

## Section 3

### Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme RPC Terms of Reference

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## **A Introduction**

1. The Department for International Development (DFID) leads the UK government's effort to fight global poverty. We cannot deliver our mission without tackling corruption. Corruption is an inescapable issue in DFID's priority countries, and it is an important part of the problems – poverty and inequality, conflict and violence, low investment and low growth – that we are committed to tackling.
2. In January 2015, DFID approved an investment of up to £9.6 m over the next five years (2015-2020) to fund new, operationally-relevant research on tackling corruption. Research uptake will mean more evidence based – and therefore effective – anti-corruption initiatives by DFID and its partners in a range of DFID priority countries.
3. The programme – 'the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme' is explicitly operational in focus. Success will require DFID country programme teams to actively engage with the researchers throughout the programme, and new evidence to be taken up in operations. The ACE programme has two components – a DFID-British Academy partnership (£3.6m – already underway), and a new Research Partnership Consortium (up to £6m).
4. This Terms of Reference (ToR) sets out requirements for the new Research Partnership Consortium (RPC<sup>1</sup>), the scope of work, detailed requirements, reporting procedures and timeframe. The ToR should be read in conjunction with the approved ACE Business Case and other material posted on the DFID Supplier portal.

## **B Objectives**

5. The overall objective of the RPC programme is (*to produce*) new, operationally-relevant evidence on tackling corruption (*which*) supports more evidence based – and therefore effective – anti-corruption initiatives by DFID and its partners in a range of DFID priority countries.
6. The Minister's vision for the programme is that success would be achieved if the new research builds a body of evidence, and directly identifies operational solutions that are then taken up in programmes. We expect RPC programme design and delivery to follow this vision.

## **C Framing the ACE RPC's research programme**

7. The overall ACE programme will have three outputs:
  - 1) High quality, policy relevant new evidence and methodological advances produced on
    - a. 'what works to reduce corruption'; (currently being delivered by DFID-British Academy partnership)
    - b. anti-corruption in the private sector.
  - 2) Interdependencies - New evidence on which combinations of anti-corruption approaches work best, where, and why.

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<sup>1</sup>The term 'RPC' is used in this ToR to mean 'the Supplier group' and should not be interpreted to imply any specific structure. This will be defined at the conclusion of the competition and draw on the proposals from bidders.

- 3) Stakeholder engagement through research process and uptake facilitates the operational application of new evidence, including by DFID.

8. Of these, Output 1.a (what works) will be delivered through a separate mechanism managed by the British Academy (BA) which started in April 2015, and is not included in this ToR. However, the successful RPC bidder is expected to collaborate with the BA and its grantees to maximise coherence between all research streams and progress towards the overall programme outcome and impact:

9. The RPC will deliver components 1.b (private sector); 2 Interdependencies); and, based on the new research produced, will make a major contribution to Output 3 (operational application of new evidence) along with the DFID-British Academy partnership.

10. The ACE Business Case sets out parameters for the 'interdependencies' and 'private sector' components.

11. The ACE Programme's overall expected outcome is: "Robust new knowledge and evidence on anti-corruption lead to development of, and investment in, more effective anti-corruption policies and programmes, including by DFID and partners".

12. ACE's overall intended impact is: "Measurably reduced prevalence of corruption, with positive impacts on service delivery, poverty reduction, safety and security, economic development, and the lives of poor people".

13. Outputs 1a (what works), 1b (private sector) and 2 (interdependencies) are all expected to contribute to achievement of the outcome, though it is unlikely that all individual research lines will result in new evidence being taken up in policy during the lifetime of the programme.

14. The requirement is divided into two lots – Private Sector (Lot 1) and Interdependencies (Lot 2). From DFID's viewpoint, the 'interdependencies' component (Lot 2) is a logical next step from the sparse but existing evidence and conceptual research on public sector corruption. The private sector component (Lot 1) is more novel, reflecting an even thinner existing evidence base.

## **LOT 1 - CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

15. Corruption is an important factor in shaping the relationship between the state and businesses. Corruption also affects structures within the private sector (such as representational associations), and the relations between businesses (such as informal payments to secure contracts in complex supply chains). Corruption thus shapes the incentives of firms in ways that remain poorly understood.

16. Bribe-paying firms may be victims of corrupt officials but also the instigators and beneficiaries of corrupt behaviour, and can illicitly drive policy-making in their favour, such as influencing resource allocation and land zoning. Private sector corruption and organised criminality in mineral extraction is of particular strategic importance – and is particularly under-researched. Overall, DFID's experience is that analysis and research has tended to under-estimate the diversity and complexity of private sector related corruption – depending on sector, phase of economic development, and even within single sectors.

17. Successful anti-corruption interventions in this area need evidence about how different approaches change the incentives and propensity of firms to pay bribes, and how this could reduce both the direct and indirect costs of corruption.

18. For DFID's operational needs, most of the new research supported should focus on countries and sectors (i.e. energy, infrastructure, agriculture) receiving the largest proportions of DFID's economic growth related investments, and – if feasible - could explicitly aim to provide operationally relevant research to support DFID's largest investments, including both country level investments and global programmes such as through CDC and PIDG. However, the selection of countries, sectors, sub sectors and partners will ultimately depend on negotiations (between researchers, DFID, and other partners) during the inception phase.

19. The following are examples of the kind of research questions that could be developed. Suppliers should adapt and expand on the research questions where relevant in their proposed methodology, and depending on the sectors and interventions around which they propose to prioritise.

20. An indicative generic format for developing RQs could be: What mechanisms are most effective for measurably reducing corruption in/for XXXX and could be applied to diverse settings such as (for example):

- Fertiliser markets.
- Access by small-scale farmers to maize markets.
- Professional associations in the health sector.
- New entrant small manufacturers in health equipment .
- Surface transport of iron ore/coal/.
- Ensuring sub contractors' compliance with environmental, health and safety standards in global readymade garment supply chains.

21. These are intentionally wide ranging as we expect the Supplier to define and justify selection of sectors, sub-sectors and RQs.

22. In all of the private sector research streams, selection will be because corruption and leakage are significant constraints on growth, or on benefits such as creation of new jobs, market competition, access for new entrants, efficiency, and affordable market prices. The Supplier will be expected to justify their selection in these terms.

23. New research would identify plausible hypotheses in priority operational areas, and then rigorously test them. Outputs would support design of future programmes with targeted combinations of interventions that can reinforce each other, and strengthen systems and institutions.

24. We anticipate that the Supplier may need to commit more effort (for Lot 1 than for Lot 2) to understanding the specific context (selected sector/sub-sector/country; delivery or investment chain) as these may have been relatively unresearched previously. Basic research on corruption in a sector may be required before the most promising anti-corruption interventions are selected as a focus for research.


25. The Supplier will also design and manage further small grants competition(s) as one part of the private sector component. We anticipate that 20%-30% of the private sector component budget will be allocated in this way. Bidders should propose an allocation with rationale, and a mechanism for grant competition. This small grants competition is intended to further extend the range of researchers engaged in anti-corruption research, so those already involved in delivering the private sector component will not be eligible for this competition. The lead Supplier will also be responsible for building and managing a network of individuals and/or organisations to deliver the programme and will be responsible for ensuring quality in research process, researcher engagement during design, implementation and research uptake, and for quality assuring all research outputs.

## LOT 2: UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN ANTI-CORRUPTION INTERVENTIONS

26. Most specific anti-corruption interventions are part of wider governance reforms, yet research often focuses on a single component and ignores wider dependencies. In areas where the evidence is better developed, such interdependencies appear to be vital for change to be achieved.

27. Specific hypotheses and research questions (RQs) to be tested will depend on the countries, sectors, sub sectors, and specific combinations of interventions selected through negotiation with DFID country offices and their partners. The RQs will be fully defined during the inception phase.

28. Our starting assumption for the sectors to be considered for the research is captured in the table below. Bidders and the appointed Supplier will be expected to select a sub set from within this, but may also add further sectors if they can be justified.



29. The following are examples of the kind of operationally relevant RQs that the interdependencies component is expected to address:

- Does stronger budgetary oversight by parliaments measurably increase the anti-corruption impact of supreme audit institutions?
- Are procurement system reforms more effective at reducing corruption if the independence of civil servants, including procurement officers, is protected?
- Do sanctions against duty bearers added to report card-based social accountability deliver a greater and more sustained reduction in corruption/leakage?

30. Alternatively/additionally, RQs could be phrased in a format such as this:

- What would be a minimum package of anti-corruption interventions required for a measurable reduction in corruption in XXX sub sector.

31. This format could be used to define research for sub-sectors as varied as (for example only)

- service delivery at primary health facilities;
- construction and maintenance of rural feeder roads;
- recruitment and payment of primary school teachers;
- old aged pensions;
- factory compliance with environmental, health and safety standards;
- registration of urban property.

32. The research framework would then define and test reform packages. In at least some such applications, we anticipate that changes in service quality would be measured as well as reduced corruption and leakage.

33. New research would identify plausible hypotheses in priority operational areas, and then rigorously test them. Outputs would support design of future programmes with targeted combinations of interventions that can reinforce each other, and strengthen systems and institutions.

34. The majority of activity under the 'interdependencies' component will focus on anti-corruption in the public sector. However, we expect that some of the hypotheses tested and research questions will include or focus on private sector processes, and that some research streams may address both components (interdependencies and private sector) together. Consequently there may be a need to coordinate/work with the supplier working on the other component.

## **SECTIONS APPLICABLE TO BOTH LOT 1 AND LOT 2**

35. Country focus: The research programme will be explicitly comparative in approach, testing similar interventions in more than one setting and aiming to draw out generalisations as well as identify important contextual factors.

36. A final selection of 3-4 countries (per lot) in Africa and Asia (at least one) will be negotiated during the inception phase, from a short list including Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Nigeria; and Bangladesh and Bihar (India). DFID offices in all of these countries have stated 'in principal' interest in being involved. Countries with the largest DFID economic development investments are currently Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Nigeria.

37. There may be limited scope for including comparative components in additional countries. However, these would be a small minority (e.g. <10%) of the total effort and would require very convincing justification by the Supplier.

38. We invite bidders to specify which 3-4 countries they would ideally prioritise and justify why. Factors are likely to include:

- specific sectors and sub-sectors within specific countries in which the need for anti-corruption research is high and/or political opportunities for reform and/or the RPC research programme are greatest;
- bidder's previous or ongoing country and sector expertise, research experience, and networks with researchers, policy makers, DFID country teams/programmes, and other actors.

39. We strongly advise bidders to specify their preferred countries with clear justification, rather than presenting a country list without clear differentiation.

40. We remain flexible about whether the two lots (private sector and interdependencies) should be delivered in all or some of the same set of countries. However, during the negotiating stage we will try, where possible to have at least 2 of the 3-4 focal countries be the focus of both Lots, and there are likely to be vfm reasons for focussing on the same countries for both, so that (for example) the same background analysis and in-country research teams could contribute to both components, if feasible.

41. Selection of sectors, sub sectors and interventions: We expect bidders to propose a model for structuring the research programme for each lot in terms of numbers and distribution of separate research streams within and between countries and with outline costings. This will be indicative. It will be refined and costed with the preferred consortium during the negotiation stage; and finalised during inception phase.

42. Selection of interventions may include applications of technology as well as structural, social, administrative, legal and other reforms.

43. Achieving and measuring outcome and impact: we note that achieving and measuring the stated impact within 5 years is difficult. We expect Suppliers and bidders to be ambitious in this, and by year 5 begin to measure results at outcome level and at least rigorously measure progress on a convincing and specified trajectory towards impact.



44. Vfm and rates of return: conceptually, reducing corruption should be good vfm because it will reduce the costs of service provision and procurement by removing illicit payments and leakage, and increasing efficiency and effectiveness in expenditure. However, measurement difficulties mean that losses to corruption – and the vfm gains through reducing corruption – have been hard to demonstrate in practice. We expect the RPC research to contribute evidence in this area and – where possible – contribute to debates on the rates of return from anti-corruption interventions; and rates of return of anti-corruption research

## **D Scope of work**

45. Each Lot will design and implement a combination of basic and operationally relevant research for delivery.

46. Research design and method will be proposed in the bidding process; refined through DFID's conclusion of the competition and negotiation with winning bidder(s); and developed in detail by the selected Supplier during a 6 month inception phase which will start immediately after agreements with RPC Supplier(s) have been signed.

47. The Supplier will design and implement multidisciplinary research through a mix of complementary quantitative and qualitative research methods. It will produce an ambitious range of high quality new research outputs, including synthesis products and new primary research products. All should have a clear operational relevance.

## **E Outputs/Deliverables**

48. The key outputs/deliverables of the RPC over five years (2015-2020) will be:

Synthesis products: During inception phase the Supplier will

- i) update general syntheses on evidence for effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions (if required);
- ii) produce new synthesis outputs that summarise operationally-relevant evidence in sectors/sub-sectors and/or settings selected for RPC research.

49. It is anticipated that these will underpin the research design and field research, but also produce outputs to be disseminated as public goods.

50. We anticipate that syntheses and research design will be accompanied by rigorous political economy analysis of the same sectors/sub-sectors and/or settings. Our expectation is that this political economy analysis should also produce early publicly available outputs during the inception phase so that it can underpin the RPC's research and contribute to public debates on corruption. However, we recognise the potential sensitivities in publishing political economy analysis before interventions are tested, and expect to be consulted before publication.

51. Research products, communication and uptake: the RPC will produce a range of research products over a continuum that includes research strategy, design and methods, methods papers, evidence reviews and

working papers, articles in leading peer reviewed journals, and research summaries and policy briefs that package available evidence, including the RPC's research, for policy makers. We envisage at least 13 peer-reviewed journal articles and 26 other research outputs by the end of project. Details of the research products to be produced will be finalised in the inception period. All research products are expected to be of sufficient quality and interest for ultimate publication in the appropriate international journals. It is noted that actual acceptance for publication in journals will be impossible to organise in a timely way, so the project will need to resource and arrange timely independent peer review to quality assure these outputs as having potential for publication in high quality journals. DFID reserves the right to make a final judgement on the quality of these papers, including commissioning further independent peer review of outputs as needed.

52. We expect these outputs to be sustained throughout the life of the project and for the RPC to be responsive to DFID requests for interim products and briefings (DFID may consult with wider HMG and other partners e.g. country governments and multilateral organisations), providing that this does not undermine or detract from delivery of a high quality research strategy.

53. We expect the Supplier to use creativity and innovation in ensuring research communication and engagement with target audiences throughout the research cycle, including through use of social media. We expect such communication to be objective and to represent the ACE programme's new research in relation to the wider body of research evidence, rather than to promote or lobby for the uptake of the programme's own research alone.

54. Publications and research outputs should be made available in accordance with [DFID Research Open and Enhanced Access Policy](#).

## **F Methods and approach**

55. ACE will be an interdisciplinary research programme, cutting across disciplines including political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, and socio-legal studies. We aim to fund research that is innovative, ambitious as well as operationally useful, and attract new entrants (from other research areas) into anti-corruption research.

56. Selection of research methods will be directed by the RQs and settings. Most are likely to require a combination of complementary methods.

57. We expect an ambitious approach to measurement in all research components, probably requiring collection of new quantitative data and rigorous use of secondary data. We directly relate the idea of 'ambitious measurement' to specific approaches to assessing the strength of evidence and encourage bidders to define an ambitious approach in similar terms, building on (for example) the approach used in the U4 Evidence review<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Johnsen, J. N. Taxell and D. Zaum, Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: Assessing the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption, Report 7, October 2012,

58. We also recommend that bidders acquaint themselves with the latest prominent themes in DFID's research, policy, and programming and consider which and how these can be integrated into the ACE RPC:

59. Impact Evaluation (IE) is a relatively small part of the Governance, Conflict and Social Development (GCSD) Research Team's portfolio, and most Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) funded have been delivered within specialist programmes (e.g. J-PAL's Governance Initiative). In our forward strategy we aim to integrate IEs into thematic research programmes (including ACE) when RQs and research settings dictate.

60. We recommend that bidders consider opportunities for including experimental methods and evaluation within the wider body of the proposed RPC research, and consider how they would harness the skills and experience to design and implement IEs as and when required.

61. Case control methods are widely used in DFID-funded health research because of their relative speed, simplicity, and cost effectiveness. GCSD is interested in testing whether Case Control approaches can be applied more widely in social research and will be interested to see proposals for their deployment within the ACE RPC research.

62. Behaviour change and shifting social norms is an area of increasing interest across GCSD's portfolio and has been elaborated in the World Bank's WDR 2015. Social norms and governance are of increasing interest, including in relation to corruption and anti-corruption.

63. Applied Political Economy approaches: DFID's governance cadre engages directly with researchers defining and applying approaches such as 'Problem Driven Iterative Approaches' (PDIA); 'Politically Smart, Locally Driven'; and 'Thinking and Working Politically'. These are relevant to wider 'Better Delivery' reforms in DFID programme management, including greater delegation to 'Senior Responsible Owners' (SROs), and integration of adaptive programming<sup>3</sup>.

64. We are interested in how these approaches can be integrated in the RPC research, both in terms of i) an iterative approach to designing anti-corruption interventions and ii) rigorously and objectively testing these approaches (rather than seeking to demonstrate their effectiveness).

65. Overall, we expect political economy methods to improve 'anti-corruption' efforts and inform operational decisions, rather than to further explore the problem of corruption alone. For example, within a specific sector, political economy analysis may direct a focus on types of corruption most tractable to reform, rather than those causing the largest losses.

66. 'Testing what works' approaches: ACE is explicitly designed to deliver operationally relevant research with researchers engaging with DFID country offices throughout the research cycle. The RPC programme will be a pilot for DFID's implementation of HMG's 'Testing what works' (a HM Treasury-led

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<http://www.u4.no/publications/mapping-evidence-gaps-in-anti-corruption-assessing-the-state-of-the-operationally-relevant-evidence-on-donors-actions-and-approaches-to-reducing-corruption/>.

<sup>3</sup> For background see <http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/the-evidence-debate-continues-chris-whitty-and-stefan-dercon-respond/>

initiative<sup>4</sup>). The expectation is that at least some ACE research components will be integrated into or run alongside the design and implementation of anti-corruption interventions by DFID and its partners, including – where appropriate – testing parallel approaches through ‘trailing’. Particular methods should be defined by specific RQ and setting but could include (most ambitiously) impact evaluation, or other pilot testing using observational research methods.

67. Where possible, bidders should propose which projects or programmes (DFID or DFID partners’) they would complement with new research, including making clear any existing or recent work that they have with these projects or partners. However, in bid preparation bidders should not contact DFID country offices and should use publically available information to inform their bids. Detailed negotiation will take place during the contract negotiation phase; and then during the project inception phase. Where required, this will be facilitated by the SRO of the ACE programme.

68. Research quality: DFID’s approach to defining and assessing research quality has become more explicit in the last 5 years. We recommend that bidders examine DFID’s public documents on assessing research quality; and quality in qualitative approaches<sup>5</sup>. Bidders and Supplier(s) will be expected to define and implement a strategy for maximising research quality, and DFID will assess the quality of research outputs at annual review. This includes ensuring the quality of intermediate outputs such as working papers that are made public on websites as well as articles in peer reviewed journals.

69. Open data: The programme will include substantial fieldwork to generate new data. Datasets generated – both quantitative and qualitative – are expected to be anonymised and be made public according to the terms of the DFID Research open and enhanced access policy<sup>6</sup>.

## **G Recipients**

70. Though all outputs will be public goods, the programme will explicitly address the operational needs of DFID and its partners. Research outputs should be accessible (i.e. made available and in suitable style) to stakeholders including DFID country programme and headquarters staff and advisers, national politicians and policy makers in priority countries, bilateral and multi-lateral agencies, national governments, civil society organisations, the research community and media.

71. To maximise ease of dissemination and uptake, all outputs must be written in a ‘plain English’ style that can be readily understood by development generalists.

## **H Requirements**

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<sup>4</sup> See <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/what-works-evidence-for-decision-makers>

<sup>5</sup> See [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/291982/HTN-strength-evidence-march2014.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/291982/HTN-strength-evidence-march2014.pdf) and

[http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Quality-in-qualitative-evaluation\\_tcm6-38739.pdf](http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Quality-in-qualitative-evaluation_tcm6-38739.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-research-open-and-enhanced-access-policy>

72. The research programme will use a mix of best in class research approaches and methods as described above.

## **J Research Ethics**

73. Researchers, evaluators and implementing agencies should adhere to clear, best practice ethical guidelines (e.g. confidentiality, disclosure, adequate and informed consent, explicitly ensuring ‘do no harm’), building on existing WHO resources and academic ethics protocols.

74. Anti-corruption research is by nature sensitive, and particular points for bidders to consider include:

- The safety of respondents and the research team is paramount. It should be reflected in all decision making and monitored closely;
- Information gathering and documentation must be done in a manner that is methodologically sound, transparent, and builds on current experience and good practice;
- Protecting confidentiality of individuals is essential to ensuring no harm to respondents and data quality;
- Anyone providing information must give informed consent before participating in a study;

75. Specifying and ensuring compliance with ethical standards should form a part of research design, preparation of research teams, and delivery. All study team members and members of organisations involved in research delivery, should be carefully selected and receive specialised training and on-going support in research ethics;

76. Allied to ensuring best practice in research ethics, we expect the lead Supplier to ensure that clear ethical standards in research management are established, communicated, complied with, and monitored, including in relation to financial management and people management by all agents involved in research delivery and (particularly) all recipients of UK aid funds. The Supplier will be expected to develop an anti-corruption and counter fraud strategy for RPC programme delivery.

77. Suppliers will be required to have written protocols for research/evaluation ethics and ethical clearance and to demonstrate adherence to WHO protocols and DFID research and ethical guidelines.<sup>7</sup> During implementation, ethical review will be the responsibility of an appropriate Ethical Review Committee.

## **K Uptake of research**

78. Output three is specifically about research uptake *“Stakeholder engagement through research process and uptake facilitates the operational application of new evidence, including by DFID”*.

79. Research evidence is most likely to have direct impact on policy and practice if policy makers and/or practitioners are involved throughout the

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-ethics-principles-for-research-and-evaluation>

project. In particular, it is crucial that those who may be able to use research results are involved in research design. This is the approach for virtually all recent RED research programmes but is particularly stressed for the ACE RPC, given the Business Case's exceptional focus on engagement with DFID country teams and advisory cadres, and uptake by DFID of new evidence produced.

80. The RPC will have an explicit research uptake strategy in line with DFID's guide on research uptake<sup>8</sup> which includes four strands:

- stakeholder engagement, including stakeholder mapping to identify the main organisations and processes which influence policy making in a specific area;
- capacity building;
- targeted communication plans to ensure research and evidence outputs reach key decision-makers at national and international levels and in appropriate formats; and
- monitoring and evaluation of uptake.

81. The Supplier will be expected to target diverse audiences through a variety of media including articles in leading peer-reviewed journals, methods papers, working papers, policy briefs, social media, video content, and participation and presentation of results in key national and international policy and practitioner meetings.

82. The RPC is expected to build on, contribute to, and strengthen existing networks, communication channels and evidence resources such as websites and portals and bidders should specify their proposed approach.

## **L Research Capacity Building**

83. The Supplier should place strong emphasis on linking northern and southern organisations and/or researchers, and other stakeholders, to design and implement a high quality research programme and achieve the programme's outputs and outcome and make progress towards impact.

84. The ACE programme does not have a specific output for research capacity building. If required, initiatives to strengthen skills and systems of individuals and organisations may be included in the delivery of the research strategy and pursuit of research excellence, such as development, import (from other fields) or adaptation of novel research methods, tools and analytical approaches, research ethics, quality assurance, and also in research management themes such as financial and staff management, compliance, and quality assurance.

85. In general, we see these as part of the lead Supplier's quality assurance in delivering the research programme to the expected standard, not as an explicit programme of research capacity development.

86. Limited orientation and training of policy makers and other targeted audiences for specific research streams may be included in the research uptake strategy to engage stakeholders and facilitate policy uptake.

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/research-uptake-guidance>

## **M Environmental Considerations**

87. The Supplier should ensure due consideration is given to the environmental impact of all work undertaken to deliver the programme, both in terms of minimising any direct negative impact, and the extent to which research findings contribute to positive environmental management (e.g. more sustainable and efficient environmental management, water supply, energy, transport, infrastructure, disaster risk management etc).

88. Specific attention to minimising operational impacts on the environment and global climate of those undertaking the research must include ensuring individuals travel by economy class, and reducing carbon footprint through for example, using recycled paper and minimising printing and other waste.

## **N Transparency**

89. DFID has transformed its approach to transparency, reshaping our own working practices and pressuring others across the world to do the same. DFID requires Suppliers receiving and managing funds, to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate sub-contractors, sub-agencies and partners.

90. It is a contractual requirement for all Suppliers to comply with this, and to ensure they have the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this to DFID – further IATI information is available from <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

## **O Risk Management**

91. Research on anti-corruption entails significant risks as vested interested may obstruct the research and researchers. The supplier will be expected to set out its understanding of the most important anticipated risks, with an explanation of mitigation strategies for these.

## **P Budget and timeframe**

92. The maximum budget for the ACE RPC programme is £6 million over 5 years, with a maximum of £3 million for each of the two Lots. Suppliers should demonstrate excellent vfm as part of their bid. Where appropriate, bidders are encouraged to link payments to the delivery of outputs i.e. Payments by Results. A strong bid should outline the costs attributed to the achievement of each output, and within this should also show how the cost is attributed to each country, and the activities undertaken to deliver it.

93. The ACE RPC will commence work as soon as possible after the winning supplier has been selected and the contract agreed. It will run for 5 years consisting of a 6 month inception phase followed by a 4.5 year implementation phase with the option to extend for up to 30 months.

94. There will be a formal break point in the contract at the end of the inception phase. Progression to the implementation phase will be subject to satisfactory performance of the Supplier, DFID approval of inception phase outputs, and DFID agreement to work plans and any revised costs. There will be a second formal break point in the contract mid-way through the implementation phase. The exact timing of this second break point will be agreed between DFID and the Supplier during the inception phase. At both break points, DFID reserves the right to revise or terminate any specific research components (e.g., research on a specific theme or in a specific country) if the work is not progressing as projected and when remedial efforts have failed to improve research implementation to DFID's satisfaction.

95. DFID, in consultation with key stakeholders, reserves the right to scale up/back the project if necessary. The RPC could also raise additional funds from other sources, including using DFID's commitment to attract additional funds. Bidders should briefly describe their strategy for this, particularly for the private sector component.

## **Q Implementation requirements**

96. We expect an inception phase to be complete in the first 6 months; research competitions to be designed and let in year 1; research field work and analysis to be conducted in years 2 and 3; and years 4 and 5 to be dedicated to research outputs, facilitating uptake, and operational application. In year 5 we expect to begin to measure results at outcome level, and measure convincing progress towards impact.

## **R Research Programme Inception Phase**

97. The programme will have an inception phase of six months, during which proposals will be refined, research strategy and framework defined, final focal countries selected (following negotiation with DFID country programmes and other stakeholders) and budgets finalised (in line with proposal and indicative budget set out in the tender).

98. During the inception phase, DFID will expect at least monthly meetings with the Research Manager and RPC Leader (Consortium Executive Director – CED - see below) to ensure that progress against work plan is on track.

99. The key Inception phase outputs of this component are:

100. Mid-point of inception phase: the supplier will submit a concise mid-inception report to be reviewed at a formal meeting between key DFID staff and the supplier to discuss progress against plan and the overall direction of the programme.

101. End of inception phase: the Supplier will submit a detailed inception report. DFID's approval of this inception report will be required for the RPC to continue (see 'Budget and timeframe'). Specification for the inception report will be negotiated with the Supplier, but is expected to include the following content:



- Detailed research framework including clearly further refining ACE Business Case's Theory of Change demonstrating how the research will lead to intended outcome and impact; research approach; hypotheses and research questions; research methods, and approach to research ethics.
- Final selection of focal countries and sectors/sub-sectors for RPC research, identification of anti-corruption interventions, with justification, and confirmation of engagement by relevant stakeholders, including DFID country offices.
- Updated synthesis of existing evidence (by sector, sub-sector and/or country setting as required);
- Formative research products, including political economy analysis of sectors/sub-sectors/country settings as appropriate for subsequent delivery of the research strategy and work plan.
- Uptake Strategy, including dissemination and engagement with policy makers in country (including, as appropriate, government, other donors, civil society, academia, and media).
- Approach to Open Access publishing and data sets.
- Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, including final RPC log-frame (to be 'nested' within the overall ACE programme's logframe).
- Work plan and budget, including breakdown by component, research strand, and country.
- Risk management strategy and plan.
- Final approach to leadership, management, and governance of RPC, including ToRs and any necessary update on delivery partners.

## **S Reporting and Management**

### ***Management and Governance of the RPC***

102. Please refer to the ACE Business Case's management case and additional information.

103. Forming and managing the RPC: during the negotiation stage, DFID will enter into negotiations with the shortlisted bidders for Lots 1 and 2 to form a consortium and prepare an overall proposal, where possible. The consortium may include academic, civil society and commercial organisations.

104. All organisations and individuals in the research programme should demonstrate relevant expertise, including technical expertise, financial and management expertise, and proven expertise in managing relevant research programmes. This will not involve the separate establishment of a physical centre or the formation of a new research organisation.

105. The RPC will be led by a Consortium Executive Director (CED). The CED will provide managerial and intellectual leadership to the RPC, be first point of contact for DFID, and be accountable for all RPC delivery. The CED will lead development of the research strategy and ensure coordination and coherence between all components.

106. DFID's preference is that this is at least a half time post and that the CED is employed by the RPC's lead supplier. The prospective candidate for

CED should be named in bids for Lots 1 and 2, and bidders must guarantee her/his availability if successful.

107. A Consortium Advisory Group (CAG) will be established during the inception phase to advise the RPC on strategy, taking an overview of the programme and its progress. DFID will be a member of this CAG, but will not be bound to act on advice from the CAG. Executive authority, including all final decisions regarding budgets, workplans and strategy, will be retained by DFID. Meeting at least once in 6 months, the CAG will receive and discuss proposed work plans, review activities and progress, and discuss any significant issues that require input from the CAG members. The CED will prepare and submit the documentation for the CAG's consideration.

108. In addition, DFID expects the RPC to establish mechanisms for wider stakeholder engagement, debate technical and implementation issues, and collaborate effectively with consortium partners.

109. Final ToRS for high level posts, management and governance arrangements will be part of the Inception Report.

#### ***T ACE Programme level governance / advisory***

110. DFID will constitute an advisory group and management group for the entire ACE programme. We anticipate that the BA-DFID Partnership's Programme Steering Group, and RPC's Consortium Advisory Group will have some members in common, and we will aim for regular meetings to be arranged to run back to back on a single day. In consultation with BA and the RPC supplier we will consider merging the two into a single, programme-wide advisory body.

111. We anticipate that the ACE Programme Management Group will include the SRO, the BA Programme Director; the RPC CED, and at least one other DFID representative, and will focus on overall programme coherence, performance, and progress against logframe and theory of change, and programme-level vfm and risk management, including responding to changes in context and new opportunities, such as national, regional or global policy processes that the programme should engage with. If required we may reallocate funds to do this.

112. The Supplier will maintain regular dialogue with DFID's programme management team to ensure compliance with all terms and conditions set out in the agreement and guided by DFID's Procurement and Commercial Department (PCD); best practice financial management, including timely and accurate financial forecasting and invoicing and cost control; and effective contract management, including early notification on any proposed changes to the contract, before formal agreement is sought from DFID.

113. The specific management structure of the programme will be proposed by bidders and refined by the supplier during the inception phase.

114. A clear governance structure for ensuring effective partnership across the research programme, production of high quality primary research, and quality assurance is required.

#### ***U Contracting and Reporting Requirements***

115. Key performance indicators (KPIs) and payment milestones will be agreed between DFID and the Supplier during Inception Phase. KPIs that will measure performance could cover the following areas: quality and delivery; management, strategy and financial; personnel; and innovation and continuous improvement indicators. However, bidders are encouraged to make provision in any commercial bids to ensure that payment of fees is clearly linked to and subject to performance and/or achievement of results.

116. DFID management for this component will be led by the GCSD Team. There will be monthly project management meetings in inception and quarterly project management meetings in implementation with the Supplier that will be used for them to report on, and DFID to monitor, progress against the agreed objectives/logframe.

117. DFID conducts Annual Reviews of all programmes to assess progress against the objectives contained in the logframe, ensure that the programme is on track, and consider if any adjustments should be made. The Supplier will be expected to produce Annual Reports using DFID's standard format. This will form the basis of the Annual Review.

118. The Supplier will be required to deliver effective financial management and will need to demonstrate Value for Money (vfm) at all stages of the programme. This will include demonstrating that administrative costs can be minimised and that programme activities are designed to maximise cost effectiveness. The research programme will be expected to report on vfm measures integrated into the programme and this will be assessed during DFID annual reviews.

119. All reporting requirements will be agreed between DFID and the Supplier in the RPC agreement.

120. While recognising the inherent difficulties in research delivery, DFID will actively encourage contingency planning to maintain timely progress. Dependent on project progress and direction DFID reserves the right to redistribute funds between components– for example moving funds between sub-themes; and between directly delivered components and research competitions.

121. We encourage bidders to propose performance related elements to funding, such as giving additional resources for research uptake to the best performing researchers (as well as the most promising interventions).

## **V Duty of Care (DoC)**

122. At this point, the focal countries for the ACE RPC are undefined. FCAS countries have been excluded from the research. However, we have assessed DoC as medium-high risk because of the sensitive nature of anti-corruption research.

123. Suppliers are required to carry out a risk assessment (of foreseeable risks) and are required to provide evidence that they have the capability to take on and effectively manage their DoC Responsibilities throughout the life of the agreement. During the Inception Phase, DFID will conduct risk assessments for the focal countries selected.

124. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of all of its personnel (as defined in DFID's agreement with the Supplier, Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

125. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on risk assessments, security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

126. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing relating to health, safety and security. Travel advice is available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest positions.

127. This Procurement may require the Supplier to operate in a seismically active zone and is considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and can result in major devastation and loss of life. There are several websites focusing on earthquakes, including

<http://geology.about.com/library/bl/maps/blworldindex.htm>. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

128. This Procurement will require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. Travel to many zones within the region will be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted).

129. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments, etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course (e.g. SAFE) or safety in the field training prior to deployment if necessary.

130. Tenderers must develop their Request for Concept Note (RFCN) Response and Tender (if invited to the Invitation to Negotiate Stage One) on the basis of being fully responsible for DoC in line with DFID's policies and the details provided above. Suppliers should be aware that an assessment of Duty of Care will be undertaken at the ITN stage.

131. Suppliers must also include a Duty of Care plan as part of the ITN response. For this procurement, Suppliers will be required to provide evidence that they have the capability to take on and effectively manage their DoC Responsibilities throughout the life of the agreement.

132. If the Supplier is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, the Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

## **W Background**

133. For more background to the ACE programme please refer to the Business Case including references, and the materials hosted on the DFID procurement portal.

### **Country Security Risks: 30 July 2015**

#### **Risk assessment**

Country	Security Category	Violent Crime and Civil Disorder	Terrorism
Bangladesh	3	3	3
Ghana	3	3	1
India	2	2	3
Mozambique	3	3	2
Nigeria	4	4	4
Tanzania	3	4	3
Uganda	3	3	3

1 Very Low risk	2 Low risk	3 Med risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
			SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN NORMAL RISK	