and strategically interact with them to maximize joint efforts. We will establish a **quarterly forum of TLs on relevant projects**, to identify synergies, avoid duplication, and share learning. We will use a rapid WhatsApp communication channel to share key information. Projects we would look to involve include FCDO's AXE-FILLES, SEMI and Green Growth Projects, AFD's revenue mobilisation and automated tax systems project (including in the provinces), and the World Bank's STAREST and ENCORE (under which Cowater is now implementing support to the DG Treasury and Public Accounting). Relevant projects and implementation partners will also be invited to **Dissemination Workshops and Annual Reflection Sessions at provincial and national levels** (see T9). The information-sharing and networks from this CSO, government and donor-level coordination will support FCDO in identifying suitable activities for national and central level TA under Component 3.

Rather than identifying singular, issue-based opportunities for provincial CSO/government coordination, we will facilitate long-term engagement and trust building by supporting the strengthening of existing and/or development of new **provincial-level health and education sector working groups** ("*tables de concertation*"). These mixed stakeholder groups involving provincial and CSO actors with consistent membership, will facilitate dialogue on service delivery problems identified through our PDIA process. Subject to confirmation at Inception, these working groups may intersect with existing Health and Education clusters. We have supported such platforms in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Madagascar in our extractives transparency and accountability project PASIE (£11m, GAC, 2016-23), strengthening sustainable collaborative relationships between CSOs/government officials. We may extend this model to key ETDs.

### 5.3 Approach to forming and supporting coalitions

Many South Kivu CSOs have experience in participatory budgeting and expenditure monitoring (e.g. *Centre d'Étude pour l'Éducation et le Développement Communautaire*), but institutional issues between the Governor and the provincial assembly will require an agile approach to strengthen accountability. We also know pre-established CSO coalitions exist in health and education in this province, and we will scope and seek engagement in Inception. In Kasai, a younger province, CSO coalitions are still emerging and the programme will seek to **support their establishment and capacities**. We will use SFCG's approach to assessing and forming coalitions, building on their existing CSO mapping work to assess with CSOs/CBOs their suitability for coalition membership. We have identified potential partners *Association pour le Développement des Femmes Travailleuses des Affaires Sociales* (ADFTAS) in Kasai, and *Karibu Jeunesse Nouvelle* (KJN) in South Kivu. For new and existing coalitions, all members will go through a **due diligence process** to ensure reliability, a priority given political interference in the CSO space. We will also carry out thematic and skills-focused **self-led organizational capacity assessments** on key technical (e.g. budget monitoring, PFM systems, advocacy) and management topics to help strengthen their voice and influence. We will especially **prioritise women led CSOs/CBOs** for organizational development, engagement and coalition building support. Our CSGA Provincial Coordinators will provide to all participating CSOs, SFCG's CGA training, preparing CSOs from across dividing lines to coordinate constructively, prevent competition from undermining collaboration, and strengthen engagement with Government. While most of our emphasis is on training and in-kind support, we will assess opportunities to sub-contract CSOs where appropriate (See T4).



## T6: Value for Money (VfM)

### 6.1 Management systems for Strong Financial Controls

Cowater's quality assurance and financial management systems will ensure accountability yet remain flexible to maximise VfM. Monthly advances and spending reviews will be used by our DRC-based field finance team, and HQ-based Finance Manager and Programme Director to ensure the programme achieves VfM. In Inception we will develop a tailored VfM framework to be submitted to FCDO regularly – a draft version is below.

**Financial Management:** Our FCDO finance and programme team has been working on DRC and other fragile contexts for over 10 years and is expert in the transparent management of funds and effective minimisation of fiduciary risk in line with FCDO standards. Cowater has established financial management, budgeting, and reporting systems which are tried and tested in DRC and other fragile contexts, which will be quickly rolled out and adapted to PARI-TACS to support rapid and effective mobilisation. Our Finance Field Office Manual comprises robust financial policies, controls (including multi-level approvals), and guidelines that ensure PARI-TACS will be able to operate efficiently and transparently. Our Finance Manager, *Dennis Byarugaba*, will have day-to-day responsibility for managing programme finances. He will be supported and overseen by the PM, *Martin Biayi Mutombo*, and Cowater's backstopping resources to ensure effective oversight of and management of FCDO resources. Procedures outlining responsibilities will be agreed during Inception, including monthly budgeting approvals, forecasting, separation of duties on accounting and accounts payable, internal procurement procedures, approval of expenses and audit management. Cowater has been recognized for excellence in our financial management of FCDO-funded projects and have been found to be 100% compliant by FCDO.

**Milestone-based payment, KPIs, and PbR:** We have experience delivering against a Payment by Results (PbR) mechanism such as that laid out in the TOR, including up fees retained against KPIs. In terms of milestone-based payments, during Inception we will work with FCDO to jointly agree the structure of payments and make any amendments required to the design of milestone, based on agreed workplans. **Note:** as a VfM contribution to PARI-TACS, Cowater will **absorb the cost of all Inception expenses**, including flights, accommodation, laptops and office costs in Kasai. Our partner SfGC will absorb office costs in Kinshasa and South Kivu.

### 6.2 Effective management of sub-contractors

Cowater undertakes a comprehensive due diligence process before considering organisations for consortiums, subcontracts, accountable grants for CSOs, or other inter-organizational partnership relationships. This process establishes that any partners meet Smart Guide compliant standards for governance and internal controls (including ethics, compliance, controls for aid diversion, and safeguarding), their technical and managerial ability to deliver the inputs required, and their financial stability. Organisations that do not pass this process will not enter any contractual relationship with Cowater nor receive any FCDO funds.

**Consortium partners:** As the lead partner, Cowater will retain overall responsibility for delivery of PARI-TACS, including quality assurance over the life of the contract, progress towards key milestones, contract management, and Duty of Care. Therefore, to aid effective oversight, we have built a short and tight supply chain of two trusted partners we trust to deliver. Throughout PARI-TACS, Cowater will maintain quality assurance and quality control of all activities through rigorous performance monitoring of activities, reports and outputs against the formal contract and agreed TORs with both partners. In order to ensure cohesive delivery, we will also maintain frequent, transparent communications with our delivery chain partners, including regular consortium meetings. In our consortium meetings we will discuss progress against Logframe targets and KPIs, programme governance, VfM, and team management.

**CSO partners:** While we have already identified and mapped several suitable CSOs to work with on PARI-TACS, including SfGC's existing partners, we have elected not include Congolese CSOs within our consortium to allow a proper consultative mapping process to take place during Inception. Nevertheless, we do expect to work through CSOs for much of our supply-side work, for example in contracting CSOs to train other CSOs within the coalition. Potential partners will be required to pass our due diligence process, including modules relating to ownership structure; ethics and compliance systems; safeguarding practices; and financial capacity. CSOs will be contracted to carry out clearly-defined pieces of work which suit their capacity. In each province, a dedicated Civil Society Coordinator will both support CSOs to successfully deliver their activities and closely supervise their work to ensure quality is maintained. CSOs which struggle to complete work to the required standards will receive training and TA, but continued failure to deliver will result in a scale-down or termination of their allocated activities.

### 6.3 Value for Money Framework and Indicators

We have developed a tailored VfM framework that will integrate with the monitoring, review and learning approach of PARI-TACS, with our finance and accounting systems providing ongoing and measurable VfM reporting, and close links into our MEL Strategy. Our VfM framework allows for the tracking of costs by intervention and specific budget lines, as well as to assess the overall project sustainability and the extent to which the programme is fostering gender equality and inclusion. Our approach will further use monitoring and quick feedback loops to support real-time programmatic decisions to maximize impact and VfM. In addition, we will use benchmark data from Cowater's other FCDO-funded programmes to provide a more detailed assessment of the VfM for PARI-TACS. The framework outlined below will be refined and approved by FCDO during Inception and the status of indicators will be updated in each of our Quarterly and Annual Reports. Baselines will be set during Inception. **Indicators apply to all components** except as indicated.

Dimension	Criteria	Indicators	Frequency
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Economy	Cost distribution for key project inputs	Overall programme spend to date: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project management and overhead</li> <li>Project delivery costs <b>by Component</b> and sub-output</li> <li>Cost savings realised through co-location and shared services with partner programming</li> </ul>	Quarterly
	Unit cost for inputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Average daily fees for consultants (national/international)</li> <li>Average daily accommodation and subsistence costs for long-term international consultants</li> <li>Total travel costs/average unit price per flight</li> <li>Variance to initial implementation plan</li> <li>Average cost per PEA assignment under <b>C3</b></li> </ul>	Quarterly
	Time required to mobilise inputs	Number of days required to mobilise expertise: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of days from submission of request for assistance to placement of expert.</li> <li>Number of days required to procure PEA assignment (<b>C3</b>).</li> </ul>	Biannual
	Expenditure achieved against forecast	Overall expenditure as a % of planned expenditure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disaggregated into project management and delivery costs for each programme output and <b>Component</b>.</li> </ul>	Quarterly
	Quality of financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adherence of financial reporting and management to SOPs and FCDO requirements.</li> <li>Competitive sourcing of least-cost inputs related to regular procurement.</li> <li>Other initiatives undertaken to reduce overhead and delivery spend</li> </ul>	Biannual
Efficiency	Extent of output delivery	Output delivery as a % of planned delivery (Segmented by <b>Component 1, 2, 3</b> )	Biannual
	Unit cost for key outputs	Unit cost of individual outputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Compared to project plan</li> <li>Compared to benchmarks for similar projects</li> </ul>	Biannual
	Quality of outputs (C1 & C2)	<b>For C1 and C2</b> , extent to which beneficiaries report that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outputs delivered are relevant to their needs</li> <li>Outputs delivered meet their expectations with respect to quality</li> <li>They are currently applying knowledge from outputs in their day-to-day work.</li> </ul>	Biannual
	Responsiveness to Changes in Context	Measure of project's flexibility and adaptability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percent of intervention plans adapted in response to contextual changes</li> <li>Qualitative assessment of flexibility and adaptability</li> </ul>	Quarterly Annual
Effectiveness	Annual increase in nominal revenue collected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Year-over-year increase in nominal revenue collected</li> <li>% achievement of annual revenue targets</li> </ul>	Annual
	Annual increase in budget execution at provincial level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Year-over-year increase in budget execution (in particular within health and education)</li> <li>% achievement of annual budget execution targets</li> </ul>	Annual
	Project cost-effectiveness	Estimated delivery cost for each CDF 1,000,000 increase in provincial revenue collection. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project cost-effectiveness benchmarked to similar projects.</li> </ul>	End of project
Equity (Women & Marginalised Groups)	Proportion of women and marginalised groups who are satisfied with transparency of public finances ( <b>C1 &amp; C2</b> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of women and minority citizens who agree that they are aware of their health and education service entitlements, who agree that it is easy to obtain information about provincial and local public finances or health and education funding</li> <li>Proportion of women and minority citizen taxpayers who have been asked to pay a bribe to reduce their tax burden.</li> </ul>	Annual
	Proportion of women and marginalised groups who are included in governance advocacy and engagement ( <b>C2</b> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of women- and minority-focussed CSOs included in capacity-building or supported coalitions</li> <li>Proportion of women and minority citizens participating in community consultations and coalitions</li> </ul>	Annual
	Equitable provision of training ( <b>C1&amp; C2</b> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of women among training recipients</li> <li>Proportion of women among workshop attendees</li> </ul>	Biannual



## T7 Risk mitigation

### 7.1 Our approach to risk mitigation on PARI-TACS

With the Project Director, Cowater's Head of Risk will monitor the implementation of our risk management (RM) approach, escalating to Cowater's Executive Management and Risk Committee as necessary. Cowater has successfully delivered programmes in DRC since 2014, using a risk mitigation approach with four pillars:

1. **Participatory, open and honest RM:** RM is a participatory process involving all staff and stakeholders. Our regular management meetings include open discussion of risks, based on our live **Risk Register**. We ensure FCDO is part of the discussion, **rapidly escalating** excess or severe risks to FCDO within 48 hours.
2. **RM is informed by contextual analysis:** Our PEA, Conflict Sensitivity, and GEDSI Advisors will input into our **Risk Management Strategy**, completed in Inception, including a detailed description of how the project will manage risks through organisational arrangements, policies, procedures and controls. PEA, Conflict Sensitivity, and GEDSI Advisors will also input into our Risk Register, and risk logs maintained at the intervention level.
3. **Mapping and mitigating differential risks by province:** Our overarching Risk Register will be fed by **province-specific risk pipelines**, reflecting the different risk profiles in each province. E.g., conflict risks in South Kivu are characterized by the prevalence of armed groups (especially in Uvira) and inter-ethnic conflict, while in Kasai conflict drivers centre around friction between customary authority and state structures.
4. **RM is a core part of our learning and adaptation process.** Our management team will hold regular informal risk lessons learning discussions, and structured six-monthly exercises with documented outputs, shared with FCDO.

#### Box 7.1: Tackling Corruption and Political Risk in DRC

Cowater's PROGRESS project worked with DRC's Ministry of Defence to build accountability around transfers to widows, which were subject to high corruption. In this sensitive context, a key risk was the disengagement of MoD stakeholders. To tackle this, we deployed a local team headed by a trusted regional TL, and patiently built trust through dialogue, allowing us to drive key reforms.

We have strong capabilities to manage the most severe risks presented by PARI-TACS (see the Risk Register in Annex 1). **Corruption and fraud** are widespread, public authorities exhibit weak accountability and transparency, influence peddling is common, and local partners often have low fiduciary risk management capacity. TA is not immune to this risk: FCDO's PEA indicated that DGRKAS reduced access to ENCORE training for those not politically linked or willing to 'share' per diems. Cowater has a zero-tolerance approach to corruption and fraud and implements controls including separation of approvals, spending limits, and policies on cash and cheque handling, advances, procurement, supplier vetting, and asset management. We will conduct spot checks, periodic risk-based audits, and use our financial management software to identify fraud. We will operate anonymous fraud reporting channels in English and French, advertised with staff and partners. Per diems to government staff will be minimised and subject to stringent controls. All suspected fraud events will be reported to FCDO, investigated, and findings shared. Project staff will be subject to our Code of Conduct and trained on our corruption and fraud policies. We will transmit our controls downstream through subcontracts, and manage downstream risks through due diligence, screening suppliers against blacklists, conflict of interest checks, and review and sample-based audit of transactions.

**Safeguarding** risks in DRC are moderate to high, particularly political and duty of care risks to partners engaging in demand-side activities, SEAH, and risks to beneficiaries through data collection. We will work closely with CSO partners to mitigate political risks, applying a conflict sensitivity lens to interventions, and building relationships and understanding across the demand-supply division. Our Code of Conduct and safeguarding policies proscribe all forms of exploitation, harassment and abuse. We will monitor and report on safeguarding risks, roll out our anonymous whistleblowing hotline, and investigate any breaches or complaints. We will use due diligence processes to assess downstream risks and capacity-building needs, and train staff and partners in how to recognise and mitigate safeguarding risks. We will monitor data collection through downstream partners to ensure that, if sensitive data (for example on affected communities' needs) is gathered, data breach risks are managed.

Cowater's Head of Risk will oversee our **duty of care** (DoC) systems, managed on the ground by the Programme Manager (PM) and Security Manager. Cowater's DoC provision is well adapted for DRC, and includes health and safety support, journey management, crisis response and communication protocols, equipment including vehicle safety kits and location trackers, and a suite of specialist insurances. Staff will be trained on DoC protocols before deployment.

### 7.2 Exit planning

Cowater plans for exit from inception. Our exit strategy for PARI-TACS will be based on: using stakeholder management, evidence and communications to build ongoing commitment to participatory budgeting, and capacity in supply and demand side actors; convening supply-demand relationships and building a coordination framework to enable continuing engagement; transparency, mutual accountability and flexibility in our stakeholder management, to ensure partners are prepared for a range of exit scenarios; research and learning to enhance the evidence base and support future programming; management of exit risks, including on beneficiary data and safeguarding; and strong programme management to ensure exit planning is thorough, and exit phase deliverables are comprehensive and high-quality.

Key exit phase deliverables will include an updated exit phase plan; reference guide to technical materials and intellectual property produced on PARI-TACS; programme completion report; lessons learned workshop and report, summarising insights, with commentary on how these might be applied in future HMG activities; asset management and disposal plan; final budget reconciliation, and full financial reporting. See the Workplan in T4 for a full Exit Workplan.

## T7 Annex – Risk Register

#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑–↓)	Owner
<b>Category: Contextual and political</b>											
	<b>Political change, instability, inter- and intra-community conflict:</b> instability following the recent national elections and upcoming selection of provincial positions has compounded existing conflict risks, in our delivery locations as well as generally across DRC. This has exacerbated the conflict risks of PFM and service delivery interventions, and increased stakeholder access, intervention continuity, safeguarding, staff duty of care and reputational risks.	From inception onwards	High	High	High	Apply conflict sensitive approaches to ensure broad engagement across inter- and intra-communities divisions, and to identify and mitigate conflict risks. Prepare province-specific Conflict Analyses, and maintain ongoing monitoring. Deliver CGA Training for conflict transformation. Identify conflict and political trends through PEA, and PDIA to select interventions and pivot programme towards conflict-reducing approaches. Deliver through local partners, and highly localised team. Monitor and report on risks, and integrate risk management into regular team decision-making, and programme strategy. Roll out safeguarding and duty of care approaches to mitigate conflict-related risks.	Medium	Medium	Medium	↑	PD
	<b>Commitment of provincial and national authorities:</b> previous PFM programmes, the experience of our partners, and our own detailed scoping for this bid, indicate that provincial and national authorities' commitment to PFM reforms is inconsistent. This shapes the space available for reform, and will affect our strategies, selection of priorities, and partner engagement.	From inception onwards	High	High	High	Use PEA and PDIA approaches to identify reform champions, moments and locations of political opportunity to drive PFM ambition through PEA, and pivot towards these. Build and maintain strong partner relations through local presence and highly localised team. Build demand side capacity to exert leverage over authorities. Bring demand and supply sides together to identify opportunities for joint work. Highlight the importance of PFM as a factor in supporting the rule of law. Build and communicate evidence of value of successful PFM and service delivery reform, aligned with the individual goals of stakeholders, and with provincial and national authorities interests and strategies. Communicate and celebrate successes, through strategic and project communications approaches. Align with other programmes, and leverage other international development community actors to bring concerted pressure for reform.	Medium	Medium	Medium	–	PD
	<b>Coordination between provincial and national authorities:</b> coordination between provinces, and between provincial and national authorities, is limited and impacted by provincial and national political dynamics as well as	6-12 months onwards	Medium	Medium	Medium	Use pre-established platforms, i.e. COREF (at national level and in Kasai) to discuss financial decentralization, fiscal transfers, revenue sharing, and participatory budgeting. Provide TA to enhance dialogue. Hold quarterly meetings with these actors to share lessons and understand opportunities for strategic	Medium	Low	Medium	–	PD



#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑↓)	Owner
	complex networks of rapportage. This may limit potential for alignment and mutual reinforcement between project workstreams.					engagement. In South Kivu, establish a working group of PFM actors (provincial and central government) to share lessons, and feed/escalate up to the central government.					
	<b>Ability of demand- and supply-side actors to bridge gaps and incentives:</b> effective demand and supply coordination is challenging, particularly in high conflict environments. This may increase the investment and time needed to build trust and establish effective joint working practices.	From inception onwards	Medium	Medium	Medium	Use stakeholder management approach to prepare supply side actors and demand side actors for constructive engagement as part of TA and capacity building, emphasizing the identification of areas of common interest. Use PDIA process, change space analysis, and feedback loops once problem identified and interventions underway. Identify and test key areas of potential collaboration between stakeholders, with the view of building engagement and trust.	Medium	Low	Medium	–	PD
	<b>Access and influence with programme stakeholders:</b> low capacity, unclear internal structures, political staff placements, staff turnover, and complex political economic dynamics in provincial and national authorities create risks of effective stakeholder engagement.	From inception onwards	Medium	High	High	Use PDIA and change space analysis to identify champions at a sufficiently high political or administrative level, which can help drive specific interventions. Use demand side influence to build traction with actors and support for specific interventions. Draw on highly localised team with existing networks to build productive relationships and ensure continuing and close stakeholder engagement.	Low	Medium	Medium	–	PD
<b>Category: Operational and delivery</b>											
	<b>Absorption capacity in provincial and national authorities:</b> despite an often-large number of human resources in government structures from the national to the local levels, government authorities have limited existing capacity in terms of both skills and systems, and may be unable to effectively absorb technical assistance and capacity-building support. This will limit the uptake and sustainability of PFM and service delivery improvements.	6-12 months onwards	High	High	High	Use PEA, PDIA and stakeholder management approaches to identify where greater absorption capacity exists, and adjust to those opportunities. Apply collaborative organizational development approach focused on having government structures and their staff themselves identify their key weaknesses, along with priorities areas for TA and capacity building support from the programme to build ownership.	Medium	High	High	–	PD
	<b>CSO partner capacity:</b> most CSOs in South Kivu, Kasai and the potential scale-up locations are of comparatively low capacity, and may struggle work effectively towards better demand-side actions and supply-demand coordination.	6-12 months onwards	High	Medium	High	Use established partner network to connect with higher capacity and growth potential CSOs. Assess capacity risks through due diligence processes. Build capacity through organisational development approach that places CSOs and their staff in the lead to identify key weaknesses and priority areas for TA and capacity	Medium	Low	Medium	↓	PM



#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑↓)	Owner
						building joint delivery and training. Use subcontract accountability provisions to mitigate VFM risks.					
	<b>Establishment of effective operational platforms in all delivery locations:</b> if effective platforms are not quickly established in South Kivu, Kasai, Kinshasa, and (if necessary) scale-up locations, programme activities will be delayed.	0-3 months	Medium	High	High	Use partners' strong existing platforms in all delivery locations. Deploy programme staff into existing facilities, speeding up mobilisation and reducing operational overheads.	Low	Low	Low	–	PM
	<b>Duty of care:</b> DRC is a high-risk location. Health and safety, conflict and instability, and broader duty of care risks are particularly high. This risk is increasing with conflict and instability.	From inception onwards	Medium	High	High	Apply strong duty of care management, including health and safety support, journey management, crisis response and communication protocols, equipment including vehicle safety kits and location trackers, and specialist insurances. Deploy local staff, able to operate at lower duty of care risk.	Low	Medium	Medium	↑	Head Risk
	<b>Coordination and alignment across donor activities:</b> DRC is a crowded donor landscape. PARI-TACS must ensure alignment across activities, including bilateral and multilateral donors, and development banks.	From inception onwards	Medium	Medium	Medium	Engage across donors and implementers, map activities and identify opportunities for alignment. Establish a forum of TLs on relevant projects to meet quarterly, e.g. FCDO's AXE-FILLES, SEMI and Green Growth Projects, AFD's revenue mobilisation and automated tax systems project (including in the provinces), and the World Bank's STAREST and ENCORE (under which Cowater is now implementing support to the DG Treasury and Public Accounting). Use WhatsApp to share key information. Invite relevant projects to Dissemination Workshops and Annual Reflection Sessions (see T9). Use the information and networks from this coordination at government and donor-level to support FCDO in identifying suitable activities for national and central level technical assistance under Component 3. Provide evidence briefs and programme communications to assist FCDO in engagement across international partners.	Low	Low	Low	↑	PD
	<b>Delivery consortium alignment:</b> if partners are insufficiently aligned, programme activities will be less impactful and lower VFM.	From inception onwards	Low	Medium	Medium	Use detailed pre-programme relationship-building, detailed MOU between partners, shared leadership governance arrangements entailing distribution of power and resources between partners, standard operating procedures and regular coordination meetings.	Low	Low	Low	–	PD

Category: safeguarding

#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑↓)	Owner
	<b>Downstream partners exposed to negative blowback and other harms:</b> partners may experience negative blowback resulting from exercising their agency, and the elevation of primary stakeholder voices. This may include increased conflict and political risks, and resistance from duty-bearers and powerholders.	6-12 months onwards	Medium	High	High	Integrate conflict sensitive approach into all programming. Deliver Common Ground Approach Training for conflict transformation to CSOs, and train CSOs in cascading capacity building of conflict sensitive approaches. Carefully consider political exposure implications within all CSO communication activities, and engagement with demand side activities, and develop risk mitigation strategies for each relevant intervention.	Low	Medium	Medium	↑	PD
	<b>Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment, and engagement with vulnerable people:</b> SEAH is common in DRC, including commercial sex, creating risks of harm to vulnerable people, and reputational risks for the programme, FCDO and UK. Demand side CSOs may be engaged with vulnerable people, as their accountable populations.	From inception onwards	Medium	Medium	Medium	Enforce Code of Conduct, SEAH and safeguarding policies which prohibit all forms of SEAH. Train staff and CSO partners in ethical and safeguarding requirements. Operate anonymous, multilingual whistleblowing channel, investigate, and report all complaints and findings to FCDO. Periodically audit programme compliance with ethical requirements.	Low	Medium	Medium	–	PM
	<b>Risks to beneficiary data:</b> individuals and communities engaging on demand side action may face risks of negative blowback. These risks are exacerbated if CSOs gathering supporter data do not manage this data effectively.	6-12 months onwards	Low	Medium	Medium	Review CSO data protection approaches in due diligence. If necessary, support CSOs with data management capacity-building. Address beneficiary data risks within exit planning.	Low	Low	Low	–	PM
	<b>Risk of excluding certain groups when recruiting local staff:</b> due to sometimes conflicting ethnic and identity dynamics, members of some ethnic groups might want to exclude those from other groups. This could make the programme party to a pre-existing conflict and further inflame tensions.	From inception onwards	Medium	Low	Medium	Identify intercommunal conflict drivers and dynamics within conflict analyses and PEA processes. Ensure these are considered during recruitment. Foster an open and positive team dynamic based on a shared mission. Address any internal tensions in team management and staff management discussions.	Low	Low	Low	↑	PM
<b>Category: financial and fiduciary</b>											
	<b>Corruption and fraud:</b> there may be incidents of corruption and fraud, including diversion from programme activities and misuse of funding provided to civil society and social movements. This would breach UK and FCDO requirements, erode programme impacts, reduce VFM,	From inception onwards	High	High	High	Implement strong fiduciary risk controls, including separation of authorities, spending limits, and policies on cash and cheque handling, advances, procurement, supplier vetting, and asset management. Conduct spot checks, periodic risk-based audits, and use financial management software to identify fraud. Operate anonymous fraud reporting channels in English and	Medium	Medium	Medium	–	Fin Mgr

#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑→↓)	Owner
	and create stakeholder and reputational risks.					French, advertised with staff and partners. Report fraud events to FCDO, investigate, and share findings. Apply Code of Conduct and financial policies to all staff and downstream partners, and deliver training. Manage downstream risks through subcontracts, due diligence, screening, conflict of interest checks, and review and sample-based audit of transactions. Our partner SFCG also operates a fraud reporting hotline, trains staff and partners in anti-fraud measures, and monitors conflicts of interest. Apply additional scrutiny to any payments to government officials (e.g. per diems), and minimise these as much as possible.					
	<b>Downstream supplier financial accountability:</b> downstream partners may have lower capacity to manage fiduciary risks and demonstrate financial accountability.	From inception onwards	High	Medium	Medium	Identify downstream partner financial accountability capacity through due diligence processes. Provide targeted support to CSOs if necessary. Manage risks through subcontracts, due diligence, screening, conflict of interest checks, and review and sample-based audit of transactions.	Medium	Medium	Medium	↓	Fin Mgr
<b>Category: VFM</b>											
	<b>Partner accountability for results:</b> if demand and supply partners are not committed to and hold shared accountability for participatory budgeting and service delivery outcomes, VFM, impact and sustainability risks will be increased.	6-12 months onwards	Medium	High	High	Build shared approach and accountability through collaborative design processes and shared results frameworks. Build evidence and use communications tools, to reinforce importance of participatory budgeting, aligned with individual and organisational actor's interests. Transmit supplier accountability to milestone and deliverables through subcontracts.	Low	Medium	Medium	–	PD
	<b>Sustainability of reforms:</b> sustainability will be jeopardised if partners are unable or unwilling to continue participatory budgeting and service delivery reforms after programme close.	From inception onwards	Medium	High	High	Plan for exit and sustainability from inception. Use stakeholder management, evidence and communications to build ongoing commitment to participatory budgeting, and capacity in supply and demand side actors. Build capacity through organisational development approach that places CSOs and their staff in the lead to identify key weaknesses and priority areas for TA and capacity building joint delivery and training. Convene supply-demand relationships and build a coordination framework to enable continuing engagement. Maintain transparency, mutual accountability and flexibility in stakeholder management, to ensure partners are prepared for a range of exit scenarios. Use research	Medium	Medium	Medium	–	PD

#	Risk description	Proximity	Gross likelihood (L M H)	Gross impact (L M H)	Gross risk rating (L M H)	Mitigation	Residual likelihood (L M H)	Residual impact (L M H)	Residual risk rating (L M H)	Gross risk trend (↑–↓)	Owner
						and learning to enhance the evidence base and support future programming.					
<b>Category: reputational</b>											
	<b>Reputational risks arising from programme effectiveness and conflict sensitivity:</b> if the programme fails to deliver on its objectives, manage conflict risks effectively, or align with other development actors, this will create reputational, and bilateral and multilateral engagement risks for FCDO.	From inception onwards	Low	Medium	Medium	Apply strong overarching programme theory of change, strategy, approach and logframe. Use PDIA approach to seize moments of opportunity for impact. Apply rigorous MEL approach to monitor, evaluate and learn from results, and course-correct if necessary. Engage with other development actors to ensure alignment, and identify distinctive impact opportunities for PARI-TACS.	Low	Low	Low	–	PD



## T8. Inclusion of Marginalized Groups in particular women

Women and marginalized groups are disproportionately affected by conflicts, violence, and insecurity in DRC. This is explained in part by how informal institutions often dominate formal ones, raising especially strong barriers to gender equality and inclusion. This means in practice that a relatively weak and fragile state captured by a small clientelist elite excludes important segments of the population, including on a gender or identity basis. The Congolese state is thus failing to effectively manage and equitably provide basic public services such as health and education or consider the priorities and needs of women and vulnerable groups in its decisions at local, provincial, or national levels. Furthermore, the prevalence of corruption, and how the benefits from public services are distributed across communities combined with deprivation and a lack of livelihood opportunities can themselves become drivers of conflicts. Cowater is a global leader in designing and implementing GEDSI programs, as well as mainstreaming GEDSI in its projects, including as part of governance initiatives in FCAS. Our in-house GEDSI team specialized in developing solutions to foster inclusive and equitable economic and social development, the Head of which will join PARI-TACS as our GEDSI Advisor.

**Integrating GEDSI into PARI-TACS:** We will build up an understanding of the context and the root causes of conflict, gender inequality, and social exclusion by explicitly integrating GEDSI Analysis into our PEA and CA methodology. Our GEDSI Advisor will support our national GEDSI Analyst to identify the key actors and specific impacts of conflict, violence, and fragility on women and gender relations to establish how gender inequality and prevailing social norms shape these situations. Beyond understanding conflict and gender inequality drivers during Inception and maintaining a firm grasp of the evolving context during implementation through MEL systems, we will ensure we implement a Do No Harm approach. This will involve assessing and mitigating a range of contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks in DRC, and especially safeguarding against SEAH along with GBV, as encapsulated in our GEDSI Strategy and programme Code of Conduct.

**Designing gender-responsive interventions:** Our program delivery approach will utilize Cowater's Gender Based Analysis (GBA+) approach to examine the barriers women and marginalized groups face to accessing services and state institutions. This first requires transforming discriminatory gender norms and relations, particularly those at the root of Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG). Second, we will focus on mitigating informal norms and institutions that drive exclusion and create accessibility barriers in provincial governments, ETDs, and CSOs. Third, we will support the equitable access to quality services, including education and health, by prioritizing problems through our PDIA process that are detrimental to their effective access from a community and a women and marginalized groups perspective. As our process will involve formal engagement with governments, Women's Right Organisations (WROs), CSOs, communities, and marginalized groups, this will allow us to identify key problems and co-create interventions which will increase women's participation in decision-making concerning service delivery and the related accountability processes. Our PDIA approach will further be key in the context of DRC's limited institutional capacity by enabling the design of interventions that will realistically address both the supply and demand side issues of a key problem supported by effective TA and capacity building approaches. Moreover, when designing interventions, understanding and mitigating the risks of backlash and increased conflict that may result from women's empowerment is another critical challenge. This puts the emphasis on finding the right balance between realistic short- to medium-term improvements while contributing to longer-term transformation in gender relations. Effectively implementing this approach requires the active engagement of program stakeholders and beneficiaries, enabling effective intervention design and rapid identification of what is or is not working in implementation, and iterative and flexible adaptations toward realizing desired changes and outcomes.

### Box 8.1: Gender-responsive tax reform in Benin

Cowater's PAARIB programme helped create Benin's first Tax Policy Unit (TPU). Following PAARIB's study on the implicit and explicit biases of fiscal policy and taxation, the TPU incorporated proposed solutions to reform the Salary and Wages Tax, removing the requirement that child benefit be paid to the head of the family, who is typically the male. This both reduced an identified gender inequality and increased total-to-date revenue of this tax by GBP 13m.

To ensure interventions consider GEDSI properly, we will adapt Cowater's **GEDSI Scorecard** tool. At design stage, prospective interventions are graded on a range of factors such as whether GEDSI objectives are core to the design (including the impact on women and marginalised groups), and whether GEDSI factors have been considered in the analysis. The highest rating is 'Transformation', for interventions which can deliver lasting institutional and social change for women and marginalised groups. The lowest score is 'At Risk', for interventions that are expected to have harmful effects on equality and inclusion which have not been mitigated. This is a fail rating, and interventions scoring 'At Risk' will not be approved or progressed. The lowest passing score is 'Minimum Compliance to DNH', for interventions which do not explicitly aim at equality but have considered relevant issues, will DNH, and disaggregated data will be collected.

**Increasing female participation in programme activities:** within our supply-side activities, we will actively target women and marginalised groups within provincial and local governance bodies for training and mentoring which responds to particular pressures which affect them. E.g. in an anticorruption project in South Africa, Cowater set up a safe space within government structures for women to exchange and discuss specific challenges in their workplaces, including those linked to sexual harassment and sextortion. For demand-side activities, we will partner with women-led CSOs to carry out leadership training sessions for women representatives, on themes such as on women's rights in the DRC, gender-inclusive activity implementation and positive masculinities. We will then be able to work through these CSOs to ensure women participate in our community-focused activities. Our partner SFCG has employed this approach in South and North Kivu, enabling women to create and lead local governance forums which, for example, successfully pressured public officials in Kabare Territory of South Kivu to close a polluting waste management site.




## T9 Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Strategy

### 9.1 MEL Strategy and Approach for Collecting and Reporting Results

Our MEL strategy is context-driven, adaptive, and designed to allow the programme to pilot, learn and scale up what works – whilst also sharing lessons and best practice with key stakeholders in digestible and actionable formats as a means to influence and add value beyond the programme. IES, who have deep experience delivering MEL in South Kivu and Kasai, including under FCDO's ELAN programme, will lead on its design and implementation. During Inception we will work with FCDO to develop a comprehensive MEL strategy which will elaborate key learning questions, as well as the processes by which knowledge and learning will be continuously collected, analysed, and shared/reflected upon, and the frequency and timing of the learning and communication products generated. MEL Expert *Emmanuel Muke* will work closely with the GEDSI and the Conflict Sensitivity Advisors in its design, including for developing methodologies for disaggregating and reporting data in ways that support a more inclusive and gender-sensitive programme that works to mitigate conflict drivers, drawing on his 15 years' experience in MEL for public sector and CSO interventions.

An adaptive learning process at the intervention level is core to our approach. This treats each piece of work we do as a learning opportunity, driven by feedback loops. Whether it is a piece of TA to provincial government, capacity-building to a CSO, a targeted piece of PEA, or a PDIA-based consultation between local government and citizens, every piece of work we do will be part of an **intervention** which has its own **Learning, Oversight and Operations Pack (LOOP)**, a set of monitoring and learning tools designed to channel a constant flow of information about the progress and impact of each intervention. This includes a learning plan, a workplan, mini results framework and indicators, and a risk matrix. Our strategy begins with the design of the **overarching Theory of Change (TOC)**, shown in draft form in Fig 1, and Learning Strategy for the programme and continues through the design of each intervention's LOOP, with regular review points set at both intervention and portfolio levels to adapt and improve the overall programme (see 9.1.2).



#### 9.1.1 Evaluating the ToC through Qualitative and Quantitative Methods and Data: *Figure 2 Draft Theory of Change for PARI-TACS*

**Methods and Data:** we will maintain an **online MEL portal**, enabling FCDO and other stakeholders to follow progress in real time wherever they are, and to enable learning. Feeding into the MEL Portal, we will combine quantitative and qualitative monitoring, including a baseline for each LOOP and plans for an endline with defined indicators, with at least one able to contribute to the project logframe. These will feed into the **Intervention-level Review Points (IRP)** and **Portfolio Review Points (PRP)**, and help to ascertain whether results validate the ToC. Examples of the data points we will monitor during the course of interventions include:

Type <sup>2</sup>	Method and Tools	Sample Data Points to Monitor
Qual	Key Informant Interviews	Assess how citizen trust in and engagement with ETD, provincial, and central government evolves over time; Track citizen demands and the extent to which improvements within provincial PFM and service-delivery satisfy these demands
Qual	Focus Group Discussions	
Qual	Field assessments	
Quant	Surveys	Capacity enhancement pre- and post-TA (for government and CSOs); Effectiveness of government business process improvement; Measure how the degree of participation and influence of women and youth on government decision-making processes evolves over time
Quant	Structured assessments	
Quant	Use of existing government administrative data	Assess use of data, periodic planning and reporting; Measure level of policy compliance, policy improvements, systems/institutions strengthened; TA outcomes at provincial and ETD level (e.g. revenue collected, budget execution, data on health and education service delivery)
Quant	Primary data collection	Participation in trainings through gender-disaggregated data

<sup>2</sup> We will use qualitative methods including key informant interviews, focus group discussions, situational analysis, and field assessments. Participants will be selected based on a variety of key variables (i.e., age, religion, ethnicity, gender, urban vs rural settings, vulnerable groups such as IDPs) ensuring broad representation and an understanding on the experiences of the various demographic groups. Quantitative surveys using online survey-based data gathering tools such as ODK Collect and Zoho will also be used. Through these, survey forms are downloaded, and finalised submissions are uploaded to a server monitored by the survey analyst in real time.



Mixed	Programme sessions	reflection	Evidence how the programme as a whole as well as its activities have adapted to opportunities and challenges presented by changes in the political economy and conflict context
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### 9.1.2 How lessons learned from implementation will be recorded and acted upon

We will set learning goals both at the intervention and portfolio level to ensure we actively capture learning as we go. We view learning as an input to programme delivery improvement and not merely an output of implementation. In addition to IRPs, which drive learning-based adaptation at the intervention level, learning will be generated through the following practices, and also documented within a **Learning Log**.

- **Biannual Portfolio Review Point (PRP) reflection sessions:** These will bring together senior programme staff to discuss the evolving contexts, challenges and opportunities that exist within interventions and what key learning trends are beginning to emerge through implementation. These sessions will be one-day events every other quarter.
- **Annual strategic review sessions (SRS):** Incorporating and expanding a PRP, an SRS will bring together senior programme staff, FCDO, government counterparts and other relevant partners/multilaterals (such as WB, EU, or other FCDO programmes) to review PARI-TACS' ToC, make key adjustments based on evidence generated and discuss where wider windows for opportunity and collaboration present themselves.
- **Sharing learning and evidence:** The learning and evidence generated by MEL will be communicated to other relevant actors and initiatives through a range of mechanisms which will be agreed with FCDO during inception. Together with FCDO, we will plan regular **Dissemination Workshops**, targeting state and non-state actors in the space, including international partners and provincial and local government, aiming to share results, achievements, and lessons learnt. Targeted dissemination workshops will also be held with CSOs and communities to share successes and lessons learnt. We will also share **learning products** such as policy briefs, which will be produced to translate research/learning on what works in governance and service-delivery reform into digestible formats for diverse stakeholders.

**9.1.3 Internal Evaluation:** the PRP and SRS events described will assess the extent to which interventions are achieving objectives and where either the interventions or the TOC should be adapted to reflect the context and strengthen impact. They will also feed into regular reporting, the format and cadence of which will be agreed with FCDO during Inception. We anticipate that this will include, at a minimum, the following. An internal **monthly activity dashboard** providing an overview of key data points and the overall progress of all activities. This will provide the information for a monthly management dialogue to ascertain, among other things, whether more rapid adaptation to pilot activities might be necessary. **Quarterly and annual performance and evaluation reports** will build on the monthly activity dashboard and the monthly management dialogues and will assess context, progress relative to the work plan and the results framework, outline the work plan for the next quarter, in addition to providing spending/financial reports and forecasts. A lesson learned section outlining key results and lessons learned will be included, as well as activities for which the programme will need to revise its approach, scale up or scale down. The final quarterly report will be an expanded Project Completion Report. As per the TORs we will also contract an **external mid-term evaluation and final impact evaluation**.

### 9.2 Draft Logframe (See ToC for full impact, outcome, and output statements. Data sources: Cowater provincial research)

Abbreviated Statement	Indicators [Baselines (BL) to be confirmed in Inception]
Impact: Improved capacity of decentral and national institutions to be more accountable & effective	% increase in actual operational provincial expenditure on health and education [BL: S Kivu: Education USD156,509, Health: USD119,144 (2022); Kasai: TBC]; No. of CSO inputs submitted to participatory budgeting processes with evidence that inputs are taken up in provincial budgets [BL: TBC]
OC1: Improved PFM	% execution rate of provincial budget [BL: Kasai: 41% (2023), S Kivu: 47% (2022)]; budgets are passed by provincial assemblies {BL: Kasai: Yes; S Kivu: No}
OC2: Improved tax management	% increase in provincial tax collection [BL: Kasai TBC; S Kivu: 26% in 2022]; % level of satisfaction of taxpayers that say they are treated equitably [BL: TBC]
OC3: Improved national govt commitment to fiscal decentralisation	% variance between fiscal transfers (retrocession) expected and received [BL: TBC - as of Feb 2024, 32 month delay in S Kivu; Kasai has not received for 40 months]
O1. Citizens and communities understand entry points for influencing PFM and service delivery	No. of CSOs and citizens trained; No. of evidence-based reports on service delivery challenges produced by CSOs; No. of tax awareness-raising events held by CSOs [BL: 0]
O2. Increased citizen (esp. women's) participation in PFM advocacy and decision-making	No. of women trained; % of women/marginalized groups in civil society coalition; No. of pieces of GEDSI analysis produced as input to advocacy; No. of minority-led CSOs engaged in coalitions; [BL: 0]
O3. CSOs more able to hold govt to account around PFM and service delivery reform	No. of ETDs in which local consultation frameworks are formed; No. of tools and strategies developed and used by supported CSOs (scorecards, advocacy strategies) to engage government; [BL: 0]
O4. Support to provincial govt to allocate, execute, monitor funds	Evidence of new and improved expenditure management processes for PFM; Number of parliamentarians trained on public finance systems [BL: 0]
O5. Support to provincial govt to raise, management and monitor tax	Evidence of new and improved business processes for tax; No. of complaints received from taxpayers [BL: 0]
O6. National govt and partners influenced to renew engagement on fiscal decentralisation	No. of TA inputs delivered to national government around fiscal decentralisation; No. of targeted policy outreach events held with national-level actors [BL: 0]

## SV1 Supply Chain Diversity

Social value (SV) will be integrated into all three PARI-TACS components, through our SV Strategy, based on an ENGAGE-DEVELOP-EMPOWER model:

**Engage:** We will engage local new businesses, SMEs, VSCEs, mutuals and start-ups through our local platforms in each delivery location. We will use our highly localised team to deliver the three programme components, and expand our network to onboard new experts and subcontractors where further niche skills are needed. We will hold engagement events, and identify subcontracting opportunities for local businesses to provide delivery support, such as business services, travel and accommodation. We have already mapped a wide range of CSOs engaging in PFM and service delivery issues, and will broaden our networks of CSOs and VSCEs to deliver Component 2.

**Develop:** We will build the capacity of our partners and suppliers, to support a more vibrant and diversified enterprise ecosystem in our delivery locations. We will identify capacity-building needs of CSOs under Component 2, deliver targeted TA through an organisational development model, build their joint advocacy and networking capacities, cascade support through other subcontracted CSOs, and, with appropriate partners, deliver Learning by Doing Sub-Contracts (see T4). We will train our partners, associates and staff in compliance, safeguarding and ethical risks, and fiduciary risk management (see T7). We will develop the professional skills, including technical, management and 'soft skills', of our associates across all components, strengthening the long-term capacity of the DRC labour market.

**Empower:** We will empower our suppliers and partners. Our NGO partner, SfCG, will lead Component 2 and our CA approach. Our local SME subcontractor, IES, will deliver PEA under Component 3, and engage national firms at first instance where suppliers are needed. Both core partners will participate in programme leadership and strategy. Leadership of day-to-day delivery will be held by our local and regional associates.

In Inception, we will set out an SV work plan, and incorporate SV measures into our results framework.

Further details on specific activities aligned to the MAC 3.1 evaluation criteria are set out below.

### 1.1 Our understanding of businesses in DRC

Cowater has been active in DRC since 2014, SfCG since 2001, and IES since its founding in 2015. Our consortium has platforms, with existing relationships with a wide range of local businesses, community enterprises and civil society, in each location. Kinshasa has a vibrant entrepreneurial community, with a strong business support service sector. Sectors in South Kivu and Kasai are less developed, with a small number of established firms. All delivery locations (including North Kivu and Kasai Central) have a number of mid- to high-capacity CSOs, including some engaged on PFM. Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) and Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprises (VSCEs) face a range of barriers to greater market participation, differentiated by location, typically including cash flow and cash handling limitations; corruption risks; energy supply; and goods and transport costs. Our market and commercial approaches are designed to mitigate these.

### 1.2 Identifying opportunities to open sub-contracting to diverse businesses

Our procurement process will emphasise supplier diversity and localisation wherever this is practical, strong VfM, and consistent with fiduciary risk management. In inception, we will update our mapping of market capacities in South Kivu, Kasai and Kinshasa, focusing on the service provision capacity of start-ups and MSMEs, localised enterprises, women-led enterprises, and enterprises led by people with disabilities. We will prepare an annual procurement plan setting out anticipated needs, review this against market capacity, and determine the optimal route to market. We anticipate that all national operational needs will be met within local markets, and the majority within SMEs. This includes travel and transport, food and accommodation, office facilities, equipment and supplies, IT, and business support services. Under Component 2, we will identify opportunities

#### Box SV1.1: Engage–Develop–Empower of RMTeam

**ENGAGE.** RMTeam started in 2013 as a Turkey-based, Syrian-led data collection company. In 2015 it was hired by Cowater to collect monitoring data for FCDO's Syria Independent Monitoring (SIM) contract, as Syrian territory was inaccessible to international experts. RMTeam has been conducting field data collection for Cowater in Syria since then.

**DEVELOP.** Over the first few years of the SIM contract, Cowater undertook to systematically strengthen RMTeam's capacity by: building its HSS system (policies, procedures, material, training of trainers); developing its safeguarding and complaint system; building the capacity of its field monitors; and providing technical advice to its senior staff.

**EMPOWER.** RMTeam has won various high-value contracts (SRTF, EU-Syria monitoring) as contract lead, either as single service provider or relying on Cowater quality assurance expertise.

#### Box SV1.2: Cowater's Approach to Diversity in Supply Chains

Cowater has a strong global supply chain across developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, Middle East and FCAS countries. We manage large-scale global framework contracts that support diverse and inclusive supply chains including our EU Framework contracts, FCDO's TAF2+, FCDO's Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crises, and DFAT's Empowering Women in Indonesia (MAMPU). On these framework and facility contracts, we are currently managing over £100m in donor-funds with over 70% of these funds going to supply chain partners including 89 pre-registered suppliers for rapid call-down services, 341 active subcontractors (including 189 local organisations / VCEs and 45 SMEs). Currently 100% of our development contracts use local organisations and experts to deliver within our supply chain, and we are working with our partners to build their capacity to take on a greater proportion of programme spend.



to subcontract CSOs to deliver training to other CSOs – cascading our capacity-building activities to strengthen the supply base. Under Component 3, if we need to commission a specific PEA assignment from a downstream provider (beyond IES), we will target national firms in the first instance. Our annual procurement plan will specify supplier diversity targets, including targets for the proportion of procurement through start-ups and MSMEs; localised enterprises; and women-led enterprises. At the end of each year, we will review our performance, and share this with FCDO.

### **1.3 Engaging a diverse range of business, prior to award and during contract**

In selecting partners and associates for this bid, we have emphasised localisation and diversity. Our consortium members are a DRC-national, locally-embedded SME, and an international non-profit with longstanding presence in DRC. Our delivery team is heavily localised: 5 out of 7 of our core team is Congolese, the remaining 2 being African nationals; and 56% of our full team is Congolese, and a further 20% African national.

Through our bid preparation, we have mapped a broader consultant base in DRC, heavily localised and with emphasis on gender diversity. We have also mapped CSOs across South Kivu and Kasai, identifying those active on PFM and service delivery reform, as well as those focussed on or led by women. We will draw on this mapping to quickly launch demand-side activities. Periodically in implementation, we will hold supplier engagement events, locally advertised from our platforms in South Kivu, Kasai and Kinshasa, to give forward notice of procurement opportunities and maintain a current mapping of market capacity. Our supplier engagement activities, as well as our advertising and procurement processes, will be conducted in French and English depending on market. All our experts are native French-speakers.

To monitor our SV activities, we will use scorecards with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets specific/tailored to our supply chain diversity goals. We will hold a mid-project and end of project learning workshops to inform the SV approach and reflect learning on the SV strategy. Scorecards will also inform programme level annual review processes, whose feedback will be used to improve our SV approach, learn and adapt. MAC 3.1 specific SV related metrics (qualitative and quantitative), based on the results of our assessment and mapping of suppliers and agreed upon engagement strategies, will be integrated into our MERL Results Framework and reflected in our logframe indicators.

### **1.4 Collaborative working with diverse businesses**

Collaboration is at the heart of our supply chain management approach. We will manage downstream providers through shared problem-solving, joint accountability within an agreed results framework, joint progress review, and shared lessons learning. Where obstacles are encountered, we will address them openly through our adaptive management approach. Where it is necessary to performance-manage a provider or staff member, we will do this through a transparent process, clearly set out in our contracts, with a focus on supporting people to deliver high-quality results. We are committed to the UK Prompt Payment Code, our commercial arrangements are designed to support smaller businesses with cash flow, and we will always pay our suppliers within agreed terms, notwithstanding whether we have yet been paid by FCDO.

Cowater takes seriously its responsibility to strengthen local market capacity. We will do this on PARI-TACS through a collaborative due diligence process with demand side partners, identifying areas for capacity development; providing support and materials on financial management and compliance; sharing tools and templates for programme delivery; regular check-ins; and sessions with providers to identify market barriers. We will adopt inclusive working methods, including use of inclusive technology, where compatible with programme needs. We will use flexible working arrangements where necessary to allow inclusive participation, for example remote working for people with carer responsibilities.

### **1.5 Advertising of supply chain opportunities, including on Contracts Finder**

Where appropriate (e.g. for larger value service contracts), we will conduct open advertising of specific opportunities through local and social media, to engage local MSMEs, and through Contracts Finder, to engage UK SMEs.

### **1.6 Ensuring accessibility for disabled business owners and employees**

Our project offices in DRC are wheelchair-accessible, as is our Cowater UK office. We will make reasonable workplace adjustments to enable people with disabilities and specific needs to participate in our team. We use inclusive work patterns and technology to support accessibility. We will ensure that our market outreach and other supplier engagement events are accessible. We will measure performance on supply chain accessibility for disabled business owners and employees through our yearly procurement review, and implement supply chain management changes as necessary.

### **1.7 Structuring supply chain selection process to ensure fairness**

Our procurement processes are structured to ensure fairness, VfM, and strong RM. Procurement decisions will be reviewed by a panel comprising the PD, PM and Finance Manager, against transparent criteria. Supplier evaluations will include supply chain diversity metrics, to encourage (within our overall VfM framework) selection of suppliers which face barriers to participation, including businesses owned by or employing disabled people, minority group representatives, women, veterans or other underrepresented groups; and suppliers which can demonstrate social contribution, including those with strong environmental, social and safeguarding practices, purpose-driven businesses, non-profit organisations, voluntary, community and social enterprises, mutuals, or other enterprises which deliver community value, such as providing employment to disadvantaged groups.

## **B4 Matters not appropriate in any other appendix**

None.