



Work Order

This document is a Work Order according to the definitions contained within the provisions of the Services Delivery Agreement (SDA) dated **23rd May 2024**, between **Bloom Procurement Services Ltd** and **Public Digital Limited**.

Except where stated herein, all the clauses and conditions specified in the said supplier terms are included herein by reference and form part of this Work Order.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Bloom Standard Terms & Conditions (only where applicable), the SDA and this Work Order constitute the contract between Bloom and the SPS Provider and are hereinafter referred to collectively as the Supplier Terms.

We are delighted to advise that **Bloom Procurement Services Ltd** have been authorised to obtain the following services on behalf of the Authority.

Project Number:	Project_7751 Contract_18559
Project Name:	NEPRO3 - IBCA Strategic Design: Continuity & Knowledge Transfer
SPS Provider:	Public Digital Limited
For the Attention of:	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information
E-mail:	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information
Telephone Number:	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information
Address:	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Description of Specialist Professional Services / deliverables required:



Public Digital Limited have been appointed by Bloom Procurement Services Limited on behalf of Cabinet Office (CO) on behalf of the Infected Blood Compensation Authority (IBCA), to support the build of the Infected Blood Compensation Service in a way which is user centred, fast paced and scalable. In doing so, Public Digital will support IBCA to understand the long-term requirements of the service and build out internal capability to a sustainable point, in the coming months:

The scope covers requirements for specialist skills in service design, service coordination and operational policy, to deliver the following priorities and the Deliverables brought to fruition through



this requirement will directly contribute to (and, in some cases, entirely enable) IBCA's ability to administer compensation.

- Open the service to all user groups by the end of this calendar year. To achieve this, IBCA requires additional expertise in service coordination, so that work across the service aligns to the service roadmap - and all of the moving parts across IBCA together work collaboratively to achieve the necessary outcomes.
- Bring to fruition recommendations made by the Infected Blood Inquiry made in July 2025. To achieve this, IBCA requires expertise in service design and product thinking to lead and support work on these emerging priorities and integrate them with the wider service design vision.
- Provide in-depth knowledge transfer and capability building to IBCA's in house operational policy team, on a deeply complex policy area. To achieve this, IBCA requires continuity of expertise, sufficient time to develop training material and roughly 4 months dedicated support for the soon to be recruited / onboarded in-house team.
- Advising on the development of our delivery approach and ways of working by providing and embedding key capabilities as the service scales, so that we follow best practice, particularly in the context of the fast pace of delivery required. The most obvious capabilities that we will need over this period include product and delivery management, service design, interaction design, operational policy and leadership coaching.
- Using insight gained from engagement activity with the infected blood community, to help shape our public narrative that explains IBCA's approach to delivery to stakeholders, the infected blood community and the public.
- Reducing IBCA's dependency on professional services in the short to medium term by:
 - Advising on models that bring together policy, operations and delivery to work collaboratively in multidisciplinary teams.
 - Providing support and advice on setting up high performing, blended teams which deliver outcomes in an iterative, user-centred way.
 - Supporting the leadership team in introducing and developing capabilities such as user-centred design, service ownership and agile ways of working across IBCA.
 - Embedding a test-and-learn approach throughout the organisation to de-risk delivery and let the service evolve as it scales to respond to user needs.

1. Detailed Requirements

Functional Requirements

In addition to those outlined in section 3 of this document, Public Digital Limited will need to meet the following overarching requirements.

Supporting the development and delivery of the long term, strategic, vision for IBCA's digital service, against a backdrop of rapid delivery by multiple digital squads. This includes implementing the recommendations made by the Infected Blood Inquiry made in July 2025.



As IBCA onboards permanent staff, Public Digital Limited will also provide knowledge transfer across roles, ensuring continued delivery and retention of organisational knowledge for IBCA.

Public Digital Limited will achieve this by delivering activity that fulfils the following objectives:

- Iterating existing policy implementation and translating operational policy requirements into the service - as existing and future user needs are understood.
- Helping to shape IBCA's future roadmap, including maturing of service capabilities, expanding the service to new claim types and future service states.
- Deliver Alphas for Affected and Deceased Infected claims - including the delivery of workable prototypes, Design Thinking, community engagement, and highlighting strategic decision points.
- Production of papers and reports to enable IBCA's Executive Committee (ExCo) and Board to decide on future service delivery.
- Provide Interaction Design leadership, whilst in house recruitment for this specialist role concludes. This will include development of design system fundamentals, leading and guiding the Interaction Design (IXD) community of practitioners, managing IBCA's approach to prototyping.
- Maintain momentum in the evolution of IBCA's service design and delivery, whilst in house recruitment for the vital specialist roles being filled through the current contract concludes.
- Create space for newly hired in-house staff to rapidly learn from the supplier, reach the level of competence required for self-sufficient delivery and ensure that the service is not adversely impacted by the supplier's departure from IBCA at the end of this contract.

Capability

IBCA will require the following skills sets:

- Operational Policy expertise
- Public Sector service delivery
- Digital and agile delivery
- Service Design
- Community engagement
- Facilitation skills
- Coaching skills

Delivery

Public Digital Limited will deliver against the milestones, service levels and key Performance Indicators (KPIs) outlined in the sections below - attending relevant governance meetings, IBCA / Delivery Team sessions and working groups, where their expertise will add value.

Behaviours

Public Digital Limited will champion 'working in the open' principles and evidence a willingness to operate - and communicate - transparently with IBCA / CO stakeholders throughout the duration of the contract.

Mandatory Requirements

- **Requirement to publish on Contracts Finder**

To comply with Procurement Policy Note (PPN) 01/23, the Authority (CO) is required to publish a redacted version of Work Order on Contracts Finder. A template of the redacted Work Order is available at Annex 2.

**Important:**

The redacted Work Order will include, at a minimum, the detailed requirements of the contract. If bidders have any concerns regarding the publication of this information, these must be raised with Bloom prior to the Work Order being signed.

Cyber Essentials Plus accreditation: Public Digital Limited must hold and maintain Cyber Essential Plus certification or currently working towards Cyber Essentials Plus and committed to obtaining accreditation within 1 month of contract commencement. Cyber Essential Plus certification must be renewed annually by Public Digital Limited for the duration of the Work Order.

Cabinet Office Information Security Requirements: Public Digital Limited shall adhere to the Annex 1 (Appendix. 2) Information Security Requirements during the period of the Work Order.

Vetting Requirements: Public Digital Limited undertakes that all Personnel will hold Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) Security Clearance and, in limited cases, an appropriate UKSV security clearance for the duration of the Work Order. The provider will evidence clearance of all staff deployed to IBCA within the contract's first week.

Conflicts of interest: Public Digital Limited shall complete the Conflict of Interest form and notify the Cabinet Office any potential, actual or perceived conflicts of interest. **Safeguarding**

1. The parties acknowledge that the SPS Provider is responsible for the management and control of the activity provided under this Work Order and for the purposes of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. The SPS Provider shall act in accordance with any relevant statutory framework, legislation, policy or guidance.
2. The SPS Provider shall comply with the Relevant Authority's safeguarding policies as amended from time to time.
3. The SPS Provider shall comply with all statutory obligations including but not limited to safeguarding and any relevant statutory obligations relating to the delivery of the Specialist Professional Services.
4. The SPS Provider shall indemnify the Delivery Partner against all actions, claims, demands, losses, charges, costs, penalties, and expenses which the Delivery Partner may suffer or incur as a result of or in connection with any breach or alleged breach of its safeguarding obligations referenced immediately above in paragraphs 1 – 3.

Data Processing Agreement (DPA): The SPS Provider (Public Digital Limited) and the Relevant Authority (CO) acknowledge and agree to sign data processing agreement directly between the Relevant Authority and the SPS Provider.

2. Milestones

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information



3. Service Levels and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

4. Contract Management (Measuring Success and Review)

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information	
REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information	
REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information	
Commencement Date	21 st October 2025
Completion Date	27 th February 2026
REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information	

Invoicing procedure

The SPS Provider shall complete and submit a Payment Request/Highlight Report via the Technology Platform. This will initiate the Self-Billing Process once approved by the Authority or requirement owner.

Milestone reporting and Payment (Subject to agreed Payment Request/Highlight Report) Payment Schedule

Description	Deliverables	Planned Payment Request Submission Date	Total Price



	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
	REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information			
Total:				£600,000.00

Total Price	Commencement Date	Currency
£600,000.00	21 st October 2025	Pounds Sterling



Acknowledgment re supervision and control of SPS Provider personnel.

By signing this Work Order and agreeing to the Supplier Terms, the SPS Provider confirms for the duration of the Services provided (subject to the contractual terms governing the Services to be provided):

1. The SPS Provider shall procure that its personnel do not act or operate in a manner which could be perceived in such a way as to infer that the SPS Provider's personnel are employees of the Authority;
2. The SPS Provider shall always ensure that the Authority shall not supervise or control the work being carried out by the SPS Provider's personnel;
3. The SPS Provider is free to determine the personnel it uses to provide the services provided that all personnel meet the standards specified by the Authority (including security clearances where applicable);
4. The SPS Provider shall not assume any line management responsibility for any of the Authority's employees;
5. The SPS Provider shall use their own equipment to deliver the Services, except where the provision of equipment by the Authority is necessary for security purposes;
6. The SPS Provider shall determine their own place and hours of work, except where the nature of the project naturally enforces restriction e.g. attending project meetings at client site during business hours;

If at any time, the SPS Provider fails to comply with the above terms, this shall amount to a material breach of the Work Order which is not capable of remedy for the purposes of the termination clause of the SDA and this Work Order will be terminated with immediate effect. If the SPS Provider breaches these provisions it may be liable for the payment of income tax or national insurance contributions.

ANNEX 1 – to record permitted project specific processing of personal data.

1. The Contractor shall comply with any further written instructions with respect to processing by the Data Controller.
2. Any such further instructions shall be incorporated into this Schedule and this Schedule may be amended at any time during the Term by agreement in writing between the Data Controller and the Contractor to ensure that the description and detail set out in this Schedule with regard to the processing of personal data reflects the arrangements between the Parties, is accurate and is compliant against the Data Protection Legislation.

No	Description	Details
1	Subject Matter of the Processing	In addition to email addresses for Cabinet Office and ALB staff, a small number (1-2) user researchers within the consultancy team will need to have access to a Cabinet Office laptop and Smart Survey account, so that they can conduct user interviews with the infected blood community securely.
2	Duration of the Processing	For the duration of the contract.
3	Nature and Purposes of the Processing	User research activity - and the views and perspectives from service users that it derives - is vital in enabling IBCA to build the user centred organisation it wants (and needs) to become.



4	Type of Personal Data	Staff email addresses and contact details of people who have volunteered to participate in user research interviews (the latter of which is stored exclusively on Smart Survey, which has been risk assessed by the CO Digital Information Risk & Assurance Team).
5	Categories of Data Subject	Staff email addresses and contact details of people who have volunteered to participate in user research interviews (the latter of which is held exclusively on Smart Survey, which has been risk assessed by the CO Digital Information Risk & Assurance Team).
6	Plan for return and destruction of the data once the processing is complete UNLESS requirement under union or member state law to preserve that type of data	Any records to be destroyed immediately once the contract has ended.

ANNEX 2

1. This Annex lists the sub-processors that the Data Controller has authorised the Contractor to use in accordance with the Supplier Terms.
2. The Data Controller may, at any time and upon such notice as is reasonable in the circumstances, withdraw its approval in relation to any or all sub-processors listed within this Annex and upon such withdrawal the Contractor must immediately cease using that sub-processor.
3. If the Contractor wishes to propose a new sub-processor for approval, it must provide written notice to the Data Controller detailing the identity of the proposed sub-processor, the nature of the sub-processing and confirmation that a written contract in relation to the sub-processing is in place between the Contractor and the sub-processor. The Data Controller must not unreasonably refuse or delay approval.
4. The Data Controller may at any time and upon reasonable notice request copies of the contracts between the Contractor and its approved sub-processors in relation to the sub-processing.

Sub-contractor details: (name, address and company registration number)	Nature of sub-processing:	Commencement date and term of contract between Contractor and Sub-processor:
N/A	N/A	N/A



Signature Area

Appendix. 1 – Conflict of Interest

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Appendix. 2 - Cabinet Office Information Security Management Requirements

**Information Security Management Cabinet Office project requirements for
Consultancy/Professional Services**



1 Cabinet Office Options

Risk assessment

The Cabinet Office has assessed this Agreement as	a standard consultancy agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>
	a higher-risk consultancy agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>

Relevant Certifications

Where the Cabinet Office has assessed this Agreement as a standard consultancy agreement, it requires the SPS Provider to be certified as compliant with:	Cyber Essentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Cyber Essentials Plus	<input type="checkbox"/>

2 SPS Provider obligations

- 2.1 Where the Cabinet Office has assessed this Agreement as a higher-risk consultancy agreement, the SPS Provider must comply with all requirements in this Schedule Annex 1 (Security Management).
- 2.2 Where the Cabinet Office has assessed this Agreement as a standard consultancy agreement, the SPS Provider must comply with this Schedule Annex 1 (Security Management), other than:
- (a) the requirement to be certified as compliant with ISO/IEC 27001:2013 under Paragraph 7.1(b);
 - (b) the requirement to undertake security testing of the SPS Provider Information Management System in accordance with paragraph 3 of Appendix 1;
 - (c) the requirement to produce a Security Management Plan in accordance with Paragraph 8
 - (d) the requirement to document unencrypted Cabinet Office Data in the Security Management Plan in accordance with paragraph 5.4 of Appendix 1

3 Definitions

In this Schedule Annex 1 (Security Management):

“Anti-virus Software”	<p>means software that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) protects the SPS Provider Information Management System from the possible introduction of Malicious Software; (b) scans for and identifies possible Malicious Software in the SPS Provider Information Management System;
------------------------------	--



	<p>(c) if Malicious Software is detected in the SPS Provider Information Management System, so far as possible:</p> <p>(i) prevents the harmful effects of the Malicious Software; and</p> <p>(ii) removes the Malicious Software from the SPS Provider Information Management System.</p>
“Breach of Security”	<p>means the occurrence of:</p> <p>(a) any unauthorised access to or use of the Services, the Cabinet Office Premises, the Sites, the SPS Provider Information Management System and/or any information or data used by the Cabinet Office, the SPS Provider or any Subcontractor in connection with this Agreement;</p> <p>(b) the loss (physical or otherwise) and/or unauthorised disclosure of any information or data, including copies of such information or data, used by the Cabinet Office, the SPS Provider or any Sub-contractor in connection with this Agreement; and/or</p> <p>(c) any part of the SPS Provider Information Management System ceasing to be compliant with the Certification Requirements.</p>
“Cabinet Office Data”	<p>means any:</p> <p>(a) data, text, drawings, diagrams, images or sounds (together with any database made up of any of these) which are embodied in any electronic, magnetic, optical or tangible media; or</p> <p>(b) Personal Data for which the Cabinet Office is a, or the, Data Controller,</p> <p>that is:</p> <p>(i) supplied to the SPS Provider by or on behalf of the Cabinet Office; or</p> <p>(ii) that the SPS Provider generates, processes, stores or transmits under this Agreement.</p>
“Cabinet Office Equipment”	<p>means any hardware, computer or telecoms devices, and equipment that forms part of the Cabinet Office System.</p>



“Cabinet Office System”	means the information and communications technology system used by the Cabinet Office to interface with the SPS Provider Information Management System or through which the Cabinet Office receives the Services.
“Certification Default”	means the occurrence of one or more of the circumstances listed in paragraph 7.4.
“Certification Rectification Plan”	means the plan referred to in paragraph 7.5(a).
“Certification Requirements”	means the information security requirements set out in paragraph 7.
“Cyber Essentials”	means the Cyber Essentials certificate issued under the Cyber Essentials Scheme.
“Cyber Essentials Plus”	means the Cyber Essentials Plus certificate issued under the Cyber Essentials Scheme.
“Cyber Essentials Scheme”	means the Cyber Essentials scheme operated by the National Cyber Security Centre.
“End-user Device”	means any personal computers, laptops, tablets, terminals, smartphones or other portable electronic device used in the provision of the Services.
“HMG Baseline Personnel Security Standard”	means the employment controls applied to any individual member of the SPS Provider Personnel that performs any activity relating to the provision or management of the Services, as set out in “HMG Baseline Personnel Standard”, Version 6.0, May 2018 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/714002/HMG_Baseline_Personnel_Security_Standard__May_2018.pdf), as that document is updated from time to time.
“Malicious Software”	means any software program or code intended to destroy, interfere with, corrupt, remove, transmit or cause undesired effects on program files, data or other information, executable code, applications, macros or configurations.
“NCSC Cloud Security Principles”	means the National Cyber Security Centre’s document “Implementing the Cloud Security Principles” as updated or replaced from time to time and found at https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloudsecurity/implementing-the-cloud-security-principles .



“NCSC Device Guidance”	means the National Cyber Security Centre’s document “Device Security Guidance”, as updated or replaced from time to time and found at
-------------------------------	---

	https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/device-securityguidance .
“Privileged User”	means a user with system administration access to the SPS Provider Information Management System, or substantially similar access privileges.
“Process”	means any operation performed on data, whether or not by automated means, including collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction of that data.
“Prohibited Activity”	means the storage, access or Processing of Cabinet Office Data prohibited by a Prohibition Notice.
“Prohibition Notice”	means a notice issued under paragraph 1.3 of Appendix 1.
“Relevant Certifications”	means those certifications specified in paragraph 7.1.
“Relevant Convictions”	means any previous or pending prosecution, conviction or caution (excluding any spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974) relating to offences involving dishonesty, terrorism, immigration, firearms, fraud, forgery, tax evasion, offences against people (including sexual offences), or any other offences relevant to Services as the Cabinet Office may specify.
“Security Management Plan”	means the document prepared in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 8.



"Sites"	<p>means any premises:</p> <p>(a) from or at which:</p> <p>(i) the Services are (or are to be) provided; or</p> <p>(ii) the SPS Provider manages, organises or otherwise directs the provision or the use of the Services; or</p> <p>(b) where:</p> <p>(i) any part of the SPS Provider Information Management System is situated; or</p> <p>(ii) any physical interface with the Cabinet Office System takes place.</p>
"Standard Contractual Clauses"	<p>means the standard data protection clauses specified in Article 46 of the United Kingdom General Data Protection Regulation setting out the appropriate safeguards for the transmission of personal data outside the combined territories of the United Kingdom and the European Economic Area.</p>
"SPS Provider Information Management System"	<p>means:</p> <p>(a) those parts of the information and communications technology system and the Sites that the SPS Provider or its Sub-contractors will use to provide the Services; and</p> <p>(b) the associated information assets and systems (including organisational structure, controls, policies, practices, procedures, processes and resources);</p>
"Sub-contractor Personnel"	<p>means:</p> <p>(a) any individual engaged, directly or indirectly, or employed, by any Sub-contractor; and (b) engaged in or likely to be engaged in:</p> <p>(i) the performance or management of the Services;</p> <p>(ii) or the provision of facilities or services that are necessary for the provision of the Services.</p>



“SPS Provider Personnel”	means any individual engaged, directly or indirectly, or employed by the SPS Provider or any Sub-contractor in the management or performance of the SPS Provider’s obligations under this Agreement.
“UKAS”	means the United Kingdom Accreditation Service.

4 Introduction

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

5 Principles of security

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

6 Access to SPS Provider Personnel and SPS Provider Information Management System

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

7 Certification Requirements

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

:

8 Security Management Plan

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

9 Notices

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 43 (2), Commercial Information

1 Location

1.1 Unless otherwise agreed with the Cabinet Office, the SPS Provider must, and must ensure that its Sub-contractors must, at all times, store, access or process Cabinet Office Data either:

- (a) in the United Kingdom;
- (b) the European Economic Area; or
- (c) in a facility operated by an entity where:
 - (i) the entity has entered into a binding agreement with the SPS Provider or Subcontractor (as applicable);



- (i) that binding agreement includes obligations on the entity in relation to security management at least as onerous as those relating to Sub-contractors in this Schedule Annex 1 (Security Management);
- (ii) the SPS Provider or Sub-contractor has taken reasonable steps to assure itself that
 - (A) the entity complies with the binding agreement;
 - (B) any system operated by the SPS Provider or Sub-contractor has in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the Sub-contractor will store, access, manage and/or Process the

Government Data as required by this Schedule Annex 1 (*Security Management*); and
- (iii) the SPS Provider has provided the Cabinet Office with such information as the Cabinet Office requires concerning:
 - (A) the entity;
 - (B) the arrangements with the entity; and
 - (C) the entity's compliance with the binding agreement; and
- (iv) the Cabinet Office has not given the SPS Provider a Prohibition Notice under paragraph 1.3.

1.2 Where the SPS Provider cannot comply with one or more of the requirements of paragraph 1.1:

- (a) it must provide the Cabinet Office with such information as the Cabinet Office requests concerning the security controls in places at the relevant location or locations; and
- (b) the Cabinet Office may grant approval to use that location or those locations, and that approval may include conditions; and
- (c) if the Cabinet Office does not grant permission to use that location or those locations, the SPS Provider must cease to store, access or process Cabinet Office Data at that location or those locations within such period as the Cabinet Office may specify.

1.3 The Cabinet Office may by notice in writing at any time give notice to the SPS Provider that it and its Sub-contractors must not undertake or permit to be undertaken, the storage, access or Processing Cabinet Office Data as specified in the notice (a "**Prohibited Activity**").

- (a) in any particular country or group of countries;
- (b) in or using facilities operated by any particular entity or group of entities; or
- (c) in or using any particular facility or group of facilities, whether operated by the SPS Provider, a Sub-contractor or a third-party entity (a "**Prohibition Notice**").

1.4 Where the SPS Provider or Sub-contractor, on the date of the Prohibition Notice undertakes any Relevant Activities affected by the notice, the SPS Provider must, and must procure that Sub-contractors, cease to undertake that Prohibited Activity within 40 Working Days of the date of the Prohibition Notice.

2 Vetting, Training and Staff Access



Vetting before performing or managing Services

- 2.1 The SPS Provider must not engage SPS Provider Personnel, and must ensure that Subcontractors do not engage Sub-contractor Personnel, in any activity relating to the performance and management of the Services unless:
- (a) That individual has passed the security checks listed in paragraph 2.2; or
 - (b) The Cabinet Office has given prior written permission for a named individual to perform a specific role.
- 2.2 For the purposes of paragraph 2.1, the security checks are:
- (a) the checks required for the HMG Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) to verify:
 - (i) the individual's identity;
 - (ii) the individual's nationality and immigration status so as to demonstrate that they have a right to work in the United Kingdom;
 - (iii) the individual's previous employment history; and
 - (iv) that the individual has no Relevant Convictions;
 - (b) national security vetting clearance to the level specified by the Cabinet Office for such individuals or such roles as the Cabinet Office may specify; or
 - (c) such other checks for the SPS Provider Personnel of Sub-contractors as the Cabinet Office may specify.

Annual training

- 2.3 The SPS Provider must ensure, and ensure that Sub-contractors ensure, that all SPS Provider Personnel, complete and pass security training at least once every calendar year that covers:
- (a) general training concerning security and data handling; and
 - (b) phishing, including the dangers from ransomware and other malware.

Staff access

- 2.4 The SPS Provider must ensure, and ensure that Sub-contractors ensure, that individual SPS Provider Personnel can access only the Cabinet Office Data necessary to allow individuals to perform their role and fulfil their responsibilities in the provision of the Services.
- 2.5 The SPS Provider must ensure, and ensure that Sub-contractors ensure, that where individual SPS Provider Personnel no longer require access to the Cabinet Office Data or any part of the Cabinet Office Data, their access to the Cabinet Office Data or that part of the Cabinet Office Data is revoked immediately when their requirement to access Cabinet Office Data ceases.
- 2.6 Where requested by the Cabinet Office, the SPS Provider must remove, and must ensure that Sub-contractors remove, an individual SPS Provider Personnel's access to the Cabinet Office Data or part of that Cabinet Office Data specified by the Cabinet Office as soon as practicable and in any event within 24 hours of the request.



Exception for certain Sub-contractors

- 2.7 Where the SPS Provider considers it cannot ensure that a Sub-contractors will undertake the relevant security checks on any Sub-contractor Personnel, it must:
- (a) as soon as practicable, and in any event within 20 Working Days of becoming aware of the issue, notify the Cabinet Office;
 - (b) provide such information relating to the Sub-contractor, its vetting processes and the roles the affected SPS Provider Personnel will perform as the Cabinet Office reasonably requires; and
 - (c) comply, at the SPS Provider's cost, with all directions the Cabinet Office may provide concerning the vetting of the affected Sub-contractor Personnel and the management of the Sub-contractor.

3 Security Testing

3.1 This paragraph applies only where the Cabinet Office has assessed that this Agreement is a higher-risk consultancy agreement.

Note: the definition of SPS Provider Information Management System includes those information and communications technology systems that Sub-contractors will use to assist or contribute to the SPS Provider providing the Services.

3.2 The SPS Provider must, at the Cabinet Office's option, before providing the Services and when reasonably requested by the Cabinet Office, either:

- (a) conduct security testing of the SPS Provider Information Management System by:
 - (i) engaging a CHECK Service Provider or a CREST Service Provider;
 - (ii) designing and implementing the testing so as to minimise its impact on the SPS Provider Information Management System and the delivery of the Services; and
 - (iii) providing the Cabinet Office with a full, unedited and unredacted copy of the testing report without delay and in any event within ten Working Days of its receipt by the SPS Provider; or
- (b) Provide details of any security testing undertaken by a CHECK Service Provider or a CREST Service Provider in respect of the SPS Provider Information Management System in the calendar year immediately preceding the Cabinet Office's request or the Effective Date (as appropriate), including:
 - (i) the parts of the SPS Provider Information Management System tested;
 - (ii) a full, unedited and unredacted copy of the testing report; and
 - (iii) the remediation plan prepared by the SPS Provider to address any vulnerabilities disclosed by the security testing; and
 - (iv) the SPS Provider's progress in implementing that remediation plan.

3.3 The SPS Provider must remediate any vulnerabilities classified as "medium" or above in the security testing:

- (a) before Processing Cabinet Office data where the vulnerability is discovered before the SPS Provider begins to process Authority Data;



- (b) where the vulnerability is discovered when the SPS Provider has begun to Process Cabinet Office Data:
 - (i) by the date agreed with the Cabinet Office; or
 - (ii) where no such agreement is reached:
 - (A) within five Working Days of becoming aware of the vulnerability and its classification where the vulnerability is classified as critical;
 - (B) within one month of becoming aware of the vulnerability and its classification where the vulnerability is classified as high; and
 - (C) within three months of becoming aware of the vulnerability and its classification where the vulnerability is classified as medium.

4 **End-user Devices**

- 4.1 The SPS Provider must manage, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors manage, all Enduser Devices on which Cabinet Office Data is stored or processed in accordance the following requirements:
 - (a) the operating system and any applications that store, process or have access to Cabinet Office Data must be in current support by the vendor, or the relevant community in the case of open source operating systems or applications;
 - (b) users must authenticate before gaining access;
 - (c) all Cabinet Office Data must be encrypted using a encryption tool agreed to by the Cabinet Office;
 - (d) the End-user Device must lock and require any user to re-authenticate after a period of time that is proportionate to the risk environment, during which the End-user Device is inactive;
 - (e) the End-user Device must be managed in a way that allows for the application of technical policies and controls over applications that have access to Cabinet Office Data;
 - (f) the Supplier or Sub-contractor, as applicable, can, without physical access to the Enduser Device, remove or make inaccessible all Cabinet Office Data on the device and prevent any user or group of users from accessing the device;
 - (g) all End-user Devices are within in the scope of any current Cyber Essentials Plus certificate held by the SPS Provider, or any ISO/IEC 27001:2018 certification issued by a UKAS-approved certification body, where the scope of that certification includes the Services.
- 4.2 The SPS Provider must comply, and ensure that all Sub-contractors comply, with the recommendations in NCSC Device Guidance as if those recommendations were incorporated as specific obligations under this Agreement.
- 4.3 Where there any conflict between the requirements of this Schedule Annex 1 (Security Management) and the requirements of the NCSC Device Guidance, the requirements of this Schedule will take precedence.

5 **Encryption**

- 5.1 Unless paragraph 5.2 applies, the SPS Provider must ensure, and must ensure that all Subcontractors ensure, that Cabinet Office Data is encrypted:



- (a) when stored at any time when no operation is being performed on it; and (b) when transmitted.

5.2 Where the SPS Provider, or a Sub-contractor, cannot encrypt Cabinet Office Data as required by paragraph 5.1, the SPS Provider must:

- (a) immediately inform the Cabinet Office of the subset or subsets of Cabinet Office Data it cannot encrypt and the circumstances in which and the reasons why it cannot do so;
- (b) provide details of the protective measures the SPS Provider or Sub-contractor (as applicable) proposes to take to provide equivalent protection to the Cabinet Office as encryption;
- (c) provide the Cabinet Office with such information relating to the Cabinet Office Data concerned, the reasons why that Cabinet Office Data cannot be encrypted and the proposed protective measures as the Cabinet Office may require.

5.3 The Cabinet Office, the SPS Provider and, where the Cabinet Office requires, any relevant Subcontractor shall meet to agree appropriate protective measures for the unencrypted Cabinet Office Data.

5.4 This paragraph applies where the Cabinet Office has assessed that this Agreement is a high risk consultancy agreement.

Where the Cabinet Office and SPS Provider reach agreement, the SPS Provider must update the Security Management Plan to include:

- (a) the subset or subsets of Cabinet Office Data not encrypted and the circumstances in which that will occur;
- (b) the protective measure that the SPS Provider and/or Sub-contractor will put in place in respect of the unencrypted Cabinet Office Data.

5.5 Where the Cabinet Office and SPS Provider do not reach agreement within 40 Working Days of the date on which the SPS Provider first notified the Cabinet Office that it could not encrypt certain Cabinet Office Data, either party may refer the matter to [be determined by an expert in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Procedure].

6 Access Control

6.1 The SPS Provider must, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors:

- (a) identify and authenticate all persons who access the SPS Provider Information Management System and Sites before they do so;
- (b) require multi-factor authentication for all user accounts that have access to Cabinet Office Data or that are Privileged Users;
- (c) allow access only to those parts of the SPS Provider Information Management System and Sites that those persons require;
- (d) maintain records detailing each person's access to the SPS Provider Information Management System and Sites, and make those records available to the Cabinet Office on request.



- 6.2 The SPS Provider must ensure, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors ensure, that the user accounts for Privileged Users of the SPS Provider Information Management System:
- (a) are accessible only from dedicated End-user Devices;
 - (b) are configured so that those accounts can only be used for system administration tasks;
 - (c) require passwords with high complexity that are changed regularly;
 - (d) automatically log the user out of the SPS Provider Information Management System after a period of time that is proportionate to the risk environment during which the account is inactive.
- 6.3 The SPS Provider must require, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors require, that Privileged Users use unique and substantially different passwords for their different accounts on the SPS Provider Information Management System.
- 6.4 The SPS Provider must, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors:
- (a) configure any hardware that forms part of the SPS Provider Information Management System that is capable of requiring a password before it is accessed to require a password; and
 - (b) change the default password of that hardware to a password of high complexity that is substantially different from the password required to access similar hardware.

7 Malicious Software

- 7.1 The SPS Provider shall install and maintain Anti-virus Software or procure that Anti-virus Software is installed and maintained on the SPS Provider Information Management System.
- 7.2 The SPS Provider shall ensure that such Anti-virus Software:
- (a) is configured to perform automatic software and definition updates;
 - (b) performs regular scans of the SPS Provider Information Management System to check for and prevent the introduction of Malicious Software; and
 - (c) where Malicious Software has been introduced into the SPS Provider Information Management System, identifies, contains the spread of, and minimises the impact of Malicious Software.
- 7.3 If Malicious Software is found, the Parties shall cooperate to reduce the effect of the Malicious Software and, particularly if Malicious Software causes loss of operational efficiency or loss or corruption of Cabinet Office Data, assist each other to mitigate any Losses and to restore the Services to their desired operating efficiency.
- 7.4 Any cost arising out of the actions of the parties taken in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 7.3 shall be borne by the parties as follows:
- (a) by the SPS Provider where the Malicious Software originates from the SPS Provider Software, any third-party software licenced by the SPS Provider or the Cabinet Office Data (whilst the Cabinet Office Data was under the control of the SPS Provider) unless the SPS Provider can demonstrate that such Malicious Software was present and not quarantined or otherwise identified by the Cabinet Office when provided to the SPS Provider; and
 - (b) by the Cabinet Office, in any other circumstance.



8 Breach of Security

- 8.1 If either party becomes aware of a Breach of Security it shall notify the other as soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware of the breach, and in any event within 24 hours.
- 8.2 The SPS Provider must, upon becoming aware of a Breach of Security or attempted Breach of Security immediately take those steps identified in the Security Management Plan (if applicable) and all other reasonably steps necessary to:
- (a) minimise the extent of actual or potential harm caused by such Breach of Security;
 - (b) remedy such Breach of Security to the extent possible;
 - (c) apply a tested mitigation against any such Breach of Security; and
 - (d) prevent a further Breach of Security in the future which exploits the same root cause failure.
- 8.3 As soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, within five Working Days, or such other period agreed with the Cabinet Office, following the Breach of Security or attempted Breach of Security, provide to the Cabinet Office full details of the Breach of Security or attempted Breach of Security, including a root cause analysis where required by the Cabinet Office.
- 8.4 The SPS Provider must take the steps required by paragraph 8.2 at its own cost and expense.

9 Sub-contractors

The SPS Provider must assess the parts of the information and communications technology system and the Sites that its Sub-contractors will use to provide the Services against the NCSC Cloud Security Principles at their own cost and expense to demonstrate that the people, process, technical and physical controls have been delivered in an effective way. The Subcontractor must document that assessment and make that documentation available to the Cabinet Office at the Cabinet Office's request.

10 Third-party Software

The SPS Provider must not, and must ensure that Sub-contractors do not, use any software to Process Cabinet Office Data where the licence terms of that software purport to grant the licensor rights to Progress the Cabinet Office Data greater than those rights strictly necessary for the use of the software.

11 Deletion of Cabinet Office Data

The SPS Provider must, and must ensure that all Sub-contractors, securely erase any or all Cabinet Office Data held by the SPS Provider or Sub-contractor when requested to do so by the Cabinet Office using a deletion method that ensures that even a determined expert using specialist techniques can recover only a small fraction of the data deleted.

Signature Area

Organisation Name:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Role/Title:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Name:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Signature:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Organisation Name:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Role/Title:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Name:

REDACTED TEXT under FOIA Section 40, Personal Information

Signature: