

## **CALLDOWN CONTRACT**

**Framework Agreement with: IMC Worldwide Ltd**

**Framework Agreement for: DFID Global Evaluation Framework Agreement**

**Framework Agreement Purchase Order Number: PO 7448**

**Call-down Contract For: Performance Evaluation of the IMSAR**

**Contract Purchase Order Number: 8152**

I refer to the following:

1. The above mentioned Framework Agreement dated 12<sup>th</sup> September 2016;
2. Your Technical and Commercial proposals of **18<sup>th</sup> December 2017** and Proforma received **1<sup>st</sup> May 2018**

and I confirm that DFID requires you to provide the Services (Annex A), under the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement which shall apply to this Call-down Contract as if expressly incorporated herein.

### **1. Commencement and Duration of the Services**

1.1 The Supplier shall start the Services no later than **1<sup>st</sup> June 2018** ("the Start Date") and the Services shall be completed by **22<sup>nd</sup> October 2022** ("the End Date") unless the Call-down Contract is terminated earlier in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement.

1.2 This contract is subject to the following contract break points:

#### **i. Break Point**

If the main programme terminates for whatever reason, there will be a break point in this contract which will take effect three months after that termination date and the supplier will be required to provide DFID with an exit plan to be implemented during that period.

### **2. Recipient**

2.1 DFID requires the Supplier to provide the Services to the **Department for International Development (DFID)** ("the Recipient").

### **3. Financial Limit**

3.1 Payments under this Call-down Contract shall not exceed **£748,895** ("the Financial Limit") and is exclusive of any government tax, if applicable as detailed in Annex 1.

### **4. DFID Officials**

- 4.1 The Project Officer is: REDACTED, Senior Responsible Owner and Livelihoods Adviser, DFID REDACTED.
- 4.2 The Contract Officer is: REDACTED Procurement and Commercial Manager, Programme Sourcing, PCD, REDACTED

## **5. Key Personnel**

All the Supplier's Personnel identified within the Technical and Commercial Proposals dated 18<sup>th</sup> December 2017 cannot be substituted by the Supplier without DFID's prior written consent. The substitute's qualifications and expertise should match that of key personnel being replaced and DFID will require copies of CV's for each proposed substitute.

## **6. Reports**

- 6.1 The Supplier shall submit project reports in accordance with the Terms of Reference / Scope of Work at Annex A.

## **7. Duty of Care**

All Supplier Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Agreement) engaged under this Call-down Contract will come under the duty of care of the Supplier:

- I. The Supplier will be responsible for all security arrangements and Her Majesty's Government accepts no responsibility for the health, safety and security of individuals or property whilst travelling.
- II. The Supplier will be responsible for taking out insurance in respect of death or personal injury, damage to or loss of property, and will indemnify and keep indemnified DFID in respect of:
  - II.1. Any loss, damage or claim, howsoever arising out of, or relating to negligence by the Supplier, the Supplier's Personnel, or by any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with the performance of the Call-down Contract; and
  - II.2. Any claim, howsoever arising, by the Supplier's Personnel or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with their performance under this Call-down Contract.
- III. The Supplier will ensure that such insurance arrangements as are made in respect of the Supplier's Personnel, or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier are reasonable and prudent in all circumstances, including in respect of death, injury or disablement, and emergency medical expenses.
- IV. The costs of any insurance specifically taken out by the Supplier to support the performance of this Call-down Contract in relation to Duty of Care may be included as part of the management costs of the project, and must be separately identified in all financial reporting relating to the project.

- V. Where DFID is providing any specific security arrangements for Suppliers in relation to the Call-down Contract, these will be detailed in the Terms of Reference.

**8. Call-down Contract Signature**

- 8.1 If the original Form of Call-down Contract is not returned to the Contract Officer (as identified at clause 4 above) duly completed, signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within 15 working days of the date of signature on behalf of DFID, DFID will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Call-down Contract void.

**9. Safeguarding**

- 9.1 The Supplier has committed to meeting DFID's Supply Partner Code of Conduct as attached at Annex C, which includes Safeguarding, within six months of the start date of this Contract.

For and on behalf of  
The Secretary of State for  
International Development

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

For and on behalf of  
IMC Worldwide Ltd

Name:

Position:

Signature:

Date:

## **Annex A - Terms of Reference**

### **Terms of Reference for PO 8152 Performance Evaluation of the Improving Market Systems for Agriculture in Rwanda (IMSAR)**

#### **1. Introduction**

1.1. DFID Rwanda requires an evaluation specialist team to undertake ongoing, independent performance evaluation throughout the lifetime of the Improving Market Systems in Rwanda (IMSAR) programme. This will include:

- a) periodic engagement with the technical service providers to ensure the development and implementation of a sound M&E system;
- b) quarterly and annual assessment and quality assurance of the implementer's adaptation and results, capturing lessons learnt and progress towards outcomes; and
- c) an impact-oriented evaluation at the end of the programme.

#### **2. Objective of this contract**

2.1 The aim of this performance evaluation function is to provide:

- A. Appropriate adaptation: assessing whether Technical Service Providers (TSPs) are utilising their freedom to flex and adapt appropriately: TSPs are expected to be a flexible and adaptive programme. The evaluation will provide evidence on TSP's application of its flexibility, looking at:
  - a) TSP's decision making process;
  - b) The evidence used by TSPs about context, progress and results to adjust delivery, direction and theory of change;
  - c) TSP's level of ambition and approach to risk and return;
  - d) The robustness of TSP's theory of change and whether it has been adapted appropriately; and
  - e) The progress made to date.

Conducting this assessment will give TSPs the space to innovate and flex, but giving DFID assurance that TSP's freedom has been appropriately used.

- B. Effectiveness of the programme for the poor and cross cutting issues: The evaluation will provide evidence on the programmes focus and effectiveness for the poor, and how it is addressing key cross cutting issues important to DFID namely, nutrition, climate change and gender.
- C. Understanding how component parts are synergising: engagement during inception and implementation phase with other service providers to examine how components across the programme are sharing information, coordinating activities and where possible, creating synergies to increase overall effectiveness and impact of the programme.

### **3. Recipient**

- 3.1 The private sector and the Government of Rwanda (GoR) will be significant beneficiaries of this contract, as well as other development partners' supporting programmes to commercialise agriculture.
- 3.2 The evaluation team will be required to engage with a range of public and private stakeholders including: members of the private sector; development partner organisations; Government of Rwanda agencies and; members of civil society to ensure IMSAR's M&E system is capturing useful, high quality data, including through sustainable data collection channels that will outlast the programme's lifetime.
- 3.3 Ultimately, the evaluation team will report directly to DFID Rwanda, whilst also engaging closely with the Technical Service Provider for the programme. The evaluation team's main point of contact will be the DFID Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and the Deputy Programme Manager for the IMSAR programme.

### **4. Budget**

- 4.1. Indicative budget is £500,000 to £750,000 (inclusive of applicable taxes). This budget is independent of IMSAR's programme's implementation budget of £22.5m.
- 4.2. It is expected that a revised work plan, deliverables and payment plan for this contract will be developed and agreed as part of the inception phase deliverables.
- 4.3. It is recognised in the IMSAR business case that there is a possibility to scale up, scale down, or change scope either of individual components or of the programme as a whole, in response to injection of additional funding from other donors, assessment of programme performance and / or shifts in programme context. Further proportional budget shifts to this evaluation component may therefore be required during the life of the contract.

## 5. Background

- 5.1. IMSAR will help to commercialise agriculture by improving the way agricultural market systems function, making them more effective, participatory (by including poor farmers and other disadvantaged groups), and more competitive. In so doing, it will contribute to increasing the incomes of poor households in targeted agricultural market systems.
- 5.2. Commercialising agriculture provides the greatest opportunity to transform the economy, create jobs, increase incomes, reduce poverty and deliver more inclusive economic growth. The Government of Rwanda (GoR) recognise that Rwanda's growing trade deficit can only be addressed by increasing agricultural contribution to the economy through commercialisation.
- 5.3. The IMSAR theory of change (see annex 1) assumes that the provision of Market Development Services to farmers and agribusiness will reveal attractive opportunities to commercialise agriculture through increased investment by the private sector resulting in value being added to commercial produce. The main functions the SP will be expected to deliver to help achieve this are: market analysis; strategy development; facilitation and advisory services; short / medium term grant finance; and long-term debt / equity investments.
- 5.4. These functions will be delivered through three main components. Component 1 will provide **market development services** that will hire experts to identify market failures and design and establish interventions to overcome them and **technical assistance** to strengthen the capacity of the private sector, private sector associations and Government agencies. Component 2 will provide **short / medium term grant finance** to private sector companies. Component 3 will provide **long-term debt and / or equity investment to companies** over a medium to long-term payback period (5-10 years) and a business support function will provide much needed business advice to businesses that have received investments.
- 5.5. The **outcome** of the intervention will be "Selected market systems work more effectively for poor farmers and MSMEs". This will contribute to the **impact** of increasing the income of the poor households in targeted agricultural market system. Key targets achieved by 2022 will be defined during the programme's inception phase, once programme activities have been identified. Results include:
  - a) Increase in the number of off farm jobs created;
  - b) Number of poor farmers experiencing increases in average income;
  - c) Increased sales among farmers and agro-enterprises;
  - d) Increase in the percentage of Rwandan agricultural produce that has value added;and

- e) Increase in export diversification - percentage increase in non-traditional vs traditional crops (tea and coffee).
- 5.6. The programme's budget for implementation is approximately £22.5m over five years (2017 – 2022); this excludes the separate evaluation budget. IMSAR will draw on market systems (or Making Markets Work for the Poor: M4P) principles to inform intervention and design and delivery: tackling the systemic market constraints of the agricultural sector, and taking a facilitative approach by building the capacity of existing actors in a non-market distorting manner – but applying this approach flexibly as appropriate to the context.
- 5.7. Component 1 and 2 of IMSAR will be implemented by a technical service provider (TSP), which we expect to be appointed by March 2018. The TSP will be responsible for management of all parts of IMSAR's implementation, including the programme's internal monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) system. The TSP will be required to finalise the detailed design of programme interventions during its 6 month inception period. This intentionally provides valuable scope for the performance evaluation team (hereafter the "evaluation team") to advise the TSP during inception to ensure on evaluation considerations that should be built in from the start.
- 5.8. Component 3 is being implemented by AgDeVCo, an agricultural development and investment company operating as a not-for-profit-distribution 'Social Impact Investor'. AgDevCo invests patient capital in the form of debt and equity into early stage agribusinesses and act as promoter or co-promoter of greenfield agriculture opportunities. AgDevCo have their own independent M&E and data collection systems. The purpose of the AgDevCo evaluation is to:
- a) Generate solid evidence and learning on stimulating private sector investment in agriculture and its poverty reduction and developmental benefits, including understanding how change happens, in what circumstances, who experiences changes and how;
  - b) Test untested assumptions and change processes, mainly relating to the interaction between various investment typologies and the regional innovation investments; and
  - c) Ensure accountability, demonstrating how funds have been spent and ensuring value for money.
- 5.9. In 2016, AgDevCo also commissioned an independent review of its M&E and data collection and updated their systems. This ToR will also evaluate AgDevCo because there are particular aspects of their work we would like to consider in the Rwanda context, and synergies between components 1 and 3 that we would like to examine. It is important that we ensure there is no duplication between the two AgDevCO evaluations.

- 5.10. Both the providers of component 1 and 2 and component 3 are required to work closely with each other, coordinating activities and where possible, collaborating.
- 5.11. DFID Rwanda has a number of economic development programmes that will complement IMSAR's objectives over its lifetime, including: TradeMark East Africa, support to the Government of Rwanda's (GoR) Export Growth Facility, Rwanda Investment Climate Programme, Access to Finance Rwanda, Programme of Support to Agriculture (PoSA). While not all of these programmes will directly contribute to IMSAR's results, the contracted evaluation team will need to bear in mind any synergies and positive or negative spill overs that may contribute to IMSAR's objectives.

## **6. Scope**

### **Overview:**

- 6.1. Deliverables under this performance evaluation contract will complement the ongoing internal monitoring and evaluation activities carried out by the TSPs. Therefore, this contract is not aimed at substituting their own results measurement systems, but to complement, quality assure and advise DFID, TSP and AgDevCo on strategic areas for improvement from an independent perspective.
- 6.2. The TSPs will be responsible for developing its own monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework during the programme's 6 month inception phase, and subsequently implementing this framework. The TSP and AgDevCo will be expected to carry out self-monitoring: self-assessment of progress. This will include (but is not limited to) updating the IMSAR log frame, updating the Theory of Change (ToC), undertaking viability studies, developing intervention baselines and metrics for monitoring, evaluating outputs, and iteratively refining the MEL framework as needed to adapt to realities on the ground. The TSP and AgDevCo should support the independent evaluation team by providing such information and support as is needed to effectively carry out the performance evaluation objectives.
- 6.3. DFID want to give IMSAR the freedom to flex and adapt their programme. The evaluation service provider role includes assessing whether IMSAR is using this freedom appropriately to maximise the effectiveness of the programme. The evaluation service provider will therefore be expected retain an objective view of IMSAR's approach, will maintaining a close relationship with IMSAR in order understand the programme and the programme context.
- 6.4. The evaluation Service Provider's assessments will be used as an input into the DFID annual review.



- 6.5. The scope of the independent evaluation team's contract is set out below, divided into three core phases.

**Phase 1 – Inception Phase Design:**

- 6.6. The evaluation team will steer the TSP's in designing its MEL framework and self-review approach during the inception phase of component 1 (from September 2017). The team will guide and eventually review TSP's and AgDevCo's strategy to ensure that a high quality MEL framework and robust ToC is developed. It will also ensure that the TSP generates the data and analysis needed to facilitate the evaluation team's own execution of responsibilities.
- 6.7. The evaluation team will develop a detailed approach to executing its responsibilities during implementation, which fits with and builds on the approach to monitoring and self-review to be carried out by the TSP. This will include setting initial evaluation questions for the programme's final impact oriented evaluation, thus playing a lead role in identifying baseline data sets and ensuring these are collected adequately.
- 6.8. The key deliverable for the design phase will be an inception evaluation report, which should outline in detail the approach to be used for both the ongoing MEL system and impact-oriented evaluation. This should include:
- a) The review / evaluation methodology;
  - b) Evaluation team work plans (including timelines);
  - c) Team and governance structures (with terms of reference for key personnel);
  - d) Updated budget for evaluation activities; and
  - e) Communication and stakeholder engagement strategy.
- 6.9. The evaluation design will need to be cognisant of, and appropriate for, the flexible and adaptive nature of the IMSAR programme, which aims to use a problem driven iterative and adaptive programming (PDIA) approach.
- 6.10. As part of this design process, the evaluation team will advise the TSP, AgDevCo and DFID which types of information should be gathered over the life of the project to inform the internal MEL framework and final evaluation.
- 6.11. We expect the evaluation team to be engaged with the TSP and AgDevCo from inception phase onwards in order to ensure that the approach to MEL reflects a clear understanding of the nature of the programme, that required information is gathered throughout the life of the programme, and that review and evaluation findings can be fed back to into programming decisions.

## **Phase 2 – Implementation phase:**

- 6.12. Periodic “light touch” engagement with the TSP and AgDevCo to understand the interventions they implement, help them refine their approach to MEL, and to understand the emerging results from the individual interventions and programme overall. The evaluation team will have full access to TSP’s and AgDevCo’s data to enable it to add substantive value to the TSP’s and AgDevCo’s approach, and relay independent lessons back to DFID. The exact frequency of engagement will be demand driven and finalised during the programme’s inception phase between the evaluation team, DFID, the TSP and AgDevCo. However, it is envisaged that the evaluation team will engage principally at key MEL cycle milestones: MEL framework development during inception, and at quarterly review points. Periodic MEL engagement will comprise a combination of in-country visits and desk-reviews, as deemed appropriate by DFID and the evaluation team. The evaluation team will produce a MEL learning report to accompany the TSP’s and AgDevCo’s quarterly review reports.
- 6.13. More extensive engagement will be required for the evaluation team to advise and quality assure Annual Reports and associated analysis of outputs carried out by the TSP and AgDevCo. This annual engagement should be carried out predominantly in-country in order to engage with programme stakeholders and verify results on the ground. As part of this annual assessment of progress, the evaluation team should provide:
- a) An independent critique of the results set out in the logframe, quarterly and annual progress reports;
  - b) Assessment of the robustness of and progress along all chains of the current ToC (from inputs to impact), capturing overarching lessons on how programme interventions are progressing across the theory of change (ToC) (largely from outputs to outcomes);
  - c) Synthesis of lessons learnt, also capturing unintended positive and negative spillovers, as well as indirect and induced effects of interventions (e.g. job creation, value addition, export growth, foreign exchange earnings), where possible;
  - d) Assessment of the extent to which gender, conflict and environmental sensitivity have been effectively embedded into the design, implementation and monitoring of the programme; and
  - e) An assessment of the efficacy of the TSP’s and AgDevCo’s overall strategy for delivering the programme’s outcomes and impact.
- 6.14. All of the above observations and recommendations will be presented in an independent MEL lesson learning synthesis report on the back of the TSP and AgDevCo (or independent service provider’s) Annual Review:

- a) As a five year programme, this contract will require four independent learning synthesis reports at the Annual Review point; and
- b) The fifth annual review by the evaluation team will take the form of the programme impact-oriented evaluation, which will feed into DFID's Project Completion Report (outlined below).

### **Phase 3 – End of programme evaluation:**

The evaluation team will carry out a final “impact-oriented evaluation” performance evaluation in line with the approach set out below, and agreed during the inception phase.

## **7. Performance Evaluation Parameters**

### **7.1. Indicative parameters include:**

#### **A. Lessons learnt about how change happens in Rwandan context and what this programme has achieved:**

- a) At programme end, has the programme led to the desired results it set out to achieve in the business case? Carrying out an impact-oriented evaluation to assess in depth what the outcomes of the TSP's and AgDevCo's work have been, and whether these outcomes are on track to deliver the desired impact. Evaluation questions will be developed in conjunction with DFID and the TSP during inception. The impact evaluation should test the principal hypothesis:

*“IMSAR has helped commercialise agriculture by improving the way agricultural market systems function, making them more effective, participatory (by including poor farmers and other disadvantaged groups), and more competitive. In doing so, IMSAR has ultimately contributed to increasing the income of poor households in targeted agricultural market systems.”*

Specific evaluation questions to consider may include:

- a) What systemic changes have been achieved within the agricultural market system that can be either a) attributed to the programme, or b) the programme has contributed to?
- b) What evidence is there that the programme has helped crowd in additional public or private investment into the sector, and what potential is there for additional investment beyond the programme's lifetime?

- c) How sustainable are the outputs and outcomes generated by the programme?
- d) Specifically, to what extent has the programme built capacity of key stakeholders to sustainably drive forward market system reforms in the longer term?
- e) Which actors are primed to take on the market facilitation role played by the TSP in the long term?
- f) To what extent have coalitions been strengthened to continue agricultural market development advocacy in the long term?
- g) What has been the fit of the programme's work with wider GoR, private sector, civil society and development partner activities?
- h) What impact has the programme had on marginalised or vulnerable groups, including women, children and persons with disabilities?
- i) What environmental impact has the programme had – directly and indirectly?
- j) Are there any unintended spillovers from the programme's interventions – positive or negative?

**B. Impact on the poor and on cross cutting issues:**

- a) What are the programme's effects on the poor?
- b) How is the programme addressing key cross cutting issues, including nutrition, climate change and gender?

**C. Understanding how component parts have synergise:**

- a) Synergies: have synergies being created across programme components and are these increasing the overall effectiveness and impact of the programme?

7.2. **Data collection:** We expect the evaluation team to combine analysis of qualitative data (interviews, focus group discussions, etc.) with secondary analysis of data from programme and external sources. We do not anticipate stand-alone quantitative data collection. The timing of the evaluation team's design period to overlap with main IMSAR partners' inception period allows the evaluation team to agree proportionate data collection by the TSP partner for evaluative purposes, and to build on the initial inception evidence studies to inform longer term data collection needs for the evaluation contract.

7.3. **Gender and Ethics:** We expect the evaluation team to incorporate gender dimensions of the intervention intentionally and robustly into the evaluation. The evaluation will be expected to develop its ethics policy (including for dissemination and communications activities) in the Design Phase, and apply it during implementation.

**8. Methodology**

8.1. In carrying out all aspects of the contract, the evaluation team will need to demonstrate how their proposed methods will conform with best practice in monitoring, evaluation and learning processes. This should include analysis of which of the standardised principles for evaluation are most appropriate frameworks for use in IMSAR's context – e.g. the OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance. Some aspects of these general methodologies which will be particularly important include:

- a) Where appropriate, defining relevant comparison groups and measuring results with reference to them
- b) Separating out improvements in results from improved measurement of changes
- c) Disaggregating analysis according to IMSAR's cross-cutting themes of: gender inclusion, impact on vulnerable groups, and environmental impact
- d) Disaggregating the contribution of each individual component of IMSAR to the overall outcome or impact.
- e) Demonstrating additionality of IMSAR's interventions when measuring results (including indirect and induced impact)
- f) Ensuring work undertaken and outputs generated effectively contribution to the TSP's and AgDevCo's programme delivery through the life of the programme
- g) Complementing and contributing to related programmes being implemented by DFID and other development partners in Rwanda in the sector
- h) Reflecting best practice in thinking on private sector development and market systems development (or M4P) approaches
- i) Considering the sustainability of collecting data and measuring impact beyond the life of the programme by Rwandan partners
- j) Being participatory, involving beneficiaries as well as the range of IMSAR's government and private sector stakeholders and implementing partners
- k) Retaining independence and impartiality from the TSP and AgDevCo.

8.2. All work and outputs will be considered complete only once approved of a satisfactory quality by DFID.

8.3. All underlying data sets will be made available to other researchers for analysis, with due consideration given to the privacy of respondents or any other sensitivities.

## **9. Constraints and dependencies**

9.1. The evaluation team is expected to work closely with the IMSAR TSP and AgDevCo to ensure that there is a good fit between ongoing programme monitoring, evaluation and learning, and the external evaluation processes.

## **10. Implementation requirements**

### **Team structure:**

10.1. The evaluation team is afforded flexibility in the structure and composition of the team it assembles. However, it is expected to have a single overall team leader to be responsible for managing and overseeing the contract deliverables. The team may mix international and national/regional experts, with the understanding that national expertise will be highly valued and should be built up over time. Within the team, we will expect skills in, qualifications relevant to and knowledge of the following to be demonstrated:

- a) Design of monitoring, evaluation and learning systems for a market systems programme within resource- and data-poor context;
- b) Design of research projects which aim to draw out broader lessons from programmes relevant to the wider extractives and economic development community;
- c) Extensive experience with private sector development, particularly with market systems methodologies – capturing systemic change and hard-to-measure results;
- d) Problem-driven, iterative and adaptive programme management;
- e) Political economy analysis skills essential, particularly local knowledge relating to extractives in Rwanda/East Africa (desirable); and
- f) Ability to build strong relationships.

### **Transparency:**

10.2. DFID has transformed its approach to transparency, reshaping our own working practices and pressuring others across the world to do the same. DFID requires Suppliers receiving and managing funds, to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate sub-contractors, sub-agencies and partners. It is a contractual requirement for all Suppliers to comply with this, and to ensure they have the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this DFID – further IATI information is available from <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>. The Supplier should also note DFID's Open and Enhanced Access Policy for the research that DFID funds.

## **11. Timeframe and Deliverables**

11.1. Implementation of component 1 of the IMSAR programme is expected to start in April 2018, so we anticipate a start date for this contract of no later than end of **1<sup>st</sup> June 2018** and expect completion by **22<sup>nd</sup> October 2022**, with an option to extend at DFID's

sole discretion of up to a maximum of **12** months subject to good performance (with review periods).

### 11.3. Timing and Deliverables are as follows:

Phase	Deliverables	TSPs Timeline	Evaluator timeline
Phase 1 – Inception Phase MEL Design; stakeholder engagement and communication strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Submission and finalisation of the inception evaluation report, which should outline in detail the approach to be used for both the ongoing MEL system and impact-oriented evaluation. This report should include: evidence of thorough engagement with the TSP and relevant IMSAR stakeholders; recommended baseline data indicators and advice on collection considerations; proposed end-of-programme evaluation questions (non-exhaustive).</li> <li>ii. Workshop to present and discuss inception findings with stakeholders, post-report submission (within 1 month).</li> </ul>	<p>TSP Inception Phase for component 1 expected to begin on 1<sup>st</sup> June 2018 and will last for 6 months.</p> <p>AgDevCo continues to examine pipeline opportunities and make some investments in early stage businesses</p>	Evaluator to commence phase 1 by October 2018 to align with TSP inception phase.
Phase 2 – Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Submission of “light touch” quarterly MEL advisory assessments, on the back of the TSP’s quarterly progress reports (exact scope to be agreed during inception).</li> <li>ii. Submission of two annual MEL lesson learning synthesis reports on the back of the TSP (or independent service provider’s) Annual Reviews: the 2018/19, 2019/20,</li> </ul>	<p>TSP implementation phase estimated to begin June 2018.</p> <p>The systematic IMSAR Annual Review process will take place in October each year (as per the Business Case approval date).</p>	Evaluator to commence quarterly light touch assessments and annual lesson learning reports in line with TSP and AgDevCo implementation timeline.

	2020/21 and 2021/22 AR.		
	iii. Workshop to present and discuss annual findings with stakeholders, post-synthesis report submission (within 1 month).		
Phase 3 – End of programme evaluation	i. Inception report outlining objectives and methodology for the end of programme impact-oriented evaluation report.  ii. Final draft impact-oriented evaluation report, to be completed no later than 3 months following the official programme's end.  iii. Workshop to present and discuss evaluation findings with stakeholders, post-report submission.	IMSAR TSPs contract due to end 31 <sup>st</sup> March 2023.	Evaluation inception report should be submitted to DFID within the final month of the TSP's contract (to ensure final collaboration).  Final evaluation report and workshop to be delivered within 3 months of IMSAR programme end.

## 12. Verification process and payment

12.1. DFID approval of the main deliverables will pay particular attention to the quality of implementation for each review/evaluation process, as well as the extent to which its outputs are useful, accessible and offer appropriate analysis. An approach to measuring quality of implementation and associated KPIs will be agreed as part of the Design Phase. The evaluation team is expected to link partial release of payments under this contract to approval of the quality of deliverables.

12.2. All key outputs of the evaluation will also need to follow DFID's quality assurance process. Feedback on this QA comments will be given through DFID Rwanda, and will be incorporated into the feedback given on all aspects on the evaluation process, quality and the degree to which the evaluation is adding value. Payments will not be made against deliverables until approval has been given.

12.3. Internally DFID requires at least 10 working days to review and comment on any products produced by the evaluation team<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The DFID QA process takes 10 days to provide its assessment. Products which are submitted to QA will require a longer time period to incorporate time for the QA review to be produced.



12.4. Payments will be released upon satisfactory completion of deliverables and DFID's approval of the required outputs, and submission of accompanying financial reports. If there are issues on quality of delivery, it will be discussed at the earliest opportunity with the evaluation team and clear directions will be given that are expected to be adhered by the evaluation team, and that DFID will subsequently monitor. DFID also reserves the right to withhold payment in case of missed or unsatisfactory delivery of outputs.

### **13. DFID co-ordination**

13.1. The evaluation team will report to the DFID Rwanda Livelihoods Advisor (IMSAR SRO) and Programme Manager, and will liaise with the DFID Evaluation, Statistics and Results Adviser. The SRO will be responsible for oversight of all programmatic aspects of the consultancy on behalf of DFID. Contract administration and payments will be managed by the Programme Manager on behalf of DFID.

### **14. Evaluation risks**

14.1 **Appropriateness of evaluation design:** Designing and implementing a performance evaluation structure with methods which are appropriate to analysing the effectiveness of this adaptive, highly politically sensitive programme will be essential. This will involve an innovative and pragmatic approach to evaluation design, while maintaining an appropriate level of analytical rigour.

14.2 **Maintaining an effective relationship with TSP and AgDevCo:** The evaluation team will need to ensure that it sustains an effective working relationship and good channels of communication with the TSP and AgDevCo. There may be tensions between providing collaborative advice as well as independent scrutiny of the TSP's and AgDevCo's activities, which will need to be managed.

14.3 **Avoiding duplication with TSP and AgDevCo:** The evaluation team will need to focus on adding value over and above the main TSP's monitoring and evaluation strategy.

### **15. Other Requirements – Security and Duty of Care**

15.1 The evaluation team must be self-supporting and responsible for their own activities and should not rely on DFID Rwanda transport, offices, facilities, logistical or administrative support. Evaluators must include all such costs in their bids.

### **16. Duty of Care**

16.1 The evaluation team is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under

this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

- 16.2 DFID will share available information with the evaluation team on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. The evaluation team is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the evaluation team must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.
- 16.3 Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix prepared by DFID (see Appendix 1). They must confirm in their Tender that:
- a) They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care;
  - b) They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan; and
  - c) They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.
- 16.4 If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.
- 16.5 Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence provided in response to the tender requirements.

## APPENDIX 1

### Duty of Care Country Risk Assessment

#### Rwanda-provisional risk rating

Theme	Northern Province	Eastern Province	Southern Province	Western Province	Kigali Province	OVERALL
Overall Rating	2	2	2	2	2	2
FCO Travel Advice	2	2	2	3	2	2
Host Nation Travel Advice	Not available					
Transportation	2	2	2	2	1	2
	Do not recommend driving at night in rural areas due to poorly lit roads, dense population, untethered livestock, variable condition of vehicles.					
Security	2	2	2	2	2	2
			Potential for security to deteriorate depending on events over the border in Burundi.	Potential for security to deteriorate depending on events over the border in DRC.		
Civil Unrest	1	1	1	1	1	1
Violence/Crime	2	2	3	3	2	2
			Reports of criminal gangs operating on Burundi border.			
Terrorism	1	1	1	1	2	1
War	1	1	2	2	1	1
			Possible spill over from events in Burundi	Depends on events on DRC side of border.		

<b>Earthquake</b>	3	3	3	3	3	3
<b>Flood</b>	3	3	3	3	2	2
	Risk is to rural infrastructure: roads, power, poorly constructed domestic dwellings. Rains are seasonal: Feb to June and Sep to Dec.					
<b>Medical Services</b>	3	3	3	3	2	3

1 Low/Very Low risk	2 Med low risk	3 Med high risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>		<b>High</b>	

Supplier to confirm with DFID Programme Team that the above Assessment has not been subsequently updated when finalising their own Risk Assessment. The ratings have been provided by DFID Security Section but with the proviso that these are generic to the country as a whole, and Suppliers may apply local knowledge or experience to amend these in their own risk assessments, or to take into account local variations. DFID Duty of Care Assessments are updated roughly annually, or in response to an event.