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Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for Strategic Support to the Ministry of Interior Phase Two (SSMI II)

DFID Afghanistan

Introduction:

1. These Terms of Reference (ToRs) outline DFID's 3.5 year (2015–2019) programme of technical support to the Ministry of Interior (Ministry of Interior) of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (the Government). The value range of the implementation contract is £7m - £9.5m. A separate monitoring and evaluation contract will be procured for this programme.
2. The UK's focus on promoting stability in Afghanistan delivers on the National Security Council (NSC) Strategy for Afghanistan, which is informed by the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011). By supporting the institutional development of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, this Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) programme contributes to the goals of promoting security and stability and supporting the prosperity and development of Afghanistan under the UK's Afghanistan Country Business Plan 2015-2018. Specifically, this programme contributes to the outcomes of an effective and sustainable ANSF, improving civilian security institutions, promoting good government and reducing corruption. The programme will be managed by the Public Sector Reform Team (PSRT) in DFID Afghanistan, working out of the British Embassy in Kabul.
3. These terms of reference cover the implementation of the SSMI II programme through the provision of a team of long-term and short-term international and Afghan advisers, training courses, mentoring and other skills-transfer methods. The programme will start with a 6 month inception phase and, if the context allows, a scaled-up programme of support for the final period of the programme, as the multilateral interventions providing support to the Ministry of Interior scale down.

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Objective:

4. The **goal** of the programme is to *improve service delivery by the Afghan National Police* through improved allocation and use of resources.
5. The **outcome** is to improve the Ministry of Interior's ability to manage the Afghan National Police; through exercising good governance, making the Ministry of Interior more capable, more accountable and more responsive to the public.
6. The supplier will supply a team, both international and Afghan nationals, to the Ministry of Interior to build institutional capacity to deliver on its 5-year strategy. This should allow the Ministry of Interior to better understand policing needs across the country and therefore allocate resources more effectively to meet those needs; hold the police to account and ensure that Ministry of Interior officials have the skills needed to manage the Ministry effectively.
7. The programme will therefore focus on public sector reform activities and will not initially engage on security sector reform activities as these are currently covered by other development partners and multilateral missions. However, as other multilateral missions draw down their engagement, there may be scope to review and expand activities into this area.

Recipient:

8. The primary beneficiary of these services provided will be the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Key stakeholders within the Ministry will be the Minister of Interior, the Chief of Staff and the three Deputy Ministers. Other key Ministry of Interior staff will include the Director General Budget, the Ministry of Interior Inspector General, and the Ministry of Interior Spokesperson as head of the Media and Public Affairs Department.
9. A Memorandum of Understanding will be signed between DFID and the Ministry of Interior to underpin the SSMI II programme, setting up a programme governance structure including regular Steering Group Meetings involving DFID Afghanistan and the Minister of Interior and selected other Deputy Ministers as well as regular meetings with the Country Head of DFID Afghanistan and the UK Ambassador.

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Scope:

10. The supplier should undertake the work primarily based out of the Ministry of Interior in Kabul. The supplier should also be prepared to travel to and work with other relevant ministries and civil society organisations on a regular basis, for example the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Women's Affairs etc. The supplier will need to work with a range of Government and development partner counterparts.
11. There will be a requirement that team members will be able to travel to and operate in provincial police headquarters to carry out trainings and mentoring. As the programme scales up after the first 6 months, the team may be required to take on additional work in the provinces to compensate for the withdrawal of the multilateral missions that have previously provided technical assistance at the level of provincial police headquarters.

Programme Requirements:

Approach

12. The SSMI II programme will be delivered through the provision of a team of long-term and short-term international and Afghan advisers, training courses, mentoring and other capacity building and skills-transfer methods.
13. Given the fast changing nature of the security context and international support, DFID would like this programme to be delivered flexibly, according to the principles of Problem Driven Iterative Analysis (PDIA) (See Annex B for more information).
14. The successful supplier will be expected to work closely with an evaluation agent who will verify political economy analysis, conflict analysis and feedback on programme effectiveness on an ongoing basis. The evaluation agent will be contracted separately by DFID to start in October 2015 at the same time as the programme; the evaluation contract cannot be won by the same supplier that wins the contract for the implementation of the SSMI II programme.

Programme Logframe / Monitoring Mechanism

15. DFID will provide a logframe to cover programme mobilisation and the inception phase.

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16. The supplier should develop options for the programme monitoring mechanism, for example, a logframe, and approach to programme monitoring during the inception phase. This will be reviewed and agreed and accepted by DFID at the end of the inception phase.
17. Continuous monitoring of the programme should be undertaken by the supplier through a monitoring component. This should allow more effective iterative management of the programme, by confirming which approaches are working and allowing for adaptation of activities to achieve outputs and outcomes. It will also allow DFID to test the theory of change and delivery of benefits, providing a strengthened evidence base for future programming of this nature.

Evaluation

18. An independent evaluation agent will be contracted to set an evaluation framework for the programme, verify progress towards achieving the programme impact and evaluate the delivery of the programme and if lessons are being learned. The evaluation agent will undertake reviews at set intervals and may also undertake annual reviews and the programme completion review.
19. The supplier should monitor the programme and demonstrate the results of the programme and adapt activities to take on lessons learned. This will include working with the evaluation agent and DFID on the design of the evaluation framework and approach for the programme during the inception phase.

Inception Phase Deliverables:

20. During the inception phase the supplier is expected to:
 - a) **Deliverable 1** - Within the first month of the inception phase produce a report, workplan and presentation to DFID including:

Report:

- An update on progress of the programme;
- Assessment of which existing activities from SSMI 1 should continue, change or stop to consolidate progress that has been made by UK support under the SSMI I programme. This should enable some continuity of support and presence in the Ministry of Interior;
- Assessment of quick win opportunities to demonstrate the value of the programme;

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- Assessment of pilot activities that should be tested during the inception phase;
- A proposed approach to use a PDIA to manage the programme. This should reflect the need to manage the programme flexibly, responding to opportunities as they arise, in consultation with DFID, the Ministry of Interior and other donors. The approach may include activities such as regular updates of political economy analysis, risk management, review of monitoring assumptions and continual learning.

Workplan:

- A workplan of activities to be taken forward in the inception phase, taking into account the above assessments. This should identify activities from SSMI I to continue, quick win opportunities and any new pilot activities; and

b) **Deliverable 2** - At the end of the inception phase - produce a final inception report(s) that considers covering the following areas covering the following areas, no longer than 50 pages (excluding annexes):

- An in-depth political economy analysis to inform identification of areas of focus for the programme, including measure of Government commitment that can be assessed in regular programme reviews;
- Confirm any gaps in analysis for possible work areas and if appropriate, consider whether programme focus should be narrowed or altered for maximum impact;
- Design and identify programme outputs and activities to support the programme outcome, based on the priorities of the Ministry of Interior and to harmonise with other donor or multilateral plans;
- A detailed forward workplan no longer than 1 year and a high level indicative workplan for the remaining programme timeframe;
- The programme monitoring approach including a plan for a monitoring work stream and options for the programme monitoring mechanism for example, a logframe and approach to programme monitoring;
- An update to the proposed approach to use a PDIA to manage the programme, if necessary;
- A review and update of the programme theory of change;

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- Stakeholder mapping and analysis with proposed stakeholder engagement approach for the programme and DFID;
- A risk assessment and proposed risk management approach;
- Make one or more presentations to DFID on the inception report and proposals on the plans, approach, management and monitoring of the programme;
- Make a one or more presentations to stakeholders including British Embassy colleagues and other sector stakeholders on the key findings of the inception phase and forward plans; and
- The supplier's input to the design of the evaluation framework and approach for the programme.

21. At the end of this 6 the inception report will be reviewed and DFID will decide whether to continue with the work or not. This will be the first break point in the contract.

Expectations of the supplier during the programme:

22. During the inception phase and during course of the programme, the supplier is expected to:

- a) Provide regular reports and updates to the political economy analysis, frequency and format to be decided at the end of the inception period;
- b) Provide regular programme management reports to DFID – frequency and format to be decided at the end of the inception phase;
- c) Provide regular reports and updates to DFID and/or knowledge sharing events on strategic issues and risks relevant to the programme and sector, frequency and format to be decided at the end of the inception period;
- d) Participate in all DFID reviews of the programme;
- e) Provide relevant technical expertise to support the programme. This may include mechanisms to draw on police and security sector expertise;
- f) Coordinate with other stakeholders including Resolute Support Mission, EUPOL, GPPT;
- g) Work collaboratively with the evaluation agent and undertake all other necessary engagement with the evaluation agent as deemed necessary by DFID. The supplier should to undertake review of the programme,

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report progress to DFID and make this information available to the evaluation agent;

- h) Undertake effective programme and financial management of the programme to manage resources efficiently;
- i) Engaging with the DFID and the evaluation agent on a regular basis and respond to the recommendations and findings of the evaluation agent and DFID; and
- j) The supplier will be expected to make the necessary programme documentation and key personnel available to the evaluation agent.

Indicative areas of work

23. The indicative areas of work and some activities for programme are set out below. The supplier should explore the relevance and feasibility of these and other activities in order to deliver the programme outcome. These indicative areas of work / activities are not exclusive or exhaustive.

24. As a priority area for the UK Government, the promotion of human rights and an awareness of gender issues will form an integral part of all outputs. Under SSMI I, there has been a standalone output working to 'improve levels of support for Women in Policing'. It is critical that progress continues under SSMI II to ensure the UK continues to support gender programming across Afghanistan.

Enhance leadership capacity in the area of strategy and policy development and implementation

- Building capability in development and implementation of strategy and policy;
- A strategic leadership programme;
- Support the process of preparing a long term policing plan;
- Design and roll-out of a senior leadership development programme;
- Preparation of an overarching longer term policing plan; and
- Support to civilianisation of the Ministry of Interior.

Policy development, strategic planning and programme budgeting and monitoring

- Improved functions and capacity of staff in the Ministry for Interior in these areas;
- Operational capabilities to oversee and coordinate the execution of strategies through well managed, financially resourced and monitored programmes and projects;

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- Development of a framework to ensure capacity-building in this area extends to the provinces and improves Ministry of Interior links between provinces and Kabul;
- Develop clearer communication and decision-making systems between Ministry of Interior departments and between central and provincial level; and
- Support to monitoring and evaluation.

Human resource management reform and ministry restructuring

- Introduction of an HR policy framework enabling the Ministry of Interior to fill the current civilian establishment, focusing on key posts;
- Look at steps to increase the proportion of staff in specialist posts that have relevant skills and experience;
- Tackling blockages in recruitment processes; and
- Streamline functions and implement good force management planning, in support of “right sizing” of the ministry.

Improved accountability and oversight mechanisms for the Ministry of Interior to hold itself and the police to account

- A programme of policies to be developed to determine the professional standards to be adopted by the Afghan National Police in their interactions with the public;
- Training in policy and strategy, development of to guide the police in their tasks and interaction with the public; and
- Development of a police complaints board.

Improved representation of and protection of women in policing

- Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law and SCR1325 Implementation Plan;
- Contribute to greater donor coherence on gender issues in the Ministry of Interior;
- Better understanding amongst Ministry of Interior, Afghan National Police and the Afghan public of the crucial role women must play in policing;
- Activities to support longer-term change in negative attitudes and a reduction of violence towards women in the police force;
- Better strategies and increased resources to recruit, retain, support and protect women in the police force; and
- Improved MOI engagement with, and accountability, to external stakeholders including civil society and the media.

Better public outreach including civil society and the media

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- Improved mechanisms for gathering information on the public's expectations to allow Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police to be more responsive to those expectations and allocate resources more efficiently;
- Improving Ministry of Interior's ability to engage and share information with groups including civil society and the media;
- Improved ability of the Ministry of Interior to increase awareness of the role that it and police need to play in service delivery; and
- Enhancing the Ministry of Interior's through better understanding of communities policing needs.

Constraints & Dependencies:

25. This programme will be mainly based in Kabul; however, provincial trips will be necessary. The Supplier will take responsibility for duty of care for its personnel in Afghanistan.
26. The supplier must complete the requirements and outputs and deliverables that the Inception Plan identifies by the end of March 2019. Any amendment to the programme outputs or timeframes must be discussed and agreed with DFID.
27. Operating in the volatile and insecure environment of Afghanistan requires a high degree of conflict sensitivity. This means managing security risks for programme staff and partners. Moreover, this means that the programme needs to make sure it does no harm.

Implementation Requirements:

28. The supplier is required to implement the programme on the basis of the following key principles and is requested to set out in the bid proposal how they will apply these principles to the work:
- Relevance to context and capacity so that the programme remains relevant to the conflict and security context and brokers solutions that suit

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the culture, organisational context and capacity. The programme will also emphasise building the capacity of the ministry to deliver reform itself, rather than substituting capacity to reach reform goals;

- Flexibility and responsiveness to political environment to ensure support responds to changes in priorities and takes advantage of windows of opportunity. This should use a PDIA approach and will require provide frequently updated political economy analysis;
- Partnership with the Afghan government so that interventions support an Afghan-led reform process in the Ministry of Interior to deliver the 5-year Ministry of Interior Strategy. Ministers and senior officials in the Ministry of Interior must be the driving force behind overseeing and steering technical interventions;
- Coordinating and adding value to other contributions particularly multilaterals such as EUPOL and RSM. The programme will build partnerships with other donors wherever possible to share risk and broker understanding between the international community and the Ministry of Interior. As multilateral missions draw down, the UK should look to expand the programme's donor base;
- Broad engagement and coalition building, both within the Ministry of Interior and with agents for change outside the Ministry of Interior; and
- Monitoring and Evaluation to ensure that lessons are understood, learned and applied continuously.

29. The supplier will manage all of the programme activities and inputs except the independent evaluation.

Programme Personnel

30. The supplier will be responsible for appointing the long-term advisers that will form the core of the programme. Advisers will be appointed with the agreement of DFID. There will need to be at least two long-term advisers in Kabul at any one time. Ministry of Interior will be consulted on the selection of these advisers and will be invited to take part in the tender exercise. The supplier will also need to establish and maintain the pool of short-term experts. Candidates will be vetted by the supplier, approved by DFID Afghanistan and discussed with the Ministry of Interior.

31. Project personnel should contain a mix of national and international consultants. In the case international consultants, wherever possible they should have experience of Interior Ministries in similar legal pluralism and cultural contexts. The team will be led by a highly experienced, credible team leader with the gravitas to engage strategically with the Minister of Interior and other senior stakeholders. The team leader will have extensive professional

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experience of working with political leaders and leading institutional reform. All long-term international advisers and short-term experts will have to undergo a familiarisation course, provided by the supplier before deployment on the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police, in order to ensure that they are operational and effective once mobilised.

Skills required:

32. The supplier will need to ensure that 2 long term advisors are present in Kabul at any one time over the life of the programme. These will comprise of the Team Leader and two other personnel (due to rotations and leave) that will between them have the following skills and experience:

Resident Team Leader: This post will require more than 10 years' experience in managing and motivating multi-disciplinary teams in complex and fluid environments. They should have experience of working strategically and engaging with senior Government and Donor counterparts. They require extensive experience in public sector reform and security sector reform, ideally with experience working in a Ministry of Interior (in a developing conflict or post-conflict context).

Other long-term personnel: Will have 5-10 years' experience in developing and post-conflict country contexts and are able to deputise for the team leader. They should have experience overseeing programme management and administration in challenging environments.

All long term personnel should have the following skills and experience:

- Excellent communication, team-working and stakeholder management skills;
- Strategic planning and critical thinking;
- Facilitation and negotiation skills;
- Political awareness;
- Significant experience of public sector reform, institutional development, change management and capacity building; and
- Experience working with a Ministry in a conflict affected country
Appreciation of cultural contexts.

The following should be demonstrated through the experience across the group of long term personnel:

- Promotion of transparency and accountability of Government in a development / conflict context;
- Experience in gender / women in policing;

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- Knowledge of the Afghanistan context;
- Political analysis skills;
- Language skills – Dari and Pashto;
- Experience working with international military and police;
- Experience in public relations, communications and outreach; and
- Experience of promoting participation of women in police and security sector; and child rights and protection with a focus on criminal justice aspects, juvenile detention, prevention and combating of violence against children.

The long term personnel will also need, either directly or through reach back:

- Operational and policy level understanding of human rights standards for law enforcement in key areas such as arrest, detention, use of force, women's and child/juvenile rights standards, fair trial rights;
- Understanding of effective police complaints and accountability processes (internal and external), knowledge of wider legal and justice system context in Afghanistan; and
- Monitoring and evaluation skills, especially in designing appropriate baselines and reporting against DFID logframes.

The pool of short term experts should have, but not be limited to, the following experience:

- Experience of formulating strategy, policy, guidance and standard operating procedures (SOP);
- Experience of disseminating policy guidance and SOPs including developing training curricula;
- Professionalisation of staff in areas such as human resource management, budgeting and financial management and programme management;
- Experience of facilitating civil society capacity development and strategic platform and alliance building;
- Tackling gender issues and violence against women (VAW) and children: the police response and policy frameworks for combating violence against women in a similar context; and
- An excellent understanding of VAW issues in Afghanistan, relevant international standards, police and policy making experience; understanding of non-discrimination standards for recruitment, sexual harassment policy etc.

Mobilisation and Deployment

33. As soon as the contract has been awarded, the programme should begin mobilisation. The current SSMI I programme concludes at the end of

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September 2015 so DFID would like the new programme to start as soon as possible in October 2015 to avoid a gap in programming. Suppliers are to include their plans and time frames for mobilisation and transfer from the existing programme to the new programme.

Performance Requirements:

34. DFID aims to maximize the impact of each pound spent. This is analysed through the lens of the 'three E's': economy; efficiency and effectiveness.

35. As such, Value for money (VfM) is a key objective of the SSMI II programme and so it is important that the programme is assessed on the basis on the three E's:

- Economy (spending less): This refers to ensuring lowest cost procurement of goods and services within project design, and focuses on making sure that the unit costs are benchmarked against market norms;
- Efficiency (spending well): This refers to ensuring that the choice of goods and services procured results in the envisaged outputs. The input to output ratios are the key consideration; and
- Effectiveness (spending wisely): This refers to the selection of those outputs most likely to result in the desired outcomes (and impacts).

36. In their bid proposals suppliers should detail how they will demonstrate VfM over the inception phase of this work. The Inception Plan will provide the detail as to how VfM will be delivered during the implementation.

37. Bidding suppliers are expected to propose Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that can be monitored to demonstrate value for money and performance of the contract Inception Phase, as a part of their proposal. These will explain how they propose to achieve outputs on the identified work streams. Discussion around how the KPIs can be developed, adapted and best utilised for the needs of the programme will be an essential aspect of the Inception Plan.

Reporting:

38. On contract award the supplier should have an immediate meeting with DFID programme staff to establish the frequency of meeting and reporting requirements. Once settled the minimum will be for the supplier will provide a programme update and meet DFID programme staff on a monthly basis. This will

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continue during the inception phase and culminate in the report at the end of the inception phase as outlined in Deliverable 1.

39. At the end of the inception DFID will agree the format and frequency of reporting for the remainder of the programme. This will include regular updates on the political economy analysis and regular programme management reports. These reports should cover updates on programme activities, the programme monitoring framework e.g. logframe and programme finances.
40. The supplier is also expected to provide regular updates to DFID and/or knowledge sharing events on strategic issues relevant to the programme and sector, frequency and format to be decided at the end of the inception period.
41. Moving from the inception phase of the programme to the remainder of the programme will occur on the basis of reviews by DFID with input from the independent evaluation agent based on programme effectiveness and value for money. DFID Afghanistan will make the final decision on whether to move from inception phase to implementing the main programme phase and at what scale it will operate. DFID will also decide review points and monitoring arrangements for the remainder of the programme at the end of the inception phase.
42. DFID will confirm of the deliverables acceptance in writing after all reports and presentations have been delivered throughout the programme.
43. The supplier will report to the DFID Afghanistan Public Sector Reform Team Leader and Programme Manager. This programme is part of a joint-CSSF programme; therefore the FCO will be an important stakeholder in the programme.
44. Other key stakeholders will be the leadership of Resolute Support Mission, EUPOL and other donors working in the Ministry of Interior.

Timeframes

45. The supplier will be contracted for a period of 3.5 years (including inception phase) with an anticipated start date of 1st October 2015. The initial contract will be let for a period of up to 3.5 years in the first instance but will include a breakpoint after the inception phase at 6 months other review points over the course of the programme, yet to be decided. Progression from 1 period to the next will be subject to satisfactory performance of the supplier, the continuing requirement of the services and agreement on workplans and budget for the following period.

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46. The programme will be implemented in phases.
- Inception phase (6-months)
 - Scale-up phase and remaining programme (3 years)
47. The successful supplier will have the opportunity to discuss and agree on a final work plan for the inception period during the start-up meetings with DFID within 2 weeks of the contract being awarded.
48. There will be a 6 month inception phase to design and identify programme outputs and activities for the programme. DFID will review the programme at the end of the 6 month inception phase to review deliverables, progress to date and proposed future work. The inception phase report will need to be agreed with DFID before any activities and additional consultants related to activities are engaged. At the end of the inception phase DFID will decide programme outputs, reporting arrangements, format and frequency that will satisfy and enable ongoing adjustments to the programme.
49. From 2017 the programme may be required to scale up activities based on learning and successful activities during the beginning of the programme in line with the drawdown of multilateral missions.
50. The contract may be further extended up to a maximum of 24 months dependent on the success of the supplier and the political environment and availability of funding.
51. If DFID decides not to proceed beyond contractual break points, the contract will be terminated at no cost to DFID with the design and any associated work being the property of DFID.

Pre-bid meeting

52. There will be a pre-bid meeting after the PQQ stage for successful suppliers to discuss programme requirements.

DFID Co-ordination:

53. The Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the SSMI II programme will be the Public Sector Reform Team (PSRT) Leader.

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Background:

UK Support to the Ministry of Interior

54. This programme will be funded through the UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). It is part of a wider programme of support to Afghan policing that includes secondment of five advisors to Resolute Support Mission's capacity building effort in the Ministry of Interior; focussing on budgeting, payroll and strategic policing, plus a maximum of two secondments to EUPOL and two advisors to the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) Special Operations Group. The SSMI II programme comes under the same business case as these secondments, thus there is a requirement that the SSMI II supplier work closely and coordinate with RSM and EUPOL in delivering this programme. Currently, funding has been secured for the first 6-months of the SSMI II programme. DFID Afghanistan will need to bid for multi-year funding from the CSSF during next year's bidding round. The need for multi-year funding has already been highlighted to the CSSF Secretariat in the pipeline. The scope of work will be reviewed and may be adjusted or expanded depending on analysis of the context and the work of other development partners.

55. In addition the UK will pay its £70m Chicago commitment for the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces to police salaries - at least initially through the UNDP-Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan; the supplier will thus also be required to work closely with UNDP-LOTFA.

Context

56. At the London Conference on Afghanistan on December 4th 2014 the new Afghan Government and the International Community reaffirmed their partnership and commitment to reform. The National Unity Government (NUG), with the support of the international community, is committed to immediate reforms including improving security and tackling the underlying drivers of corruption. The Afghan government has also committed to a comprehensive programme of governance reform to professionalise Afghanistan's security establishment.¹

57. Despite the most recent commitments to security reform, lack of security is seen by most Afghans as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan.² Violence

¹ The Government (2014) Realizing Self Reliance: Commitment to Reforms and Renewed Partnership. London Conference on Afghanistan, December 2014, para.19, pg.8

² The Asia Foundation (2014) Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People. Released 11/18/2014

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and discrimination against women is pervasive. Insecurity and the predatory behaviour of the police also impact on the economy by constraining private sector development.³

58. Research by the World Bank has demonstrated that lack of physical security is a major impediment to poverty reduction⁴. The World Development Report 2011⁵ warns that one of the biggest threats to development in the 21st century is chronic insecurity caused by cycles of criminal and political violence. Long-term economic growth, poverty reduction, human security and state legitimacy in Afghanistan will thus depend on establishing a functioning law and order system, which relies on the development of an effective police force.
59. Recent research sponsored by DFID found that provision of security is the primary criterion of state legitimacy, as the police service is the principal interface with the state for most Afghans.⁶ The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) need to effectively deliver on their responsibility to provide security to the Afghan population in order to increase stability, economic potential and, ultimately, state legitimacy. In the context of the recent international troop withdrawal and the impending reduction of multilateral support to the security ministries over the next two years, it is essential that the ANSF becomes able to deliver this service independently and sustainably.
60. Since 2002, the Afghan National Police has been built up from nothing to a force of over 150,000. Assistance to policing in Afghanistan intensified from around 2007 in response to donor concern over the growing insurgency and poor progress in police development. Since then, international actors such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the European Policing Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) have significantly shaped core decisions about the direction of the Afghan National Police and force strength.
61. The Afghan security ministries have not been included in wider public sector reform processes such as public financial management and human resource management reforms. As a result the Ministry of Interior lags behind other Afghan ministries in development of robust and accountable systems. Efforts focused on building institutional capacity have largely been delivered through ISAF with a focus on operational and tactical delivery as a fighting force

³ IMF Country Report No. 14/128, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Available: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf>

⁴ World Bank (1999) *Voices of the Poor*. Research Initiative. Accessed at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20622514~menuPK:336998~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html>

⁵ World Bank (2011) *World Development Report*.

⁶ The Liaison Office (2014) *Assessing State Legitimacy in Afghanistan and the Role of the International Community* (unpublished)

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against the insurgency. This is at odds with a more recent push by the international community and the Ministry of Interior itself to transition towards a community policing model.

62. A number of key challenges to reform in the Ministry of Interior continue to exist, most notably: a lack of incentives to civilianise administrative roles or carry out reforms that would reduce nepotism and corruption; a Ministry structure that does not encourage internal communication; uncoordinated international assistance that has in some cases provided conflicting advice; and a culture that does not value the role of women in policing.
63. Despite the challenges, there have been a number of encouraging recent developments. Former Minister of Interior Patang issued a 'Ten Year Vision for the Afghan National Police' for the years 1392-1402. This has been translated into a five-year MOI Strategy and a three-year MOI Plan, endorsed by the most recent Minister of Interior Daudzai in May 2014. These documents are the first overarching strategic planning tools developed by the Ministry of Interior itself and support donor coordination by setting out priority reforms. Minister Daudzai also signed the 'Strategy for the Management of the Affairs of Female Personnel' (SMAFP), the first Afghan Ministry of Interior strategy aimed at increasing female police and their protection in the workplace.
64. The appointment in January 2015 of Noorulhaq Ulomi as Minister of Interior was cautiously welcomed as demonstrating intent to reform the Ministry of Interior. Early indications are positive, with a swift streamlining of Deputy Minister Positions and a reorganisation of the dysfunctional human resource management system. A new leader has taken over the Personnel and Recruitment Departments, reporting directly to the Minister. A cell of reformers in the Minister's office is tasked to deliver high-end strategy and reform. The UK has been in discussions with advisors from this cell, and will develop its support to the Ministry of Interior in line with the reform priorities of the Minister.

Future international support to Ministry of Interior

65. The recent security transition has seen a shift by major multilateral providers of assistance to the ANSF away from tactical and operational support towards more strategic support focused at ministry level. On 1st January 2015, the International Special Assistance Force (ISAF) handed over to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which has a mandate to train, advise and assist in the capacity development of the ANSF, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence.

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66. EUPOL's mandate has been renewed to cover the years 2015-2016. Over that period, EUPOL will move towards a more strategic institution-building focus, reducing its provincial footprint and cutting its numbers from 400 to 150.
67. The third major provider is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which manages the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). LOTFA VII had four proposed pillars: i) police sustainment (salary payments) ii) Ministry of Interior Institutional Reform iii) Afghan National Police Professionalisation iv) community policing. However, in December 2014 President Ghani agreed only to sign off a 6-month inception phase of the planned 3-year programme, alongside a conditions-based payroll transition plan negotiated with donors. It is unlikely that UNDP-LOTFA will play a strong role in Ministry of Interior reform outside of payroll functions in the future. More detail on UNDP-LOTFA is available in the CSSF Programme Document covering the UK's Chicago Contribution.
68. The above administrative landscape demonstrates that multilateral missions plan a big push on institutional development of the Ministry of Interior over the next two years. The security ministries must, however, anticipate a significant drop off in support at the end of 2016 as the big multilateral interventions draw to a close.
69. To date, the UK has contributed to Ministry of Interior reform and Afghan National Police sustainment through contributions to police salaries; secondments to the ISAF Ministry of Interior Ministerial Advisory Group; secondments to EUPOL; staff support to the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB); and bilateral technical assistance through the DFID Strategic Support to the Ministry of Interior (SSMI I) programme, which was launched in 2011 and runs until September 2015.
70. The UK recognises that institutional reform is a long-term process that must be implemented incrementally, building on existing systems and relying on local political will for success. While RSM and EUPOL will make a valuable contribution over the next two years, the Ministry of Interior will need continued support beyond this date to embed reforms and take on full responsibility for decision-making, strategic direction and management of the Afghan National Police in the absence of international mentors.
71. With its proven experience of public sector reform assistance in Afghanistan and the good reputation of the SSMI I programme, the UK is well-placed to provide the technical assistance and capacity building that will be needed by the Ministry of Interior over the medium-term. This assistance will ensure that

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the UK's investment in this sector to date is sustainable, consolidating the gains of multilateral and bilateral efforts, increasing the efficiency of the Ministry of Interior moving through the Transformation Decade and supporting effective handling of Chicago funds through to 2017. As the number of actors in the Ministry of Interior diminishes, the UK's added value and ability to influence reform will increase.

Evaluation Criteria

See Annex C for details.

Other Requirements:

Guidelines for Submitting Bids:

72. The supplier will be required to prepare and submit a detailed technical bid for all the specified components except the independent evaluation. In responding to these ToRs, bidding suppliers will need to ensure that the following elements (as a minimum) are included in their response:

- Proposed Methodology and Approach: to include details of the supplier's proposed approach to deliver:
 - Delivering the inception phase, planning and scoping the programme focused on delivering the programme outcome.
 - Scale-up and delivery of the programme (after inception).
 - The approach to managing the programme flexibly using a PDIA approach, including approach to political economy analysis.
 - The approach to designing a monitoring framework such as a logframe.
 - Include the key risks that they have identified, including programme specific risks and wider risks and should outline how the plan to mitigate them.
 - The approach to coordinating and adding value to the contributions of other donor partners and UK contributions.
 - Approach to working with a separate evaluation agent.
- CVs for the proposed staffing of the core resident team and indicative CVs for the pool of short-term experts (i.e. national and international) will be

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required. This will also need to include details of Dari/Pashto language capacity within the core resident team and expert pool.

- Financial proposal: to include the indicative budget for the lifetime of the project including daily rates for the resident team, short-term experts, security and other costs.

73. The supplier will be expected to provide security arrangements for the resident team and short-term consultants over the lifetime of the project and ensure that all duty of care issues are appropriately addressed. These costs will need to be factored in and identified separately in the financial proposal.

Budget:

74. The budget for the programme of work outlined in these terms of reference is in the region of £7 – 9.5 million over 3.5 years.

National Technical Advisors (NTAs)

75. If NTAs are to be employed during the course of this contract then the employing organisation is to comply with the Afghan Government Policy which governs the rates those NTAs should be paid. Donor nations including DFID have agreed to implement this within any contractual agreements which will use NTAs.

Fraud and Corruption

76. DFID recognises fraud and corruption as a critical development challenge and seeks to tackle it through direct and indirect activities. **DFID's policy on corruption and fraud** is linked to the way we manage risks. We are willing to accept a degree of risk because but require appropriate measures (mitigation) to be in place. When we find fraud and corruption in DFID programming we have zero tolerance towards it. If fraud is suspected or discovered during the course of this contract suppliers are required to inform DFID staff immediately. Contracts will be suspended if there are indications or fraud or corruption and this may result to termination of the contract if the supplier has not brought this to DFID's attention.

77. The supplier should make sure they provide assurance to DFID on their anti-fraud and counter corruption policies and procedures. DFID may consider undertaking a comprehensive assessment of due diligence on prospective

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partners by an independent assessor. The assessment, where appropriate, identifies areas which need strengthening and this can lead to an agreed action plan undertaken by the partner to ensure that it meets acceptable standards.

Break Points:

78. Due to its duration, the contract must have adequate provision for variation to adapt to changes that occur during the life of the programme. Following DFID reviews, DFID shall reserve the right to request changes to the contract, including the services, the Terms of Reference and the contract priced to reflect lessons learned, changes in circumstances, policies or objectives relating to or affecting this programme.

79. The key review points for this programme will be at the end of the Inception phase (six months after contract start). There will be future break point throughout the remainder of the programme, yet to be determined. These will be decided at the end of the inception phase. At this point DFID will also decide programme outputs, reporting arrangements, format and frequency that will satisfy and enable ongoing adjustments to the programme.

80. At each point DFID reserves the right to terminate the contract in the event of unsatisfactory performance and delivery of outputs. DFID further reserve the right to terminate the contract in the event of substantial changes in the Government of Afghanistan or within the operating environment of the programme.

Format and Content of Responses:

81. Service providers should refer to accompanying ITT volume 1 where full guidance is available about how and when to respond to this tender.

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Annex A: DFID overall programme/intervention summary risk assessment matrix

Project/intervention title: [Name]

Date of assessment: [Date]

Assessing official: [Programme Lead]

Theme	DFID Risk score
OVERALL RATING⁷	4
FCO travel advice	4
Host nation travel advice	4
Transportation	4
Security	4
Civil unrest	2
Violence/crime	4
Espionage	4
Terrorism	5
War	3
Hurricane	1
Earthquake	4
Flood	1
Medical Services	4
Nature of Project/ Intervention	3

1 very low risk	2 low risk	3 medium risk	4 high risk	5 very high risk
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Low	Medium	High risk
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⁷ Calculated using the MODE function which determines the most frequently occurring value

Annex B - Problem Driven Iterative Approach (PDIA)

82. A problem driven iterative approach (PDIA) allows a programme to respond to a problem flexibly and quickly. PDIA programmes will not be rigid in their design and will allow space for development and adaptation of approaches. Analysis, diagnosis and evaluation are all key elements of a PDIA programme approach. The PDIA approach is problem-centred and differs from a ‘solution and leader-driven change’.

83. The PDIA approach to institutional reform involves (i) solving defined performance problems through (ii) creating an environment amenable to experimentation, (iii) creating tight feedback loops, and (iv) engaging a broad set of actors⁸.

84. PDIA principles allow one to solve a particular performance problem in a specific process. However, it is unclear if PDIA is employed in one process, if you can undertake this reform in other broader areas of governance reform such as addressing civil service reform or reform of public financial management systems.

85. As suggested by Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. & Woolcock, approaches to PDIA should be based on four core principles:

- Solving locally nominated and defined problems in performance.
- Create an ‘authorising environment’ for decision-making that encourages positive deviance¹ and experimentation.
- Embedding experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning.
- Actively engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant, and supportable.

For donors, key lessons are:

- Be aware of the limited role that external actors can play in facilitating institutional change (but play these roles as effectively as possible).
- Identify and engage with key stakeholders.
- Invest in strengthening networks that have a strong reach from policymakers to the grassroots.
- Cultivate mobilisers – motivators, convenors and connectors.
- Establish long-term relationships which allow external actors to earn trust.

⁸ <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/HDQ1099.pdf>

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- Provide relevant and timely information to local reformers.