



E-Sign.

This Document has been Signed with a **secure electronic signature** via E-Sign.

Document Details

Title

Author

Document Created on

Digital Fingerprint

Document Signers

Scan/Click the QR Code to view signature information

Name

Email

Status

Signature Fingerprint

Name


Email

Status

Signature Fingerprint

Document History





Section 4 Appendix A

CALLDOWN CONTRACT

Framework Agreement with:	Coffey International Development Ltd
Framework Agreement for:	Global Evaluation Framework Agreement
Framework Agreement Purchase Order Number:	PO 7448
Call-down Contract For:	Performance evaluation of the Supporting Sustainable Artisanal Mining in Rwanda programme
Contract Purchase Order Number:	PO 7974

I refer to the following:

1. The above mentioned Framework Agreement dated 12 September 2016;
2. Your Technical and Commercial proposals of 7 July 2017;
3. Your email communication of 25 October 2017.

and I confirm that DFID requires you to provide the Services (Annex A), under the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement which shall apply to this Call-down Contract as if expressly incorporated herein.

1. Commencement and Duration of the Services

- 1.1 The Supplier shall start the Services no later than 18 December 2017 ("the Start Date") and the Services shall be completed by 30 September 2020 ("the End Date") unless the Call-down Contract is terminated earlier in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement.

2. Recipient

- 2.1 DFID requires the Supplier to provide the Services to the Department for International Development (DFID) ("the Recipient").

3. Financial Limit

- 3.1 Payments under this Call-down Contract shall not, exceed £359,649.00 ("the Financial Limit") and is exclusive of any government tax, if applicable as detailed in Annex B.

When Payments shall be made on a 'Milestone Payment Basis' the following Clause 28.1 shall be substituted for Clause 28.1 of the Framework Agreement.

28. Milestone Payment Basis


- 28.1 Where the applicable payment mechanism is "Milestone Payment", invoice(s) shall be submitted for the amount(s) indicated in Annex B and payments will be made on satisfactory performance of the services, at the payment points defined as per schedule of payments. At

each payment point set criteria will be defined as part of the payments. Payment will be made if the criteria are met to the satisfaction of DFID.


When the relevant milestone is achieved in its final form by the Supplier or following completion of the Services, as the case may be, indicating both the amount or amounts due at the time and cumulatively. Payments pursuant to clause 28.1 are subject to the satisfaction of the Project Officer in relation to the performance by the Supplier of its obligations under the Call-down Contract and to verification by the Project Officer that all prior payments made to the Supplier under this Call-down Contract were properly due.

4. DFID Officials

4.1 The Project Officer is:




4.2 The Contract Officer is:



5. Key Personnel

The following of the Supplier's Personnel cannot be substituted by the Supplier without DFID's prior written consent:



6. Reports

6.1 The Supplier shall submit project reports on at least a monthly basis and in accordance with Annex A - Terms of Reference.

7. Duty of Care

All Supplier Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Agreement) engaged under this Call-down Contract will come under the duty of care of the Supplier:

- I. The Supplier will be responsible for all security arrangements and Her Majesty's Government accepts no responsibility for the health, safety and security of individuals or property whilst travelling.
- II. The Supplier will be responsible for taking out insurance in respect of death or personal injury, damage to or loss of property, and will indemnify and keep indemnified DFID in respect of:



- II.1. Any loss, damage or claim, howsoever arising out of, or relating to negligence by the Supplier, the Supplier's Personnel, or by any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with the performance of the Call-down Contract;
- II.2. Any claim, howsoever arising, by the Supplier's Personnel or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with their performance under this Call-down Contract.
- III. The Supplier will ensure that such insurance arrangements as are made in respect of the Supplier's Personnel, or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier are reasonable and prudent in all circumstances, including in respect of death, injury or disablement, and emergency medical expenses.
- IV. The costs of any insurance specifically taken out by the Supplier to support the performance of this Call-down Contract in relation to Duty of Care may be included as part of the management costs of the project, and must be separately identified in all financial reporting relating to the project.
- V. Where DFID is providing any specific security arrangements for Suppliers in relation to the Call-down Contract, these will be detailed in the Terms of Reference.

8. Call-down Contract Signature

- 8.1 If the original Form of Call-down Contract is not returned to the Contract Officer (as identified at clause 4 above) duly completed, signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within 15 working days of the date of signature on behalf of DFID, DFID will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Call-down Contract void.

For and on behalf of
The Secretary of State for
International Development

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

For and on behalf of
Coffey International Development Ltd

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

Terms of Reference

PO 7974 - Performance evaluation contract for the Supporting Sustainable Artisanal Mining in Rwanda (SSAMIR) programme

Terms of Reference, May 2017

DFID Rwanda

1. Introduction

- 1.1. DFID Rwanda is seeking an evaluation specialist team to undertake ongoing, independent performance evaluation of the Supporting Sustainable Artisanal Mining in Rwanda (SSAMIR) programme throughout SSAMIR's lifetime. This is expected to include: a) periodic engagement with the Technical Service Providers (TSP) to ensure the development and implementation of a sound M&E system; b) annual assessment and quality assurance of the implementer's results, capturing lessons learnt and progress towards outcomes; and c) a final performance evaluation at programme end.

2. Budget

- 2.1. The budget for this contract is £359,649.00 (inclusive of applicable taxes).
- 2.2. It is expected that a revised work plan, deliverables and payment plan for this contract will be developed and agreed as part of the inception phase deliverables.
- 2.3. It is recognised in the SSAMIR business case that there is a possibility to scale up, scale down, or change scope either of individual components or of the programme as a whole. Budget shifts to this evaluation component may therefore be required during the life of the contract. DFID may exercise an option to increase the contractual financial limit by a maximum of £200,000.

3. Timeframe

- 3.1. Implementation of the SSAMIR programme began in April 2017. A start date for this contract of no later than end of December 2017 is anticipated and completion expected by September 2020. DFID retain the option to extend the duration of the contract by a maximum of 1 year beyond the contract End Date.

4. Objective of this contract

- 4.1 The aim of this performance evaluation function is to provide:
 - A. Strategic advice on the programme's MEL systems: engagement during inception and implementation phase to independently advise and assess the robustness of the TSP's internal monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) system, as well as advising and examining the TSP's adaptive management approach using real-time feedback loops and iterative intervention design;
 - B. Better understanding of how change occurs throughout the programme: capturing overarching lessons on how programme interventions are progressing across the theory of change (ToC) (largely from outputs to outcomes), including strategic advice on the nature of transmission mechanisms and areas for intervention adaptations;
 - C. Independent quality assurance (QA) of results and impact measurement: providing an independent QA function of programme results at annual milestones, culminating in a final performance evaluation at programme end (assessing progress *towards* outcomes and impact, given the short duration of this pilot programme).

5. Recipient

- 5.1 The primary recipient of this contract is DFID Rwanda.
- 5.2 The ultimate recipient of direct and indirect benefits through this contract will be the artisanal and small scale miners in targeted mining communities of Rwanda.
- 5.3 The Government of Rwanda (GoR) and private sector will be significant beneficiaries of this contract, particularly as the TSP is expected to be embedded within GoR's Ministry of Natural Resources (MINIRENA). The evaluation team will be required to engage with a range of public and private stakeholders to ensure SSAMIR's M&E system is capturing useful, high quality data, including through sustainable data collection channels that will outlast the programme's lifetime.
- 5.4 The evaluation team will report directly to DFID Rwanda, whilst also engaging closely with the TSP for the programme. The evaluation team's main point of contact will be the DFID Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and the Deputy Programme Manager for the SSAMIR programme.

6. Context

- 6.1. The SSAMIR programme will contribute to the economically and environmentally sustainable growth of Rwanda's mining sector, in line with the Government of Rwanda's (GoR) Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) II. GoR recognises the importance of the mining sector to the economy. Mining is one of Rwanda's largest exporting sectors by value. In particular it can play a critical role in sustaining long-term GDP growth, attract vital investment, job creation, increasing exports, address the trade deficit and the foreign exchange crisis. As a result, GoR is committed to increasing the mining sector's contribution to GDP from 1.2% to 5.27% by 2017/2018 (EDPRS II).
- 6.2. In addition, the GoR has set targets during the same period to increase the number of people working fulltime in the sector from 20,000 to 60,000; investment in the sector from US\$ 150 million to US\$ 500 million; export earnings from US\$ 158 million in to US\$ 400 million. GoR has indicated that it would welcome technical assistance to help reform the mining sector. This programme is well placed to support GoRs efforts to reform and restructure the sector in order to meet its development goals and targets.

7. Scope

Overview:

- 7.1. Deliverables under this performance evaluation contract will complement the ongoing internal monitoring and evaluation activities carried out by the TSP. Therefore, this contract is not aimed at substituting the TSP's own results measurement systems, but to complement, quality assure and advise DFID and the TSP on strategic areas for improvement from an independent perspective.
- 7.2. The TSP will be responsible for developing its own monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework during the programme's 6 month inception phase, and subsequently implementing this framework. The TSP will be expected to carry out self-monitoring: self-assessment of progress. This will include (but is not limited to) updating the SSAMIR log frame, updating the Theory of Change (ToC), undertaking

viability studies, developing intervention baselines and metrics for monitoring, evaluating outputs, and iteratively refining the MEL framework as needed to adapt to realities on the ground. The TSP should support the independent evaluation team by providing such information and support as is needed to effectively carry out the performance evaluation objectives.

- 7.3. The scope of the independent evaluation team's contract is set out below, divided into three core phases.

Phase 1 – Inception Phase Design:

- 7.4. The evaluation team will steer the TSP in testing and strengthening its MEL framework and self-review approach during the programme's inception phase (from April 2017). The team will guide and review the TSP's strategy to ensure that a high quality MEL framework and robust ToC is developed. It will also ensure that the TSP generates the data and analysis needed to facilitate the evaluation team's own execution of responsibilities.
- 7.5. The evaluation team will develop a detailed approach to executing its responsibilities during implementation, which fits with and builds on the approach to monitoring and self-review to be carried out by the TSP. This will include setting initial evaluation questions for the programme's final performance evaluation and ensuring these are collected adequately – either by the TSP or evaluator, as agreed during inception.
- 7.6. The key deliverable for the design phase will be an inception evaluation report, which should outline in detail the approach to be used for both the ongoing MEL system and performance evaluation. This should include:
- The review/evaluation methodology
 - Evaluation team work plans (including timelines)
 - Team and governance structures (with terms of reference for key personnel),
 - Updated budget for evaluation activities.
 - Communication and stakeholder engagement strategy
- 7.7. The evaluation design will need to be cognisant of, and appropriate for, the flexible and adaptive nature of the SSAMIR programme, which aims to use a problem-driven iterative and adaptive programming (PDIA) approach.
- 7.8. As part of this design process, the evaluation team will advise the TSP and DFID which types of information should be gathered over the life of the project to inform the internal MEL framework and final evaluation.
- 7.9. We expect the evaluation team to be engaged with the TSP from inception phase onwards in order to ensure that the approach to MEL reflects a clear understanding of the nature of the programme, that required information is gathered throughout the life of the programme, and that review and evaluation findings can be fed back to into programming decisions.

Phase 2 – Implementation phase:

- 7.10. Periodic "light touch" engagement with the TSP to understand the interventions they implement, help them refine their approach to MEL, and to understand the emerging results from the individual interventions and programme overall. The evaluation team will have full access to TSP's data to enable it to add substantive value to the TSP's approach, and relay independent lessons back to DFID. The exact frequency of

engagement will be demand-driven and finalised during the programme's inception phase between the evaluation team, DFID and the TSP. However, it is envisaged that the evaluation team will engage principally at key MEL cycle milestones: MEL framework development during inception, and at quarterly review points. Periodic MEL engagement will comprise a combination of in-country visits and desk-reviews, as deemed appropriate by DFID and the evaluation team. The evaluation team will produce a MEL learning report to accompany the TSP's quarterly review reports.

7.11. More extensive engagement will be required for the evaluation team to advise and quality assure Annual Reviews and associated analysis of outputs carried out by the TSP. This annual engagement should be carried out predominantly in-country in order to engage with programme stakeholders and verify results on the ground. As part of this annual QA of results, the evaluation team should provide:

- An independent critique of the results set out in the logframe, quarterly and annual progress reports;
- Assessment of the robustness of and progress along all chains of the current ToC (from inputs to impact);
- Synthesis of lessons learnt, also capturing unintended positive and negative spillovers, as well as indirect and induced effects of interventions (e.g. job creation, value addition, export growth, foreign exchange earnings), where possible;
- Assessment of the extent to which gender, conflict and environmental sensitivity have been effectively embedded into the design, implementation and monitoring of the programme;
- An assessment of the efficacy of the TSP's overall strategy for delivering the programme's outcomes and impact.

7.12. All of the above observations and recommendations will be presented in an independent MEL lesson learning synthesis report on the back of the TSP (or independent service provider's) Annual Review.

- As a three year programme, this contract will require two independent learning synthesis reports at the Annual Review point.
- The third annual review by the evaluation team will take the form of the programme performance evaluation, which will feed into DFID's Project Completion Report (outlined below).

Phase 3 – End of programme evaluation: The evaluation team will carry out a final “performance evaluation” in line with the approach set out below, and agreed during the inception phase.

7.13. **Geographical scope:** During implementation, the aim is for Pillar 1 enabling environment interventions to be cross-cutting across the whole industry, therefore applicable across all mining districts throughout Rwanda. Pillar 2 – establishing two pilot Mining Services Aggregation Centres – will be concentrated in two districts: Gakenke, and one to be finalised during inception consultation. For the purpose of this evaluation contract, in-country engagement will be carried out mostly in Kigali, with field visits to Gakenke and the second MSAC district.

8. Performance Evaluation Parameters

8.1. Indicative parameters include:

A. Strategic advice on the programme's MEL systems:

- Are we tracking effectively? An independent review of the TSP's monitoring, evaluation and learning approaches, providing recommendations for adjustments.
- Is it worth the cost? An independent assessment of the TSP's progress against agreed value for money principles and metrics, particularly focusing on strategic output to outcome level VFM indicators (to be decided during inception).
- An eye on the future: A review of evidence linked to the potential longer-term impact, sustainability and potential to scale up for work under the SSAMIR programme management contract.

B. Better understanding of how change occurs throughout the programme:

- Are we still sure we're doing the right things? A close look at key assumptions inherent in the overarching ToC for the SSAMIR programme (including output-to-outcome and outcome-to-impact levels, where possible) and assessment of any evidence that supports or refutes their credibility/validity. Adjustment of ToC for the programme in light of findings.
- Are the new "ways of working" actually working? A review of the TSP's efforts to implement specific ways of working. These include:
 - Flexible and adaptive programming and
 - Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)
 - Payment by Results as an incentive for flexibility and ambition
 - Risk management
 - Governance structures
- Is DFID paying attention to the right things and in the right way? Advice to DFID on how we can improve our monitoring of the SSAMIR programme management contract, for example in terms of the frequency and selection of the information and analysis we receive from the TSP

C. Independent quality assurance (QA) of results and performance evaluation:

- Do the results presented by TSP withstand scrutiny? Triangulating quantitative and qualitative evidence and stakeholder feedback to assess the validity of annual programme results, as well as corroborating the findings from the independent annual audit of programme-related mining sites. Where gaps or deficiencies are present, the evaluation team will make specific recommendations on how to address these. DFID will use the evaluation team's independent assessment of results to help inform its decision on performance-based payments to the TSP.
- At programme end, has the programme led to the desired impact it set out to achieve in the business case? Carrying out a performance evaluation to assess in depth what the outcomes of the TSP's work have been, and whether these outcomes are on track to deliver the desired impact. Evaluation questions will be developed in conjunction with DFID and the TSP during inception. The final evaluation at programme end should test the principal hypothesis:

“SSAMIR has effectively tackled a range of key market failures that are significant barriers to artisanal and small scale mining in Rwanda. In doing so, the programme has helped improve the enabling environment to increase private investment in the Rwandan mining sector, and proven the effectiveness of a mining services aggregation model as a way of achieving a viable and sustainable mining sector. In turn, SSAMIR has ultimately contributed to the improvement of incomes and livelihoods of artisanal and small scale miners in Rwanda.”

Specific evaluation questions to consider may include:

- What systemic changes have been achieved within the ASM market system that can be either a) attributed to the programme, or b) the programme has contributed to?
- What evidence is there that the programme has helped crowd in additional public or private investment into the sector, and what potential is there for additional investment beyond the programme's lifetime?
- How sustainable are the outputs and outcomes generated by the programme?
- Specifically, to what extent has the programme built capacity of key stakeholders to sustainably drive forward market system reforms in the longer term?
- To what extent have the Mining Services Aggregation Centres (MSAC) attracted sustainable private sector delivery partners?
- Which actors are primed to take on the market facilitation role played by the TSP in the long term?
- To what extent have coalitions been strengthened to continue mining market development advocacy in the long term?
- What has been the fit of the programme's work with wider GoR, private sector, civil society and development partner activities?
- What impact has the programme had on marginalised or vulnerable groups, including women, children and persons with disabilities?
- What environmental impact has the programme had – directly and indirectly?
- Are there any unintended spillovers from the programme's interventions – positive or negative?

8.2. **Data collection:** We expect the evaluation team to combine analysis of qualitative data (interviews, focus group discussions, etc.) with secondary analysis of data from programme and external sources. We do not anticipate stand-alone quantitative data collection. We are aware of the significant data gaps in Rwanda, and the TSP seeks to address these through undertaking a number of critical baseline and economic appraisal studies during inception (outlined in the business case). The timing of the evaluation team's design period to overlap with main SSAMIR partners' inception period allows the evaluation team to agree proportionate data collection by the TSP partner for evaluative purposes, and to build on the initial inception evidence studies to inform longer term data collection needs for the evaluation contract.

8.3. **Gender and Ethics:** We expect the evaluation team to incorporate gender dimensions of the intervention intentionally and robustly into the evaluation. The evaluation will be expected to develop its ethics policy (including for dissemination and communications activities) in the Design Phase, and apply it during implementation.

9. Methodology

9.1. In carrying out all aspects of the contract, the evaluation team will need to demonstrate how their proposed methods will conform with best practice in monitoring, evaluation and learning processes. This should include analysis of which

of the standardised principles for evaluation are most appropriate frameworks for use in SSAMIR's context – e.g. the OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance. Some aspects of these general methodologies which will be particularly important include:

- Where appropriate, defining relevant comparison groups and measuring results with reference to them
- Separating out improvements in results from improved measurement of changes
- Disaggregating analysis according to SSAMIR's cross-cutting themes of: gender inclusion, impact on vulnerable groups, and environmental impact
- Disaggregating the contribution of each individual component of SSAMIR to the overall outcome or impact.
- Demonstrating additionality of SSAMIR's interventions when measuring results (including indirect and induced impact)
- Ensuring work undertaken and outputs generated effectively contribution to the TSP's programme delivery through the life of the programme
- Complementing and contributing to related programmes being implemented by DFID and other development partners in Rwanda in the sector
- Reflecting best practice in thinking on private sector development and market systems development (or M4P) approaches
- Considering the sustainability of collecting data and measuring impact beyond the life of the programme by Rwandan partners
- Being participatory, involving beneficiaries as well as the range of SSAMIR government and private sector stakeholders and implementing partners
- Retaining independence and impartiality from the TSP.

9.2. All work and outputs will be considered complete only once approved of a satisfactory quality by DFID.

9.3. All underlying data sets will be made available to other researchers for analysis, with due consideration given to the privacy of respondents or any other sensitivities.

10. Constraints and dependencies

10.1. The evaluation team is expected to work closely with the SSAMIR TSP to ensure that there is a good fit between ongoing programme monitoring, evaluation and learning, and the external evaluation processes.

11. Implementation requirements

Team structure:

11.1. The evaluation team is afforded flexibility in the structure and composition of the team it assembles. However, it is expected to have a single overall team leader to be responsible for managing and overseeing the contract deliverables. The team may mix international and national/regional experts, with the understanding that national expertise will be highly valued and should be built up over time. Within the team, we will expect skills in, qualifications relevant to and knowledge of the following to be demonstrated:

- Design of monitoring, evaluation and learning systems for a market systems programme within resource- and data-poor context
- Design of research projects which aim to draw out broader lessons from programmes relevant to the wider extractives and economic development community
- Extensive experience with private sector development, particularly with market systems methodologies – capturing systemic change and hard-to-measure results
- Evaluation experience within the extractives/mining industries in East Africa is highly valued
- Problem-driven, iterative and adaptive programme management
- Political economy analysis skills essential, particularly local knowledge relating to extractives in Rwanda/East Africa (desirable).
- Networking, relationship management, team working.

Transparency:


- 11.2. DFID has transformed its approach to transparency, reshaping our own working practices and pressuring others across the world to do the same. DFID requires Suppliers receiving and managing funds, to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate sub-contractors, sub-agencies and partners. It is a contractual requirement for all Suppliers to comply with this, and to ensure they have the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this DFID – further IATI information is available from <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>. The Supplier should also note [DFID's Open and Enhanced Access Policy](#) for the research that DFID funds.


UK Aid Branding

- 11.3. Suppliers that receive funding from DFID must use the UK aid logo on their development and humanitarian programmes to be transparent and acknowledge that they are funded by UK taxpayers. Suppliers should also acknowledge funding from the UK government in broader communications but no publicity is to be given to this Contract without the prior written consent of DFID.

12. Deliverables

- 12.1. Deliverables are as follows:





13. Verification process and payment

- 13.1. DFID approval of the main deliverables will pay particular attention to the quality of implementation for each review/evaluation process, as well as the extent to which its outputs are useful, accessible and offer appropriate analysis. An approach to measuring quality of implementation and associated KPIs will be agreed as part of the Design Phase. The evaluation team is expected to link partial release of payments under this contract to approval of the quality of deliverables.
- 13.2. All key outputs of the evaluation will also need to follow DFID's quality assurance process. Feedback on this QA comments will be given through DFID Rwanda, and will be incorporated into the feedback given on all aspects on the evaluation process, quality and the degree to which the evaluation is adding value. Payments will not be made against deliverables until approval has been given.
- 13.3. Internally DFID requires at least 10 working days to review and comment on any products produced by the evaluation team¹.
- 13.4. Payments will be released upon satisfactory completion of deliverables and DFID's approval of the required outputs, and submission of accompanying financial reports. If there are issues on quality of delivery, it will be discussed at the earliest opportunity with the evaluation team and clear directions will be given that are expected to be adhered by the evaluation team, and that DFID will subsequently monitor. DFID also reserves the right to withhold payment in case of missed or unsatisfactory delivery of outputs.

14. DFID co-ordination

- 14.1. The evaluation team will report to the DFID Rwanda Private Sector Adviser (SSAMIR SRO) and Programme Manager, and will liaise with the DFID Evaluation, Statistics and Results Adviser. The SRO will be responsible for oversight of all programmatic aspects of the consultancy on behalf of DFID. Contract administration and payments will be managed by the Programme Manager on behalf of DFID.

¹ The DFID QA process takes 10 days to provide its assessment. Products which are submitted to QA will require a longer time period to incorporate time for the QA review to be produced.

15. Evaluation risks

- 15.1 **Appropriateness of evaluation design:** Designing and implementing a performance evaluation structure with methods which are appropriate to analysing the effectiveness of this adaptive, highly politically sensitive programme will be essential. This will involve an innovative and pragmatic approach to evaluation design, while maintaining an appropriate level of analytical rigour.
- 15.2 **Maintaining an effective relationship with TSP:** The evaluation team will need to ensure that it sustains an effective working relationship and good channels of communication with the TSP. There may be tensions between providing collaborative advice as well as independent scrutiny of the TSP's activities, which will need to be managed.
- 15.3 **Avoiding duplication with TSP:** The evaluation team will need to focus on adding value over and above the main TSP's monitoring and evaluation strategy.
- 15.4 **Difficulties operating in a data-poor environment:** There is a real lack of systematic and reliable mining data in Rwanda – which the programme seeks to address. However in the short term, this will involve the evaluator working closely with a range of partners to ensure sufficiently reliable baseline data.
- 15.5 **Reputational risks:** There are significant risks associated with evaluating a project with high reputational risk implications, which include: risks of corruption, poor health and safety standards, and conflict mineral leakage across the mining sector. The evaluator will need to factor these risks into interaction with all programme stakeholders.

16 Supporting documents

- a. SSAMIR Business Case
- b. ToR for the SSAMIR Technical Service Provider (TSP)
- c. SAMIR TSP logframe (Indicative)
- d. Report commissioned by DFID's East Africa Research Hub (PACT, 2017), currently available in draft format and subject to change: "Understanding the Economic Contribution of ASM in East Africa – Rwanda Case Study [DRAFT]".
- e. "Scoping Mission Report for Supporting the Development of a Sustainable Mining Industry in Rwanda" (Estelle Levin Ltd., 2016)
- f. "Scoping Mission Report – Options Paper" (Estelle Levin Ltd., 2016)

17 Other Requirements – Security and Duty of Care

- 17.1 The evaluation team must be self-supporting and responsible for their own activities and should not rely on DFID Rwanda transport, offices, facilities, logistical or administrative support. Evaluators must include all such costs in their bids.

18 Duty of Care

- 18.1 The evaluation team is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be

responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

- 18.2 DFID will share available information with the evaluation team on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. The evaluation team is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this Call-down Contract. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the evaluation team must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.
- 18.3 Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence.

20. SSAMIR Programme summary

- 20.1 The SSAMIR programme will support the sustainable development of the artisanal & Small-scale Mining (ASM) sector by: i) supporting an enabling environment that will increase private sector investment in mining in Rwanda, and ii) by testing the effectiveness of a new mining services aggregation model as a way of achieving a viable and sustainable mining sector.
- 20.2 Ultimately, the programme aims to positively impact the livelihoods of over 40,000 Rwandans involved in the artisanal small scale mining industry, as well as benefiting the growth of the wider economy. The Government of Rwanda is keen to support this sector in its quest to build a diversified economy that creates jobs, increases exports, improves domestic resource mobilisation, and reduces aid dependency. The programme will work in two parallel pillars:

20.3 Pillar 1: Improving the business enabling environment

- Generating crucial data and evidence regarding Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (ASM) in Rwanda
- Reviewing and reforming mining legislation and standards
- Creating a centralised database for geological data available to investors
- Creating a centralised data collection system to improve revenue collection
- Supporting the banking sector in offering financial products tailored to the mining sector


20.4 Pillar 2: Piloting the model of aggregation service centres for ASM


- Training miners in more efficient and environmentally sustainable mining and processing techniques; health and safety
 - Testing the effectiveness of a new mining services aggregation model as a way of achieving a viable and sustainable mining sector: piloting 2 MSACs in two mining districts with the aim of crowding in private sector ownership of these centres before programme end, and eventually replicating in other mining districts.
- 20.5 The **outcome** of the programme will be “an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable ASM in target areas”. This will contribute to the **impact** of “an increased contribution of the mining sector to economic growth and improving livelihoods among ASM communities.”


- 20.6 Specific results to be delivered by 2020 will be agreed during the inception phase. Expected results will include:
- A more professional, transparent and economically viable mining sector, in line with environmental best practice;
 - A healthier, safer and better working environment for miners;
 - Crucial data and a stronger knowledge base on ASM vital for the future development of the sector;
 - Increased opportunities for private sector investment are brought to fruition;
 - An increase in incomes of ASM miners in target areas.
- 20.7 The programme's budget for implementation is approximately £4.3m over three years (2017 – 2020); this excludes the separate evaluation budget. SSAMIR will draw on market systems (or Making Markets Work for the Poor: M4P) principles to inform intervention and design and delivery: tackling the systemic market constraints of the mining sector, and taking a facilitative approach by building the capacity of existing actors in a non-market distorting manner – but applying this approach flexibly as appropriate to the context.
- 20.8 The Theory of Change (Figure 1, below) and the annexed SSAMIR business case will provide further context on the programme's objectives and components.
- 20.9 SSAMIR is being implemented by a technical service provider (TSP), appointed in April 2017. The TSP will be responsible for management of all parts of SSAMIR's implementation, including the programme's internal monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) system. The TSP will be required to finalise the detailed design of programme interventions during its inception period. This intentionally provides valuable scope for the performance evaluation team (hereafter the "evaluation team") to advise the TSP during inception to ensure on evaluation considerations that should be built in from the start.
- 20.10 DFID Rwanda has a number of economic development programmes that will complement SSAMIR's objectives over its lifetime, including the following: TradeMark East Africa, support to the Government of Rwanda's (GoR) Export Growth Facility, Rwanda Investment Climate Programme, Access to Finance Rwanda. While these programme will not directly contribute to SSAMIR's results, the contracted evaluation team will need to bear in mind any synergies and positive or negative spillovers that may contribute to SSAMIR's objectives.
- 20.11 DFID is the first donor to develop a comprehensive programme of support towards the ASM sector in Rwanda, and emerging impact measurement from SSAMIR will contribute to an evidence base that could potentially crowd in new donors in the medium term. Other donor support in the extractives sector includes the German Cooperation – both GIZ (development institution) and BGR (natural resources institute), which have undertaken scoping of the mining sector and provided expertise to support transparent

mineral certification. This independent evaluation contract should therefore take into account this broader, but limited, development support into the evaluation framework design.

Figure 1: SSAMIR Theory of Change









SCHEDULE OF PRICES


MILESTONE PAYMENT SCHEDULE

The amount to be paid for the completion of the services is fixed at £359,650.00.

[illegible]







[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

