Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

UKaid
from the British people

CALL DOWN CONTRACT

Framework Agreement with ITAD Ltd
Framework Agreement for Lot 3: Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning, High Value Lot (>£600k) with mini-competition.
Framework Agreement Reference Number: ecm_4748

Call Down Contract for Provision of Monitoring Evaluation and Learning for Global Mine Action Programme 3 (MEL GMAP3
Contract Reference Number: ecm_5319

I refer to the following:

1. The above-mentioned Framework Agreement dated 1 February 2023;

2. Your proposal of 26 May 2023

and I confirm that FCDO requires you to provide the Services as set out in Annex A - the Terms of Reference (ToR) and supply in accordance to Annex C – Tender under the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement which shall apply to this Call Down Contract as if expressly incorporated herein.

1. Commencement and Duration of the Services

1.1 The Supplier shall start the Services no later than 11 July 2023 ("the Start Date") and the Services shall be completed by 31 July 2023 ("the End Date") unless the Call Down Contract is terminated earlier in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of the Framework Agreement.

2. Recipient

2.1 FCDO requires the Supplier to provide the Services to the FCDO (the "Recipient").

3. Financial Limit

3.1 Payments under this Call Down Contract shall not, exceed £951,352 (nine hundred and fifty one thousand, three hundred and fifty two pounds) ("the Financial Limit") and is exclusive of any government tax, if applicable as detailed in Annex B**.**

4. Extension Options

4.1 FCDO reserves the right to extend the Call Down Contract by up to 24 months in total and additional value of up to £1.0 million.

4.2 Minimum written notice to Supplier in respect of extension is at least Thirty (30) Working Days written notice.

5. FCDO Officials

5.1 The Project Officer is:

REDACTED

The Contract Officer is:

5.2 REDACTED

6. Key Personnel

The following of the Supplier's Personnel cannot be substituted by the Supplier without FCDO's prior written consent:

Name	Role
	Team Lead and Evaluation Lead
	Monitoring Lead
	Learning/ Evidence Advocacy Lead
REDACTED	Project Manager/ Digital Lead
	Data Manager
	Value for Money (VfM) / Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) Lead
	Project Director
	Gender, Disability and Social Inclusion
	Environmental Impact

7. Reports

7.1 The Supplier shall submit project reports in accordance with the Terms of Reference at Annex A.

8. Duty of Care

All Supplier Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Agreement) engaged under this Call Down Contract will come under the duty of care of the Supplier:

8.1 The Supplier will be responsible for all security arrangements and Her Majesty's Government accepts no responsibility for the health, safety and security of individuals or property whilst travelling.

8.2 The Supplier will be responsible for taking out insurance in respect of death or personal injury, damage to or loss of property, and will indemnify and keep indemnified FCDO in respect of:

8.2.1 Any loss, damage or claim, howsoever arising out of, or relating to negligence by the Supplier, the Supplier's Personnel, or by any person employed or otherwise

engaged by the Supplier, in connection with the performance of the Call Down Contract;

8.2.2 Any claim, howsoever arising, by the Supplier's Personnel or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier, in connection with their performance under this Call Down Contract.

8.3 The Supplier will ensure that such insurance arrangements as are made in respect of the Supplier's Personnel, or any person employed or otherwise engaged by the Supplier are reasonable and prudent in all circumstances, including in respect of death, injury or disablement, and emergency medical expenses.

8.4 The costs of any insurance specifically taken out by the Supplier to support the performance of this Call Down Contract in relation to Duty of Care may be included as part of the management costs of the project, and must be separately identified in all financial reporting relating to the project.

8.5 Where FCDO is providing any specific security arrangements for Suppliers in relation to the Call Down Contract, these will be detailed in the Terms of Reference.

9. Call Down Contract Signature

9.1 If the Call Down Contract is not signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within 15 Working Days of the date on which it was sent for the electronic signature, FCDO will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Contract void.

No payment will be made to the Supplier under this Contract until the Call Down Contract is signed by both Parties.

Annex A

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Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning of Global Mine Action Programme 3

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This document comprises the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) of the third iteration of the FCDO's Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP3). The MEL contract is expected to run from June 2023 to the end of June 2025 with a possible extension(s) of up to 24 months. The contract value for the period to end of June 2025 is up to £1.0 million exclusive of VAT, and the value of any extension would be up to an additional £1.0 million. The requirements for this tender are specified in section 9 to 11.

1.2 The UK has had a historic role in tackling the global impact of landmines, cluster munitions (CM) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), being one of the founding signatories to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 1997 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. The UK has supported some of the poorest countries around the world to clear landmines, CM, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and other ERW post conflict. UK funding for mine action saves lives, releases land for productive use, helps pave the way for further humanitarian and development programming, and contributes to security and stabilisation outcomes.

1.3 The Business Case for GMAP3 allows FCDO to contract one or more Suppliers for: (a) the release of land contaminated by landmines, CM and other ERW; (b) the delivery of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE); and (c) the capacity development (CD) of national authorities and local Implementing Partners (IPs) in up to 12 countries.[1] The Business Case recognises that conditions may not allow delivery of all of (a), (b) and (c) in all of the countries all of the time.

1.4 The Business Case also allows FCDO to contract a Supplier to conduct MEL of the design, planning and implementation of GMAP3.

1.5 Under GMAP3's predecessor (GMAP2), between April 2018 and end March 2022, the FCDO invested £146 million in mine action activities. Under GMAP2, the UK cleared and confirmed safe over 496 million square metres of land and delivered risk education messages to over four million people in communities affected by mines, CM and other ERW.

1.6 Under GMAP3, the FCDO is putting increasing emphasis on results at the outcome level, where mine action activity contributes to broader goals. The FCDO is also looking to increase its ambition regarding the cross-cutting themes of gender, disability and inclusion, and positive environmental impact.

1.7 GMAP3 started in April 2022 and is scheduled to last until end March 2025. GMAP3 is currently active in eight countries.[2] In seven countries this work is being conducted under short-term enabling contracts that will complete by end September 2023. In the remaining country (Ukraine) the work is being conducted under a grant agreement that will complete by end June 2023. The associated MEL contract, the scope of which is limited to current interventions

[1] Countries in scope of the business case are Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[2] Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine and Zimbabwe

in seven of the eight countries, will run until 31 December 2023. The ongoing short-term enabling contracts and agreements as described in this paragraph are not, therefore, in scope of this tender. Further context about the history of GMAP is provided in Annex A.

1.8 A GMAP3 procurement process is under way for a two-year mine action programme in Afghanistan that is expected to start in April 2023 and run to the end of March 2025, with a budget of £5.5 million, and with an up to two-year extension option. New contracts are also expected to be concluded by the beginning of July 2023 for mine action in Ukraine and by the beginning of October 2023 for mine action in up to eight additional countries (Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia (on the border with Somalia), Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe). The eight countries are likely to be grouped into two or more lots and separate contracts will be awarded to each lot. The new contracts are also expected to run to end March 2025, with an up to two-year extension option. Contract values (apart from Afghanistan) are to be confirmed.

1.9 This tender is for a central MEL contract that covers all the mine action contracts specified in the preceding paragraph. The MEL Supplier must be able to start delivering MEL for the Afghanistan contract as soon as the MEL contract has been signed (likely April 2023). The MEL Supplier must be able to deliver MEL for the Ukraine contract once that contract has been signed (likely July 2023). The MEL Supplier must be able to deliver MEL for contracts up to the eight additional countries specified in the preceding paragraph (likely October 2023). The MEL Supplier must also be able to conduct lessons learned exercises across the GMAP3 country portfolio; see section 11. In addition, the MEL Supplier must also be able to demonstrate an ability to scale up to provide MEL in other countries in scope of the GMAP3 business case, and to undertake/subcontract original research, if additional funding becomes available in the second year or during an extension period.

1.10 Please note that in order to ensure the independence of the activities under MEL, the same supplier is not allowed to deliver the GMAP3 contracts which they are monitoring and evaluating. For avoidance of doubt, suppliers are allowed to bid for MEL and mine action implementation contracts, however, should they win the MEL contract they will not be eligible for any of the mine action implementation contracts under GMAP3 and vice versa.

1.11 In these ToR, the term ‘GMAP3 Implementing Partners’ refers to the suppliers contracted to deliver mine action activities under GMAP3 during financial years 23/24 and 24/25. The term ‘MEL Supplier’ refers to the supplier contracted to conduct MEL as set out in these ToR.

1.12 A glossary of terms and abbreviations acronyms used in these ToR is given in Annex B.

2. GMAP3 IMPACT, OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

2.1 Impact. The GMAP3 Business Case describes the expected impact of GMAP3 to be “…. increased human security and support towards peace and development for people in countries affected by landmines and ERW. As the UN’s Agenda 2030 recognises, there can be no development without (human) security.” As referenced in section 1.6, FCDO also attaches importance to

inclusion and gender and environmental impact when considering impact, outputs and outcomes.

2.2 Outcomes. GMAP3 ToC has five intended outcomes:

a) Outcome 1: Measurable progress towards APMBC, CCM and CCW treaty compliance and universalisation.

This will be achieved primarily through the clearance of areas of land known to be contaminated by anti-personnel mines (including improvised anti-personnel mines), CM and other ERW.

b) Outcome 2: Responsive and equitable nationally owned mine action through improved governance and with increased local implementation.

This will be achieved primarily through support to national mine action authorities (where circumstances allow) and to national Implementing Partners including training, mentoring and collaboration (where circumstances allow).

c) Outcome 3: Mine action integrated or sequenced with humanitarian, development, peacebuilding or stabilisation initiatives.

This will be achieved primarily through collaboration with humanitarian, peace, stabilisation and development actors. GMAP3 Implementing Partners will be expected to demonstrate how such collaboration will be achieved throughout GMAP3.

d) Outcome 4: Safe and productive land use improves livelihoods and basic services, improving the quality of life and the environment.

This will be achieved primarily from contaminated land cleared in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and formally handed over to authorities and/or communities which represent the intended beneficiaries of the cleared land including agencies delivering humanitarian aid.

e) Outcome 5: Risk of harm reduced which increases returns and the freedom of movement.

This will be achieved primarily through the removal of risk from explosive hazards (both area clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) spot tasks) and the increased awareness of the risk of harm through effective EORE of men, women, boys and girls.

2.3 Outputs. The outputs to be used for GMAP3 are shown in the programme logframe. GMAP3 ToR has five intended outputs:

a) Output 1: Land released for safe and productive use;

b) Output 2: Increased awareness of the risk of harm from explosives ordnance;

c) Output 3: Increased collaboration with humanitarian, peace, stabilisation, development and environmental actors;

d) Output 4: Enhanced capacity of national authority / NMAA; and

e) Output 5: Enhanced capacity of local implementers.

This includes four key performance indicators (KPI):

a) Land cleared (sqm);

b) Land reduced (sqm);

c) Number of EORE sessions; and

d) Number of EORE beneficiaries.

2.4 Beneficiaries. The intended beneficiaries of GMAP3 are:

a) Communities currently at risk of harm from mines, CM and ERW;

b) Communities unable to use land productively because of the fear of harm from mines, CM and ERW;

c) Communities unable to access ~~to~~ emergency humanitarian assistance and basic services, facilities and vital infrastructure because of mines, CM and ERW;

d) National mine action authorities who over time will assume a greater responsibility for regulating, coordinating and managing national mine action with minimal international assistance; and

e) Local mine action IPs who over time will assume a greater responsibility for conducting mine action activities with minimal international assistance.

At community level, the beneficiaries of demining and EORE activities are defined in detail in '*Standardising Beneficiary Definitions (SBD) in Humanitarian Mine Action'*, Second Edition, October 2020. SBD provides separate definitions for direct and indirect beneficiaries of EORE, land release, EOD and victim assistance (VA). Note: VA is not included in GMAP3.

3. GMAP3 THEORY OF CHANGE AND LOGFRAME

3.1 Theory of Change. The Theory of Change (ToC) for GMAP3 is at Annex C. It is based on the sector-wide ToC developed by Itad in 2021/22 with funding from the UK and NL Governments.

3.2 Theories of Action. For GMAP3, the conditions and assumptions to be considered in assessing whether the predicted output and outcome targets will be achieved are set out in the Theories of Action (ToA) to be prepared by the selected GMAP3 Implementing Partners during the Inception Phase for each GMAP3 country project. The conditions and assumptions shall be reviewed by the MEL Supplier during the Inception Phase and should be continuously monitored throughout the project.

3.3 Logframe. The draft logframe for GMAP3 is at Annex D. The provisional indicators proposed in the logframe will be reviewed and agreed during the Inception Phase with FCDO, the GMAP3 Implementing Partners, and the MEL Supplier.

4. GMAP3 MEL PURPOSE

4.1 The purpose of the MEL Contract is to:

a) provide FCDO with accurate and timely information on progress in achieving the agreed output targets and intended outcomes of GMAP3;

b) assess the degree to which GMAP3's outcomes were achieved for value for money (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, cost effectiveness) and the degree to which the impact will be achieved over time; and

c) inform FCDO and other stakeholders of lessons learned from GMAP3 that will deliver continuous improvement of GMAP3 and guide the design of future UK-funded mine action.

5. THE RECIPIENT & BENEFICIARIES

The recipient of the service under this Contract will be the FCDO GMAP3 programme team. The intended beneficiaries of GMAP3 are listed in 2.4. This Contract will help them by contributing to improved GMAP3 delivery. This Contract will additionally benefit the wider mine action sector, including other mine action programmes, through dissemination of lessons learned.

6. GMAP3 MEL SCOPE

6.1 The MEL Supplier must be able to deliver Monitoring and Evaluation covering Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia (border with Somalia) Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe). The MEL Supplier must have capacity to expand its coverage to cover the other countries in scope of the GMAP3 business case if additional funding becomes available in 24/25.

6.2 This will necessarily involve the capability and willingness of the MEL Contractor to operate in fragile and conflict affected states. It will also deliver a learning component.

6.3 FCDO Afghanistan has commissioned an independent Assurance and Learning Programme (ALP). The ALP is supporting FCDO to strengthen delivery across its bilateral ODA portfolio and strategy in Afghanistan, through enhancing management of risks, use of evidence and lesson learning. This is being delivered through an independent third-party monitoring workstream and a portfolio monitoring, evaluation and learning workstream. These two workstreams are being delivered by the same MEL consortium. The GMAP3 MEL supplier will need to work with the ALP team to ensure complementarity of MEL activity for Afghanistan and to provide any further assurances to FCDO.

7. GMAP3 MEL BUDGET & TIMINIG

7.1 See section 1.1 above for details of budget and duration.

7.2 The MEL Contract will be implemented in three phases: inception, implementation, and completion (post operations). Because the mine action implementation contracts will become active at different times, the MEL Supplier must expect to be operating in different phases simultaneously in different countries. For example, the MEL Supplier will have completed the Inception Phase for Afghanistan and possibly for Ukraine before commencement of the inception phase for other countries.

8. SCALE UP / DOWN

8.1 FCDO may scale up the programme, including changing the funding, outputs, and outcomes of the GMAP3 MEL Contract. The most likely scale up options would be to enhance the level of ambition in existing countries, add one or more countries also in scope of the business case, and/or add an original research component.

8.2 FCDO reserves the right to scale down or discontinue this programme at any point in line with the terms and conditions of the Contract. Scaling down is at FCDO's discretion, and may occur for a number of reasons including, but not limited to, changes to the political economy of the countries in scope or a shortage of funds. Political economy reasons include a change in security, government stability, corruption or interference in local engagement that negatively affect delivery.

8.3 Any such changes will be fully communicated to the MEL Supplier and implemented in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract.

9. MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Objective. Monitoring is the continuous collecting, analysis and use of information for the purpose of management and decision-making. The 'monitoring' component of GMAP3 involves two interconnected sets of activities:

a) Monitoring the GMAP3 Implementing Partners' progress in meeting predefined and agreed targets and milestones; and

b) Reviewing the GMAP3 Implementing Partners' management and operational performance with emphasis on identifying immediate lessons to be learnt.

Such lessons may benefit other stakeholders and other projects, and/or may require immediate changes to be made to the programme. The 'review' activities provide a bridge to the 'evaluation' which focuses on how well the programme's outcomes have been achieved, and identifies lessons learnt for future FCDO mine action policies and programmes.

9.2 Monitoring process

a) The process of monitoring starts with agreeing the indicators to be used in all of the GMAP3 countries and developing the format and timing of the quarterly monitoring reports - both the Country Update Reports (prepared by the GMAP3 Implementing Partners per contract/agreement), and the MEL Supplier's Quarterly Summary Reports.

b) Quarterly reporting covers the previous three-month period based on the UK Government's financial year and must include an assessment of the likelihood of achieving the next quarter milestone targets.

c) The Implementing Partner for each GMAP3 contract or agreement shall prepare a quarterly Country Update Report and logframe for each of the country programmes covered by the contract. The reports shall be submitted to the MEL Supplier to a deadline agreed with the Implementing Partner ahead of relevant contract award, but it is likely to be after the

completion of each quarter. Every quarter the GMAP3 Implementing Partner should provide a covering email highlighting important contractual issues such as failing to achieve Delivery Key Performance Indicators (D-KPIs) and/or requesting changes to the targets.

d) The MEL Supplier shall review all the Country Quarterly Update Reports and prepare a Quarterly Summary Report for each contract/agreement. The MEL Supplier shall also combine all the country logframes into a single GMAP3 meta-logframe every quarter. The meta-logframe should include the country logframes as individual tabs and provide summary logframes, which combine the targets and results for all the country projects in each contract.

e) In reviewing the Country Quarterly Update Reports, the MEL Supplier shall, where necessary, request additional information and/or evidence from the GMAP3 Implementing Partners to confirm the accuracy of the results provided in the update reports. The MEL Supplier shall also critically review the risk assessment provided as part of the update reports.

f) The MEL Supplier shall submit the Quarterly Summary Reports, the updated meta-logframe and a covering email with recommendations to FCDO by no later than 10 Working Days following receipt of the country update reports.

g) On receipt of the Quarterly Summary Reports, FCDO will set up meetings with the MEL Supplier and GMAP3 Implementing Partners to discuss the Quarterly Summary Reports, the findings from any in-country monitoring visits, see sub-paragraph (i) below, and their recommendations.

h) Every six months the MEL Supplier with prepare a Programme Level Progress Report summarising performance across all GMAP3 contracts and agreements during the previous six months. The emphasis will be on assessing progress towards achievement of outcomes across the programme. Programme Level Progress Reports are to be delivered no later than 6 weeks after the end of the 6 month reporting period. The precise scope and format of the Programme Level Progress Report will be agreed during the Inception Phase, see paragraph 9.3).

i) In addition to the Quarterly Summary Reports, the MEL Supplier shall conduct an in-country monitoring visit to each of the GMAP3 country programmes, where conditions allow, during the lifespan of the Contract. The MEL Supplier should work on the assumption that monitoring visits will be required for Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine and Zimbabwe assuming circumstances on the ground permit. Country monitoring visits must include field visits, meetings with impacted communities and beneficiaries, and meetings with collaborative partners and national authorities. Monitoring visit reports are to be prepared within ten Working Days following the visit and are to be forwarded to FCDO as part of the following Quarterly Summary Report. Noting the possibility that the ability to access in-country programmes may change during the lifespan of the Contract,

FCDO and the MEL Supplier will agree changes to the programme of visits as required.

9.3 Inception Phase. The Contract will include an Inception Phase of three months. Once work is completed during the Inception Phase of one contract/agreement, it is expected that the work can then be used to inform Inception Phases for other countries. During the Inception Phase the MEL Supplier shall:

a) with FCDO and the Implementing Partners review the indicators, baselines and targets, including milestone targets proposed by the GMAP3 Implementing Partners in their tenders;

b) with FCDO and the Implementing Partners establish agreed indicators, baselines and targets, including milestone targets, and develop a combined GMAP3 meta-logframe which combines the country-specific GMAP3 logframes;

c) agree with FCDO the format of the Quarterly Summary Reports to be provided by the MEL Supplier to FCDO. As a minimum this will include:

i) a narrative report to: summarise progress for each GMAP3 contract/agreement in achieving agreed milestone targets for each in-country programme, highlighting significant changes to any risks of achieving the targets, and if necessary recommending changes to the targets; case studies and innovation; key learning points and recommendations; and reporting on cross cutting issues (see paragraph 13 for more detail);

ii) a combined GMAP3 meta-logframe which shows the targets and progress of all indicators for all the country projects, listed by lot. The meta-logframe will include graphs of all the output and outcome indicators;

iii) updated workplan where applicable; and~~,~~

iv) updated asset registers.

d) with FCDO and the Implementing Partners, agree additional information to be provided by the suppliers for inclusion in the Quarterly Summary Report. This will be in addition to the data provided in the logframes;

e) agree with FCDO the number and format of the Country Quarterly Update Reports to be provided by the Implementing Partners to the MEL Supplier. This will include decisions on reporting against individual contracts as there may be potential to combine reporting if the same Supplier were to win multiple contracts;

f) agree with FCDO the format and scope for the MEL Supplier's 6 monthly Programme Level Progress Report.

g) agree with FCDO a programme of monitoring visits to GMAP3 countries dependent upon conditions in country and the scope of the Contracts/agreements when signed. Consideration should be given to conducting joint monitoring/evaluation visits and the organisations that the

MEL Supplier will visit and engage with throughout their trip (e.g. mine action partners, National Mine Action Authorities, local development agencies); and

h) agree with FCDO the format and timing of the Country Visit Monitoring Reports.

9.4 Implementation Phase. During the Implementation Phase, the MEL Supplier shall:

a) review the Country Quarterly Update Report(s) provided by the Implementing Partners. Where necessary, request additional information and/or evidence to confirm the accuracy of the results provided in the reports. Critically review the risk assessment provided by the Implementing Partners;

b) prepare the Quarterly Summary Reports by individual contract/agreement unless otherwise agreed with FCDO during the Inception Phase, and submit the reports to FCDO;

c) prepare the 6 month Programme Level Progress Report, and submit to FCDO;

c) conduct monitoring visits to the specified GMAP3 countries where, in addition to visiting GMAP3 Implementing Partner in-country offices, the MEL Supplier will be expected to consult with National Mine Action Authorities, local development agencies and community beneficiaries, and provide country monitoring visit reports in a timely manner;

d) attend quarterly meetings with FCDO and the GMAP3 Implementing Partners to discuss progress. The number of quarterly meetings will be determined during Inception Phase once bid winners for implementing contracts have been confirmed; and

e) provide advice and assistance to FCDO as requested.

A diagram showing how: (i) Country Quarterly Update Reports are prepared by the Implementing Partner; (ii) are collated and reviewed by the MEL Supplier, who then (iii) prepares a Quarterly Summary Report for FCDO is shown at Annex E.

10. EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS

10.1 Objective. The 'evaluation' component of GMAP3 involves three interconnected sets of activities:

a) assessing whether GMAP3 has delivered value for money;

b) assessing whether the delivery has been in line with national priorities at the country level; and

c) reviewing the causal pathways and assumptions of the GMAP3 ToC.

Through this process, the evaluation will build the evidence base for GMAP3, and contribute to identifying lessons learnt and recommendations for adaptive management.

10.2 Evaluation process. The evaluation of GMAP3 shall be conducted in two parts: a formative evaluation and a summative evaluation.

a) The purpose of the formative evaluation is to assess whether any mid-course changes need to be made to the overall programme or individual projects to ensure the intended impact of GMAP3 as set out in the ToC is achieved. The formative evaluation should also provide sufficient information (findings, conclusions and recommendations) to inform the Business Case for a follow-on GMAP.

b) The purpose of the summative evaluation is to reflect on the overall success of GMAP3, identify lessons to be learnt in the detailed design and implementation of a follow-on GMAP, and to inform the wider mine action sector.

c) To support the evaluation process the MEL Supplier will conduct an in country evaluation visit for each country covered by the GMAP3 contracts/agreements, where conditions allow.[3] The MEL Supplier should consider the benefits and/or disadvantages of joint monitoring/evaluation country visits, and the MEL Supplier's ability to visit more than one country in a single visit programme.

d) Both summative and formative evaluations must include an evaluation of cross cutting issues (see 13.1 for more detail).

10.3 Inception Phase. The Inception Phase provides the MEL Supplier and FCDO with the opportunity to agree the:

a) approach and methodology to be used for both parts of the evaluation;

b) ~~the~~ interaction of the monitoring and evaluation components of GMAP3; and

c) ~~the~~ format and timing of the formative and summative evaluation reports.

During the Inception Phase, the MEL Supplier shall produce an Evaluation Framework. This must be agreed with FCDO before the evaluation commences. The Evaluation Framework shall be developed in consultation with the GMAP3 Implementing Partners and FCDO. The Framework shall:

[3] Noting the possibility that the ability to access to in country programmes may change during the lifespan of the contract, FCDO and the MEL Supplier will agree changes to the programme of visits as required.

a) consider the outcome and impact indicators in the global GMAP3 logframe to review and assess whether the programme's overall approach fits with the ToC, and propose amendments if necessary;

b) set out plans for a comprehensive stakeholder exercise with the programme's intended beneficiaries~~,~~ and GMAP3 Implementing Partners;

c) set out the evaluation design. The MEL Supplier shall develop potential evaluation questions and, for each question, show the proposed methodology and sources of evidence for evaluating GMAP3's overall approach and the combined effect of its interventions. This design will be in accordance with the OECD DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (2010)[4] and Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance (1991);[5]

d) set out the process for, and timing of, data collection and reports. Design will include the data collection strategy, including methods (as robust as the programme allows) and sequencing. Reporting will include an interim (formative) and final (summative) evaluation;

e) set out the MEL Supplier's approach to contribution analysis;

f) set out the MEL Supplier's approach to Value for Money (VfM) including a comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to inform a Business Case for future UK-funded mine action.

When assessing VfM, the MEL Supplier should consider the "5Es":

i) Economy: is FCDO (or its suppliers) buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?

ii) Efficiency: how well is FCDO (or its suppliers) converting inputs into outputs? ('spending well')

iii) Effectiveness: how well are the outputs of GMAP3 having the intended effect? ('spending wisely')

iv) Equity: how fairly are the benefits of GMAP3 distributed, in particular amongst marginalised groups? ('spending fairly')

v) Cost-effectiveness: what is GMAP3's ultimate impact on the UK's foreign policy objectives, relative to the inputs that FCDO or its suppliers invest in it?

g) produce summaries of the impact of the separate country projects and provide generic lessons to inform future programme designs.

The evaluation must draw on good practice in gender and disability disaggregation and include a review of the programme's gender dimensions and impacts, gathering gender-disaggregated data where possible.

[4] https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/qualitystandards.pdf
[5] https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/2755284.pdf

The formative evaluation is expected to cover the first year of the programme. It will be no more than 30 pages~~,~~ plus a short summary and annexes. It will not be published.

The summative evaluation is expected to cover the entire time period of the programme. The summative evaluation report will be no more than 30 pages, plus a short summary and annexes. In keeping, with FCDO policy, it will be published.

10.4 Implementation Phase. The MEL Supplier shall implement the Evaluation Framework as agreed with FCDO during the Inception Phase. The Formative Evaluation Report should include, inter alia, the results of the CBA and key conclusions and recommendations in sufficient time to inform any future Business Case. A final Summative Evaluation Report should include an in-depth analysis of GMAP3, with recommendations for the GMAP programme team to utilise when considering future programming. The Implementation Phase will also include drafting an Annual Review report, using the FCDO template, see Annex H.

10.5 Completion phase. Post operations, the MEL Supplier will complete the Summative Evaluation Report. A final Summative Evaluation Report should include an in-depth analysis of GMAP3~~,~~ with recommendations for the GMAP programme team to utilise when considering future programming. Post operations, the MEL Supplier will also draft the Programme Completion Report, using the FCDO template (at Annex I) and complete the final meta logframe.

11. LEARNING REQUIREMENTS

11.1 Objective. The core objective of the 'learning' component of GMAP3 is to ensure that lessons identified in procedures and practices resulting from GMAP3 are shared and applied to improve effectiveness, efficiency and safety.

11.2 Inception Phase. During the Inception Phase, the MEL Supplier shall produce a GMAP3 Learning Plan. The Plan shall:

a) set out how the MEL Supplier will review the lessons identified in the GMAP2 Formative and Summative Reports, and assess whether the lessons are implemented as appropriate, i.e. they have been applied in the design and implementation of GMAP3;

b) with FCDO and the GMAP3 Implementing Partners, establish a system to identify, document and validate lessons identified and learned across all GMAP3 countries and the wider mine action sector; and

c) with FCDO and the GMAP3 Implementing Partners establish an agreed way to disseminate lessons learned to the wider mine action sector and academia through, for example, presentations at the annual International Meetings of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers, by holding separate workshops (face-to-face, virtual and hybrid), and through sector-wide publications (such as the quarterly Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction).

11.3 Implementation Phase. The MEL Supplier shall implement the Learning Plan as agreed with FCDO during the Inception Phase. Some of the learning results should be incorporated into the GMAP3 Formative and Summative Evaluation Reports. Others should be disseminated more immediately to the wider mine action sector, other UK Government Departments and academia through other media and mechanisms.

12. PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

To ensure that the evaluation is objective and seen to be relevant, it is desirable that the MEL Supplier establish dialogue with in-country organisations including civil society groups as well as national authorities who can provide local knowledge and context. Developing such relationships should help to provide a legacy and a sense of local 'ownership' of the results of the evaluation.

13. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

During all three components of the GMAP3 MEL, emphasis should be given to addressing the cross-cutting themes of gender, disability, diversity and inclusion, and environmental impact. Data on gender and disability are collected through the disaggregation of the indicators of the impact of contaminated land and the benefit of mine action activities, but effective MEL will require the Implementing Partners to explain how they will use such data to improve the delivery of their projects and to improve outcomes. The MEL Supplier must explain how they will monitor and evaluate how effectively GMAP3 Implementing Partners are addressing gender, disability, diversity and inclusion in the design and delivery of GMAP3, and how they are ensuring their work will aim to have a positive environmental impact. The FCDO recognises that it is harder to capture data around disability than gender but requires the MEL Supplier to work together with GMAP 3 Implementing Partners to improve the quality of data collection and analysis for this cross-cutting theme.

14. DATA QUALITY MANAGEMENT

For all three components of GMAP3, the MEL Supplier must ensure the quality of the data provided by the GMAP 3 Implementing Partners and other sources of information that will be monitored, evaluated and used for learning. For example, assessing the Country Quarterly Update Report(s) may be achieved, by triangulating a sample of data provided by the GMAP3 Implementing Partners and from other sources. For in-country monitoring visits this may be achieved, for example by comparing the data held by the GMAP3 Implementing Partner with the data held by the National Mine Action Authorities. For evaluations the MEL Supplier should seek out complementary sources of data at community, district and national levels, for example, whether land reported by the GMAP3 Implementing Partners as 'cleared' is available for safe productive use.

15. GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

FCDO GMAP programme team will hold a review meeting every six months with the MEL Supplier to discuss performance in meeting its contractual requirements.

16. MEL SUPPLIER TEAM PROFILE

16.1 The MEL Supplier shall provide a project team able to deliver the requirements as set out in these ToR. It shall comprise:

a) a monitoring team with monitoring experience in humanitarian and development programmes. At least one member must have significant experience of the mine action sector. The monitoring lead must have an established track record of monitoring programmes in fragile and conflict affected contexts; and

b) an evaluation team with strong evaluation and learning expertise in humanitarian and development programmes, including theory-based evaluation. At least one member must have significant experience of the mine action sector. The evaluation lead must have experience in managing complex evaluations of humanitarian, development and stabilisation programmes in fragile and conflict affected contexts.

16.2 The MEL team should include expertise in humanitarian demining, EORE, CD and conflict sensitivity. The team should have strong analytical and presentation skills. In putting the MEL team together, the MEL Supplier should have regard to diversity.

16.3 All members must have excellent report writing skills and be fluent in written and spoken English.

17. PAYMENT METHODOLOGY

17.1 A Milestone-based payment approach will be used for the deliverables, as outlined in paragraphs 17.2 to 17.6 below.

17.2 The payment for activities will be linked to the performance of the Contract and will be measured against the successful delivery of the Milestones. The Milestones are detailed in Annex F to the document.

17.3 Payment will be made in arrears for each Milestone as follows:

a) 60% of the Milestone value will be paid on the submission of the final version of the deliverable.

b) The remaining 40% will be paid subject to acceptance by FCDO of the delivered Milestones following their assessment against the criteria as set out in Annex F. No payments will be made in advance of the Milestone completion. Unless completed and approved before, the Milestones acceptance will take place at the end of each quarter. The expectation is that all Milestones are completed on time and to the required high-quality standards.

17.4 The MEL Supplier must inform FCDO as soon as possible~~,~~ if it anticipates missing the deadlines for any Milestones. In this circumstance, the MEL Supplier will provide to FCDO with a justification for the anticipated delay in the delivery and propose of a new deadline for FCDO's consideration. FCDO may, as its sole discretion, agree to extend the deadline for completion of a Milestone – this approval will be provided in writing and will not be unreasonably withheld.

In such a scenario, the payment will be made in the next invoicing period following the completion of the Milestone and its acceptance by FCDO.

17.5 Any delays due to the MEL Supplier's performance will attract a deduction of up to 10% of the total Milestone value. 6% of the total Milestone value (10% of 60%) will be deducted, should the final version of the deliverable be below reasonably expected quality or its submission delayed. Further 4% of the total Milestone value (10% of 40%) may be deducted should the requested by FCDO revisions required in order to allow FCDO to accept the Milestone are delayed beyond the agreed deadline. Severe delays (10 Working Days or more) to the submission of the Milestone or if applicable revisions requested by FCDO of one or more Milestone will trigger a contract performance review and may result in the termination of the Contract in line with clause 44 (Termination with Default of the Supplier).

17.6 Any expenses out with the Milestone structure shall be based on actuals, with the Price Schedule (Pro Forma) unit rates as a ceiling (provided they are in line with the FCDO's Cost Eligibility Guidance).

18. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

18.1 The Contract Management Key Performance Indicators (CM KPIs) will measure the performance of the team (quality and timeliness of - reporting); accurate and timely submission of forecasting and invoices; and the extent to which the MEL Supplier is responsive and flexible to FCDO and stakeholder needs and continuous improvement and innovation.

18.2 Service Credits are a reduction of the amounts payable in respect of the Deliverables and do not include VAT. The MEL Supplier shall offset the value of any Service Credits against the appropriate invoice. The value of one (1) Service Credit is £500.

18.3 Service Credits will be associated with each of the CM-KPIs (Annex G) and will be used to monitor performance during the Contract. FCDO may, at its sole discretion, further refine these CM-KPIs in consultation with the MEL Supplier

18.4 On a quarterly basis, the MEL Supplier will be required to provide evidence of achievement against each of the CM KPIs to FCDO. FCDO and MEL Supplier will meet to moderate scores based on the supporting evidence. Approval by FCDO's SRO will trigger payment for the MEL Supplier. Any Service Credits will be deducted from the next invoice.

19. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

19.1 Any reports or documents prepared, or information produced by or on behalf of the MEL Supplier relating to the Contract and all intellectual property rights therein, will be the property of the Crown. The MEL Supplier will therefore assign to the Crown all intellectual property rights in such materials generated by the MEL Supplier in the performance of the Contract and waive all moral rights relating to such materials.

19.2 Consideration will be given to release certain Intellectual Property, for example to enable the MEL Supplier to conduct work in partnership with other donor governments to benefit the wider mine action sector.

20. RISK MANAGEMENT

20.1 The MEL Supplier should identify the key risks that they perceive and how they plan to manage and mitigate them. The MEL Supplier should conduct regular risk assessments throughout the duration of the MEL Contact, taking appropriate actions which aim to reduce the probability and mitigate the impact of the risks. The assessment should include risks associated with the successful design, development and implementation of the project, and must propose measures, which systematically monitor risk throughout the project lifecycle and the escalation chain. Risks will be identified in accordance with FCDO's risk matrix (to be provided).

20.2 The MEL Supplier will undergo a Delivery Chain Mapping exercise of their downstream partner(s) to ensure reputational and delivery risks are identified and managed. This will involve clearly outlining the relationship between the MEL Supplier and their downstream partner(s), division of responsibilities and up to date due diligence assessments. This will be managed and reviewed on an ongoing basis, at a minimum at annual reviews but also as and when there are changes in the structure of the programme.

21. AID TRANSPARENCY

21.1 In line with the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), FCDO requires partners receiving and managing funds to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate sub-contractors, sub-agencies and partners. The MEL Supplier must submit copies of its supply chain (subcontractor) invoices and evidence of payment when invoicing FCDO for its actual costs of procurement of local services and applicable management fee.

21.2 It is a contractual requirement for the MEL Supplier to comply with this, and to ensure it has the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this to FCDO. Further IATI information is available from: http://www.aidtransparency.net/

22. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

22.1 It is essential that MEL work is: independent i.e. those conducting the evaluation, for example, must be objective and not connected with the intervention under study; be transparent i.e. results must be publicly available; and use robust methodologies which, if replicated, will produce similar results.

22.2 All MEL must be of high quality and have practical value. The MEL Supplier will:

a) adhere to ethical research principles around doing no harm, informed voluntary consent for participation, and confidentiality;

b) identify the need for and secure ethics approval for primary data collection and in-depth studies; and

c) operate in accordance with international human rights commitments to which the UK is a signatory, regardless of local country standards, and respect cultural sensitivities.

23. UK AID BRANDING

Suppliers that receive funding from FCDO must use the UK aid logo on their development and humanitarian programmes to be transparent and acknowledge that they are funded by UK taxpayers. Suppliers should also acknowledge funding from the UK government in broader communications, but no publicity is to be given to this Contract without the prior written consent of FCDO. There may be locations where the use of the UK Aid logo will not be appropriate. Any exceptions to the rule above must be discussed with FCDO on a case-by-case basis.

24. DUTY OF CARE

The MEL Supplier is fully responsible for the safety and well-being of its staff (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract), consultants, informants and third parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. The MEL Supplier will be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for domestic and business property.

24.1 FCDO will share information with the Supplier on the security status and in-country developments (see Annex J - Risk Assessment Matrix for Afghanistan). Travel advice is also available on the FCO website. The Supplier must ensure it (and its personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

FCDO Travel Advice website https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/afghanistan

https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/iran

https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/pakistan

The Supplier must provide appropriate safety and security briefings for all their personnel working under this Contract and ensuring that their personnel register and receive briefing as outlined below.

Conflict Affected Zones and training.

24.3 The delivery of the Contract may require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas. Travel to certain areas may be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation may be volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier must be experienced working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted where applicable).

24.4 The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in, and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training.

Earthquakes.

24.5 The delivery of the Contract will require the Supplier to operate in a seismically active zone and is considered at high risk of earthquakes. Minor tremors are

not uncommon. Earthquakes are impossible to predict and can result in major devastation and loss of life. There are several websites focusing on earthquakes, including https://www.thoughtco.com/seismic-hazard-maps-of-the-world-1441205. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract.

Afghanistan

24.6 The British Embassy in Kabul has suspended in-country operations. All UK diplomatic and consular staff have been temporarily withdrawn, therefore FCDO at present will be unable to offer security briefing by the British Embassy/FCDO on arrival and copies of FCDO Visitor notes.

25. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS

25.1 FCDO works to embed environmental and social safeguards predominantly to ensure that our development and humanitarian interventions do no harm. They are also a key part of ensuring that our outcomes are sustainable, that they provide good value for money and that protect the positive results and transformative impacts for poverty reduction and development that we aim to deliver.

25.2 FCDO needs to understand the scope of safeguard risks that might need to be considered in a given project, to ensure that risks are identified, properly analysed and mitigation measures are in place, with clear oversight responsibility, for example to safeguard those directly or indirectly involved as beneficiaries or community members of FCDO interventions.

25.3 Further considerations of particular importance to managing the risk of doing unintended harm to people and/or the environment include (but are not limited to): social and poverty impact, gender equality, resource scarcity and environmental vulnerability, climate change, institutional environment, the political economy, conflict and fragility.

25.4 FCDO Suppliers are expected to demonstrate:

a) top-level commitment: evidence of top-level organisational commitment to implement E&S safeguards, enhance E&S outcomes, and seek continual improvement. This should ideally take the form of a written statement signed by senior management, shared publicly;

b) appropriate systems and processes: robust policies and systems in place for identifying E&S risks, implementing E&S safeguards, and monitoring performance relevant to this programme or investment, including regular field supervision and spot-checks. This should include, where relevant, clear policy and strategy and robust processes and documents such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), [child] safeguarding policies, Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), Stakeholder Engagement Plans (SEPs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan (OHSMPs) documentation;

c) adequate resources: evidence on adequate financial, professional, and institutional resources in place to implement E&S safeguards, coordinate down-stream partner implementation of E&S safeguards, and seek continual improvement throughout the entire lifecycle of this programme or investment? This should include adequate staff with specialist training and experience (including high-risk issues such as HIV/AIDs, gender-based violence, and child protection), and dedicated budgets; and

d) strong track record: suitability to deliver FCDO's contract requirements, including assessment of an organisation's past performances, financial stability and organisational principles and track record of implementing E&S safeguards on similar programming.

Appendix 1 of Call-down Contract (Terms of Reference)

Schedule of Processing, Personal Data and Data Subjects

This schedule must be completed by the Parties in collaboration with each-other before the processing of Personal Data under the Contract.

The completed schedule must be agreed formally as part of the contract with FCDO and any changes to the content of this schedule must be agreed formally with FCDO under a Contract Variation.

Description	Details
Identity of the Controller and Processor for each Category of Data Subject	The Parties acknowledge that for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation, the following status will apply to personal data under this Call-down Contract **[FCDO to complete or remove the options below as appropriate prior to Contract Award]:** 1) The Parties acknowledge that Clause 33.2 and 33.4 (Section 2 of the contract) shall not apply for the purposes of the Data Protection Legislation as the **Parties are independent Controllers** in accordance with Clause 33.3 in respect of the following Personal Data: • [to be completed during the Inception Phase]
Subject matter of the processing	
Duration of the processing	
Nature and purposes of the processing	
Type of Personal Data [and Special Categories of Personal Data]	
Plan for return and destruction of the data once processing complete	

Annex A – Summary of UK-funded mine action

The UK Government has been a strong supporter of humanitarian mine action for over three decades. Initially, the Government responded to ad-hoc requests for funding from the HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group for demining projects in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique in the 1980s.

In 1993, the UK Government promoted the creation of a global focal point for humanitarian demining within the (then) UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs. And in 1999 the Government provided political and financial support for the establishment of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This included providing a team to develop International Mine Action Standards in 2001, thus creating the foundations of today's global mine action sector.

During the first decade of the 2000s the UK, as one of the top four donor governments, continued to fund mine action with a focus on demining and risk education. As with earlier UK-funded projects, the primary objectives were risk reduction and enhanced livelihoods.

In 2013, an evaluation of UK funded mine action provided a number of important conclusions and recommendations.[6] These included, inter alia, that:

a) there was insufficient clarity from the UK Government on its vision of how mine action should support development;[7] and

b) reporting by mine action contractors "…. is viewed as an exercise in compliance. While the approach has minimised the management burden on the CHASE team, it has made it difficult to meet internal requirements of efficiency and effectiveness. DFID should …. put in place effective reporting and monitoring procedures."[8]

In response to the evaluation, CHASE conducted an inclusive exercise with mine action implementing organisations, Country DFID offices and the UN. This was followed by the publication of a policy paper '*Clearing a Path to Development'*. The paper provided the UK Government's vision for mine action and described how UK-funded mine action would contribute to humanitarian and development goals. It also, for the first time, provided a Theory of Change which showed the intended relationship between funded mine action activities, projected outputs, intended outcomes, impact and assumptions.

In 2014, DFID issued Invitations to Tender (ITTs) for a number of country projects, which together were referred to as the Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP). DFID also issued an ITT for a GMAP Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) project. The role of the M&E contractor was to collect, collate and review quarterly update reports submitted by the mine action Implementing Partners, and to prepare a consolidated 'monitoring report' for CHASE highlighting key issues and making recommendations. The M&E contractor was also required to conduct an evaluation of GMAP which

[6] DFID Mine Action Evaluation – PO 6119

[7] Ibid. p. 34 (Conclusion 4)

[8] Ibid. p. 35 (Conclusion 5)

included a formative evaluation report at the mid-point of GMAP, and a summative report delivered shortly after the completion of GMAP.

In 2018, DFID issued ITTs for a follow-on GMAP2 including an ITT for M&E. The approach to M&E was similar to that conducted for its predecessor, although the reporting formats were updated and a consolidated logframe was designed which included graphs to show more clearly progress in delivering outputs and outcomes.

GMAP2 represented considerably increased UK ambition in support of mine action. The business case was originally valued at £87.4m from 2018-2020. However, following extensions during the pandemic, the UK ultimately invested through GMAP2 £146m between 2018-2022 in 14 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Under GMAP2 the UK cleared and confirmed safe over 496 million square metres of land and delivered risk education messages to over 4.1 million people in communities affected by mines.

Further information on GMAP2 is available on the UK Government's devtracker:

https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300544/documents

This tender also includes two key documents that draw out GMAP2's achievements and lessons learned; Summative Evaluation (Annex K) and, Programme Completion Report.

The third iteration of GMAP commenced in April 2023. As outlined in the ToR to date GMAP3 has been delivered through short-term (in-year) enabling contracts. Now that the GMAP budget is more certain, the intent – through this ToR- is to move towards longer-term contracts and/or agreements that can deliver higher ambition and better value for money.

Annex B – Glossary and acronyms

The definitions of terms used in this ToR are taken from International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Beneficiary

GMAP3 will use the definitions given in '*Standardising Beneficiary Definitions (SBD) in Humanitarian Mine Action'*, Second Edition, October 2020. SBD provides separate definitions for direct and indirect beneficiaries of EORE, land release, EOD and victim assistance (VA). Note: VA is not included in GMAP3.

Clearance

In the context of mine action, the term refers to tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth, or other agreed parameters as stipulated by the NMAA.

Cluster munition (CM)

A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive sub-munitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms and includes those explosive sub-munitions.

Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)

Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/ERW by raising awareness of men, women and children in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting behavioural change. Previously referred to as mine risk education (MRE).

Explosive remnants of war (ERW)

All munitions (including CM) containing explosives, nuclear materials, or biological and chemical agents. The munitions may have been fired and not detonated and therefore potentially dangerous or left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict.

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

The GICHD is an international centre of expertise and knowledge which works with national authorities, international and regional organisations, NGOs and commercial operators to develop and professionalise mine action and ammunition management. The GICHD supports around 40 affected states and territories every year.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)

IMAS have been developed to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness in mine action and to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations. IMAS provide guidance, establish principles and, in some cases, define international requirements and specifications. They provide a frame of reference which encourages the sponsors and managers of mine action programmes and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed levels of effectiveness and safety. They provide a common language, and recommend the formats and rules for handling data, which enable the accurate and timely exchange of important information.

Mine action

Activities which aim to reduce the risk of harm from landmines, ERW and improvised explosive devices to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination. Mine action comprises: (a) EORE; (b) humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance; (c) victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; (d) stockpile destruction; and (e) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.

A number of other enabling activities are required to support these five components of mine action, including: assessment and planning, the mobilisation and prioritisation of resources, information management, human skills development and management training, quality management and the application of effective, appropriate and safe equipment.

Annex C – Theory of Change for GMAP3



Note: National authorities (NA) for GMAP3 in Afghanistan refers to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and other UN organisations and agencies

Theory of Change Assumptions

- Security and/or political situation in country allows demining activity to be carried out.
- Strong programme design.
- Implementing Partners and local development agencies working to National Mine Action Standards, and where applicable, in line with International Mine Action Standards.
- Capacity development activities are well received by beneficiaries and national authorities have sufficient will and backing to improve.
- Assets are not misappropriated.
- Explosive Ordinance Risk Education successfully targets those most at risk in communities.
- Trained staff remain in the sector.
- Mine action coordination bodies willing and able to prioritise on the basis of vulnerability and development impact.
- Active coordination across the sector.
- The land prioritised for clearance can be used productively by target community.
- Complementary development inputs for targeted communities are secured.
- Implementing organisations and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning providers able to measure the impact of interventions.
- The benefits of each intervention accrue to the intended outcome.

Annex _D_GMAP3 MEL logframe

GMAP3 logframe template		Baseline at Start Date	Milestone at end of Q1 Planned	Milestone at end of Q1 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q2 Planned	Milestone at end of Q2 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q3 Planned	Milestone at end of Q3 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q4 Planned	Milestone at end of Q4 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q5 Planned	Milestone at end of Q5 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q6 Planned	Milestone at end of Q6 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q7 Planned	Milestone at end of Q7 Achieved	Milestone at end of Q8 Planned	Milestone at end of Q8 Achieved
IMPACT To be developed during inception phase	Impact Indicator 1 To be developed during inception phase																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)															
	Impact Indicator 2 To be developed during inception phase																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)															

																			Assumptions
OUTCOME 1 Measurable progress towards APMBC, CCM and CCW treaty compliance and universalisation	Outcome Indicator 1.1 Area of land released/disag/ngated by land cleared, land reduced and land cancelled (m2)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTCOME 2 Responsive and equitable nationally-owned mine action through improved governance and with increased local implementation.	Outcome Indicator 2.1 Enhanced capacity of NMAA's programme management systems, procedures & practices																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.2 Enhanced capacity of NMAA's operations management systems, procedures & practices																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.3 Enhanced capacity NMAA's quality management plans, systems, procedures and practices																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.4 Enhanced capacity of NMAA's information management systems, processes and data																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.5 Local IPs have enhanced operational plans, systems, procedures and practices (CD score from matrix)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.6 Local IPs' have enhanced management skills and knowledge (CD score from matrix)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 2.7 Local IPs have enhanced Information Management systems procedures and practices (CD score from matrix)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTCOME 3 Mine actions integrated or sequenced with humanitarian, development, peacebuilding or stabilisation initiatives	Outcome Indicator 3.1 Number and percentage of mine action activities that have resulted in sequenced or integrated support from other sectors																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 3.2 Number of beneficiaries from joint plans between IPs and other development, humanitarian, peace or stabilisation actors																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTCOME 4 Safe and productive land use improves livelihoods and basic services, improving the quality of life and the environment	Outcome Indicator 4.1 Number of direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods as a result of GMAP3																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 4.2 Number of indirect beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihoods as a result of GMAP3																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 4.3 Number of direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to basic services as a result of GMAP3																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 4.4 Area of formerly contaminated land in use following land release activities (m²)	Residential																	
		Agricultural/pastoral																	
		Community/dev																	
		Natural resources																	
		Infrastructure																	
		Access																	
		Total																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 4.5 Number and percentage of mine action interventions demonstrating a positive impact on the environment																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTCOME 5 Risk of harm reduced which increases returns and the freedom of movement	Outcome Indicator 5.1 Number of direct beneficiaries from land released and EOD (SADD and percentage with disabilities)	Women																	
		Men																	
		Girls																	
		Boys																	
		Total W, M, G & B																	
		# of total with disabilities																	
		% of total with disabilities																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 5.2 Number of indirect beneficiaries from land released and EOD (SADD and percentage with disabilities)	Women																	
		Men																	
		Girls																	
		Boys																	
		Total W, M, G & B																	
		# of total with disabilities																	
		% of total with disabilities																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 5.3 Number and percentage of people from impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in people who behave in a safer manner	Total surveyed																	
		Total reporting increase in safer behaviour																	
		% of total surveyed																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 5.4 Number and percentage of people surveyed reporting increased freedom of movement and/ or an increased sense of normalisation	Total surveyed																	
		Total reporting increase in freedom of movement																	
		% of total surveyed																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 5.5 Number and percentage of people surveyed who report that mine action helped enable their safe return home	Total surveyed																	
		Total reporting mine action enabled their return home																	
		% of total surveyed																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Outcome Indicator 5.6 Number and percentage of people surveyed who report feeling safer as a result of mine action	Total surveyed																	
		Total feeling safer																	
		% of total surveyed																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	

																			Assumptions
OUTPUT 1 Land has been released for safe and productive use (in accordance with IMAS/NMAS)	Output Indicator 1.1 Area of land cleared (m²)	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 1.2 Area of land reduced (m²)	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 1.3 Area of land cancelled (m²)	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTPUT 2 Increased awareness of the risk of harm from explosive ordnance	Output Indicator 2.1 Number of EORE sessions delivered	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 2.2 Number of direct beneficiaries of EORE (SADD and percentage with disabilities)	Women	0																
		Men	0																
		Girls	0																
		Boys	0																
		Total W, M, G & B	0																
		# of total with disabilities	0																
		% of total with disabilities	0																
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 2.3 Number of indirect beneficiaries of EORE (through other EORE programmes)	Women	0																
		Men	0																
		Girls	0																
		Boys	0																
		Total W, M, G & B	0																
		# of total with disabilities	0																
		% of total with disabilities	0																
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 2.4 Percentage of EORE beneficiaries surveyed who demonstrate increased knowledge of RE safety messages	Total surveyed	0																
		Total increased knowledge	0																
		% of total surveyed	0																
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTPUT 3 Collaboration with humanitarian, peace, stabilisation, development and environment actors	Output Indicator 3.1 Number of mine action activities for which there is joint or sequenced support by other actors																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 3.2 Number of informal or formal agreements/MOUs in place with humanitarian, peacebuilding, and/or development																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTPUT 4 Enhanced capacity of NMAA	Output Indicator 4.1 Number and % of capacity development objectives (from the plan) achieved	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 4.2 Number of personnel from NMAA trained or supported by CD activities (disaggregated by gender and by area of training)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 4.3 Improved coordination between stakeholders in the mine action sector																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 4.4 Number of policies, systems, and procedures developed and in place in NMAA																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 4.5 Revision of SOPs to be Gender and Conflict sensitive																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	
OUTPUT 5 Enhanced capacity of local implementers	Output Indicator 5.1 Number and percentage of CD objectives (from the plan) achieved	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 5.2 Number of policies, systems, and procedures developed and in place for local IPs	0																	
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 5.3 Number and percentage of trained local staff conducting mine action activities																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 5.4 Number of local organisations or national actors supported by CD																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
	Output Indicator 5.5 Number of personnel from local IPs trained or supported by CD activities (disaggregated by gender and by area of training (e.g. EORE, medical, EOD etc.)																		
			(include here the source(s) of data for the reported results)																
INPUTS (£)		FCDO	Total (£)	FCDO SHARE (%)															
INPUTS (HR)		FCDO (FTE#)																	

Annex E – GMAP3 Monitoring Reports Summary of activities and responsibilities



Annex F – Milestones Table

Milestone	Performance Measure	Acceptance criteria	Due Date	FCDO responsibility	Payment by Result (PbR)
MEL Supplier is Operational	MEL Supplier contract management team is in place.	Organogram submitted to FCDO showing that a core management team has been appointed, their job roles, responsibilities and contact information.	Inception - within one week of signing Contract.	Confirm acceptance of monitoring, evaluation and learning team, and supply detail of FCDO contract and programme management structure within 5 WDs of receipt of evidence.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Templates	Submit template designs for: • Quarterly narrative report summary from MEL Supplier to FCDO per contract/agreement • Quarterly narrative report from Implementing Partners to MEL Supplier • Monitoring and Evaluation visit reports • Programme Level Progress Report template	Template submitted and revised where appropriate following discussion with FCDO.	Inception - within one month of signing contact.	Confirm acceptance and review within 10 Working Days of submission.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Country Specific Logframes	Country specific logframe with indicators/targets confirmed with FCDO and relevant Implementors.	Logframes submitted and revised, where appropriate, with FCDO.	Logframe for each country to be submitted within three months of signature of relevant contract /agreement.	Confirm acceptance and review within 10 Working Days of submission.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance

Country Specific Workplan	MEL Supplier to review each country specific workplan.	Workplan submitted and agreed with FCDO.	Inception - within 10 days of receipt from relevant Implementing Partners.	FCDO to review and approve within 10 working days of submission.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Delivery Chain Mapping and Due Diligence	MEL Supplier downstream partner delivery chain mapping and evidence submitted to FCDO.	Delivery chain map to be submitted to FCDO, clearly showing type of partner (e.g. NGO, local authority/implementer), completed due diligence assessments and financial arrangements for disbursements.	Inception - within the first 6 weeks of the contract. If MEL Supplier's downstream partners are to change for any reason throughout the programme, the Supplier must inform FCDO within 10 Working Days.	Review Supplier's downstream partner list, due diligence assessments and financial arrangements and approve.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Learning Workplan	Produce a GMAP3 Learning Plan. a lessons learned plan, including delivery of one workshop a year involving all Implementers of GMAP3.	Inception - submission of plan and any necessary revisions following discussion with FCDO.	Inception - within two month(s) of the signing of the contract.	Review plan within 10 days of submission.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Evaluation Framework	Produce an evaluation framework as specified in the Terms of Reference.	Inception - submission of framework and necessary revisions following discussion with FCDO.	Inception - within two month of this MEL Contract.	Review and approve framework within 10 days of submission.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
MEL Supplier Quarterly Summary Reporting	Deliver summary Quarterly Narrative Report(s) and associated documentation agreed during Inception Phase (see 9.3 above) based on partner country-level update reports for each contract/agreement.	Implementation - submission of Quarterly Narrative report to FCDO.	First Quarterly Summary Report for period to end June023 to be submitted 10 Working Days after Implementer provides its reports to MEL Supplier.	Review within 10 Working Days of receipt from MEL Supplier.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance

	Separate reports required for each contract/agreement signed, unless otherwise specified by FCDO.		Subsequent reports Quarterly thereafter to same deadline.		
Programme Level Progress Report	Deliver a single programme wide progress report.	Implementation - submission of report to FCDO.	Delivered every 6 months, first 6 month period covering all programme activity to September and every 6 months thereafter. Submission within 6 weeks of end of reporting period.	Review within 10 Working Days of receipt from MEL Supplier.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Visit Reports	Submit to FCDO the visit reports from the agreed 10 monitoring and 5 evaluation visits.	Submission of each report to FCDO.	Implementation - within 10 Working Days of Monitoring Visit completion. Within 20 Working Days of Evaluation Visit completion.	Review and approve each Report.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance Submission of actual expenses will be dealt with at time of receipt by FCDO.
Lessons Learned Workshop	Deliver a Workshop to FCDO and stakeholders covering Lessons Learned during previous iterations of the programme.	Delivery of workshop.	Implementation - delivered within the first 3 months of the programme, with a subsequent workshop after 15 months of the programme.	Attend workshop and review and approve the lessons learned that come out of the workshop.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance

Formative Evaluation Report	Prepare and submit the Formative Evaluation Report to FCDO.	Submission of Formative Evaluation Report to FCDO.	Implementation - 20 Working Days after the end of Year One.	Review and approve Report within 10 working days of receipt.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Annual Review	Feed into FCDO's Annual Review process.	In collaboration with FCDO programme team, draft the MEL Annual Review.	Implementation – drafting complete by end February 2024,	Assist with drafting, review and approve the Annual Review.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Summative Evaluation Report	Prepare and submit the Summative Evaluation Report to FCDO.	Submission of Summative Evaluation Report to FCDO.	Implementation - 20 Working Days of the completion of GMAP3.	Review and approve Report.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance
Project Completion Report	Feed into FCDO's Project Completion Report process.	In collaboration with FCDO programme team, draft the MEL Project Completion Report.	Implementation – draft complete by end May 2025	Assist with drafting, review and approve the Project Completion Report.	60% on submission 40% on acceptance

Annex G - Contract Management Key Performance Indicators

CM-KPI	Performance Measure	Acceptance criteria (Including due date)	FCDO responsibility	Payment by Result (PbR) – Service Credit
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & FORECASTING				1 Credit = £500
Invoice accuracy and submission	Forecasting accuracy on average 95% on quarterly basis alongside the submission of the Valid	The evidence must be submitted to FCDO 10 Working Days after the end of the quarter. FCDO must accept that documents and evidence submitted meet the measurement	To review the evidence within 5 Working Days and provide feedback	1 Service Credit for every (5) Working Days.

	Invoice for the previous months This measures the MEL Supplier's performance for the previous quarter, e.g. during Q2 assessing Q1. Not measured in Q1	criteria to an adequate standard. For an invoice to be valid, it must contain: • the correct purchase order (PO); • the date of the invoice; • a unique invoice number • the period(s) to which the relevant charge(s) relate; and • a detailed breakdown of the Services and the appropriate Charges and supported by any other documentation required by FCDO to substantiate the invoice.		
Progress updates on milestone schedule	The MEL Supplier will update the FCDO on the forecasted delivery of milestones every quarter.	FCDO would expect written confirmation of forecasted delivering within 10 Working Days of the quarter end. Acceptance would be provided via confirmation of receipt and approval. Approval would be contingent on a detailed explanation of milestone movement.	Receipt, review and approval within 10 Working Days.	1 Service Credit for every (5) Working Days.
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT				
Extent to which MEL Supplier is responsive and flexible to FCDO needs	. Ability of MEL Supplier team to respond to FCDO requests for information [to be agreed between the Parties Working Days or as otherwise agreed.	The evidence must be submitted to FCDO 10 Working Days after the end of the quarter for responsiveness/flexibility during the quarter (so responsiveness during Q1, reviewed during Q2). FCDO must accept that documents and evidence submitted meet the measurement criteria to an adequate standard.	To review the evidence within 10 Working Days ;and feedback to MEL Supplier	1 Service Credit for not meeting pre-agreed KPIs for responsiveness to FCDO requests for information;

Extent to which MEL Supplier is responsive to Implementing Partners needs	Regularity of formal and informal communication between the MEL Supplier and Implementing Partner [to be agreed with the Implementing Partners during the 1st 3 months of individual contracts / agreements between FCDO and the Implementing Partners].	Performance of this metrics will be based on quarterly Implementing Partner feedback. The feedback must be assessed as "Meeting requirements", using the following scale: • Exceeding expectations; • Meeting requirements; • Approaching Target; • Requires Improvement; and • Inadequate;	To conduct Implementing Partner feedback in 10 Working Days of receipt	1 Service Credit for "Approaching Target"; 3 Service Credits for Requires Improvement; and 5 Service Credits for "Inadequate"
REPORTING				
Timeliness & Quality of Quarterly Summary Reports	Submission of Quarterly Summary Reports on Time and to Agreed Standard This measures the MEL provider's Supplier's performance for the previous quarter, e.g. at the end of Q2 assessing Q1. Not measured in Q1	The Quarterly Summary Reports must be submitted 10 Working Days following receipt of Implementing Partners quarterly reports. FCDO must accept that documents and evidence submitted meet the measurement criteria to an adequate standard.	To review the evidence within 5 Working Days and provide feedback ;	1 Service Credit for every (5) Working Days.

Annex H - Annual Review Template

Title:		
Programme Value £ (full life):		**Review date:**
Programme Code: [AMP ID#] **u**	**AMP start date:**	**AMP end date:**

Summary of Programme Performance

Year								
Overall Output Score								
Risk Rating								

DevTracker Link to Business Case:	
DevTracker Link to results framework:	

[GUIDANCE NOTES:

The Annual Review is part of a continuous process of review and improvement and a formal control point in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) programme cycle. At each formal review, the performance, ongoing relevance, and value for money of the programme are assessed, and the spending team needs to decide whether the programme should continue, be restructured or whether it no longer represents value for money and should be stopped. Teams should refer to the section on annual reviews in the PrOF Rules and may also like to look at relevant PrOF Guides e.g. on Monitoring, Reviewing and Scoring Programmes.

The Annual Review includes specific, time-bound recommendations for action, consistent with the key findings. These actions – which in the case of poor performance will include improvement measures – are elaborated in further detail in internal delivery plans. More doesn't mean better here: a manageable number of actions with specific leads is more useful.

Text in brackets is included to guide staff completing each section. To reduce page count, this should be deleted before sending for approval. Section lengths are suggested maximums. Teams can delete spaces between sections on the template as needed, but the headings and sub-headings in bold must not be altered or removed unless otherwise indicated.

All text needs to be suitable for publication. You can use the Delivery Plan, Timeline and Risk Register on AMP to record more sensitive information. Bullets rather than full narrative may make sense for some sections.

Scoring your programme

The Annual Review assesses and rates outputs using the following scale. The Aid Management Platform (AMP) and the programme scoring calculator will calculate the overall output score, taking account of the weightings and individual output scores.

Description	Score
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation	A++
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation	A+
Outputs met expectation	A
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation	B
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation	C

Ideally changes should not be made to any targets or indicators less than six months before review, unless agreed with the Head of Department.

FCDO aspires to improve portfolio performance. We recognise that some programmes will underperform. Teams need to consider the options objectively. It may be that an underperforming programme accompanied by robust management and learning is more valuable than a top performing programme that has low ambition or poor management. Remember an A is the base and means meeting expectations.

Some programmes will score consecutive Bs and Cs. This is not necessarily an indication that we should close them, if we can clearly demonstrate what we are doing to get them on track and are clear about when to escalate issues to senior managers/ministers. However, it is important for teams to recognise when – whether it is due to a change in context, the realisation of major risks, delivery failures or design flaws – continued investment in the programme may no longer be justified, and FCDO funding could be better spent elsewhere.

In deciding how to score each output in a review, ask yourself: "are the results achieved to date those expected in the results framework, and if not, why not?" Provide sufficient justification in the review documentation that the score given matches the performance of the programme.]

Writing AR TORs

Terms of Reference (ToR) is important not only to confirm the principal areas to be addressed in the review, but also to help with the division of labour among review team members. Regardless of the scope of the review (e.g. field visits or desk exercise; carried out by FCDO staff or external experts) it is recommended that ToRs are prepared for all those involved in the review, and then shared and agreed in advance with any project partners.

Note that "in advance" could be anything from a few weeks to several months ahead of the actual review date, depending on the need to arrange official meetings and travel. You should aim to have the programme independently reviewed (i.e. by someone outside the programme team) at least once in the programme's lifetime. If you plan to use external reviewers, it may take several months to organise this, and you may need to consider Duty of Care.

When writing your ToRs, consider how this review fits into the bigger picture monitoring of the programme over its whole lifetime. Not every year will require a major review, but you should be considering more in-depth reviews at critical points in the programme cycle.

The level of detail in an AR or PCR will be influenced by the size of the intervention, its complexity, duration and the intensity of activity during the period in question. An AR covering a year which has mainly focused on tendering may be quite short. A proportionate review is one which provides sufficient information to the reader to determine whether the results are on track, whether the project represents Value for Money and what, if any, corrective action needs to be taken.

See the Monitoring, Reviewing and Scoring Programmes PrOF Guide for more information on AR ToRs, and the Logical Framework PrOF Guide for help designing an effective results framework to inform a strong Annual Review.

Timing your Annual Review

The first AR is due **within 12 months of Business Case approval**. Early ARs may need to focus on mobilisation and procurement rather than delivery. Early years of the results framework (or if more appropriate, a separate framework) should include process-based indicators and targets that can capture progress during this time, informing the AR and overall output score.

All programmes must be reviewed annually, unless they meet the criteria for an exemption (which then needs to be agreed by the Head of Department/Development Director). If the programme's next annual review date is within three months of the programme's end date (or if the programme has a duration of

less than 15 months) then the annual review can be exempted. A Director may defer an annual review for a maximum of three months – but not simply for the purposes of bringing it inside the exemption window.

Teams can reset their AR due date, e.g. to align better with partner reporting cycles, by completing their AR early. The AR be approved up to three weeks before the due date without affecting future due dates. Anything outside this three-week period will reset the due date for 12 months' time.

A: SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW [1-1½pages]

Description of programme [1-2 paragraphs]

[Assume that the AR will be published, and this may be the only part read by external audiences, such as journalists, programme stakeholders and beneficiaries.

Describe the programme in 1 paragraph, including what it is aiming to achieve. You might want to include headline points on changes in the operating context, partner performance and FCDO management of the programme.

For Annual Review of programmes undergoing significant adaptation as a result of reductions in ODA, please include the following standard lines (which should not be changed):

- Recognising the significant and unanticipated costs incurred to support the people of Ukraine and Afghanistan escape oppression and conflict and find refuge in the UK, the government is providing additional resources of £1 billion in 2022-23 and £1.5 billion in 2023-24.

- We will focus spend according to the priorities set out in the International Development Strategy, while maximising the best value for money and our flexibility to respond to new or emerging priority issues.

- Experts on the ground will be empowered to determine with our partners which programmes to continue in line with our approach to prioritisation. The FCDO strives to ensure that every penny of ODA spend brings maximum strategic coherence, impact and value for taxpayers' money.

- In due course, we intend to update ODA allocations and the spending commitments set out in the International Development Strategy once we have worked through these decisions with our partners and suppliers.

- The UK will remain a world leader in development, not just through the impact of our ODA spend but also through our business, trade, civil society, research and technology expertise.

- The reduction in ODA has resulted in changes to this programme, which is being adapted. This Annual Review reflects that the programme has had to refocus resources and so will deliver against a new plan with new results targets. As a result, the findings of this Annual Review reflect on a programme in transition.]

Summary supporting narrative for the overall score in this review [1-2 paragraphs]

[Summarise – without repeating detail from Section B – progress in the past year and why the programme has scored as it has against the output indicators.

Where a programme is seriously underperforming (scores a C) or failing to improve (scores a consecutive B), improvement measures will need to be put in place. Ministers receive a strategic overview of poorly performing projects, based on data held by Finance Directorate and regional divisions, every quarter as part of regular board reports. Seek support from Commercial Directorate if dealing with a commercial contract) to help you structure a performance improvement plan with your delivery partners.]

Major lessons and recommendations for the year ahead [1/2 page]

[Capture the key lessons and recommendations for the year ahead, with expected timeframe. You don't need to include the detail of all lessons and recommendations from each output. Fewer and better

specific recommendations are more useful than a laundry list. You can use the Delivery Plan and Timeline on AMP to record any information that is not suitable for external publication.]

B: THEORY OF CHANGE AND PROGRESS TOWARDS OUTCOMES [1-2 pages]

Summarise the programme's theory of change, including any changes to outcome and impact indicators from the original business case. [1/2 page]

Consider if the steps to achieving outcome and impact are still valid. Is the ToC logic, supporting evidence and assumptions holding up against implementation experience? Is there any new evidence which challenges the programme design?

Consider flagging any major changes since the programme started, rather than just over the year in question. Significant changes to the outcome or impact level of results frameworks may indicate a material change to the programme design that was approved if these details were set out in the Business Case. In this case, consider whether it would be appropriate to complete a BC addendum, and send the programme for reapproval at delegated authority levels. Otherwise, as set out in PrOF Rule 25, significant changes to the results framework should be approved by the Head of Office.

Monitoring data, evidence and learning should consider the 'Leave no one Behind' agenda and as far as possible disaggregate information by age, sex, disability, geography (update geocoding information on AMP as needed) and other relevant variables. Explain how you are using engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries to optimise impact. If the programme was designed to be adaptive, what adaptations have been made?

Describe where the programme is on/off track to contribute to the expected outcomes and impact. What action is planned in the year ahead? [1/2 page]

Review this considering the overall output and outcome assessments. Given where the programme is at, how likely is it that outcomes and impact will be achieved within the time and budget originally planned? Do you have any information from programme stakeholders and beneficiaries to support this? Check the Guide to Beneficiary Engagement for detailed guidance on how to collect and use this kind of feedback.

This is about testing the link between programme outputs and intended outcomes or impact. It is possible that outputs are being delivered but will not lead to the envisaged outcomes or impact as expected. If this looks to be the case, consider the reasons for this and what action might be needed within the programme to put things back on track.

You should refer to the current output and outcome indicators. Are there any unexpected outcomes emerging? Have there been any significant changes in the budget or timetable for delivery of the programme? Are there any changes to expected outcomes or impact on gender equality, compared to what was described in the Business Case?

Where an evaluation is planned, set out what progress has been made.

Justify whether the programme should continue, based on its own merits and in the context of the wider portfolio [1 paragraph]

Based on the above analysis of outcome and output achievement, theory of change and VfM analysis, is there enough evidence that the programme continues to represent good value for money, or should it be restructured, or closed?

You should also consider the contribution that the programme is intended to make to your department's portfolio (e.g. Business Plan) and if relevant, FCDO (e.g. Single Departmental Plan).

C. DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING [aim for 1 page per output]

Output Title	[Use the wording exactly as is from the current logframe or equivalent. This will need to be entered on AMP as part of loading the Annual Review for approval.]		
Output number:		Output Score:	
Impact weighting (%):		Weighting revised since last AR?	[If Yes, up or down?]

Indicator(s)	**Milestone(s) for this review**	**Progress**

Briefly describe the output's activities and provide supporting narrative for the score. [max 1/2 page]

Give an overview of what the output has achieved, and whether it is on track or off track to hit end-of-programme targets. Make sure you highlight any significant challenges, issues or underperformance.

Describe any changes to this output during the past year, and any planned changes as a result of this review. [1 paragraph]

Describe major changes in the past year and their implications for the programme. Ideally changes should not be made to any targets or indicators less than six months before review, unless agreed with the Head of Department. Planned changes could include setting milestone targets for the next Annual Review.

All changes should be recorded, including date of and rationale for change, in the 'change frame' tab on the logframe template.

Progress on recommendations from the previous AR (if completed), lessons learned this year and recommendations for the year ahead [1-2 paragraphs]

How much progress has been made on last year's lessons and recommendations? Which key lessons were identified this year? What implications do they have for the programme, and wider FCDO and development work? Do you have any learning aims for the coming year?

Some recommendations and lessons may need to be included in the summary of recommendations on page 1. For anything that is not appropriate for publication, please use the AMP Delivery Plan, Timeline and Risk Register. Do not assume each output must have recommendations – fewer and better is more important.

Repeat the above table and sub-sections for each programme output.

D: VALUE FOR MONEY (1 page)

Key cost drivers and performance

VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case

You should refer to VfM measures and metrics from the Business Case and/or previous annual review. Changes in cost drivers (e.g. costs of major inputs) and the theory of change may be relevant. The assessment should encompass the 5 E's of FCDO's value for money framework – economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity (including gender equality and, disability, and overall cost-effectiveness. Referring back to the relevant text in the approved Business Case's Strategic Case and agreement with the implementing partner(s) may be relevant.

Where an emissions assessment and shadow carbon pricing were required for the original appraisal case, this will need to be periodically reviewed and updated during implementation. Any review or updated estimates of emissions, and any implications these have on value for money once shadow carbon pricing has been applied, should be included here.

Assessment of whether the programme continues to represent value for money

Based on the above analysis of outcome and output attainment, theory of change, VfM and evidence analysis, is there sufficient evidence for the programme to continue, or should it be restructured or closed down?

You should also consider the programme as part of the wider portfolio in your department (e.g. Business Plan) and, if relevant for this document, FCDO as a whole (e.g. Outcome Delivery Plan) or HMG as a whole.

E: RISK [½ to 1 page]

Overview of risk management [1/2 page]

Review your risk appetite for each of our six risk categories against residual risk exposure over the last year, drawing on FCDO's Risk Management Policy and Risk Appetite Statement and guidance.

What have the main trends been in your risk exposure and response over the last year, and what have they been driven by? Where relevant, provide updates on areas requiring particular assurance, for example gender equality, counter-terrorism financing, public sector equality duty, climate and environment (if a Climate Risk and Adaptation Assessment or Environmental Assessment was undertaken, implementation of these should also be reviewed) , disability, Safeguarding against sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH) or child safeguarding. What were the main risks highlighted through due diligence on your partners, and how have you responded to them across the year?

Have you been able to deliver comfortably within risk appetite, or have there been areas of pressure? How have you responded, and what further action is required in the year ahead to manage risk within appetite? If you need to amend your risk appetite or your residual risk exposure rating, explain your rationale and document the changes in AMP. If you are increasing your risk appetite above FCDO's corporate appetite in any category, discuss this with your head of office/department before finalising.

Some relevant information may not be suitable for publication. You can use the AMP Risk Register, Delivery Plan and Timeline to record more sensitive information – these should be updated as part of or following the Annual Review. Remember that throughout implementation, risk registers should be updated as often as required, with monthly review recommended, and quarterly review a minimum standard.]

Update on Partnership Principles (delete this section if n/a) [1/2 page]

[For programmes for where it has been decided (when the programme was approved or at the last AR) to use the PPs for management and monitoring, provide details on:

- Any concerns about the four PPs over the past year, including on human rights.
- Did you notify the government of any concerns?
  - If Yes, what was the government response? Explain any remedial actions.
  - If No, was disbursement suspended during the review period? When? And what were the consequences?

For all programmes, you should make a judgement on what role, if any, the Partnership Principles should play in the management and monitoring of the programme going forward. This applies even if when the BC was approved for this programme the PPs were not intended to play a role. Your decision may depend on the extent to which the delivery mechanism used by the programme works with the partner government and uses their systems.]

Annual Statement of Progress (financial aid programmes only – delete if n/a) [1 page]

Current level of fiduciary risk and direction of travel since last ASP	Insignificant/Minor/Moderate/Major/Severe Improving/Stable/Worsening
Specific assessment of corruption risk and direction of travel since last ASP	Insignificant/Minor/Moderate/Major/Severe Improving/Stable/Worsening
Is a full FRA update required?	[Yes: likely to be needed where risk levels have worsened / No: where the situation is stable or improving]

Read the Fiduciary Risk Assessment PrOF Guide to help you answer these questions. If you have sensitivity concerns about publishing this assessment, you should complete this ASP in a separate document to submit to your HoD alongside this Annual Review. You can then delete this section.

- What are the **key fiduciary risks**? Include a brief description of the risks, planned mitigation measures, and progress achieved/remedial actions.
- Is there a credible PFMA reform programme? Is donor support for PFM aligned behind a single government-led action plan?
- Can you cite examples of positive progress to report which could feed into FCDO external publications?

List the sources used in preparing this Annual Statement of Progress, e.g. government/donor reports, meeting minutes, CSO indices.

F: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT: DELIVERY, COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE [1 - 1 ½ pages]

Summarise the performance of partners and FCDO, notably on commercial and financial issues. [max 1 page]

Issues to consider for both the implementing partner(s) and FCDO include: quality and timeliness of narrative reporting and audited financial statements; proactive dialogue on risks and updating of delivery chain maps; quality of financial management e.g. accuracy of forecasting; monitoring of assets; compliance to Paris Alignment (PrOF Rule 5) and delivery of any climate and environment commitments outlined at Concept Note and Business Case stage - particularly if any responsibility was delegated to implementing partners. Consider also how FCDO could be a more effective partner to help deliver the programme.

Briefly summarise monitoring activities throughout the review period (field visits, reviews, engagement with stakeholders including beneficiary feedback) and how these have informed risk management and programming decisions.

If there is a contract, set out (where applicable):

- Delivery against contract KPIs, and Terms and Conditions
- Compliance with the Supply Partner Code, drawing on advice from Commercial Directorate
- Compliance with the new cost and transparency requirements, highlighting any profit variance and challenge and use of Open Book Accounting
- Performance of Partners, including summary of the Strategic Relationship Management scorecard assessment for each delivery partner.

Date of last narrative financial report		Date of last audited annual statement	

Annex I - Programme Completion Review

Title:		
Final Programme Spend £ (full life):	**Review Date:**	
Programme Code: [AMP ID#]	**Start Date:**	**End Date:**

Summary of Programme Performance

Year								
Programme Score								
Residual Risk Exposure Rating								

DevTracker Link to Business Case (and any addendum):	
DevTracker Links to all logframes used during programme lifetime:	

[GUIDANCE NOTES:

The Programme Completion Review is more than a final year Annual Review. It is the opportunity to reflect on the entire programme, its performance, achievements, lessons and how learning will be shared to inform future programming.

Text in brackets is included as a prompt, to guide staff completing each section. To reduce page count, this should be deleted before sending for approval. Section lengths are suggested maximums.

The PCR must be published in full on DevTracker (unless it meets transparency exemption criteria), so all text must be suitable for publication. You can use the Delivery Plan, Timeline and Risk Register on AMP (if applicable) to record more sensitive information. Bullets rather than full narrative may make sense for some sections.]

[Scoring your programme:

The Programme Completion Review assesses and rates outputs using the following scale. The Aid Management Platform (AMP) and the programme scoring calculator will calculate the overall output score, taking account of the weightings and individual output scores.

Description	**Score**
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation	A++
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation	A+
Outputs met expectation	A
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation	B
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation	C

Ideally changes should not be made to any targets or indicators less than six months before review, unless agreed with the Head of Department.

In deciding how to score each output in a review, ask yourself: “are the results achieved to date those expected in the results framework, and if not, why not?” Provide sufficient justification of your score in the narrative].

[Writing PCR ToRs:

Terms of Reference (ToRs) are important not only to confirm the main areas to be addressed in the review, but also to help with the division of labour among review team members. Regardless of the scope of the review (e.g. field visits or desk exercise; carried out by FCDO staff or external consultants) it is recommended that ToRs are prepared for all those involved, and shared and agreed in advance with implementing partners and important stakeholders. 'In advance' could be anything from a few weeks to several months ahead of the actual review date, depending on the scope, and the need to arrange official meetings and travel.

When writing your ToRs, consider how this final review fits into the bigger picture monitoring of the programme over its whole lifetime. Not every year will have required a major review, but if there are any particular gaps in monitoring or analysis, this is the moment to rectify that.

For example – best practice dictates that you should aim to have the programme independently reviewed (i.e. by someone outside the programme team) at least once in the programme's lifetime. Unless you have an external evaluation planned, the PCR is likely to be the last opportunity to get an outside view on the programme. Just be aware that, if you do plan to use external reviewers, it may take several months to organise this (even within FCDO), and you may need to consider Duty of Care. Make sure you also consider any potential conflicts of interest, for example, using individuals who are associated with the programme in some way, or have been involved at an earlier stage of design/delivery.

The level of detail in a PCR will be influenced by the size of the intervention, its complexity (including how much it has changed over the course of implementation) and duration. Other factors to consider in setting the scope of the review are:

- The importance of capturing the specific lessons learned and evidence generated by *this* programme. A highly innovative programme, a programme in a new sector or geographic area for FCDO, or a programme that has failed to deliver as expected (or where aid failed to reach its intended recipients), is likely to have very significant lessons and evidence for FCDO on what works and doesn't work, which will be valuable for future programming. An intervention that has delivered as expected, or one that builds on an already strong portfolio of similar programmes, may have less to contribute to the evidence base.
- The public profile of the programme, the expectations of stakeholders, and the anticipated demand for information at the end of the programme's life, ensuring FCDO lives up to its commitments to transparency and accountability. For example, a programme that has had a lot of media or parliamentary attention (positive or negative), or a programme that has been very significant to a partner government or particular population, may want to use the opportunity of the PCR to tell the full story of the intervention and its impact, establishing a comprehensive point of reference for any future public enquiries.

See the Monitoring, Reviewing and Scoring Programmes PrOF Guide for more information on review ToRs.]

[Timing your PCR:

An approved Programme Completion Review is due within 3 months of the programme's end date on AMP. The due date will automatically change if the programme end date changes. Unlike Annual Reviews, PCRs cannot be deferred. This is to minimise the risk of information/institutional memory loss between programme end and review completion, either within FCDO (for example, turnover of the programme team), or among implementing partner staff (who, even if they remain with the partner organisation, will not have programme-funded time to engage with the review after the end date). It is also to ensure that we uphold commitments to accountability and transparency, and do not allow too long a gap between the final Annual Review and the PCR.]

A. Summary and Overview (1-2 pages)

Description of the programme and what it has achieved [1/2 page]

[Describe the programme in 1-2 paragraphs, including what the programme aimed to achieve. You might want to include headline points on changes in the operating context, partner performance and FCDO management of the programme. You should assume that some readers may not go beyond this summary.

Set out, without repeating too much detail from Sections B or C, why the programme has scored as it has against its final output targets, and the degree to which these have shifted compared to the original targets. If the programme closed early, explain the main reason(s) for this – for example, major changes in context; poor performance; FCDO-led reprioritisation; etc. The Early Programme Closure PrOF Guide has more guidance on the possible reasons for early closure, and how to manage risks and activities during the closedown period.

Standard wording to be used on reason for early closure due to ODA cuts. This wording should not be changed:

- Recognising the significant and unanticipated costs incurred to support the people of Ukraine and Afghanistan escape oppression and conflict and find refuge in the UK, the government is providing additional resources of £1 billion in 2022-23 and £1.5 billion in 2023-24.

- We will focus spend according to the priorities set out in the International Development Strategy, while maximising the best value for money and our flexibility to respond to new or emerging priority issues.

- Experts on the ground will be empowered to determine with our partners which programmes to continue in line with our approach to prioritisation. The FCDO strives to ensure that every penny of ODA spend brings maximum strategic coherence, impact and value for taxpayers' money.

- In due course, we intend to update ODA allocations and the spending commitments set out in the International Development Strategy once we have worked through these decisions with our partners and suppliers.

- The UK will remain a world leader in development, not just through the impact of our ODA spend but also through our business, trade, civil society, research and technology expertise.]

- This Programme Completion Review reflects that the programme has had limited time to deliver planned results, as well as reflecting the progress and achievements that have been possible. Where objectives have not been completed this does not necessarily reflect on the quality of programme design or delivery].

Major lessons learned, evidence generated and recommendations [1/2 page]

[Capture the headline lessons learned/evidence generated, and your recommendations for future programming in this sector/region. You don't need to include the detail of all lessons and recommendations from each output –communicate what is most important – for example, the reasoning behind any significant changing of targets. These key lessons and recommendations can also be

recorded on your programme's AMP Timeline, using the toggles to code these correctly, at the programme level and individual component level.

If an independent evaluation has taken place, make sure you include the major findings, and provide a link to the report. If an evaluation is planned but not yet delivered (i.e. paid for under another programme), set out the plans for this, the questions it will consider, and how FCDO will use the evidence generated.]

How this report was conducted [1 paragraph]

[Briefly set out how this report was conducted and the evidence it has drawn on. You can refer readers to your ToR for further details, but remember that – unless you include it as an annex – this information won't be accessible to external readers, so make sure you include all the critical points here.]

Actions following approval of this report [1-2 paragraphs]

[Where appropriate, teams should use this report to record any outstanding actions on the programme (for example, final payments, recovery of unspent funds, receipt of audited statements, any final disposal of assets that has not taken place already). Note that **FCDO programme funds cannot be used to pay for any activity beyond the programme and funding agreement end dates** – so most of this activity should have taken place already. See the PrOF rule 29 for more information on what is required at programme closure. Some actions and key decisions may sit better in the AMP Delivery Plan - use the Timeline feature to record and keep track of these.]

B: Theory of Change and Outcome Assessment (1-2 pages)

	Starting point	Final result
Budget	*[What was the original programme budget at BC sign off?]*	*[What was the final spend?]*
Timeframe	*[What was the anticipated programme timeframe at BC sign off?]*	*[What was the total programme timeframe, from BC sign-off to closure?]*
Outcomes	*[What was the initial outcome-level target or statement? This could have been defined in the CN, BC, or an early logframe or AR.]*	*[What did the programme end up achieving at this level? Did the indicator change?]*

Overall assessment of programme outcomes, sustainability and VfM [1/2 – 1 page]

[Were the logframe outcomes achieved, within the timeframe and budget originally allocated? If not – what was the main reason for this? What is your assessment of the likely sustainability of these results?

Consider the VfM of the programme as a whole, and how this may have increased or decreased compared to the Business Case proposition (referring to specific VfM indicators, if you can). Assessment at this level will usually focus on overall cost-effectiveness of the programme (i.e. outcomes over cost; how well the combination of outputs is delivering the outcome) while considering overall equity.. You have space in the Programme Management section to discuss economy and efficiency.

Note: this VfM structure is a suggestion. You are free to decide how to organise your VfM analysis in this review, based on what makes most sense for your programme, as long as you incorporate sufficient analysis of each of the 'E's.

When considering the equity of the programme, think also about whether any unexpected outcomes emerged (positive or negative) and how these affected different groups. What were the impacts on

gender equality, compared with what was set out in the programme's Strategic Case? Monitoring data, evidence and learning – which this PCR is a part of – should always consider equity, and as far as possible disaggregate data by age, sex, disability, geography and other relevant variables. If the programme was designed to be adaptive, how has it changed over the life of the programme, and what are the VfM implications?]

Summarise the programme's theory of change and results framework, including any changes to outcome indicators. [1/2 – 1 page]

[Refer back to the original Business Case. Describe the programme's ToC (using a diagram if helpful) and any major changes to this during implementation. Consider if the steps to achieving outcome and impact turned out to be valid. Did the logic, supporting evidence and assumptions hold up against the realities of implementation? Is there any new evidence which challenges the programme design/rationale? If the programme was specifically designed to be adaptive, what was the approach to adaptation, and what changes have been made? Explain how you have used engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries to inform these changes.

Review the outcome level results against the logframe targets, and compare these with the overall output score. It is possible that output targets were met, but the intended outcomes were not – or vice versa. Does it feel like the score is a good reflection of what the programme has achieved? Describe (without repeating detail from the output section) major changes to the results framework and targets over the programme lifetime, including when they were made and why, and what their implications were for the programme.]

C: Detailed Output Assessment [aim for max. 1 page per output. Repeat for each output]

Output Number and Title	[Use the wording exactly as is from the current logframe or equivalent. This will need to be entered on AMP as part of loading the Annual Review for approval.]		
Output Score	[Enter the score (A++ to C) exactly as generated on the programme scoring calculation sheet]		
Impact weighting (%)		Impact weighting revised since last AR?	[If Yes, up or down?]

Output Indicator	*Starting Target*	Final Logframe Target	Final Result Achieved
	[Include the first end-of-programme target given for this indicator, and its date. This could have been at BC stage, or in an earlier logframe/AR.] *[**Note:** this section of the table is intended to allow a concise summary of changes to output indicators. If this does not make sense for your programme, or would be excessively time-consuming to complete, you are free to delete it and follow a purely narrative approach instead.]*		

Briefly describe the output's activities and achievements during its lifetime, and provide supporting narrative for the score. [1/2 page]

[Give an overview of what the output has delivered during its lifetime, and whether it has achieved its final end-of-programme targets. Make sure you highlight any significant challenges, or areas of underperformance.

If it makes sense to discuss at the output level, set out how you have monitored this output over the course of the programme, and the sources have you used for your assessment (e.g. partner reporting, FCDO field visits, third party verification, formal evaluation, beneficiary and stakeholder feedback, data collection/surveys). How effective was this M&E approach? Did any of the sources conflict?]

Lessons learned through this output, and recommendations for future programming [1-2 paragraphs]

[What lessons have been identified in the course of delivering this output? What did you do differently as a result, and what implications did they have for delivery of this output? If you were unable to enact these lessons during the course of this programme, which would you recommend for the future?

A summary of the most important recommendations and lessons should be included in Section A. For anything that is not appropriate for publication, please use the AMP Timeline. This tool allows you to record lessons, recommendations, key decisions and actions at the programme level as well as individual component level, using different toggles to code these.

How will you disseminate your learning and recommendations within FCDO, among programme stakeholders, and in the broader development community?

Possible mechanisms for lesson learning and sharing include:

- Workshops with external stakeholders and experts, including partners that have participated in the programme (bearing in mind sensitivity considerations).
- Internal programme Boards and workshops within offices or departments. These can be particularly valuable for getting into detail, and documenting lessons for future programming in the same sector and/or context.
- Beneficiary feedback mechanisms, such as participatory evaluation, phone surveys and key informant discussions (further tools can be found in the beneficiary engagement PrOF guide) to understand if there are lessons learnt that could be used in similar programmes/context going forward or even form part of institutional lessons learnt.
- Presentations to colleagues via established networks, e.g. at cadre conferences; via quarterly Programme Management Lead dial-ins;
- Sharing case studies/articles on Yammer, Insight, or feeding into Smart Guides and Aid Learning Platform. Contact BDD via Service Anywhere or on Yammer if you are interested in contributing lessons from your programme in this way, and we'll be happy to discuss what might work well.
- Better Delivery Department's Delivery Solutions team, which works with programme teams on key decision points in programmes, is always open to insights on how programme teams would have managed programmes differently with the benefit of hindsight, and will treat details of individual programmes with discretion. You can contact us at DeliverySolutions@FCDO.gov.uk to set up a discussion.]

D: Value for Money [½ - 1 page]

VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case

Assess VfM compared to the proposition in the Business Case, based on the past year and during the lifetime of the programme. You should refer to VfM measures and metrics from the Business Case and/or previous annual review. Changes in cost drivers (e.g. costs of major inputs) and the theory of change may be relevant. The assessment should encompass the 5 E's of FCDO's value for money framework – economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity (including gender equalityand disability), and overall cost-effectiveness. Rreferring back to the relevant text in the approved Business Case's Strategic Case and agreements with implementing partners may be relevant. You should note any formal extensions or amendments to the programme giving brief details about cost, duration and the reasons why. Significant changes to logframe indicators or targets may also be relevant.

Where an emissions assessment and shadow carbon pricing were required for the original appraisal case, this will need to be periodically reviewed and updated during implementation. Any review or updated estimates of emissions, and any implications these have on value for money once shadow carbon pricing has been applied, should be included here.

E: Risk [½ - 2 pages]

Overview of programme risk during the past year and over the life of the programme, drawing on FCDO's Risk Management Policy and Risk Appetite Statement and wider risk guidance. [1/2 page]

[Review your risk appetite against your residual risk exposure. What have the main trends been in your risk exposure and response over the past year, and over the life of the programme? What have they been driven by?

What were the main risks highlighted through due diligence on your partners, and how have you responded to them across the life of the programme? Have you been able to deliver within risk appetite over the life of the programme?

If your programme is closing earlier than anticipated, you may want to set out here how you have managed specific risks identified part of early closure (see the Early Programme Closure PrOF Guide for more on this). This could include details of the programme's exit strategy, and any ongoing mitigations and sustainability actions that will continue beyond the period of FCDO support.

Some relevant information may not be suitable for publication but ensure the risk register on AMP and Delivery Plan are updated as necessary following this review (remember that projects remain open until they are archived, even after the PCR is complete).]

Update on Partnership Principles (delete this section if n/a) [1/2 page]

[For programmes for where it has been decided (when the programme was approved or at the last AR) to use the PPs for management and monitoring, provide details on:

- Any concerns about the four PPs over the past year and over the life of the programme, including on human rights.
- Did you notify the government of any concerns?
  - If Yes, what was the government response? Explain any remedial actions.

- If No, was disbursement suspended during the review period? When? And what were the consequences?

Do you have any lessons, evidence or recommendations linked to the Partnership Principles that will be useful for other FCDO programmes? How will you disseminate these?]

Annual Statement of Progress (Financial Aid programmes only – delete if n/a) [1 page]

Current level of fiduciary risk and direction of travel since last ASP	Minor/Moderate/Major/Severe Improving/Stable/Worsening
Specific assessment of corruption risk and direction of travel since last ASP	Minor /Moderate/Major/Severe Improving/Stable/Worsening

[Read the Fiduciary Risk Assessment PrOF Guide to help you answer these questions. If you have sensitivity concerns about publishing this assessment, you should complete this ASP in a separate document to submit to your HoD alongside this Annual Review. You can then delete this section.

- What have been the **key fiduciary risks** on this programme? Include a brief description of the risks, mitigation measures, and progress achieved/remedial actions.
- Has there been there a credible PFMA reform programme? Is donor support for PFM aligned behind a single government-led action plan?
- Can you cite examples of positive progress to report which could feed into FCDO external publications?

List the sources used in preparing this Annual Statement of Progress, e.g. government/donor reports, meeting minutes, CSO indices.]

F: Programme Management: Commercial and Financial Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation [1 - 1 ½ pages]

Summarise the performance of partners and FCDO, notably on commercial and financial issues, and including VfM measures of economy and efficiency. [1 page]

[Issues to consider for both the implementing partner(s) and FCDO include: quality and timeliness of narrative reporting and audited financial statements; proactive dialogue on risks and updating of delivery chain maps; quality of financial management e.g. accuracy of forecasting; monitoring and disposal of assets.

Consider how FCDO could have been a more effective partner to help deliver the programme, and document your lessons and recommendations for future programming.

If there is a contract, set out (where applicable):

- Delivery against contract KPIs, and Terms and Conditions
- Compliance with the Supplier Code of Conduct, drawing on advice from PCD
- Compliance with the new cost and transparency requirements, highlighting any profit variance and challenge and use of Open Book Accounting

- Overall performance of partners, including summary of the Strategic Relationship Management scorecard assessment, if applicable.]

Programme-level approach to monitoring and evaluation [1/2 page]

[Briefly summarise the overall approach to monitoring and evaluation of this programme, if you haven't done so already – e.g. where it makes more sense to do this at the programme level than at the output level. This might include field visits, formal reviews, independent evaluations, regular partner meetings, oversight committees, beneficiary feedback, data collection/surveys, evaluation, lesson learning). How effective was this? At a high level, how did it informed your risk management and programming decisions?]

Date of last narrative financial report		Date of last audited annual statement	

Annex J – Risk Assessment Summary

FCDO Summary Risk Assessment Matrix for Afghanistan

Theme	FCDO Risk Score
Country	**Afghanistan**
Overall Rating*	4
FCO Travel Advice	5
Host Nation Travel Advice	_
Transportation	5
Security	5
Civil Unrest	4
Violence/crime	4
Terrorism	5
Conflict (war)	5
Hurricane	2
Earthquake	4
Flood / Tsunami	3
Medical Services	4
Nature of Project Intervention	4

1	2	3	4	5
Very Low Risk	**Low Risk**	**Medium Risk**	**High Risk**	**Very High Risk**
Low		Medium	High	

Note: Above Risk Assessment Summary was conducted on 25/04/2022 taking into considerations updates in FCDO travel advice (Afghanistan 12/04/2022; Iran 9/08/2021; Pakistan 07/04/22) and is subject to change.

Afghanistan Assessment is limited, as there is no FCDO Security Advisor in country at present to directly collect information, assessment therefore is primarily based on information from August 2021 with April 2022 updates on terrorism and entry requirements.

Annex K - GMAP2 Summative Evaluation Report

UKaid
from the British people

ePact
Strengthening evaluation effectiveness and impact

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Global Mine Action Programme 2 (GMAP2)

Summative Evaluation – final report

February 2022

Oxford Policy Management

itad

e-Pact is a consortium led by Oxford Policy Management and co-managed with Itad

Disclaimer

This report has been prepared by the e-Pact consortium for the named client, for services specified in the terms of reference and contract of engagement. The information contained in this report shall not be disclosed to any other party, or used or disclosed in whole or in part without agreement from the e-Pact consortium. For reports that are formally put into the public domain, any use of the information in this report should include a citation that acknowledges the e-Pact consortium as the author of the report. This confidentiality clause applies to all pages and information included in this report.

This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

Acknowledgements

This report was only possible with the support of the GMAP team in London, FCDO staff at Post in the nine countries that we evaluated, and the implementing partners: NPA, HALO, MAG, GICHD, UNMAS, and UNDP. In particular, we wish to also thank the community members and national authorities who generously gave their time to provide information and insights.

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Acronyms

ACE	Afghanistan Centre for Excellence
AEO	Armed Ethnic Organisation
AGE	Anti-Government Element
AIM	Abandoned Improvised Mine
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AP	Anti-personnel
AT	Anti-tank
AV	Anti-vehicle
AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CHASE	Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
CL	Community Liaison
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Authority
CMP	Centrally Managed Programme
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DFA	De Facto Authority
DFID	Department for International Development
DMAC	Directorate of Mine Action Coordination
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EORE	Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQUALS	Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
EU	European Union
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GEFA	Global Evaluation Framework Agreement
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GMAP	Global Mine Action Programme
GMAP1	Global Mine Action Programme 1
GMAP2	Global Mine Action Programme 2
HALO	The HALO Trust
HMA	Her Majesty's Ambassador
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
ITT	Invitation to Tender
KII	Key Informant Interview
LMAC	Lebanon Mine Action Centre
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NMAC	National Mine Action Centre
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NTS	Non-Technical Survey
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSJA	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance
QA	Quality Assurance
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RE	Risk Education
RMAC	Routing-enhanced Media Access Control
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SHA	Suspected Hazardous Areas
SOC	Story of Change
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRO	Senior Responsible Owner
SSHF	South Sudan Humanitarian Fund
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VfM	Value for Money

WFP	World Food Programme
YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre
YMACC	Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre

GMAP2 Summative Evaluation

Executive Summary

CASE STUDY COUNTRY OVERVIEW

SUDAN

- Mine and Explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination result of over 20 years conflict since the country's independence in 1956
- Contamination is currently restricted to Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. All other states have been declared mine free
- NMAC has assumed full ownership of national mine action. Mine action is heavily focused on humanitarian access objectives

FCDO objectives Humanitarian access and response, peace-building/stabilisation, treaty obligations Lead contractor UNMAS Funding committed £6m Funding by activity Unknown

SOUTH SUDAN

- Legacy contamination from nearly 50 years of war leading to independence in 2011. New civil war now creating new contamination
- Over 90km² of land reportedly contaminated by mines and ERW, full extent of problem is not known, with large areas requiring survey
- UNMAS has central role in regulation and management of mine action, o National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) only limited role

FCDO objectives Humanitarian access and response, food security, protection Lead contractor MAG (Lot 2) Funding committed £3.05m Funding by activity Land release and clearance: £2.91m MRE: £121k Capacity development: £19k

SOMALIA/SOMALILAND

- Widespread contamination from ongoing conflict with ERW, mines, proliferation of small arms and light weapons and rise in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
- Contamination exists across Somalia's three major regions: south-central Somalia; Puntland; & Somaliland. Latter approaching mine free status
- Community security is primary concern for all major stakeholders
- Mine action sector largely driven by the INGOs

FCDO objectives Security, stabilisation, economic recovery Lead contractor Halo (Lot 1) Funding committed £7.79m Funding by activity Land release and clearance: £5.51m MRE: £1.68m Capacity development: £596k

ANGOLA

- Major contamination following civil war which ended in 2002, all provinces affected. Most densely populated areas and economic infrastructure now cleared, more rural communities and remaining infrastructure now focus
- Government firmly places demining as part of its economic development and poverty reduction strategy
- Recent political shifts and increased donor support, providing dividends. Clearance rates have increased, country has better survey of affected areas, capacity is being built at coordinating level from low base

FCDO objectives Economic development, livelihoods, treaty obligations Lead contractor Halo (Lot 1) Funding committed £8.42m Funding by activity Land release and clearance: £8.42m MRE: £296k Capacity development: £703k



AFGHANISTAN

- Ongoing conflict between government and non state armed groups, including Taliban and ISIS, particularly but not only in south of the country.
- Mature mine action sector - 30 years of contamination, 80% of legacy contamination cleared
- Low casualty rates from Anti-tank (AT)/Anti-personnel (AP) mine, but high rates from ERW and IEDs

FCDO objectives Stabilisation and humanitarian access and response

LEBANON

- Contamination legacy of civil war, Israeli occupation, Israeli 2006 conflict and spillover from recent Syria conflict
- Focus of mine action largely economic development, safety and stabilisation objectives
- Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) plays important coordination role

FCDO objectives Economic development, treaty obligations Lead contractor MAG (Lot 2) Funding committed £8.10m Funding by activity Land release and clearance: £7.71m MRE: £282k Capacity development: £107K

YEMEN

- Ongoing conflict since 2015, plus legacy AP and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) mine contamination from previous conflicts since 1960s
- Massive contamination from AP and AV mines, heavy cluster munitions, UXO, Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) and IEDs on land and at sea
- Accurate geographic spread unknown

FCDO objectives Humanitarian access and response, stabilisation, institutional strengthening Lead contractor UNDP Funding committed £2.55m Funding by activity Unknown

CAMBODIA

- Massive contamination remaining after civil war which ended in 1998, estimated 817km² of Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA)
- Regions around border with Thailand remain heavily affected. Improved infrastructure is drawing inward migration and increasing risk of accidents
- Cambodia committed to demining and main national and international actors mostly effective

FCDO objectives Trade, economic development Lead contractor Halo (Lot 1) Funding committed £10.69m Funding by activity Land release and clearance: £9.11m MRE: £568k Capacity development: £1.02m

MYANMAR

- Reported to be third most contaminated country in the world, a result of decades of armed conflict
- Eastern states bordering China and Thailand and areas on the western borders with Bangladesh suspected to be among most contaminated
- International humanitarian community particularly concerned for the safe return and resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Myanmar yet to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, nor has government formulated clear direction for mine action or established a national authority

FCDO objectives Conflict resolution, protection of IDPs, geopolitical Lead contractor MAG (Lot 2) Funding committed £2.06m Funding by activity MRE and community liaison: £2.06m

CONCLUSIONS

1. GMAP adopts both the 'global good' narrative of mine action alongside more complex-aware narratives captured in the GMAP ToC. However, there is insufficient granularity of programme design and adaptation of the ToC at the country level to avoid these narratives coming into tension with each other, undermining GMAP's effectiveness and coherence with other stakeholders.

2. The combination of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) and clearance, as core mine action activities under GMAP, has clearly made important contributions to the lives of the most vulnerable, promoting physical and food security, freedom of movement, livelihoods, trade, and economic development. However, the concept of mine action as a 'global good' can disincentivise efforts to source complementary support that can enhance the quality of GMAP outcomes.

3. Participatory approaches at the community level to inform programme design and delivery are well established across the sector, especially where led by NGOs. However, weak incentives for implementers to transfer responsibilities to local stakeholders undermines long-term ambitions of fully transitioning the sector to national ownership.

4. The relative scale and global reach of GMAP and the combination of funding mine action activities, advocacy, research and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL), has created important strategic value for the mine action sector, and positioned the United Kingdom (UK) as an influential thought leader, committed to promoting rules based international systems. However, it remains to be seen how cuts to the UK aid

5. GMAP Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems under Lots 1 and 2 contracts continuously improve with the collection of valuable outcome-level data. This has not yet been met by similar improvements in analysis and learning, meaning the country programmes are uncertain of their real value, can be unaware of negative consequences of their work, and lack the knowledge to really test the GMAP ToC to inform adaptive management.

6. The choice of GMAP2 to expand its funding modalities to accommodate UN implementing partners has proved beneficial in some countries, but the decision to compartmentalise United Nations (UN) and INGO delivery modalities has missed an opportunity to promote the kind of coherence and collaboration gained within the Lot 1 and 2 consortia. It has also compromised GMAP's understanding of country contexts and achievements where it is solely reliant on inadequate UN reporting systems.

7. Conflict sensitivity is largely understood within the sector as 'do no harm' and typically in the interests of securing operational access to insecure areas. However, causal pathways in the ToC that rely on mine action being conflict *transformative* are not currently supported by evidence and seem unlikely given that country-level programme teams do not deliberately build conflict transformation into their design nor routinely co-ordinate with peacebuilding stakeholders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are 4 key recommendations to FCDO and the implementers. In summary:

1 Create an enabling environment for national ownership

FCDO: Provide resources and capabilities for implementers to undertake political economy analysis to inform country-level national transition strategies and link this to GMAP's advocacy strategy to co-ordinate other donors.

FCDO: Link programme outcomes and key performance indicators clearly to national transition indicators and implementer exit. Strategies and allocate budget lines for implementer exiting.

Implementers: Develop exit plans for all programmes, no matter the timeframe, which are tied to locally-led national transition strategies, where those strategies exist.

NMAAs: Immediately engage with complementary ministries to advocate for mine action to be allocated specific budgetary resources.

2 Maximise the strategic effect of mine action

FCDO: Engage country-based humanitarian, security and development teams in planning and allocative decisions of GMAP3 to develop context-specific outcomes that are aligned to country-level FCDO priorities.

Implementers: Immediately adopt adaptive management processes informed by evidence and analysis to continuously improve the effectiveness of delivery models.

NMAAs: Immediately advocate within government to integrate mine action into relevant sectoral strategies and national plans.

3 Make improvements to MEL systems

FCDO: Develop context-specific value propositions linked to country-level ToCs to provide clarity on expected added value from programming.

Implementers: Use country-level ToCs to inform data collection priorities that will optimise analytical capability at outcome level and linked to simple VfM frameworks, thinking beyond single-year timeframes and expanding focus beyond individual clearance sites.

NMAAs: Immediately develop simple MEL systems that collate and analyse evidence of outcome-level change from across the sector and encourage accountability of the sector as a whole to achieving those outcomes.

UN agencies: Review MEL systems and revise to focus on meaningful outcome-level indicators.

4 Support mine action sector for continued engagement within fragile contexts

FCDO: Provide implementers with guidance and minimum expectations on how to conduct context analysis and ensure conflict sensitivity, supported by budget allocations to implementers.

Implementers: Ensure conflict sensitive indicators are integrated into MEL systems and analyse outcome data to inform extent of equitable distribution of benefits.

NMAAs: Immediately work with mine action stakeholders to increase their contextual awareness of the risks and opportunities of mine action within fragile and conflict contexts.

1 Introduction

This summative evaluation report has been prepared by the Itad evaluation team and provides our findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations from the summative evaluation of the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)[1] Global Mine Action Programme 2 (GMAP2), undertaken between September 2020 and June 2021.[2]

GMAP2 aimed to reduce the humanitarian and development impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) through a combination of demining activities, mine risk education (MRE) and capacity building of local implementing organisations and national mine action authorities (NMAAs), across 14 countries. The summative evaluation, which builds on the formative evaluation conducted by the Itad evaluation team between November 2018 and May 2019, is intended to assess the relevance and overall effectiveness and impact of the programme, including in relation to key cross-cutting issues (value for money (VfM), gender, and conflict sensitivity). It also builds on evaluative work conducted by Itad for GMAP2's predecessor programme – GMAP1, between 2014 and 2018 – including formative and summative evaluations. In doing so, it is intended to enhance the evidence base informing design and implementation of mine action programming by the FCDO, its implementing partners (IPs) and the wider mine action sector.

The key intended audiences for the report are the FCDO GMAP2 team and their IPs. In addition this evaluation report will be of interest to FCDO country offices, other FCDO teams working in the wider conflict and security space, and wider stakeholders in the mine action sector.

In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview of the GMAP2 programme and the wider context of mine action and present the structure of the report.

1.1 The GMAP2 programme

1.1.1 The global context of mine action

The mine action sector seeks to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and ERW, including unexploded sub-munitions. While the exact levels of mine/ERW contamination across the world are not known, owing to incomplete reporting and ongoing active conflicts where mines are still being used, approximately 60 countries across the world have some known threat of anti-personnel mine contamination, with 12 classed as having a 'massive' level of contamination, with over 100 km^2 of land affected.[3]

Significant progress has been made over the past three decades in reducing the residual threat from mines and ERW through the combined efforts of national authorities, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) and commercial demining organisations, supported by donors, including the UK government. However, substantial contamination remains. This contamination not only threatens the physical safety of communities but can also deny them the use of arable and pastoral land and restrict their ability to access markets and essential services, including health and education. The presence of mines and ERW can also constrain freedom of movement,

[1] Formerly Department for International Development (DFID); DFID merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in September 2020 to form the FCDO.
[2] Following submission of the draft report in June 2021, this revised version was then submitted in February 2022. The revised version included some minor additions which drew on newly available implementer data, plus additional data collection subsequently conducted by Itad under other workstreams of the GMAP2 monitoring and evaluation contract, to further triangulate a number of findings.
[3] International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2020) The Monitor. Available at http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/landmine-monitor-2020.aspx [Accessed 26.07.2021]

prevent the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The global response to landmine contamination has improved significantly since the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), which led to a ban on the weapons and the curtailment of new use. The Convention has kept the issue alive at the political level through its use of targets and deadlines and a framework of regular international meetings. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions singled out cluster munition remnants as the next most indiscriminate weapon, and a similar process to the APMBC has been followed. The UK was a founding member of both Conventions and has been an active participant in them since. The Conventions maintain that it is the responsibility of affected states to clear all known mined or cluster munition-affected areas, and there has been considerable support from international donors – such as DFID/FCDO – to assist national mine action programmes to meet this challenge.

At operational level, the United Nations (UN) has played an active role in the mine action sector, both globally and at country level. The creation of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 1997 provided a focal point within the UN system. This led to a number of UN policies and strategies being developed over the years, and also to the introduction of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Work by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has helped standardise and regulate the sector by providing an information management system and improving demining systems (such as land release concepts and cluster munition remnant surveys), along with hosting regular international meetings to share experience. Much of this work has been driven by demand from donors to see improved VfM from their contributions.

Between 2010 and 2019, global support to mine action amounted to a total of $6.6 billion, of which $5.2 billion was international support from donors and the remaining $1.4 billion was from affected states contributing to their own mine action efforts.[4] Annual funding has fluctuated significantly over that period. In 2017, international support amounted to $673.2 million, the highest ever annual figure. Since 2017 there has been a notable downturn, and in 2019 a total of 35 donors contributed a total of $561.3 million in international support. The United States (US), the European Union (EU), the UK, Norway and Germany were the largest donors, with the UK's contribution amounting to $71.7 million that year, the third-highest contribution. The figures provide a useful backdrop against which to contextualise GMAP2 and its contribution to international mine action efforts.

1.1.2 GMAP2 overview[5]

GMAP2 represents the UK's principal current contribution to addressing the global challenge of landmines and ERW, continuing the work of two predecessor global mine action programmes: one in 2010–13 and one in 2014–18.[6] Initially intended to run from October 2017 to March 2020, the programme was then extended by a year, taking it through to March 2021.[7] The programme aims to reduce the humanitarian and development impact of landmines and ERW through a combination of demining activities, MRE and capacity building of local implementing organisations and NMAAs. The expected results included releasing 150 km^2 of land, enabling 800,000 people to live their lives free from the threat of mines, and helping 100,000 adults and children understand the dangers of landmines. The total value of the programme, up to March 2021, is £124.4 million.[8] This represents a significant uplift from the £30 million budget of GMAP1.

Figure 1 provides a simplified extract of the GMAP2 Theory of Change (ToC), which was developed in close collaboration with the IPs of GMAP1 and revised at the start of GMAP2. The diagram details the

[4] The Monitor (2021, 2018). The most comprehensive and reliable source of information on donor funding for mine action is the annual Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor ('The Monitor'). Available at http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3188858/MA-funding-trends_2010-2019.pdf; http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2921922/Support-for-Mine-Action-in-2017_Infographic.pdf
[5] Further details on the GMAP2 programme are available on the FCDO's Development Tracker website here: https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300544/documents
[6] Referred to in this report as GMAP1.
[7] While the summative review was ongoing, the programme was once again extended by a year, up to March 2022.
[8] GMAP2 Annual Review 2019–20.

intended outputs and immediate outcomes, intermediate outcomes and impact from the combination of demining, MRE and capacity building activities funded under the GMAP2 programme. It also includes a summary of key assumptions underpinning the ToC that are most relevant to this evaluation. The full ToC is included in Annex 2.

Figure 1: Summary GMAP2 ToC



SUMMARY ASSUMPTIONS

1. **Land released** by mine action activities will be used, remains available to beneficiaries (i.e. is not expropriated) and is used in a way that aligns with UK development objectives.**
2. **Lack of knowledge is a main cause of mine/ERW accidents.**
3. **NMAA capacity development is aligned with national leadership interests and incentives.**
4. **Opportunities for employment by contractors are allocated in conflict sensitive manner.**
5. **MRE messages not undermined by socioeconomic benefits of taking risks.**
6. **Security and political situation allows benefits of land release to be realised.**

***Land cancellation:**[9] A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the non-technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Land reduction: A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Land clearance: Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

****Land release:** The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk, involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

The programme operates in 14 heavily contaminated countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Five GMAP2 countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq and Yemen) are among the ten most highly mine- and ERW-contaminated in the world, according to The Landmine Monitor 2020.[10] It covers a diverse range

[9] All definitions taken from International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2018) The Monitor. Available at http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2918780/Landmine-Monitor-2018_final.pdf [Accessed 26.07.2021]
[10] International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2020) The Monitor. Available at http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/landmine-monitor-2020.aspx [Accessed 26.07.2021]

of country contexts, including both (i) where contamination is linked to active conflicts, and (ii) post-conflict contexts, where contamination is a legacy of previous conflict.[11]

The programme is implemented through a range of funding modalities. Ten of the GMAP2 countries are grouped in two contracts, known as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Both contracts were awarded to a partnership of three INGOs – the HALO Trust (HALO), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) – and GICHD. The Lot 1 contract is led by HALO; the Lot 2 contract is led by MAG. In addition, bilateral funding has been provided to UNMAS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to be spent in select countries. The composition of these different delivery modalities is detailed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Summary of GMAP2 delivery modalities

Delivery modality	Countries
Lot 1: HALO lead; delivery partners: MAG, NPA and GICHD; subcontracting to LNGOs in Somalia and Cambodia	Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Zimbabwe
Lot 2: MAG lead; delivery partners: HALO, NPA and GICHD; subcontracting to LNGOs in Myanmar and Vietnam	Laos, Lebanon, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam
UNMAS lead; subcontracting to GICHD, INGOs and LNGOs	Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan
UNDP lead; Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) direct implementation partner	Yemen

The broader national and international development policy context and the programme's position and relevance within that context are discussed in detail in Section 3 of the report.

1.1.3 Report structure

The remainder of the report is structured as follows:

- In **Section 2**, we set out our **approach and methodology** for the evaluation.
- Across Sections 3–5 we present 19 headline **findings**, supported by a total of 12 short stories of change (SOCs) case studies.
    - In **Section 3**, we present our findings in relation to the relevance and coherence of the GMAP2 programme.
    - **Section 4** presents our findings in relation to cross-cutting issues of VfM, gender and disability inclusion, and conflict sensitivity.
    - **Section 5** covers our findings in relation to GMAP's results.
    - **Section 6** covers our findings in relation to impact and sustainability.
- In **Section 7**, based on our findings we set out a set of **conclusions, lessons and recommendations**.

[11] For ease of reporting, we distinguish between two different broad categories of operating context in this report: conflict-affected and post-conflict.

2 Approach and Methodology

2.1.1 Background and overarching evaluation strategy

Itad has been providing independent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the FCDO's GMAP2 programme since August 2018.[12] The terms of reference (ToR) for the contract are included in Annex 1.[13] As part of the evaluation component of the contract, the evaluation team has sought to assess whether GMAP2 has been delivered efficiently and effectively; assess whether delivery has been in line with country priorities; and review the causal pathways and assumptions of the GMAP ToC through a formative and summative evaluation. This summative evaluation thus represents the final stage in the Itad evaluation strategy for GMAP2, building on the formative evaluation which concluded in May 2019. Together, the two evaluations were intended to address a set of five top-level evaluation questions (EQs) and associated sub-questions. The full evaluation framework is presented in Annex 4.

In Figure 2 we show the five top-level EQs and how the formative evaluation and summative evaluation together have sought to address them. A white cross indicates that the EQ was a focus of the evaluation, while a grey cross indicates that the question was engaged with to some degree but was less of a focus.

Figure 2: How the formative and summative evaluations have addressed the 5 EQs

	FORMATIVE EVALUATION	SUMMATIVE EVALUATION
EQ 1. Relevance: To what extent and in what ways is the GMAP project design aligned to and coherent with the mine action priorities of UK, international, national government partners and community beneficiaries in selected GMAP project countries?	⊗	⊗
EQ2. Delivery: To what extent and in what ways have GMAP contractors ensured safe, efficient, quality delivery of their project strategy and plan?	⊗	⊗
EQ3: Effectiveness: To what extent have project interventions contributed to outcomes identified in the GMAP ToC (immediate and intermediate)?		⊗
EQ4. Impact: To what extent has the project contributed – or is it likely to contribute – to wider political, economic and social change, including resilience, poverty reduction and growth beyond project locations and immediate target beneficiary groups?		⊗
EQ5. Sustainability: To what extent are the effects of the immediate and intermediate outcomes likely to endure once the project has been completed?		⊗

In this report we structure our findings around relevance (EQ1), cross-cutting issues (which cut across our EQs) and results (EQ3, EQ4 and EQ5). We do not dedicate a specific chapter to EQ2 (delivery), as we touch on this area as part of our assessment of GMAP2 results and it was more thoroughly addressed during the formative evaluation. To enhance accessibility of the report, we did not structure the report around the sub-EQs set out in the evaluation framework (see Annex 4), but the sub-questions for our focus EQs are each covered in the relevant findings section.

[12] The inception period for the contract ran from August to October 2018, so preceding the start of implementation of the GMAP2 programme in November 2018.
[13] Implementation in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was not specified in the ToR as a requirement of the evaluation, and thus it is not covered in this section.

2.1.2 Reflections from the formative evaluation

The purpose of the formative evaluation was to undertake an early assessment of the relevance of GMAP2's strategic objectives and of the overall design – specifically the efficiency, safety and quality of the delivery model. In doing so, the formative evaluation responded to EQ1 and EQ2 in the GMAP2 evaluation framework (see Figure 2 and Annex 4). It set out a set of recommendations for what was then DFID and for GMAP2 implementers. A summary of these recommendations is presented in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Formative evaluation recommendations

DFID (now FCDO):		Implementers:	
1	Encourage implementers to adopt more **consistent approaches to conflict sensitivity** across GMAP.	1	Ensure any **contextual data** collected is reflected upon and used to inform programming decisions.
2	Continue to **improve M&E systems and reporting** across GMAP, sharing M&E lessons from GMAP1 with UN agencies.	2	Leverage any relationships and influence with the NMAAs to **improve prioritisation** of tasks.
3	Explore with UNMAS the possibility to deliver **third-party monitoring** in Afghanistan and Sudan.	3	All implementers should work together to identify a set of **intermediate outcome-level indicators**.
4	Use DFID's expertise in adaptive programming to encourage a more **problem-driven approach to capacity development**.	4	Work with DFID to develop **practical guidelines and processes** that capture the conflict sensitivity concerns of mine action.

Throughout the summative evaluation report, we reflect on whether these recommendations have been acted upon.

2.1.3 Summative evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

The summative evaluation builds on the formative evaluation. While it engages with all five of our GMAP2 EQs, the **purpose** of the summative evaluation is to support accountability and learning, including to inform decisions about future mine action programme design and implementation.

The **overarching objectives** of the evaluation have been to assess whether GMAP2 has been implemented effectively and efficiently and to identify lessons and recommendations on what works, what does not work, and in what contexts. In so doing, it seeks to contribute to building the global evidence base, and to support and inform decision making and future mine action programme design and implementation for the FCDO and IPs, as well as for the wider mine action sector.

The **temporal scope** of the summative evaluation is the lifetime of the GMAP2 programme from 2018 to 2021 (thus excluding the most recent extension period, which was granted while the summative evaluation was nearing completion).[14] The **geographic scope** of the evaluation is global, encompassing the entirety of the GMAP2 programme, examined through a purposeful sample of country contexts (as detailed in Section 2.1.4 below).

[14] The draft summative evaluation report was submitted in June 2021. This revised version was then submitted in February 2022, and includes some minor additions which drew on newly available implementer data plus additional data collection subsequently conducted by Itad under other workstreams of the GMAP2 monitoring and evaluation contract, to further triangulate a number of findings from the draft report.

2.1.4 Methodology

In addressing our EQs, we seek to test the underlying hypotheses about the assumed relationships between different component outputs and outcomes (both immediate and intermediate) presented in the GMAP ToC. The summative evaluation, therefore, seeks to assess the extent to which mine action interventions have made a plausible contribution to national and local mine action authorities and their capacity to manage mine action interventions, reduce the risk of death and injury, and improve livelihood opportunities in target areas. While these outcomes are largely confined to project areas and target beneficiaries, including national and local mine action authorities, assessment of impact is focused at the national societal level. Here we assess the extent to which interventions may have contributed to peace, security and development in the different contexts. In assessing sustainability, we seek to determine whether results will likely endure – for instance whether mine authorities have institutionalised good practice.

We also interrogate the interests and incentives of key stakeholders involved in the delivery chain. This means that our focus is primarily on FCDO and its international delivery partners, as well as NMAAs and local IPs. This theory- and actor-driven line of enquiry was then pursued through data collection across a purposeful sample of country contexts.

Country selection

In order to appropriately capture the scale and complexity of GMAP2 and the diversity of contexts in which it operates, we selected a purposeful sample of nine countries in which to conduct country-level data collection. These countries – Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, Myanmar, South Sudan, Somalia (including Somaliland), Sudan and Yemen – were selected to ensure appropriate coverage of both conflict and post-conflict settings, different strategic contexts, different international IPs and delivery modalities, and to examine different thematic areas of the ToC. Page ii in the Executive Summary provides an overview of each selected country.

For ease of reporting, we distinguish between two different broad categories of operating context in this report: *conflict-affected* and *post-conflict*. We include Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia (south-central), Sudan, South Sudan and Yemen as conflict-affected; and Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somaliland[15] as post-conflict. This represents an important distinction between operating in contexts with ongoing active violent conflict (even if not in the sites where GMAP2 is operational) and operating in contexts that are post-conflict; as such, the labels facilitate making this distinction within the text. These are not political categorisations, nor do they imply homogeneity within these categories.

Deviations from our inception report

Our approach to country case study selection was the only key deviation from the approach set out in our inception report. Initially we had intended to conduct a smaller set of deeper-dive country case studies. However, we eventually opted instead to conduct lighter-touch studies across a wider range of countries. This was in part a response to the widening interests of FCDO as they approached the GMAP3 design phase, but was also to enable us to test and assess the GMAP ToC through evidence gathering across a wider cross-section of different contexts. It was intended that each country study would then focus on specific thematic areas rather than consider all GMAP activity within that country. In practice, it was not always straightforward to separate out specific activities, so, while there was a country thematic focus, the country evaluations touched on a number of related issues and mine action activities.

[15] Post-conflict categorisation based on the existence of mature peace agreement, while Somaliland due to its status as an autonomous and relatively peaceful part of Somalia.

Data collection methods

We employed a mixed-methods approach, drawing on a range of primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data collected through the following methods:

Desk review of existing documentation. Documentation reviewed included key programme and project documentation (e.g. monitoring reports, pre/post-clearance assessment reports, etc.), wider mine action literature, context-related reports and literature, and outputs from other components of the Itad team's M&E contract, including quarterly summary monitoring reports and an ongoing geospatial impact evaluation of historical mine action in Afghanistan. Over 280 documents were reviewed.

Key informant interviews (KIIs). We interviewed more than 300 international, national and local stakeholders. These included donors, national mine action agencies, and civil society and GMAP implementers. Interviews were conducted both remotely and, for seven of our nine selected countries, in person by our in-country evaluators.

Focus group discussions (FGDs). In order to ensure that the evaluation included appropriate coverage of the perspectives and voice of GMAP2's intended beneficiaries, we conducted ten FGDs in each of the seven countries in which we conducted in-country data collection. These FGDs were conducted with a range of community beneficiaries, including farmers, local elders, shopkeepers and local officials, and ensuring representation of both male and female community members. Where it was not possible to conduct FGDs (due to COVID-19-related restrictions, as detailed in Section 2.1.6 below), we instead sought to conduct additional KIIs with GMAP2 beneficiaries and community members to ensure their voice was adequately captured.

Together these methods are intended to facilitate robust triangulation of evidence and to ensure the evaluation incorporates the views of a wide cross-section of GMAP2 stakeholders. Table 2 details the stakeholder groups consulted through KIIs and FGDs. Lists of documents reviewed and stakeholders consulted are provided in Annex 9 and Annex 10 respectively.

Table 2: Stakeholder groups consulted

Stakeholder group	Number of KIIs/FGDs
Her Majesty's Government (HMG)	19
GMAP2 implementers	88
Subcontracted implementers	34
NMAAs	20
Local government officials	36
Local communities/beneficiaries	74
Other donors	15
Other stakeholders – including other UN agencies, other INGOs, other humanitarian agencies, government ministries, state government officials, community-based organisations (CBOs) and researchers	31

Piloting

Data collection tools were tested through an initial pilot in Balkh province in Afghanistan as part of the Afghanistan country case study, with both remote and desk-based tools tested through this initial data collection. Tools were then refined where necessary before they were then applied for the remainder of Afghanistan data collection and the other country studies.

Sampling

Our sampling has been purposive, from the selection of countries to the choice of informants. As detailed above, the rationale for country selection was to cover an appropriate range of operational contexts and delivery modalities. For sampling of key informants, the rationale was to focus on questions of relevance and effectiveness, and hence we sought to identify informants who were involved in programme design and delivery, as well as those who may have benefited from, or had an interest in, programme results.

Locations within countries that were selected for field visits were informed to some extent by logistics and security, while also making sure locations were chosen where it was possible to investigate both explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and clearance activities within the time and budget constraints of the evaluation. Capacity development activity was not a criterion of site selection, given that NMAAs are usually based centrally and can be engaged remotely.

Country study approach

For each of the nine country case studies selected, a short approach paper was produced. A stakeholder engagement strategy for each country was developed, informed by a review of the background literature to understand who the key mine action stakeholders are within the country, as well as use of our own networks through our team members and recommendations from implementers and donors. This led to further snowball sampling, following lines of inquiry and identification of further key informants once data collection was under way.

Each country study was led remotely by a member of the core evaluation team. For seven of the nine countries, we then recruited in-country evaluators to conduct on-the-ground data collection, while for the other two – Yemen and South Sudan – all data collection was conducted remotely by our country lead.

As Afghanistan received approximately 25% of the GMAP2 budget, it was decided to conduct a deeper study in that country than in others in our sample. Our evaluators visited four different clearance districts located in the north and south of the country.[16] For this reason, there are more SOCs from Afghanistan and more examples used in the text.

Analysis and synthesis

Our analysis and synthesis process consisted of several key steps:

Evidence collation. Both primary and secondary data for each country study was coded and captured in country evidence logs, structured around the sub-EQs covered by this evaluation. Draft country-level findings were then drafted for each country. For global-level data collection, evidence was collated against a separate log, again structured around the EQs.

Sense-making and synthesis. The evaluation team then conducted a thorough sense-making and synthesis process. A series of eight internal team workshops was conducted, in which country leads presented their emerging findings against each EQ, with country-level findings discussed, compared and interrogated, in order to begin to tease out global-level findings against each EQ. In doing so, the evaluation drew on both deductive and inductive analysis: lines of questioning were loosely structured but

[16] Provinces of Balkh and Jawzan in the North and Zabul and Kandahar in the South.

not strictly aligned to the sub-EQs, and the analysis workshop allowed for the inductive surfacing of trends without being constrained by a rigid EQ framework.

Validation and co-creation. Following the conclusion of the team sense-making workshops, an initial draft synthesis report was developed, presenting initial global-level findings (supported by short country-level SOCs) and conclusions. The draft report was shared with the FCDO GMAP2 team, which informed a validation and recommendations co-creation workshop on 12 May 2021. The workshop was intended to provide an opportunity for the GMAP2 team to provide feedback and seek clarifications on the draft report, for the evaluation team to test and verify initial findings, and for the teams together to co-create a set of draft recommendations.

Fact-checking. The introduction and findings were also circulated to the implementers for fact-checking. The full report was not shared at this stage due to competition sensitivities associated with the upcoming GMAP3 tender.

2.1.5 Stakeholder engagement and dissemination strategy

Our stakeholder engagement strategy for the evaluation is founded on several key principles, which include:

- **Participatory approach to analysis and synthesis.** As detailed above, the validation and co-creation workshop with the FCDO programme team was a key component of our analysis and synthesis stage, intended to support early engagement with, and uptake of, emerging findings and conclusions, and to ensure maximum utility of recommendations. Draft reports have also been shared with the FCDO and implementers for feedback and fact-checking.

- **Strategically timed outputs.** The validation and co-creation workshop was deliberately timed in order to inform GMAP3 design by the FCDO team, while the submission of a final draft of the summative evaluation report has been timed to coincide with the GMAP3 Early Market Engagement process, so that potential implementers can also utilise the evaluation results.

- **Utilising contract extension for dissemination activities.** With the Itad M&E contract having been extended for an additional year up to 2022, the evaluation team will utilise opportunities this presents to conduct additional dissemination and learning activities. This will include presentations to implementers and the sector more broadly on the final findings, conclusions and recommendations. We will use our extended monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) contract to follow up with FCDO and implementers to support uptake of the recommendations and to track their implementation.

This strategy builds on our utilisation strategy for the contract, as outlined in our inception report and included in Annex 5.

2.1.6 Limitations

The evaluation faced a number of key **limitations**.

Access challenges. Accessing the areas in which GMAP operates was a key challenge faced by the evaluation team, particularly in conflict-affected contexts. These access challenges were compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions on international travel and face-to-face data collection during the data collection phase of the evaluation. These challenges were mitigated by utilising Itad's networks of on-the-ground evaluation teams, so that for seven of the nine countries we were able to conduct on-the-ground data collection, overseen remotely by a member of our core evaluation team. Nevertheless, for two countries – South Sudan and Yemen – security and COVID-19-related access

challenges meant that data collection had to be conducted entirely remotely. In other countries, COVID-19-related restrictions imposed limitations on the duration and number of face-to-face interviews and FGDs that could be conducted. In some cases, insecurity and/or COVID-19-related restrictions meant that national researchers were required to engage with local beneficiaries remotely by telephone, and in some cases it was not possible to conduct FGDs at all. Overall, these limitations have affected the robustness of the evidence base. Access was also limited where stakeholders were not willing or able to share information and official documents. Where we feel this is problematic, we have adjusted our language accordingly in the report.

Data quality. In some cases existing data and reporting – in particular on outcome- and impact-level results – is of variable quality, sometimes incomplete or of uncertain reliability. The Itad work under the monitoring stream of the GMAP2 M&E contract has, to some degree, helped to mitigate this limitation, seeking as it does to support implementers to strengthen monitoring processes and evidence and to provide independent verification of implementer reporting. Nevertheless, existing data can, in some cases and contexts, be patchy. The extensive primary data collection conducted by both our international and national evaluation team members has thus been crucial in order to triangulate existing evidence and to address any evidence gaps.

Independence. For on-the-ground data collection, evaluation teams in some limited cases relied on IPs to provide logistical and planning support, including use of transport and accommodation and the arranging of KIIs. Data collection teams were also reliant on IPs for the final selection of project sites and visit dates. This posed risks in terms of the independence of the evaluation. To mitigate against these risks, the evaluation team took measures, including:

- where necessary, utilising contractors to arrange the meetings with key stakeholders for us but always employing an independent translator and ensuring that IP staff were present during data collection only when strictly necessary.
- providing specific criteria for site selection of visits and, wherever possible, identifying a shortlist of sites independent to that of the IPs.
- using our own rented vehicles and logistical arrangements to conduct field visits where practical – while recognising that the use of contractors' vehicles can expedite and smooth travel arrangements (especially where security concerns and permission from the local authorities can compromise access).

Stakeholder biases. In many stabilisation contexts, beneficiaries suffer from survey fatigue and evaluation participants may tell evaluators what they think the evaluators want to hear. Similarly, interested stakeholders may try to influence what evaluators have access to. Evaluators can also be overly sympathetic to one set of viewpoints, arriving at conclusions too early and then leaning towards data collection that will support these early conclusions. Use of multiple data sources, multiple contexts and mixed methods to maximise triangulation of evidence, and the participatory approach to analysis and synthesis (described in Section 2.1.3), mitigate these risks. Observations can often also be context-specific, and we have indicated where findings may refer to only certain countries as appropriate.

2.1.7 Ethics

Itad takes evaluation ethics very seriously and has developed a comprehensive document – 'Itad's Ethical Principles for Evaluations' (see Annex 6) – which sets a standard to which all Itad staff consultants and partners adhere when working on Itad evaluations, and which is in alignment with the DFID Ethical Principles for Research and Evaluation and with FCDO Ethical Guidance.

Itad staff are required to attend training in safeguarding, and our safeguarding policy has been incorporated into all our contractual material. All evaluation team members operate in accordance with international

human rights conventions and covenants to which the UK is a signatory, regardless of local country standards, and are required to commit to adhering to aforementioned DFID, FCDO and Itad ethical principles.

Under Itad's ethical principles, Itad takes responsibility for identifying the need for and securing any necessary ethics approval for the study they are undertaking. In this case, it was deemed that no formal approval was required for this evaluation.

Key ethical considerations and risks for the evaluation included:

Primary data collection. For both remote and face-to-face data collection, a protocol was developed to ensure that interviews/FGDs were conducted in adherence to ethical principles of informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, and with a view to ensuring that the principle of 'do no harm' was front and centre of all data collection. All interviewees provided verbal consent, and were briefed that they would remain anonymous and could withdraw at any time. No direct quotes are attributed to specific individuals in this report. When deciding who to interview and where, consideration was given to vulnerable populations, to any security or conflict sensitivity issues of asking questions related to mines and ERW, and to the composition of the data collection team. Wherever possible, data collection teams were composed of both male and female team members, so interviews with women could be conducted by a female team member. In some limited cases, due to difficulties in recruiting mixed-gender on-the-ground teams in some countries, this was not possible. Interviewers took care that, for both in-person and remote interviews, participation in interviews did not expose interviewees to any undue risk. In the instances where evaluators interviewed children as part of community-level consultations, additional protocols were strictly adhered to, as outlined in the third principle of Itad's Ethical Principles for Evaluations (Annex 6).

COVID-19-associated safety risks. Itad's in-house Travel and Security team have developed strict guidelines around the conduct of face-to-face data collection. All on-the-ground teams were briefed and required to adhere to these principles in order to ensure that the risk of transmission of the virus was minimised and that face-to-face data collection was not in breach of local restrictions. Measures included ensuring that all interviews were conducted outside, ensuring that appropriate personal protective equipment was available for all participants and interviewers, and limiting the duration of all interviews and FGDs.

Remote data collection. Use of remote data collection and analysis methods and tools carries specific additional ethical considerations and risks. In particular, collecting data through remote methods such as remote interviews can pose a range of safeguarding and protection risks to respondents, while additional care is required to ensure that confidentiality, privacy and informed consent are appropriately secured. Itad ethical principles have been developed with careful consideration of these additional risk factors, and our ethical protocols for remote interviews were designed to mitigate these risks.

Data protection. Itad takes information security and data protection very seriously and has a robust data management policy, intended to ensure that all personal or sensitive information is adequately protected to industry-recognised standards. This is embedded in Itad's contractual agreements with all external consultants contracted on the evaluation. All team members were required to guard confidential material and personal information by robust use of passwords and by following up-to-date recommendations provided by Itad's specialist Systems and Data Management team to avoid damage from viruses and other malicious programmes, in order to protect the integrity of all data stored. All data collected has been anonymised for the purposes of reporting, and no personal information has been included in the report. Following the completion of the evaluation, all personal information will be deleted. Anonymised data and other documentation will then retained on Itad's secure server for seven years, in line with Itad's data management policy, after which time it will be deleted.

2.1.8 Conflict of interest

As part of the global-level data collection, the Itad team decided to conduct a study of the GMAP2 advocacy approach and results. Given that Itad has been closely involved in GMAP2's advocacy work through our research component of the GMAP2 M&E contract, it was decided to commission an independent consultant not previously involved in Itad's GMAP work to conduct this research and produce a short internal report on GMAP2 advocacy to inform the summative evaluation. No summative evaluation team members were involved in this work, but we have used the report to inform the findings, in particular on VfM. For full transparency the original report has been Annexed in full (see Annex 7: **Advocacy** evaluation report

Evaluation team structure

The core evaluation team has been led by Shaun Hext (Evaluation Lead and Afghanistan, Myanmar and South Sudan Country Lead), supported by: Alexis Ferrand (Angola and Cambodia Country Lead and VfM specialist), Belinda Goslin (Monitoring Lead), Mayssa Daye (Sudan and Lebanon Country Lead), Jason Collodi (Somalia/Somaliland Country Lead), and Giorgia Giambi (Yemen Country Lead). Tom Gillhespy (Project Director) provided additional technical oversight. Quality Assurance (QA) was provided internally by Chris Barnett and externally by Paul Balogun, following the QA process set out in our inception report.

The core team were supported by the following local evaluators in seven of our nine selected countries:

- Afghanistan: Afghanistan Centre for Excellence (ACE)
- Angola: Amandio Mavela and Francisco Ngongo Kapulu
- Cambodia: Tech Chey and Mao Touchpheaktra
- Lebanon: Mira Matar and Imad Salamey
- Myanmar: Khin Maung Lwin
- Somalia (including Somaliland): Mahad Abdullahi Hussein
- Sudan: Sayara International

3 Findings: Relevance and Coherence

This section assesses the strategic relevance and coherence of GMAP objectives in terms of alignment to the priorities of key stakeholders, including Post, donors, multilateral organisations and national governments. It also considers how beneficiaries participated in the programme design and how the design was informed by evidence of what works.

Finding 1: GMAP2 has positioned mine action as a valid end in itself – a global public good – yet in some contexts a lack of clarity on the intended outcomes outlined in the GMAP ToC increases the risk that mine action will lead to unforeseen consequences.

GMAP2 set out to declare over 150km^2 of land 'mine free' in 16 post-conflict and conflict-affected countries. As a global programme, GMAP2 clearly signals the UK's commitment to tackling an important global challenge, supporting poorer countries – mostly signatories to international disarmament treaties – to meet their treaty obligations and mine clearance targets and to contribute to UK policies that promote rules-based international systems.

The strategic aim to declare land mine free is considered by many in the mine action sector to be a valid end in itself, a global public good.[17] From this perspective, the selection of GMAP2 countries – as well as the prioritisation of contaminated areas within those countries – is premised, first and foremost, on the potential to clear large amounts of land efficiently and safely. This global public good perspective can come at a cost, in terms of clarifying the actual purpose of mine action other than to declare land mine free, reduce risk of harm, make people feel safer or, equally broadly, to improve local livelihoods.

Yet, if being mine free is accepted as a valid end in itself, then there is little incentive to engage with some of the assumptions that underpin the GMAP ToC – see Annex 3, where we list a number of 'unmet' assumptions which can undermine GMAP2 aims and objectives – in particular, assumptions about in whose interests mine action is being undertaken and who is likely to win or lose from mine action in the different operational settings.[18] The perspective influences what data collection is deemed valuable and the extent to which that data is analysed (see Findings Finding 7, Finding 10 and Finding 11). It also legitimises strategic ambiguity, with less incentive to collaborate with those outside the mine action sector (a core assumption of the ToC,[19] and in some cases can inadvertently increase the risk of unintended consequences (see Finding 14).

Finding 2: As a centrally managed programme, GMAP2 has retained a balance between operating in post-conflict and conflict-affected countries, although there was a trade-off between achieving global reach and alignment with Post priorities in some countries, weakening cross-HMG coherence.

In designing GMAP2, FCDO has ensured a balance between allocating funds to mine action in more fragile and conflict-affected countries – a high priority for the UK aid strategy at the time GMAP2 was being designed – and continuing to fund mine action in a large number of post-conflict or 'legacy' contexts (the main focus of GMAP1). This country expansion was also accompanied by a broadening of the programme's ToC. While GMAP1 had focused on local livelihood and economic development outcomes, GMAP2 is intentionally broader, seeking to achieve a range of humanitarian, stabilisation and development outcomes, ensuring relevance in all contexts. However, despite this broadening of purpose, GMAP has not always been well aligned to country-level FCDO priorities, and the assumption that HMG departments are kept apprised of UK mine action activities at country level is not always the case. This means that country-

[17] Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020. Available at http://www.mineactionreview.org/assets/downloads/907_NPA_Clearing_the_Mines_2020_WEB.pdf [Accessed 26.07.2021]
[18] Assumption C2: Information stored by national authorities and/or contractors is used to prioritise land for clearance, reduce risk through MRE, and identify follow-on development opportunities.
[19] Assumption B1/2: There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities and legitimate security forces); Assumption C1: Actors have incentives to coordinate mine action activities with stabilisation, peace-building and/or development requirement ; Assumption D1: Complementary development inputs for targeted communities are applied to released land.

level teams are unable to advocate and/or uninterested in advocating for GMAP interests,[20] and GMAP in turn does not always complement country-level interests – with the consequence of reducing the strategic value of HMG resources overall.

At global level, GMAP remains closely aligned to the UK aid agenda and the UK National Security Council priorities. Yet, as a centrally managed programme (CMP) operating in 14 different countries, there has been a trade-off between the need to disburse a significantly bigger budget and clear a far larger amount of contaminated land than the previous programme, and aligning all of that activity closely with UK objectives at country level.

For instance, in South Sudan, the Juba office is preoccupied with managing a substantial £100 million humanitarian aid programme with a view to mitigating the high risk of malnutrition and famine; in this context, mine action is seen by the humanitarian programme team as 'nice to have'. Even where GMAP and the Post are working with the same government institutions, a disconnect can exist (see SOC 1 below).[21] For example, in Lebanon GMAP2 had the potential to contribute to stabilisation and economic development objectives – both of which are aligned to the strategic objectives of the British Embassy in Beirut.[22] However, despite this alignment, Post did not engage with the programme to leverage GMAP2 efforts.[23] In contrast, GMAP in Afghanistan is the only FCDO office that directly manages GMAP2 in-country. This delegated responsibility has enabled the office to use Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and GMAP funds to achieve similar strategic ends.[24] Similarly, GMAP is of particular importance in countries where Post had a limited bilateral aid programme, for example in Laos.[25]

In these instances, what we are seeing is that GMAP as a CMP is not engaging sufficiently with FCDO colleagues on the ground to really understand how mine action can best support and complement country-level objectives. By not clarifying in more detail the added strategic value of GMAP at country level, an opportunity is missed to increase GMAP's coherence with other FCDO resources. Being joined up in these contexts is important as it not only contributes to effectiveness but also ensures cross-office commitment to security and justice assistance protocols.[26]

It should be noted that GMAP2 has further developed a ToC and set of tools that are designed to facilitate wider use of ToCs at global and country levels, collaborating with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to see how a ToC approach can be piloted at country level (see **Error! Reference source not found.** and Finding 6). This demonstrates that GMAP is already looking to address some of the concerns raised here.

SOC 1: Aligning GMAP2 to the strategic interests of Post in Somaliland

The British Office in Hargeisa liaises regularly with GMAP2's IP, HALO, to ensure that programme activities are integral with the work the UK is doing in Somaliland. This involves (1) incorporating mine action into other areas of FCDO-funded work, (2) linking HALO's work with FCDO's own prosperity interests in the cross-border work with Ethiopia, and (3) planning for a sustainable transition for when HALO leaves by preparing how they can improve explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity in the Somaliland civil authorities.

There are many good examples of collaboration in these first two areas, with HALO providing mine/ERW safety training for FCDO construction workers, clearing areas for FCDO-funded projects, and training women from marginalised groups to support the UK's equity agenda.

[20] Assumption D1/2: HMG departments are kept apprised of UK mine action activities in the country and are able and willing to act as advocates when necessary.
[21] Based on KIIs with HMG stakeholders in Somaliland.
[22] Mine Action and Stabilisation Collaborative Learning Event, October 2021; Exploring Mine Action's contributions to stabilisation and peacebuilding paper, January 2022.
[23] KII and email exchange with HMGO stakeholders; GMAP 2 formative evaluation interviews with HMG.
[24] KII with HMG in Afghanistan; Afghanistan CSSF Demining Project, Annual Review 2020.
[25] Itad (2018) GMAP1 summative evaluation report.
[26] HMG (2017) Overseas Security and Justice Assistance, Human Rights Guidance.

However, when GMAP2 was designed there was little involvement of Post in Somaliland and, despite the need for enhancing EOD capacity of Somaliland authorities, there was no capacity development element in the GMAP2 design. This is seen by FCDO colleagues at Post as an opportunity missed.

With GMAP2 funding mine action in Somaliland, HALO are seen as best placed to conduct such training and mentoring. Some informal support has been provided but this is not sufficient for the level of training required. FCDO police and military advisors in-country, who are involved in the restructuring of the security sector in Somaliland – including the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (MOD), responsible for mine action – could have worked with GMAP to support training of the authorities so they would be ready to take on this role. In this instance, good relations between the IP and Post have certainly helped align GMAP2 with broader UK interests but, as a CMP, more formal consultation and intentional strategic alignment in the design phase would have amplified the results of GMAP in Somaliland and complemented other FCDO investments.

Finding 3: GMAP2 has proactively sought to encourage alignment of outcomes across the sector through a sector-wide ToC. However, GMAP is overly reliant on its global-level ToC, meaning context-specific outcomes are not as targeted as those of other donors and multilateral agencies, making it harder for GMAP to cohere with other international stakeholders at country level.

GMAP2 has invested considerable energy in developing a ToC and set of indicators that can be adopted by the sector globally (see Finding 6), the purpose of which is to encourage a coherent outcome-level focus across the sector. However, as noted under Finding 1 and Finding 2, less time has been spent developing country-specific strategies. This can be at odds with other donors and multilateral agencies, who tend to have a clearer set of country-specific outcomes in mind and to be more closely aligned to the interests of their country offices.[27] As discussed in Finding 1 and Finding 2, this has relevance for the coherence of GMAP funding with other funding sources – in this case other donor and multilateral funding. Such complementarities are important, particularly when budgets become constrained and when aid effectiveness comes under closer scrutiny and is associated with a number of assumptions that underpin the GMAP ToC, where complementary resources are expected to promote the likelihood and quality of GMAP outcomes (see Finding 4).[28]

Nevertheless, GMAP has played an important role at country level. While the lack of country-specific strategic focus may dilute GMAP's effectiveness on any one particular issue, GMAP is still a leading source of funding, and the mine action sector in the countries that it funds would be considerably weaker in many cases without it. GMAP's strategic ambiguity can therefore be helpful, allowing funding to fill important gaps, particularly in conflict-affected countries. For example, GMAP2 has been a particularly important source of funding for UN agencies in Afghanistan, Sudan and Yemen. In Afghanistan, UNMAS considered GMAP2 to be a highly significant source of funding: a 'game-changer'.[29] In Sudan, GMAP2 has also ensured UNMAS continuity at a time when the UN Mission in Darfur was winding down, enabling UNMAS to support wider UN-led humanitarian interventions in the Two Areas.[30]

Finding 4: GMAP is aligned with national policy objectives, and countries were selected, in part, on their political commitments to mine action. However, GMAP's relevance to longer-term national economic development goals are not always well understood, limiting the extent to which GMAP can support national and subnational priorities and tap into complementary resources.

GMAP's focus on clearing large areas of land, combined with a ToC that covers a wide range of objectives, gives it flexibility, and in most cases GMAP is broadly aligned to the national objectives of the countries that

[27] All UN proposals to GMAP2 highlighted the specific outcomes of mine action at national level; we also noted that the US State Department was now paying closer attention to ensuring that its centrally managed mine action programme was closely aligned to the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID's) agricultural programmes, for instance in South Sudan; and the MFA was also ensuring closer alignment between its mine action programme and wider stabilisation priorities of its country offices.
[28] Assumption D8: HMG departments are kept apprised of UK mine action activities in the country and are able and willing to act as advocates when necessary; Assumption C1: Information stored by national authorities and/or contractors is used to prioritise land for clearance, reduce risk through MRE, and identify follow-on development opportunities.
[29] KII with implementer.
[30] Two of Sudan's southern states – South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

it operates in. GMAP also recognises in its ToC the importance of getting mine action integrated into national humanitarian and development plans, and alignment is strong in countries where mine action is integrated to the objectives of Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).[31] Furthermore, GMAP sees the NMAAs as important amplifiers of outcome-level change, prioritising countries in part for their political commitments to mine action.[32]

In some countries the relevance of mine action is clear and is included in national economic development strategies, particularly in heavily contaminated post-conflict countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon and Vietnam. It is clear that even in humanitarian contexts, such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Somalia, mine action is seen as an enabler of economic development priorities, for instance in terms of cross-border trade, peri-urban development and energy security.[33]

However, the default to mine action as a global good, and a tendency for GMAP and its implementers to prioritise humanitarian outcomes over wider economic development results – for example local livelihoods, such as foraging for wood or herbs, rather than enabling national electrification and national resource exploration projects, interventions that have a national macroeconomic return[34] – can impede alignment to higher-level societal impacts as outlined in the ToC, with similar consequences for underlying assumptions of the ToC as described in Finding 1 and **Error! Reference source not found.**.

This disconnect can be linked to UN and INGO-led programmes under GMAP engaging less systematically with other government departments beyond the NMAAs, not fully appreciating that other government departments can also be beneficiaries of mine action – which again questions a key ToC assumption,[35] which can weaken the overall logic of the ToC (see Annex 3). This is particularly the case in conflict-affected countries,[36] where NMAAs can be weakest and hence a reliance upon them can impede the implementers' full appreciation of national and subnational interests, for example those prioritised by the Ministries of Agriculture, Land or Energy (see Finding 14). While it is understandable that implementers rely on NMAAs for coordination of tasks and liaison with other stakeholders, implementers could – where possible – take more interest in the needs of other departments and work with NMAAs to support their outreach to other departments, especially where NMAAs may be weak. This could help to better ensure that they understand intended and unintended outcomes to maintain alignment with UK policies and maximise GMAP effectiveness.

Finding 5: A participatory approach has been adopted by some GMAP implementers, prioritising the engagement of communities to inform programme design.

The GMAP2 design was informed by beneficiary consultation, led – in most cases – by the implementers at the design stage. However, the approach to participatory consultation varies between GMAP funding modality, whereby INGOs tend to consistently prioritise community consultation with a more patchy response from UN agencies, and hence conflict-affected countries under GMAP tend to have a weaker demonstration of participatory processes. This is, in part, due to the proximity of INGOs to communities as direct operators and hence the benefit from strong pre-existing community ties, whereas UN agencies are not operators and are often one step removed from local communities.

As such, the Lots 1 and 2 consortia typically placed a high priority on engaging with local stakeholders, particularly at community level, often speaking with elders, youths under 18, men and women, usually in

[31] For example in Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Lebanon and Yemen. Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam are the only GMAP2 countries which do not have HRPs.
[32] The global ToC further developed under GMAP2 makes the amplification effect of the NMAAs an explicit feature of mine action.
[33] KIIs with HMG in Somalia; KIIs with implementer, other UN agencies and NMAA in Afghanistan.
[34] Itad conducted research into how to improve the evidence base that mine action leads to longer-term development. The research found that a humanitarian focus, as well as concepts of mine action as a global good, can inhibit the attention and resources given to understanding longer-term development outcomes. See Itad (2019) Understanding the contribution of mine action to longer-term development.
[35] Assumption B1/B2: There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces).
[36] We found engagement with other ministries in Angola, Cambodia and Lebanon. In Sri Lanka, meanwhile, HALO cite the example of having responded to a request from the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), acting on behalf of the Ministry of Power and the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority, to clear land earmarked for a wind farm, despite the small numbers of direct beneficiaries (humanitarian/local development), because of the large numbers of indirect beneficiaries from such primary infrastructure.

geographic locations where implementers had strong existing local ties. Community liaison (CL) visits were more widespread in post-conflict than conflict-affected settings, both as they were easier to undertake and also as a consequence of GMAP1 continuity.[37] This close liaison continued throughout delivery.[38]

The case for UN agencies is more mixed. UNMAS consultation was structured in Sudan, even projectised, a result of close involvement by the UK Post,[39] but less so in other countries where UNMAS was the lead implementer. In Afghanistan, UNMAS had limited direct engagement with local communities at the design stage, relying instead on the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)[40] and contracted operators.

The lack of consistency across GMAP implementers in how they engage beneficiaries, combined with the fact that 'beneficiary' tends to focus on communities and not other government departments (see Finding 4), means that one of the key assumptions underpinning the GMAP ToC at the design and delivery stage cannot always be guaranteed.[41] This means that effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities and legitimate security forces) may not be occurring as it should be, affecting the validity of the GMAP ToC in practice.

Finding 6: GMAP has proved to be more than the sum of its country parts, strengthening UK's position globally. It has played a significant advocacy role within the sector, leading and encouraging the sector to be more cognisant of assumptions that underpin mine action's success.

An evaluation of the advocacy efforts and results of GMAP undertaken by an independent consultant (see Section 2.1.8 on conflict of interest) found that GMAP has played a considerable role as an advocate and thought leader within the mine action sector[42] (see full report in Annex 7: Advocacy evaluation report

While there is no explicit advocacy strategy in the GMAP2 business case, the advocacy report found that GMAP has led, through direct and indirect advocacy efforts,[43] to a number of advocacy outcomes that have touched the whole sector**.** Based on an advocacy strategy framework,[44] these outcomes were grouped into three main categories: (1) awareness and understanding; (2) will and commitment; and (3) action.[45]

1) Awareness and understanding

GMAP has encouraged key actors to understand and accept that there is a need to build a stronger evidence base on the impact of mine action in order to inform and test critical assumptions that underpin the sector. The GMAP secretariat in FCDO (the 'GMAP team') drove the advocacy for a stronger evidence base by commissioning Itad to conduct research on the link between mine action and longer-term development[46] and facilitate a workshop that explored the behaviours and incentives that promote and inhibit the mine action sector to generate and use evidence to inform programming and strategic decision making.[47] Linked to this, GMAP has raised awareness among its IPs on the need to consider conflict sensitivity, which was one of the recommendations from the GMAP1 evaluations and GMAP2 formative report.

[37] For example, strong ties existed in Angola and Lebanon as well as Cambodia, which was funded under GMAP1.
[38] Mine action agencies follow IMAS guidelines on community liaison and recognise the importance of this as an activity. To 31 March 2021, the Lot 1 and Lot 2 consortia had conducted 19,367 community liaison visits across the 10 countries of operation.
[39] KII with implementer; KII with other UN agency.
[40] In Afghanistan, unlike in Sudan, UNMAS does not play a coordination role, as DMAC plays this role.
[41] Again, see Assumption B1/B2: There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces).
[42] In the report, advocacy is defined as 'what GMAP has brought to the mine action sector at the global level. It is what goes beyond the funded activities of GMAP. It is concerned with how having GMAP has enabled the FCDO and GMAP partners to engage and influence each other and the mine action sector'.
[43] Direct advocacy efforts are those where the GMAP team has largely led on engaging and influencing, and indirect advocacy efforts are those where the GMAP advocacy has been more driven by its boundary partners, which include the non-governmental organisation (NGO) implementers (HALO, MAG, NPA), GICHD, the UN agencies (UNMAS, UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)) and the M&E provider (Itad).
[44] Coffman, J and Beer, T (2015) The Advocacy Strategy Framework. Center for Evaluation Innovation.
[45] There is a linear logic leading to policy change moving from awareness to will to action.
[46] Itad (2018) Expanding the evidence base of the mine action sector. Geneva February Workshop Landscaping Paper v2; Itad (2020) GMAP2, Humanitarian Mine Action and Longer-Term Development: a review of the literature.
[47] Itad (2019) GMAP2, Understanding the contribution of mine action to development. Summary report on workshop of 15 November 2019.

GMAP has also helped to move forward discussions and generate interest on innovative financing, which ties in with financial independence elements of the GMAP ToC outcomes. It has done so by convening events – especially through Her Majesty's Ambassador (HMA) Geneva – and commissioning research on the topic, which was presented at a Directors' meeting in May 2021 and then taken to the Mine Action Support Group, a network of donors.

2) Will and commitment

GMAP, by playing a 'convening role' in bringing together key actors through its programme structure and facilitating discussions, has contributed to building a commitment by the mine action sector to deepen efforts to connect mine action to longer-term development.[48] Some GMAP2 partners are now committing themselves, for example, to (i) update their strategies and approaches on outcomes and link longer-term development with mine action and (ii) undertake geospatial studies and livelihood surveys (e.g. recent study on Afghanistan). In turn, this can incentivise greater coordination with development, peace and stabilisation stakeholders.

As part of the overall advocacy around measuring outcomes, GMAP2 IPs have also committed themselves to measure behaviour change around risk education in communities affected by mines. In particular, HALO, MAG and NPA have come together to develop a new approach to measuring behaviour change in relation to risk education, with an approach centred on conducting FGDs.[49] This means those implementers are better equipped to use information to inform MRE programming.

Informed by research conducted into the behaviours of the sector mentioned above, GMAP has encouraged and led the way in getting donors to be more aligned in their strategic thinking and programming towards mine action. This key area of GMAP advocacy is starting to reap benefits with the collaboration between FCDO and the Dutch MFA on a shared ToC (and output and outcome indicators) for the mine action sector. The importance of this for helping the sector to agree and understand the key assumptions that underpin its success is significant.

HMA has also pushed for donor alignment in its chairing and participation on the treaty committees, for example by bringing the GMAP Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) into a side event to present the ToC to encourage donor alignment.[50]

In addition to the above, GMAP's decision to contract a separate M&E partner has demonstrated the importance and value given to building an evidence base in the mine action sector. This decision is seen as a valuable resource by other GMAP partners and other actors (such as the Dutch MFA). According to the advocacy report, GMAP partners have also given greater attention and value to their own M&E.

3) Action

The structure of GMAP brings together INGOs under two consortia lots, encouraging those implementers to work together, with operational benefits, sharing of documentation and procedures, and learning from each other's experiences. For example, one result of combined advocacy efforts by Lots 1 and 2 implementers and GMAP is the agreement and operationalisation of standardised beneficiary definitions. GMAP promoted and facilitated collaboration for the NGOs in the sector to come together to standardise these, and the GMAP partner NGOs have networked and socialised these definitions more widely, bringing other NGOs on board – and getting input from the main UN agencies. As a result, there appears to be momentum in the sector to take a further step forward and get these definitions adopted by IMAS.

It is also an important achievement that INGO implementers of GMAP are now starting to measure and report on immediate and intermediate outcomes, which takes them a step further to being able to reflect

[48] Examples of this include the Mine Action and Stabilisation Collaborative Learning Event in October 2021, which brought together over 100 participants over a four-day event, participating in English, Spanish and Arabic.
[49] Boyd, H, Kasack, S and Nielsen, N F (2020) Measuring Behavior Change Resulting from EORE and the Need for Complementary Risk Reduction Activities. The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 24:1, Article 6.
[50] DFID (2020) Aligning approaches to measuring mine action outcomes. Intersessional presentation (22 June 2020).

and test whether the GMAP ToC can be delivered in practice, test the assumptions that underpin it, and potentially inform adaptive programming.

To encourage action, the comprehensive ToC for the mine action sector and the associated Theories of Action have been developed into a guide that has undergone extensive sector-wide consultation and has received positive feedback. They have been well received by GMAP's INGO partners, who appreciate the holistic nature of the model. UN agencies, including UNDP and UNMAS, have expressed appreciation for both tools, believing that both will be very useful for the sector.[51]

[51] This feedback was shared with FCDO by UNDP Global Mine Action and Development Advisor, Steinar Essen (email dated 5 July 2021) and UNMAS Chief of Policy, Advocacy, Donor Relations and Outreach, Abigail Hartley (email dated 2 July 2021).

4 Findings: Cross-Cutting Dimensions

This section assesses the extent and ways in which implementers have ensured VfM,[52] gender equality and conflict sensitivity in post-conflict and conflict-affected countries.

Finding 7: Implementers and FCDO understand VfM primarily in terms of efficiency and economy and less by effectiveness and equity, limiting a full understanding of VfM and disincentivising coordination with resources outside the mine action sector.

GMAP2 has made improvements to how it measures longer-term development outcomes, with Lot 1 and 2 implementers reporting against quantitative intermediate outcomes every six months, accompanied by anecdotal stories.[53] However, the primary considerations for VfM by both the implementers and FCDO – and the focus of the reporting systems – are still economy and efficiency, with less attention paid to effectiveness and equity. The consequences of this are that implementers are not encouraged to coordinate their work with those outside of the sector – a core assumption of the ToC,[54] where the effectiveness of outcomes is often reliant on external complementary funding. It also means that implementers cannot always understand sufficiently whether benefits are shared equitably across society, with implications for promoting gender and disability inclusion and conflict sensitivity (see Finding 9 and Finding 11).

Below we reflect on how GMAP views VfM according to the '4Es' of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.

Economy

Implementers have generally sought to procure inputs of the right quality at the right price in a relatively high-cost sector where the key drivers are salaries and equipment. It has been hard to contain salary costs, which remain high as INGO consortia members employ large numbers of deminers – and deminer salaries, often set by the government, are high by local standards, which can be benchmarked to the local INGO or security sector. As salaries are paid by donors, such scales ensure tax revenue is optimised on this source of overseas development assistance (ODA). In Afghanistan, for instance, we noted that all deminers have Tax Identification Numbers, and international operators (such as HALO) make significant tax contributions as a result of employing thousands of local staff.[55]

Some input costs for multilateral organisations are higher than INGO consortia, as UNMAS and UNDP have higher salary scales and usually have more international staff on their country programmes.[56] UN central overheads can also be higher than those of INGOs. However, UN agencies use open and competitive processes to procure mine action services from national operators, including INGOs and NGOs, as well as commercial contractors.[57] Whether these policies keep prices down depends on the nature of the local market. For instance, in Sudan, UNMAS contracting options are limited to international commercial contractors and a small number of NGOs accredited by the NMAA[58] and hence do not really benefit from market forces, as they do in Afghanistan.

Efficiency

GMAP was designed with efficiency in mind. The programme set out to clear a large amount of contaminated land for a set price. FCDO has continued to optimise efficiencies during delivery by moving country allocations in response to emergent blockages and ensuring that global clearance outputs remain

[52] DFID (2011) VfM guidelines.
[53] UN agencies are not required to do this.
[54] Assumption C1: Actors have incentives to coordinate mine action activities with stabilisation, peace-building and/or development requirement.
[55] KIIs with implementers and KIIs with local deminers.
[56] KIIs with implementer and UNMAS risk management reports, Afghanistan; review of proposed costs from UN and Lots 1 & 2 contractors.
[57] INGOs also use competitive tending processes, but do not generally subcontract clearance activities.
[58] KII with implementer; project reports; KII with subcontracted implementer.

on track. It placed a strong focus on managing cost per output, particularly cost per m^2 cleared, especially when making allocative decisions during extension periods.[59]

In response, implementers have continuously looked at ways to improve efficiency. Efficiencies have been ensured through the use of a mix of mechanical and manual approaches, including dogs, introducing new technologies, and testing different clearance techniques to optimise clearance outputs in different terrains (see SOC 2 for an example).

In all countries the INGOs advocate for improving land release methodology, with NMAAs preferring to cancel land following a non-technical survey (NTS) rather than having to use technical survey and clearance teams. In Lebanon, where cancellation started under GMAP, INGOs also advocated and introduced new methodologies. Under very tight Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) monitoring and control, this has led to operational efficiencies for the whole mine action sector in Lebanon.[60] In Somalia it is quite time-consuming to get detectors into the country (due to their dual use categorisation), so the in-country servicing of the Minelab detectors and their modular construction make it easy to replace parts and keep them operational way beyond the manufacturer's estimated life span, thereby improving efficiency.[61]

SOC 2: Test to optimise clearance efficiencies in a difficult terrain

Implementers have used adapted machinery to optimise clearance efficiencies in difficult terrains. In Afghanistan, HALO was contracted by UNMAS and DMAC to undertake such a test in the district of Hairatan, a large desert area in the northern province of Balkh, heavily contaminated with small ammunitions dumped by departing Soviet troops in 1989.

The test aimed to calculate how much of the contaminated desert land could be cleared in a month by a single mechanical team using adapted machinery with large front-loaded magnets. DMAC, UNMAS and HALO all monitored progress closely. They recorded a 100% improvement against previously benchmarked rates for such desert terrain. This was important for DMAC, as it enabled it to more accurately estimate costs for a forthcoming tender to clear a significantly larger amount of Balkh's contaminated desert land. The revised costing resulted in savings of several million dollars for donors funding the clearance and will reduce the overall cost of meeting Afghanistan's mine ban treaty targets.

Efforts have also been made to improve efficiencies through the use of NTS to cancel land, reducing the risk of spending large sums on releasing land without actually finding any mines. Where incentives are clear, significant progress has been made, for example in Angola.[62] Implementers also ensured cost-efficiencies by moving teams from one clearance task to another, often in contexts – such as South Sudan – where unseasonal weather, increased insecurity or community risks affected operations.

We noted that directly contracted INGOs cancelled more land than INGOs or NGOs subcontracted by UN agencies, thereby improving GMAP2 cost efficiency as well as reducing the amount of funding Lot 1 and Lot 2 countries will need to meet their national mine ban treaty targets. This may be due to contracting requirements whereby Lots 1 and 2 contracts can be more flexible than UN contracts. Country-specific incentives also play a part. In Afghanistan in particular, cancelling land can be perceived by some operators as financially risky, as they lack confidence that UNMAS will replace the task with another contract. Operators may also need to consider security risks of cancelling tasks, which can expose them to grievances from deminers who have their work cut short.[63]

Effectiveness

The nature of the GMAP2 contracting, with outputs as key performance indicators, prioritised m^2 of land released over the achievement of specific outcomes (see Finding 1), and therefore it incentivised

[59] Implementer proposals and AM efficiency analysis.
[60] GMAP Monitoring visit report, Lebanon, March 2019.
[61] GMAP Monitoring visit report, Somalia, January 2019.
[62] Consortia ensured country surveyed to have a clear database of confirmed hazardous areas.
[63] Itad (2019) GMAP2 formative evaluation report.

implementers to focus on outputs rather than optimising intended outcomes. As a result, implementers remained primarily focused on activities and outputs, reinforcing a view that VfM is determined primarily by output efficiency.

While implementers have continued to focus primarily on meeting short-term targets, reporting of the Lots 1 and 2 contractors has progressed, responding to recommendations from the GMAP2 formative evaluation, and they now report at six-monthly intervals against a set of intermediate outcome indicators. They also revisit sites up to one year after clearance to assess whether the land was used as intended and to collect socioeconomic data at a household level. However, GMAP2 reporting indicators are still mostly quantitative, at times complemented by local SOCs, which are often about improvements in local livelihoods but draw on beneficiary perceptions rather than hard data. There is less evidence of implementers reporting against economic development outcomes, and implementers can sometimes miss the bigger story (see Finding 14).

Hence over time there has been a tendency for GMAP to increase the monitoring and reporting burden of Lot 1 and 2 implementers with a view to ensuring policy compliance, but there is less evidence that more monitoring and reporting leads to adaptive actions, including course corrections that aim to improve effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Lots 1 and 2 contractors are in a much better place than the UN agencies to make these adaptive improvements going forward, and below we reflect on the relative approaches of the two contracting modalities.

INGOs and effectiveness

The GMAP2 consortia model incentivised collaboration between INGOs, particularly in terms of reporting, including a joint commitment to measuring intermediate outcomes.[64] As a result, INGOs have become better at measuring results, including through the use of: beneficiary-focused discussions to establish if EORE has led to knowledge retention and behaviour change among at-risk groups;[65] participatory, balanced-scorecard-style rating frameworks for assessing the outcomes of NMAA capacity development;[66] and post-demining surveys to determine land use and how that might potentially affect livelihoods.[67] Lots 1 and 2 contractors in particular have also focused on disaggregating released land by usage and also aggregating results to demonstrate totality. They have also collaborated in standardising mine action beneficiary definitions to improve reporting.[68]

There is strong evidence that INGOs made efforts to ensure alignment of tasks to intended outcomes, where outcomes have been well specified in advance. For instance, in Angola, South Sudan, Cambodia and Lebanon, Lots 1 and 2 contractors negotiated with UNMAS and NMAAs over the selection of prioritised tasks that are more likely to align to intended donor outcomes.[69]

UN agencies and effectiveness

UN agencies have shown less progress in terms of capacity to measure GMAP2 results and hence understand their effectiveness. There was some evidence of cost-effectiveness measures being used by UNMAS in Afghanistan, where GMAP is managed closely by Post.[70] However, cost-effectiveness indicators can be difficult to populate, as data is often unavailable or unreliable.

[64] Burge, R. (2021) GMAP2 Advocacy report.
[65] Boyd, H, Kasack, S and Nielsen, N F (2020) Measuring Behavior Change Resulting from EORE and the Need for Complementary Risk Reduction Activities. The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 24:1, Article 6.
[66] Balanced scorecard approaches, maturity assessments and capacity development frameworks.
[67] DMAC (2019) Post Demining Impact Assessment, March 2020.
[68] Standardising beneficiary definitions in humanitarian mine action, second edition, October 2020.
[69] As seen during monitoring visits in Angola, Cambodia and Lebanon and reported by the Itad Monitoring Team, and emerged from KIIs with implementer, subcontracted implementer and NMAA in South Sudan.
[70] UNMAS Quarterly Report, October–December 2020, which included a mix of qualitative and quantitative cost-effectiveness indicators.

UN agencies have demonstrated improved effectiveness where they were more likely to collaborate with other UN agencies to improve results and hence effectiveness, for example in countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). However, collaboration between UN a gencies was more likely when UN programme managers had an incentive to collaborate in order to achieve specific project results and when there were available resources and common interests between UN agency heads.[71] We concluded that interagency collaboration with a view to improving results was enabled more by design – by hard contractual incentives – than by soft institutional principles.

Across both UN and INGOs, tools such as trend analysis of cost per outcome were not observed, nor were attempts to self-assess, at a consortium or country level, whether resources are being used optimally to achieve intended outcomes.

Equity

Implementers often deliver mine action in areas historically overlooked for development, such as remote border regions, populated by marginalised groups, particularly ethnic minorities.[72] In both post-conflict and conflict-affected countries, borders are areas most commonly contaminated by mines and ERW, the results of earlier border clashes, for instance between Somalia and Ethiopia, Thailand and Cambodia, or Lebanon and Israel. In some cases, for example in Cambodia, indicators of poverty and female-headed households are used to identify beneficiaries.[73]

Implementers have also taken steps to be inclusive by employing staff and subcontractors from the ethnic groups living in remote areas. For instance, the consortia in Myanmar employ men and women from Kachin and Tang groups to deliver risk education in Kachin and North Shan State. While directly benefiting these individual members of local ethnic groups, such policies also produced direct benefits for implementers, able to enrich their local knowledge, enable access to remote communities, mitigate risk and ensure safe and efficient output delivery.[74]

While these actions have produced some short-term benefits, particularly in terms of local employment and output delivery, it has been harder for implementers to assess how the results of mine action have benefited marginalised groups. Disaggregation of results by ethnicity can be ethically problematic. Even disaggregation of quantitative beneficiary data by gender and disability – data only disaggregated by Lots 1 and 2 contractors – can say little about how marginalised groups actually benefit. For instance, in Afghanistan we found that, while mine action had enabled the construction of electricity transmission lines, it was the dominant Tajik and Pashtun villages that benefited from the new connections and not the Turkman villages,[75] their ability to access the service being constrained by existing structural inequalities. The implication of this is that implementers cannot always be sure who benefits (see also Finding 8). This is a particular concern where expropriation of land by elites is a known problem within the sector and a key assumption of the ToC is that it will not take place. However, it should be noted that Lots 1 and 2 contractors do go to some effort to assess land ownership in advance of clearance and revisit land cleared up to one year after clearance.

Finding 8: GMAP sought to reduce delivery risks in contexts with ongoing conflict by using UN agencies as direct implementers. This made sense at the time of GMAP2 design and has enabled more options for GMAP contracting going forward.

FCDO broadened its mix of implementers to account for the different operating environments of GMAP2, broadly working through UN agencies in conflict-affected settings and Lots 1 and 2 consortia in post-conflict environments. Although clearly the ability to clear a lot of land quickly and efficiently was a factor in the choice of the delivery modalities, in most cases VfM was not the only factor, with a focus also on risk

[71] KIIs with implementers in Afghanistan and South Sudan; KIIs with other UN agencies in Afghanistan. This is also a common aid phenomenon, a product of projectised short-term funding environments.
[72] Myanmar, Somalia and Cambodia for instance.
[73] KII with implementer.
[74] Itad, Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts, January 2022.
[75] Jawzjan FGDs.

management.[76] Both the INGO and the UN delivery models offered relative advantages in specific contexts and, broadly speaking, the decision to allocate some countries to UN agencies made sense and has increased the opportunity to also contract INGOs in Yemen. Direct contracting of INGO operators or specialist companies is usually considered by donors to be the most efficient delivery model, as there are fewer intermediaries in the delivery chain. It can be easier for INGOs to mobilise teams quickly, including because they often have long-standing relationships with local governments[77] and do not need to undertake subcontracting of other international or local operators. The contracting of IPs in the Lot 1 and 2 contracts required them to be in-country and accredited to work – in other words, ready to deploy from the beginning of the contract – which is what happened in every one of the 10 Lot 1 and 2 countries. This, for example, did not happen in the UNMAS countries – Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan – where there were significant delays in contracting.[78]

Initially, INGOs seem to have responded better to the COVID crisis, able to reallocate resources more flexibly,[79] although shortfalls in targets appear to have been recouped by UN agencies in later months.[80] In several countries, implementers have used EORE delivery channels to distribute COVID messaging and equipment, ensuring that mine action adds value to emergency responses. Also, in some countries COVID has prompted or expedited more innovative delivery of EORE. In Myanmar, for example, MAG trained community leaders and volunteers to conduct EORE in impacted communities, ensuring that the safety messages continue to be disseminated in the future beyond GMAP2. This community-based approach, coupled with messaging via social media, has also enabled EORE to be provided to the mine/ERW-affected communities where direct access is not possible, for example in Rakhine State.

The approach of delivering through INGOs was particularly well suited to GMAP1, which focused on mine action in relatively stable, post-conflict legacy environments. However, direct contracting of INGOs is not always possible or preferable in all country contexts: not possible in countries such as Yemen and Sudan, where mine action INGOs were/are not present/allowed to operate; not preferable in those cases, such as dynamic conflict contexts, where UN agencies bring specific value-add, particularly in terms of risk management (see below).

In opting to partner with the UN, in addition to Lots 1 and 2 contractors GMAP2 ensured a strategically balanced delivery model that took account of differing country contexts and wider UK strategic interests. The choice to partner with UNMAS in Afghanistan and Sudan and UNDP in Yemen was appropriate at the time GMAP2 was designed.

In countries affected by conflicts, UN authority and reputation afforded influence and protection with national governments that INGOs could not be expected to offer.[81] For example, UNDP was the appropriate choice for delivery of GMAP in Yemen at the time the programme was designed as it was well established in the country (where it had been involved in mine action since the mid-1990s) and had a close and long-standing relationship with the Yemeni authorities and YEMAC. In a context such as Yemen – where mine action is closely linked to wider UN involvement in the country, the peace process, and diplomatic efforts, and where UNMAS was absent – it was important to have a UN lead for the sector who had a strong mandate and who could engage with government counterparts and hold complex conversations at a political and technical level. Indeed, among other things, UNDP has been able to drive institutional strengthening work, including the creation of the Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC), and to advocate with YEMAC in Aden to allow mine action INGOs in the country and deliver part of the programme through them.[82] In Afghanistan the head of UNMAS has ministerial access, which can be difficult for INGOs to secure at a political rather than just a technical level. Similarly, in Afghanistan UNMAS

[76] Itad (2019) GMAP2 formative evaluation report; KIIs with HMG.
[77] For example, in South Sudan, where MAG has longstanding presence in the Equatorias, but also in Lebanon, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
[78] As evidenced in the GMAP2 meta logframe showing quarterly outputs.
[79] For example, UNMAS's model in Afghanistan and Sudan of short-term competitive tendering led to delays in operational deployment which were exacerbated by COVID.
[80] It is not always easy to assess UN progress against targets from their reporting.
[81] Collaborative Learning Week, October 2021; Itad, Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts, 2022.
[82] KIIs with other donors, HMG, implementer, and subcontracted implementers.

played an important role enabling access through official representation to local government and the Taliban; and in Sudan access on the ground was negotiated by UNMAS in partnership with NMAC.[83]

In some conflict-affected countries, where mine action INGOs were not present or allowed to operate by the government, UN agencies were the only trusted external actor that could get access on the ground to deliver mine action services.[84] The decision, for example, to deliver through UNDP in Yemen and UNMAS in Sudan was appropriate given the absence of INGOs or any other suitable alternative in these two countries at the time GMAP was designed.[85]

However, it is worth noting that in the volatile context of conflict-affected countries things may not be so straightforward, and it can be a mixed picture: access and permission to operate can also be denied to UN agencies – as, for example, happened in Yemen, where UNDP staff were denied visas by the de facto authority (DFA) to enter Sanaa to deliver mine action services.[86] It is also worth noting that is not just the UN that can gain access in hard-to-reach areas – a good example is Myanmar, where INGOs have continued to deliver in sensitive areas through local partners; and in Afghanistan INGOs continue to operate despite the advances of the Taliban.[87] This access is often aided by the close relations with subnational authorities and communities that INGOs have as operators, which agencies like UNMAS tend not to have (see Finding 5). Similarly, in the absence of UN agencies in Somaliland, non-UN operators have developed good relations with the officials within the government and have provided important capacity development support to the NMAA, with a relatively high level of national ownership compared to other countries (see SOC 1).

A further important benefit of working through UN agencies such as UNMAS and UNDP is that they can easily engage with other parts of the UN system and offer links across the UN cluster system and the country HRPs. For example, the decisions to deliver through UNDP and UNMAS in Yemen and Sudan respectively took into account the UK's wider commitment to supporting an integrated UN-led humanitarian response in both countries.[88]

Generally, in conflict-affected environments UN agencies are likely to collaborate with other UN agencies in order to realise HRP synergies and improved results. For instance, we noted nascent collaboration between UNMAS and other UN agencies – notably the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) – in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Sudan. In South Sudan, UNMAS support enabled WFP to deliver humanitarian aid, including food and non-food items to IDPs, while in Afghanistan UNMAS support enabled UN-Habitat to construct housing for IDPs. However, as already mentioned in the effectiveness section above, such collaborative initiatives often rely more on individual agency heads rather than institutional norms, and the project nature of UN funding weakens the incentives for interagency collaboration.[89]

In Afghanistan, the decision to pursue a UN delivery model was less obvious than in Sudan and Yemen, and the decision to direct GMAP funding through UNMAS was made in collaboration with Post after careful consideration of costs and benefits. INGOs were considered better suited to sustaining and building the capacity of the NMAA after transition from many years of UNMAS management. UNMAS, on the other hand, could contract both INGO and NGO operators for delivery of GMAP tasks, giving GMAP more flexibility. However, there was a risk that open and competitive processes would favour larger international operators, as they can realise scale economies by utilising existing assets and redeploying existing deminers without incurring additional hire, training and accreditation costs. To mitigate this risk, UNMAS tacitly sought to ensure the participation of NGOs in the national mine action programme, particularly with a view to delivering mine action in areas outside government control, ensuring equitable distribution of aid

[83] Afghanistan: KIIs with implementer, UNMAS Annual Report 2020, UNMAS Case Study on 'Negotiated Access in Zabul', 2020; Sudan: KII with implementer, UNMAS Sudan 2020 Q2 Update Report, UNMAS Proposal FCDO 2021.
[84] Itad, Sudan Case Study (part of the Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts paper).
[85] Yemen: KIIs with HMG, UNDP proposal to DFID 2018-2019; Sudan: KII with HMG, KII with implementer, Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020 report for Sudan.
[86] KIIs with implementer, UNDP quarterly reports to DFID.
[87] For example, HALO continues to operate in 24 Provinces as of August 2021, some of which are under Taliban control.
[88] KIIs with FCDO; Oxfam (2019) The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What Does It Mean for Multi-Mandated Organisations?
[89] KIIs with implementers and other UN agencies in Afghanistan, Myanmar, South Sudan.

and benefiting locally-owned organisations as much as INGOs. This policy has to some extent enabled UNMAS to support the UN's Grand Bargain principle of localisation while also keeping GMAP funding to INGOs.

Finding 9: GMAP has generated notable strategic benefit, elevating its VfM, but the absence of an advocacy strategy has, potentially, limited effectiveness and coherence.

GMAP, as a CMP managed by a small team, has made significant contributions to the mine action sector as a whole – including, among other things, by improving the way the sector values and uses evidence for decision making, promoting innovative finance, improving donor coherence and encouraging standardised MEL systems – and demonstrates good VfM (see Finding 5).

At country level there is also evidence of the added strategic value of GMAP, for example in Myanmar, where the relatively low cost of EORE[90] has provided the foundations for engaging in national mine action policy dialogue and advocating for humanitarian mine clearance (SOC 3). Similarly, in Yemen UNDP has facilitated INGOs to operate in the country, expanding the sector and future options to fund mine action delivery. This example shows the leverage that a relatively small amount of budget can gain and the additional benefits it can produce.

SOC 3: Risk education as a tool for mine action advocacy in Myanmar

In Myanmar, risk education has been used as an advocacy tool as part of an international humanitarian effort to advocate for Myanmar's entry to the mine ban treaty, to establish an NMAA and to secure permission for other mine action activities, including the removal of mines. Humanitarian organisations increasingly see mine action as part of a wider durable solution, ensuring safe and responsible return and resettlement in states with high IDP populations – states where peace agreements may be in place but authority is still contested by different armed ethnic organisations (AEOs).[91]

Government authorities have permitted humanitarian organisations and their operating partners to provide risk education in these states, particularly in IDP camps and in areas outside government control. However, the issue is complex: displaced people and AEOs do not always want mines removed, as mines can protect their land from encroachment, and the army refuses to permit INGOs to undertake clearance.[92]

Nevertheless, delivery of risk education has provided the necessary entry point for constructively influencing state policy on mine action more broadly, hitherto the sole domain of the military. Risk education legitimised sector coordination and helped bilateral donors make the case for establishing an NMAA.[93] Indeed, although derailed by the recent coup, in early 2020 the State Councillor's Office had agreed to start the establishment of an NMAA.[94] Mine clearance is also a component of some peace agreements made at state level and hence progress on peace and mine clearance are interconnected,[95] adding further strategic value.

Finding 10: GMAP2 implementers have continued to build on progress made under GMAP1 in promoting gender equality and have begun to disaggregate disability data. This has resulted in enhanced representation of women in the staff of implementer country programmes and programme activities which are better informed by the perspectives of women and people with

[90] For example, the total Myanmar budget (covering EORE and community liaison activities) for the April 2020–March 2021 period was £731,316 compared to a total GMAP2 budget for Lots 1 and 2 (10 countries) of £22,949,500, i.e. 3%.
[91] UNHCR/OXFAM.
[92] Direct result of 2016 land law.
[93] Mine action support group, particularly Norway and New Zealand.
[94] Deprioritised as a result of COVID.
[95] See GMAP1 summative evaluation report.

disabilities. However, more attention should be placed on understanding what contribution mine action can make to reducing inequality for women and other marginalised groups.

Implementers retained a strong focus on promoting gender equality, building on progress made during GMAP1. Implementer proposals to FCDO specifically addressed gender, and all implementers outlined how they were mainstreaming gender in their programming with gender and diversity strategies in place.[96]

As a result, the number of women employed by Lot 1 and Lot 2 consortia country programmes increased between 2017 and 2020, in some cases by up to 11%.[97] In 2020, women represented 31% of all staff in non-management roles across all INGOs, while the average percentage of women in INGO management positions was 17%.[98] Some country programmes, such as in Somalia/Somaliland and Afghanistan, found it harder to increase the number of women on their staff or in management positions, at times attributed to entrenched patriarchal norms of the country.

Implementers are conscious that their understanding of local contexts is often shaped by men and have ensured that women account for at least 50% of those consulted.[99] Greater consultation and participation of women from local communities provided implementers with a more rounded perspective regarding the extent of mine contamination or the nature of risk and insecurity. Women in most countries reported that they felt empowered as a result of being consulted, as well as by working in traditional male roles as drivers, deminers, and guards, indicating greater confidence to challenge social norms.[100]

To build on this, the social norms that can enable or disable such positive behaviour change are often under-reported, and there is a need for richer stories of gender equality outcomes, including where mine clearance has contributed to improve other rights for women, such as equal land rights. Implementers, particularly Lots 1 and Lot 2 contractors, report on equality and diversity, especially in terms of women's participation, and have also taken positive steps to measure how disabled people benefit from mine action,[101] but could pay closer attention to identifying how mine action can contribute to shifting other structural inequalities that exclude marginalised groups – such as through mobile phone ownership or land ownership.[102]

Finding 11: GMAP has placed a high priority on ensuring that UK-funded mine action does not exacerbate the causes and consequences of conflict. While implementers use a conflict sensitivity lens to mitigate delivery risk, they can pay less attention to assessing whether their results have transformed local relations or reinforced existing grievances.

GMAP has placed a high priority on ensuring UK-funded mine action does not exacerbate the causes and consequences of conflict[103] and whether implementers are conflict sensitive. To assess conflict sensitivity there are three core areas to consider: (1) understanding the conflict context; (2) understanding the interaction between the intervention and the (conflict) context; and (3) acting upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.[104] Under GMAP the evidence around #1 is strongest, but becomes increasingly weak as we look at #2 and #3.

[96] For example, the Lots 1 and 2 proposals provided significant detail on gender; UNDP Yemen had a separate annex on gender mainstreaming in its proposal; UNMAS Afghanistan refers to a Gender and Diversity Strategy, 2019–20; UNMAS Iraq have a section on gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment and a separate project activity on gender, plus an UNMAS gender advisor.
[97] This is based on a comparative analysis of gender representation within Lot 1 and Lot 2 contractors undertaken by Itad. Representation of women was reviewed to look for any changes between 2017 and 2020, also disaggregated by management and non-managerial roles. There were limitations to the analysis because data was not available for all the countries and all the organisations.
[98] Ibid.
[99] In Lebanon and Sudan for instance.
[100] KII with implementers in South Sudan; KII with implementers and subcontracted implementers in Afghanistan; KIIs with female deminers in Somalia; also speaking with female employees during GMAP2 monitoring visits conducted by the Itad monitoring team in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Angola, Lebanon and Somalia.
[101] Lots 1 and Lot 2 contractors quarterly reports. Lot 1 and Lot 2 contractors make use of Washington short set questions in household pre- and post-clearance surveys, Disability data collection scoping study: findings and conclusions, DFID GMAP2 June 2019.
[102] Asset ownership is to some extent already being monitored, for example through pre-/post-clearance household surveys being conducted by HALO in Lot 1 and 2 countries.
[103] GMAP Business case.
[104] Itad, Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts, Jan 2022; Itad Draft Conflict Sensitivity Guide, 2022.

Understanding the conflict context: Country-level conflict analyses were undertaken as part of implementer proposal submissions to the FCDO of varying quality, with those of Lots 1 and 2 of the highest standard.[105] It is also clear that, across the GMAP countries, awareness of the context remains good during delivery, as operators successfully navigate the operational sensitivities of delivering mine action in fragile contexts. However, this contextual awareness tends in practice to be motivated primarily by a desire to operate in different areas, and while the partnering with local NGOs can improve contextual awareness, it appears that these relationships are also primarily about access (see Finding 12).[106] Nevertheless, this awareness is important to principles of 'do no harm' (see below).

Understanding the interaction between the intervention and the (conflict) context: The evidence for this is limited, with analysis of how mine action can interact with the conflict seen only in the Somalia proposal from Lot 1. However, during implementation there is a tacit understanding, despite efforts to remain neutral, that mine action can do harm and hence interact with the conflict. For instance, in Sudan UNMAS contracted an international commercial firm to undertake clearance in contested parts of Blue Nile State, as NGOs were considered to be too closely associated with the Khartoum government.[107] Similarly, in Afghanistan UNMAS sought to strengthen NGO and INGO capacity to negotiate access, though in this context access depended less on the presence of designated 'community liaison advisors' and more on the personal contacts, relationship and reputations of individuals on NGO or INGO area management teams.[108] However, as stated above, this appears to be more about access and principles of neutrality (i.e. 'do no harm') than really understanding how the effects of mine action can transform conflict dynamics. For instance, in Afghanistan UNMAS has issued contracts in contested areas outside government control, ensuring an equitable distribution of resources, supporting UN neutrality principles.[109]

Acting upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts: While there is clearly good consideration of the operational risks of being seen to be favouring one side of a conflict divide over another, implementers have found it harder to understand the consequences of their actions. Post-demining impact assessments, e.g. those conducted in Afghanistan and Sudan, are primarily designed to determine the effects of clearance on local livelihoods,[110] and while data under the Lot 1 and 2 contracts are at least disaggregated by gender, there is no real understanding of who benefits and how. This is problematic from a conflict sensitivity perspective as, without conflict sensitive indicators and without knowing exactly who benefits from land release and how, the implementers can never claim to know if they are conflict sensitive or not. Indeed, land expropriation by elites post-clearance is a widely acknowledged risk within the sector[111] and there are other examples where clearance could be increasing grievances highlighted elsewhere in this report (see Finding 14). Nevertheless, there are examples of where GMAP2 has recognised that it can do more than 'do no harm' and contribute to improving conflict dynamics. For example, UN agencies align GMAP funding to UN peacebuilding priorities, and in Yemen UNDP set out to contribute to stabilisation outcomes by building capacity of key government institutions – in this case, the capacity of the mine action authorities in the north and the south of the country. What it means to be conflict transformative is also emerging within the Lot 1 and 2 contractors, who have captured this within a collaborative concept note that has the ambition of meeting the three criteria of being conflict sensitive described here.[112]

In summary, while there is progress being made by the implementers to be conflict sensitive, and an appreciation that this is not just about 'do no harm' but also about how to be conflict transformative, the fundamental issue is that insufficient data is collected by the implementers to know whether it is having no

[105] See GMAP2 formative evaluation report.
[106] KIIs with mine action sector during stabilisation research consultation process.
[107] KII with implementer, KII with sub-contracted implementer, KII with HMG.
[108] KIIs with local NGOs who were responsible for negotiating access.
[109] KIIs with implementer.
[110] PDIA in Afghanistan and Sudan. Sudan Case Study (part of Itad, Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts) paper.
[111] See GICHD (2014) Doing No Harm? Mine Action and Land Issues in Cambodia. Also evidenced in Itad (2018) summative evaluation of GMAP1 in the Cambodia case study.
[112] Concept note: Maximizing the Impact of Mine Action through Improved Identification, Prioritization & Linking with other sectors; Halo, NPA, MAG and Humanity and Inclusion.

effect, a positive effect, or a negative effect on conflict dynamics. That said, there is a commitment from the sector to improve their understanding of conflict sensitivity such that some implementers have come together to improve their approaches,[113] a commitment substantiated by the level of engagement and attendance at an online learning event on the links between stabilisation and mine action.[114]

[113] 2021, Concept note: Maximizing the Impact of Mine Action through Improved Identification, Prioritization & Linking with other sectors; developed by HALO, HI, MAG, NPA.

[114] Itad, Exploring Mine Action's potential in stabilisation and peacebuilding contexts, January 2022.

5 Findings: Results

This section assesses the extent to which GMAP2 has contributed to the intermediate outcomes and impacts articulated in GMAP's ToC.[115] The section goes some way to testing the underlying causal assumptions between activities and eight different results domains, as articulated in the ToC:

1. Mine action is recognised and recorded as having contributed towards development and/or stabilisation outcomes in line with relevant sustainable development goals (SDGs)
2. New employment opportunities, including for marginalised groups
3. Improved access to markets, trade, transport and humanitarian aid
4. Land put to productive use to improve livelihoods
5. Increased access to services
6. Safe return for refugees and IDPs
7. Target communities feel safer
8. NMAAs are more effective and sustainable

Finding 12: GMAP2 contributed to improving the technical capacity of local mine action organisations in clearance and EORE, especially in conflict-affected countries, but approaches to local partnerships across GMAP have done less to promote transitions to national ownership.

Local mine action organisations have often formed part of the GMAP2 delivery chain, in both post-conflict and conflict-affected countries, with both INGOs and UN agencies partnering with local mine action organisations, notably NGOs.[116] This is important as, within the GMAP ToC, it is assumed that local actors are engaged throughout delivery and that there is increasing transition not just of technical skills but also of management responsibility, without which mine action cannot fully be transitioned to national ownership.

However, the primary objective of engaging local partners is not always clear and tends to be prompted more by operational necessity than by a well-considered strategy to transition mine action to local ownership. In the cases of Myanmar and Afghanistan, the primary objective is an operational imperative whereby areas under the control of armed non-state actors have often precluded direct delivery by international agencies.[117] In Sudan, similar obligations exist whereby there are no INGOs to consider; and in Somalia local delivery is a requirement of the NMAA. In practice, therefore, the motivations for working with local implementers at the outset appear to be more about immediate operational imperatives.

This is not to say that the engagement to date of local implementers has not been beneficial; and where local organisations are not viable – i.e. where civil society partners would not have the capacity to deliver activities, or where the operating environment made delivery difficult – UN and INGO consortia have strengthened the technical capacity of state institutions to deliver. For instance, in Yemen UNDP contracted INGOs to provide technical training in mine clearance and EOD to deminers employed by the NMAA, while in South Sudan MAG provided on-the-job training to technical officials from the NMAA by embedding officials in MAG clearance teams.

This pragmatism and flexibility are also noted through the different models of support provided by the GMAP implementers:

Secondment model

In South Sudan, NMAA staff were seconded to MAG, the IP, across two areas: (1) Quality Management – so staff could gain practice and experience in assessing the contractors' procedures and processes and

[115] Revised ToC.
[116] For example in South Sudan, Afghanistan and Myanmar.
[117] In Afghanistan, while UNMAS awarded contracts to both INGOs and NGOs in non-state actor-controlled areas, the majority of contracts in these areas were awarded to LNGOs, with HALO generally awarded contracts in state controlled areas. DMAC appear to view the security risks as lower in government areas, and hence this approach was intended to mitigate reputational risks associated with attacks on international humanitarian organisations. KIIs with NMAA, implementer and sub-contracted implementer stakeholders.

assessing whether the cleared land is safe to use; (2) Clearance – NMAA deminers could be trained within MAG demining teams. 'Secondment' is an appropriate model here – donors are concerned with the reputational risks associated with working directly with institutions affiliated with the state security apparatus. The model, which only South Sudan formally employs in the GMAP contract,[118] has its limitations: it is focused on individuals and is contingent on the opportunity to apply the knowledge and skills once the secondment is completed. For instance, in South Sudan uptake of the skills learned could be constrained by a lack of NMAA funding.[119]

Partnership model – supporting small organisations

In Myanmar, implementers initially built the technical capacity of NGOs and smaller CBOs to deliver risk education in IDP camps and remote villages, particularly in areas where state authority was contested by AEOs. After initial training, implementers worked closely with local partners to provide ongoing quality control and oversight – CBOs we interviewed believed they had better technical capacity to plan and implement outreach projects as a result,[120] while implementers were very keen to support those smaller organisations who were embedded in communities and could employ a more 'localised' approach.[121] INGO implementers have also partnered with local organisations in other locales, but these are usually larger entities.[122]

Training of trainers

In Afghanistan, Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIMs) are a major problem. To tackle this, HALO, in partnership with Artios,[123] was contracted by UNMAS to provide training to the Afghanistan NMAA and selected NGOs in AIM removal; they will then 'transfer' this knowledge via a 'trainer of trainers' model to other NGO partners. Such a process is an efficient way of embedding skills and expertise nationally, whereby the 'trained' become the repository of needed expertise. HALO has strong capacities in this area (it is currently the only mine action operator accredited to clear improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the country).

On-the-job training/mentoring[124]

In Somalia, NPA provided capacity development training to members of a state-level NGO consortium. Yet, as the local NGO consortium was little more than a loose affiliation of individuals, it had limited functionality as an organisational entity. The institutional sustainability of such an arrangement was questioned by Puntland state officials, who favoured a response led by state institutions, notably the Puntland police. According to some local mine action officials, training the Puntland police to undertake clearance, including EOD, and to deliver risk education would be more sustainable than training local NGOs. For the Ministry of Interior, such a state-led delivery arrangement also has the potential to produce a security dividend in terms of better relations between police and communities – though it is too early to tell whether this security sector-led approach will be a more effective delivery modality given the context of conflict, security provision and clan relations in Puntland.

[118] However, HALO in Somaliland also have 'incorporated' and pay the salaries of a demining unit from the NMAA.
[119] Mine Action Review (2019) Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019. Available at http://www.mineactionreview.org/assets/downloads/10799_NPA_Cluster_Munition_Remnants_2019_WEB.pdf [Accessed 26.07.2021]
[120] Interviews conducted by local researcher in Thanintharyi, Kachin and North Shan States.
[121] KIIs with implementers and sub-contracted implementers.
[122] For instance, the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAC) in Cambodia for clearance and survey activities; Quang Tri Province Youth Union to deliver EORE.
[123] Artios were subcontracted by Halo to deliver the training to prevent conflict of interest, with Halo providing logistical support and technical support.
[124] KIIs with implementers, subcontracted implementers, government ministries and local government officials.

The capacity development examples given demonstrate that there is a range of options available to the sector to encourage transitions to national ownership. However, as outlined above, there are questions from the evaluation over whether capacity development – of LNGOs in particular – is about serving an immediate operational purpose for the implementers or part of a more considered strategy to increase national ownership of mine action.

This matters, as the motivation for providing capacity development can affect sustainability of outcomes and the quality of partnerships. Furthermore, the capacity development model in some of the countries may have unforeseen consequences. For instance, in Afghanistan DMAC/UNMAS look to spread contracts across NGOs and INGOs; however, when further NGO training is needed, UNMAS contracts INGOs to provide it. This creates a conflict of interest whereby INGOs are potentially asked to build the capacity of their competitors.[125] This is compounded by GMAP2 contracting arrangements which do not purposively encourage sustainable transition to local partners. For instance, although implementers are required to detail how they will phase out activities at the contract's end (in terms of staffing, equipment, etc.), there is no imperative to outline 'exit strategies' unless the country they are operating within is close to mine free status. By not requiring this, there are no overarching roadmaps and incentives to encourage well thought out and long-term strategies needed to prepare local implementers to inherit responsibility for delivery in the future. Even where mine free status is impending, such as in Somaliland, GMAP funding arrangements do not support implementer plans to exit. For example, there was no GMAP2 budget line for HALO in Somaliland to build local capacity to manage residual risk, much to the consternation of key stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation.[126]

A further barrier to transitioning to local ownership is that NGOs remain very dependent on international implementers for financial support – there were few examples where NGOs have been successful in securing direct funding for mine action.[127] For instance, in South Sudan NGOs are unable to access the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) directly, despite the UN Grand Bargain commitment to principles of localisation.[128] In the current SSHF funding call, NGOs had to apply in a consortium and were eligible only if they had previously already received over USD $200,000 in the past 24 months.[129] According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the fiduciary and absorptive capacity risks are too high. Even in Afghanistan, which has a number of established and well-capacitated NGOs specialising in mine clearance and EORE, there is evidence of a downturn in both direct and indirect funding flows, a result of increased attrition of donor funding and the drawdown in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence since 2014.[130] Such a constrained funding environment further hampers the viability of locally-driven mine action sectors.

Finding 13: GMAP2 EORE targets were exceeded, contributing to enhanced knowledge and behaviour change, although it is more difficult to demonstrate a tangible link between EORE and casualty rates.

Although EORE received a relatively small budget allocation (2.89% or £1.32 million[131] for the INGOs), all implementers included an EORE component in their proposals.[132] EORE targets were exceeded, and there is evidence that this led to meaningful outcome-level change – reducing risky behaviour. There is strong evidence that the INGOs have performed well, using context-specific analysis to inform programme design, proactively embracing progressive indicators, and investing in feedback mechanisms with communities. However, the performance of the UN delivery mechanisms is unclear and, across the UN and INGO

[125] It is important to note here, though, that there is a confidence in the NGO sector – vis-à-vis the awarding of contracts – in Afghanistan which could make international involvement redundant in the future. As noted above, in one case HALO then subcontracted training to DMAC to Artios to mitigate against this risk of conflict of interest.
[126] KIIs in Somaliland, January 2021. In Sri Lanka, responsibility for 'exit' falls more with the IPs, but they have only just started completion surveys to ascertain whether the country is still on track for its 2025 – revised from 2020 – mine free deadline.
[127] For EORE in Lebanon.
[128] UN High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Funding Gap. Report to UN Secretary-General, January 2016.
[129] Please see https://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/eligibility
[130] KIIs with UN agencies and mine action operators in Afghanistan.
[131] Figures for budget up to March 2021.
[132] GMAP2 logframe as of 31 March 2021.

implementers, more can be done to analyse incentives of risky behaviour in real time. This is important, as a number of assumptions under EORE causal pathways of the ToC relate to risk data and analysis.[133]

In response to this need for better data, under GMAP1 Itad worked with the GMAP1 IPs[134] to develop new indicators for EORE that measured social norm change. This is an important development in understanding outcome-level achievements and has been integrated into the Lots 1 and 2 results frameworks and reporting systems for GMAP2, centred around the following indicators (see Annex 8 for further details).

- *Indicator 4.1:* Percentage of risk education (RE) beneficiaries surveyed who demonstrate increased knowledge of RE safety message
- *Indicator 4.2:* Percentage of impacted communities surveyed who report an increase in people behaving in a safer manner

The data collected by the implementers under Lots 1 and 2 against these indicators shows high rates of knowledge retention and changes in social norms – as evidenced by recent data presented by HALO across a number of Lot 1 and 2 countries.[135] Aggregation of results from post-session surveys suggests that nearly all the people (89% and 95% respectively) who attended RE sessions came away better informed about the risks of mines and ERW (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 below).[136] The Lots 1 and 2 survey data also found that RE contributes to a positive change in behaviour, with 71% and 79% respectively of impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in safe behaviour.[137]

Figure 4: Lot 1 performance against RE indicators*



**Figures for Indicator 4.1 represent percentage of beneficiaries surveyed who demonstrate increased knowledge of RE safety message. Figures for Indicator 4.2 represent percentage of communities surveyed who report an increase in people behaving in a safer manner.*

[133] Assumption C1: Information stored by national authorities and/or contractors is used to prioritise land for clearance, reduce risk through MRE, and identify follow-on development opportunities; Assumption C4: MRE messages are not undermined by socioeconomic benefits of taking risks, e.g. farming land that has not yet been cleared or crossing minefields to collect water; Assumption D5: The risk of harm from uncleared land does no undermine the benefits of MRE to people living near cleared areas.
[134] HALO, MAG, NPA, GICHD.
[135] HALO report that Angola, Myanmar and Cambodia saw improved EORE knowledge retention test scores – and evidence of behaviour change for the latter country; 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[136] Data from GMAP2 logframe December 2021.
[137] GMAP2 Annual Review 2020.

Figure 5: Lot 2 performance against RE indicators*



**Figures for Indicator 4.1 represent percentage of beneficiaries surveyed who demonstrate increased knowledge of RE safety message. Figures for Indicator 4.2. represent percentage of communities surveyed who report an increase in people behaving in a safer manner.*
Sri Lanka is not included as no EORE was conducted there.

However, these figures contrast with findings from a survey undertaken by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) (an UNMAS grant recipient) in Afghanistan that noted that people who had received EORE did not have substantially different awareness levels from those who had not received EORE.[138] In short, the full extent of these achievements could not be verified by the evaluation team, and where it can be verified it is from qualitative perception data only.

Nevertheless, GMAP2 does seems to have achieved notable success in improving knowledge and shifting behaviour at aggregate level, although it has been much harder to assess the effects of RE on those groups most at risk of mine-related accidents, a key causal pathway of the ToC. For example, UN agencies report on the number of EORE sessions and direct beneficiaries but do not usually report their data disaggregated by sex and age.

Despite these positive movements in data collection under GMAP2 – at least within the INGO consortia – the level of analysis conducted by the UN and INGO implementers can improve.[139] For example, there is little evidence at the proposal stage that analysis has informed UN-led programme design.[140] This is in contrast to the Lots 1 and 2 proposals, which demonstrated a good understanding of the risks faced by different demographic groups within each country. However, neither the Lots 1 and 2 nor the UN implementers demonstrated routine analysis of risky behaviours as an ongoing task.[141]

While there is evidence that the implementers are targeting different risk groups – for example, in South Sudan the Lot 2 consortium targeted young men in cattle camps – it is less clear whether the routine data collected by implementers for monitoring purposes informs ongoing learning and adaptation. For example, in the case of South Sudan, men and boys have proven to be less responsive to RE messages and, according to the implementers, men and adolescent boys often profess to already have sufficient knowledge and are often reluctant to attend RE sessions.[142] Furthermore, evidence from both conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Myanmar and South Sudan, shows

[138] DDG (2018) A Comprehensive Assessment of the Current State of Risk Education in Afghanistan: Findings of Baseline, KAP Survey and Casualty Analysis.
[139] GMAP1 summative evaluation report; GMAP2 formative evaluation report; Q11 Summary Monitoring Report, March 2021.
[140] For example, there was no analysis of risky behaviours in the UNMAS proposal for Afghanistan and in the UNDP Yemen proposal a process for analysing risks was outlined but with no actual data nor analysis of risks.
[141] Itad Monitoring Report, Q11, March 2021. HALO and MAG in RE-FGDs and pre-/post-retention testing do ask questions related to risky behaviours, although the responses to these questions may not currently be analysed separately to other knowledge related questions.
[142] GMAP2 Annual Review 2020.

that there is often little incentive for those most at risk to change their behaviour if such change undermines their livelihoods[143] (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). In Afghanistan, DMAC hotline c all statistics suggested little or no use of the telephone number handed out to the many thousands of EORE session participants.[144] In South Sudan there is evidence that farmers continued to harvest their land despite the knowledge that it was contaminated.[145]

Weak data collection systems, including under-reporting, are considered as impediments to reliable assessment of such results by implementers (see SOC 4). In Afghanistan we noted that DMAC did not analyse casualty trend data or try to correlate mine action with casualty rates.

Without sufficient analysis and an understanding of why some still undertake risky behaviour, it is not possible for the implementers to fully consider the ToC assumptions and assess the effects of different RE approaches on the most at-risk groups. Given that the implementers use a wide range of communication tools, it is important that they understand the effectiveness of different approaches and interrogate shortcomings in order to learn and adapt. This would also allow the implementers to draw lessons from one country to another, which may help with increasing the relatively low effectiveness of EORE in e.g. Laos, compared to the very high success rates reported in Angola.

As such, despite the assumption that EORE saves lives, the causal links remain hard to reliably prove. It is particularly hard to identify the contribution that RE makes to saving lives in the absence of mine clearance, with the only opportunity to do this being in Myanmar.[146] While year-on-year reductions in casualty rates were reported in some states of Myanmar, this was attributed more to the cessation of conflict than to RE.[147] Indeed, Myanmar implementer country teams considered the globally aggregable behaviour change indicator to be less relevant in contexts where there is limited trust between communities and authorities.

SOC 4: Challenges of recording reliable data in Afghanistan

According to Afghanistan's official mine and ERW casualty statistics, boys account for the highest number of reported accidents.[148] There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that accident rates among boys who participate in the scrap metal trade are higher than among boys who do not.[149] According to local officials we spoke with, accident rates increase when scrap metal prices are high,[150] supporting a finding from an earlier summative evaluation that falling prices reduced the incentive to engage in the trade.[151]

Scrap metalling is a livelihood activity for many boys and young men, particularly in rural areas. Boys told us the current price of different scrap metals and admitted to participating in the trade even after receiving RE, as it was a livelihood necessity.[152] According to a recent victim assistance survey, a small percentage of survivors have little choice but to keep scrap metalling as the income is so helpful to their families.[153]

Young survivors are often reluctant to admit their accident was due to their involvement in the local scrap metal trade. Their families are concerned they will fail to qualify for victim assistance if the cause is officially reported as scrap metalling.[154] DMAC's accident data base has a category termed 'Playing with Mines/ERW' which, according to some officials, can also be a euphemism for collecting scrap metal.

[143] GMAP1 summative evaluation report (Cambodia), KIIs with implementer staff in Cambodia; MAG clearance reports and KIIs with implementers in South Sudan, KIIs with community members and IDPs in Myanmar.
[144] DMAC monthly hotline statistics, 2020.
[145] Analysis of MAG clearance reports and KIIs with MAG.
[146] Myanmar is the only GMAP country where EORE is not accompanied by routine clearance, as the Myanmar authorities have not yet permitted clearance by international organisations; and locally led clearance is not delivered at any scale, but is focused mostly on EOD spot tasks.
[147] KII with other UN agencies.
[148] DMAC accident data, 2020.
[149] KII with NMAA; DDG (2018) A Comprehensive Assessment of the Current State of Risk Education in Afghanistan: Findings of Baseline, KAP Survey and Casualty Analysis.
[150] KII with NMAA.
[151] Itad (2018), GMAP1 summative evaluation report.
[152] KIIs with children in Balkh.
[153] DDG (2018) A Comprehensive Assessment of the Current State of Risk Education in Afghanistan: Findings of Baseline, KAP Survey and Casualty Analysis.
[154], Magenta (2019) Victim assistance analysis.

Even local NGOs can be reluctant to admit that their staff sometimes participate in the market, selling items found during clearance operations. The reputational risks are too high. NGO directors are concerned that by reporting such accidents they might jeopardise their NGO's access to future donor contracts.[155]

Given the mix of interests and incentives, the appetite for understanding the relationship between men, boys and the trade is limited. The market remains largely informal and loosely regulated. Yet without a more detailed understanding of how the market actually works, it can be hard to design interventions that might help shift the behaviours of those involved in the trade, including those most at risk. Most of GMAP2 partners support victim assistance projects, yet there is little evidence that such studies have been undertaken.[156]

Finding 14: GMAP2 contributed to improved livelihood opportunities and economic development. However, a lack of understanding of how land will be used post-clearance raises concerns that implementers are unable to fully coordinate with stakeholders from other sectors and are unaware of how their activities can be counter to wider UK policy positions.

Typically, land release under GMAP2 has taken place in rural areas, with the intended benefits mostly for agricultural farmers and pastoralists, according to the INGO data, reflecting a strong link between land clearance and rural livelihoods (see Figure 6).[157] The data also indicates that, of the almost 400,000 people to directly benefit, on average approximately 50% of direct beneficiaries are male and 50% are female, with approximately 5% of those being people with disabilities.[158]

Figure 6: Land release under Lots 1 and 2 contracts, by land use[159]



However, while land cleared does appear to have a focus on livelihoods, the priorities of the NMAAs who set the clearance tasks can be related to wider economic development benefits which tend not to be well documented in implementer reporting. This can mean that implementers lack a full appreciation of how land is used once released. This is problematic for three reasons: (1) they may be oversimplifying the benefits from land release; (2) they lack sufficient knowledge of the benefits to understand whether these are felt equitably across society (see **Error! Reference source not found.**); and (3) they are unable to fully c oordinate with stakeholders from the development, peacebuilding and stabilisation sectors – a core assumption of the ToC[160] – unless they understand what the land will be used for after clearance.

While these numbers are helpful to get a sense of scale, they tell only part of the story; and below we illustrate the range of benefits that mine action can contribute to, as aligned to the two core areas of the ToC that relate to livelihoods and economic development:

[155] As noted in a DMAC coordination group meeting in 2019 attended by evaluation team, and in KIIs with NGOs.
[156] According to multiple interviews we conducted (implementers, subcontracted implementers, NMAA), up to now no such studies have been undertaken. One of the problems is 'staff churn': project officers are often not in post long enough to see such research projects come to fruition.
[157] GMAP2 logical framework data; 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[158] Lots 1 and 2 logframes, December 2021.
[159] % of land released, in m^2, by land use.
[160] Assumption B1/B2: There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces). As highlighted in Annex 3: 'Implications of findings for ToC assumptions and outcomes'.

1) Public & private land & property is put to productive use, leading to improved livelihoods

2) Improved livelihood opportunities for men & women, including marginalised and/or vulnerable groups, enabling wider economic development

Public & private land & property is put to productive use, leading to improved livelihoods

Post-demining livelihood reports conducted by implementers and NMAAs state that farmers used the land mainly to grow grain and vegetables. For instance, in Afghanistan some cleared land is used for producing wheat and potatoes, and in Sudan farmers use the land to grow maize, sorghum, groundnuts and sesame.[161] In Angola, maize is also a primary crop grown on cleared land, along with cassava, beans and potatoes, with post-clearance surveys indicating that post-clearance households are also able to grow a more diverse range of crops.[162] Clearance has also enabled women and children to forage further from home for firewood[163] and, in Afghanistan, for herbs – where some are highly sought after for their medicinal properties and high market value.[164] According to implementer reporting, in less productive pastoralist areas, such as in parts of Afghanistan,[165] Somalia and Somaliland,[166] cleared land was used for grazing livestock. In some cases clearance also saw an attendant increase in livestock numbers – with the vast majority of respondents surveyed in Somaliland (100%) and Somalia (71%) reporting increased livestock numbers post-clearance, and significant rises also seen in Zimbabwe and Angola. Cambodia also saw an increase in agricultural machinery, vehicles and other equipment.[167]

However, data available still does not give us an adequate understanding of the benefits. For example, it has not been possible to undertake year-on-year analysis in terms of farm outputs, as implementer-led livelihood studies usually offer only a snapshot. Larger NMAA livelihood studies can also lack consistency, as sites are often randomly selected and quantitative data provided by government agricultural departments can be patchy and unreliable. For example, in Afghanistan we noted that district agricultural departments in drought-affected regions reported increased wheat outputs to DMAC livelihood survey researchers.

More broadly, we noted the effects of mine clearance on local livelihoods to be far more context-specific, making it difficult for implementers to generalise findings from aggregate land utilisation data.[168] For example, we noted that cleared land was likely to be underutilised if the macroeconomic situation was weak, even in settings where farmland was at a premium. We noted this specifically in Lebanon, where premiums for farmland would usually mean that clearance led to immediate results, with private landowners usually happy to invest, confident that new olive groves, tobacco and wheat crops will improve their livelihoods. However, the economic crisis engulfing the country has meant that few farmers have the means to invest in their lands.

In contrast, qualitative analysis conducted by our local researchers in Cambodia suggests that land value increased when farmers had access to credit. Here clearance had led to livelihood diversification rather than agricultural productivity gains (see SOC 5), suggesting greater resilience.

SOC 5: Mine action enables poor rural farmers to access credit in Cambodia

A useful proxy indicator of wealth creation (primarily land value) is household access to credit.[169] In the two sites where pre- and post-survey (HALO) data was analysed and field visits were carried out by the evaluation team, there

[161] 2020 PDIA reports for Afghanistan and Sudan.
[162] In Angola it is also reported that households are also able to grow a more diverse range of crops (four or more). 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[163] 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[164] UNMAS and HALO, Balkh and Jawzjan completion reports.
[165] UNMAS and HALO, Balkh and Jawzjan completion reports.
[166] 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[167] 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[168] Itad's ongoing geospatial impact evaluation as part of the research component of the GMAP2 contract in Afghanistan may provide further insights.
[169] Access to microfinance is used as a proxy indicator for wealth created as the microfinance providers recognise the market value of the land post clearance and the credit worthiness of the owners linked to the value of their land.

was a clear testimony by smallholders that cleared land saw a significant increase in land value. This, in turn, enabled access to credit, with the reviewed sample reflecting 17% of households accessing credit pre-clearance, rising to 80% within a year of clearance.[170]

In one border community with good access to markets, post-clearance data showed that households were diversifying their income away from agriculture. In the second, more remote and poorer community, the shift was from food crops to higher-value cash crops. In both cases reviewed, household income more than doubled within a year of having their land cleared, with poorer households seeing a relatively higher increase on average.

Improved livelihood opportunities for men & women, including marginalised and/or vulnerable groups, enabling wider economic development

Evidence, albeit limited, suggests a causal relationship between rural livelihoods and economic development outcomes in some contexts. For instance, in Sudan, some farmers in South Kordofan are part of a global supply chain producing Gum Arabica for export,[171] contributing to improvements in government foreign exchange earnings. In Somalia, land clearance has facilitated increased local trade and natural resource exploration in Somaliland.[172]

Economic development was more pronounced where clearance led to specific investments in infrastructure. For example, in Lebanon local data collection showed that landowners with the means to invest in their land through infrastructure in towns such as Toul and Mais el Jabel had greater economic development gains than those unable to invest in developing their land.[173] In Afghanistan, GMAP2 cleared land that was often government-owned. Here the local government benefited directly by leasing the cleared land to farmers and investors from inside and outside the district, and in some cases this was linked to pre-planned investments, which contributed to wider economic development:

1) The Department of Urban Development and Land managed a land leasing programme aimed at increasing wheat productivity in Kandahar, principally by small farmers, reducing reliance on imports from Pakistan.

2) The Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livelihoods has implemented a cold storage project on cleared land in Daman to protect crops designated for export – mainly potatoes and pomegranates – which are affected when the Pakistan border periodically closes; cold storage will reduce risks to disruption in the export supply chain.174

SOC 6 below illustrates well the multifaceted nature of clearance and the benefits that can be derived from it, recognising that clearance can contribute to community resilience and subsistence living, livelihoods and employment, as well as providing macroeconomic benefits associated with a stronger and more secure energy sector.

[170] The sample size was around 60 households, broadly split equally between the two sites, and between those who benefited from GMAP2 clearance and those who benefited a year or two before GMAP2 – which enables a degree of validation, as this reduces the possibility that benefits observed were as a result of temporally specific conditions (e.g. a rise in cash crop prices in a specific year, or a microcredit organisation aggressively expanding in the area). Additional HALO post-clearance data supports this, reporting that the average size of bank loans increased by 48%. 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[171] Local researcher interviews in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.
[172] Tareke, G (2000) The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 Revisited. International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol 33. No.3 (635–67); Bradbury, M (2008) Becoming Somaliland. Indiana University Press; Somaliland Vision 2030; Musa, A, Wasonga, O and Mtimet, N (2020) Factors Influencing Livestock Export in Somaliland's Terminal Markets. Pastoralism 10.10.1186; Henderson, M (2020) Somalia: the New Oil and Gas Frontier. The Africa Report, 9 November 2020; Bamberger, J G and Skovsted, K (2016) Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia. DIIS Working Paper 2016:2, Danish Institute for International Studies; Ahmed, G. (2020) Somaliland Ports: the Horn of Africa's Most Valuable Real Estate. Middle East Institute, Washington D.C.
[173] KIIs with landowners.
[174] Gibbons-Neff, T and Shah, T (2020) Where the Pomegranate harvest is life, the Taliban brought ruin. 22 November 2020, New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/world/asia/Afghanistan-pomegranate-taliban.html [Accessed 14.07.2021]

SOC 6: Mine action contributes to energy security in Northern Afghanistan

Clearance of two mine-contaminated areas in Afghanistan's northern provinces, Balkh and Jawzjan, has supported local livelihoods; for instance, local people said they felt safer when collecting wood or herbs.[175] Clearance has also produced wider benefits, contributing to energy security. This has directly fuelled regional and national economic development, an under-reported result in some country contexts.[176]

Afghanistan imports large amounts of fuel and electricity from neighbouring Uzbekistan.[177] In the district of Hairatan, an important regional trading centre on the border with Uzbekistan, the removal of substantial amounts of ammunition, dumped in the 1980s by the departing Soviet army, has reduced risk to nearby oil storage bunkers and railway lines (as desert winds shift contaminated sand across tracks). Clearance has also enabled the expansion of oil storage facilities in a large business park, an area that was once an undeveloped, remote desert.[178]

In the district of Sheberghan, the capital of Jawzjan province, GMAP mine clearance has facilitated the implementation of a large flagship infrastructural development project.[179] The construction of transmission towers on the released land has increased the amount of electricity imported from Uzbekistan. This has benefited households and businesses in the province and in other parts of the country.[180]

The province is also well known for its extensive natural gas deposits, tax revenues from which are important to the national economy. There are reliable reports that more gas exploration permits have also been sold as a result of the clearance, and plans to sink more gas wells are at an advanced stage.[181]

Over 500 local people were employed on the electricity transmission project, according to the project manager,[182] although some Turkman villages complained that the electricity had yet to reach their village.[183] In Hairatan, local people were hopeful of finding employment in the expanded business park, but pointed out that the main beneficiaries were the families of prominent local politicians with government connections – those with the funds to acquire the land and build more oil storage bunkers.[184]

SOC 6 also reflects a desire by governments to ensure humanitarian resources are integrated with local economic development plans, often used to enable implementation of flagship projects and generate additional domestic tax revenues, even contributing to macroeconomic stability. However, there is less evidence that marginalised communities benefited from such local economic development initiatives unless governments had a strong pro-poor mandate. In Angola, for example, where the government is seeking to strengthen its mandate with a focus on rural development and job creation, MAG prioritises clearance areas in coordination with national and provincial authorities where the land enables settlements in emerging market towns in less developed Eastern Angola, which in turn have benefited from investments in railway and roads. This leads to local migration from the remote areas of Eastern Angola, and the cleared land offers economic opportunities as families settle and shift to cash crops and local trade.[185]

Pre- and post-clearance data collected by the implementers does often capture economic and socioeconomic benefits at a household level. For instance, IP data for GMAP2 shows that, post-clearance, in Cambodia, Somaliland, and Laos, 50%, 78% and 45% respectively of surveyed households indicated

[175] UNMAS 2020 quarterly report.
[176] KII with local government official.
[177] Tradingeconomics.com report $55 million of oil imports in 2019. Available at https://tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/imports/uzbekistan
[178] Ghazanfar group (2021) Ghazanfar Port. Available at https://www.ghazanfargroup.com/ghazanfar-port.php?lang=en [Accessed 14.07.2021]
[179] Andkhoy electricity transmission project.
[180] KIIs with Andkhoy project stakeholders.
[181] KIIs with Jawzjan electricity and gas business representatives.
[182] KIIs with Andkhoy project stakeholders.
[183] FGD with Nawabad village residents.
[184] FGD with Hairatan village residents.
[185] KIIs with MAG and beneficiaries; political economy analysis conducted by the Angola evaluation team member Francisco Ngongo Kapulu.

that income had increased. In Somalia it is reported that average income across respondents rose by 12%, while households dependent on crop production in Zimbabwe also witnessed an improvement in income. In Cambodia the greatest increase was seen by female-headed households, while Laos saw female-headed households report a greater increase in improved employment opportunities as a result of clearance. IP data also showed evidence that households saw a reduction of income spent on food (e.g. by 10% for Cambodia) and an increased spend on non-food items (by over 390% for Laos).[186]

Attention is usually given to land rights in the collection of such data; however, there are still gaps in understanding of land use, in particular as household data is typically not collected beyond 12 months after clearance, and some of the macroeconomic changes referred to in the previous paragraphs would sit outside the view of household data. This means that some risks may not be noticed by operators, and SOC 6 demonstrates the potential for inequitable distribution of benefits, potentially marginalising vulnerable communities. SOC 6, and the evidence of land clearance facilitating increased natural resource exploration in Somaliland mentioned above, both highlight the need to understand links beyond individual households, as those examples potentially go against latest UK policy on using UK foreign aid investments to benefit fossil fuel infrastructure[187] and exploration. While these are recent policy shifts, they indicate the need for understanding wider change that may be influencing mine action, in this instance placing particular importance on not doing harm from an environmental and climate change perspective.[188]

Finding 15: There is evidence that removal of mines and ERW improves freedom of movement, humanitarian access and trade. Assumptions that this would lead to significant population movements are unfounded.

There is credible evidence that removal of mines and ERW improved freedom of movement, for example by enabling people to use more convenient routes in order to visit nearby villages or district centres.[189] In some cases, IPs have specifically focused on clearing local footpaths.[190]

Local people we spoke with in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sudan and Somalia all believed that trade between villages and towns had increased as a result of land clearance.[191] In Sudan, stallholders said more goods from Khartoum were now available in some of the shops in South Kordofan.[192] Here GMAP2 has also supported the establishment of 'Peace Markets' that benefited frontline villages.

GMAP2 has, in some conflict-affected settings, enabled at-risk populations to access humanitarian aid, particularly IDPs.[193] This has been achieved through better multi-agency collaboration by UN agencies, INGOs, other multilateral donors and national government ministries working together.[194]

Such initiatives are often integrated into the country HRP and regional development plans. For instance, in Afghanistan UNMAS collaborated with UN-Habitat with a view to clearing land as part of a pre-planned government housing investment (see SOC 7). Similarly, UNMAS and UNDP have collaborated with WFP in responding to IDP needs in South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen,[195] with a view to mitigating risk of malnutrition and famine among most-at-risk groups. In South Sudan, mine action prioritisation was informed by food security classifications rather than contamination levels, in line with donor funding and HRP focus on food security.

[186] 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[187] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-the-uk-will-end-support-for-fossil-fuel-sector-overseas
[188] HMG (2020) Procurement Policy Note – Taking Account of Social Value in the Award of Central Government Contracts. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/921437/PPN-06_20-Taking-Account-of-Social-Value-in-the-Award-of-Central-Government-Contracts.pdf [Accessed 26.07.2021]
[189] According to post-clearance data in Sri Lanka. 'Analysis of Outcome Data Collected through GMAP2' presentation, HALO, August 2021.
[190] For instance in Zabul, Afghanistan.
[191] Sudan Case Study (part of the Itad Exploring Mine Action's Potential in Stabilisation and Peacebuilding Contexts paper)
[192] KIIs with local community members/beneficiaries in South Kordofan.
[193] South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan.
[194] Sudan Case Study (part of the part of the Itad Exploring Mine Action's Potential in Stabilisation and Peacebuilding Contexts paper)
[195] UNMAS South Sudan (2020) Q2 Update Report; KIIs with implementer.

SOC 7: Mine action contributes to IDP resettlement in Afghanistan

We found mine clearance was more effective when part of a pre-designed policy initiative intended as a durable solution for both returnees and IDPs. For instance, in Afghanistan GMAP has supported clearance in a number of areas prioritised for the resettlement of IDPs – part of an integrated humanitarian and development response linked to an Afghan government policy intended to support the resettlement of returnees from Europe, Iran and Pakistan, as well as IDPs from other parts of the country.

The policy initiative, backed by government and international donors, has sought to reduce migratory pressures and manage urban development by constructing peri-urban townships, particularly in Nangahar, Kabul, and Herat. These cities are all popular destination points for the majority of IDP returnees.[196]

The holistic approach includes provision of free land allocation to eligible returnees and IDPs, including land clearance, drainage and transport systems. According to UN-Habitat, the value of the allocated land (300m^2) has since increased from USD $4,000 to USD $17,000.[197]

Additional livelihood investments include provision of mulberry bushes to members of women's cooperatives to stimulate silk production; and provision of ancillary services in settlements – including banks, shopping malls, wedding palaces – and a solar farm to improve energy security is also planned.

While mine action is seen to be part of a durable solution, contributing to the return of displaced people to their areas of origin, there is less evidence that land clearance contributes to larger population movement. For refugees and IDPs in conflict-affected contexts, returning to their area of origin is also contingent on improvements in the local economic and security situation, not only on removal of mines and ERW.[198] We noted this to be the case in Afghanistan, Myanmar and South Sudan[199] (see SOC 8).

SOC 8: Mine action contributes to IDPs and returnees feeling safer in South Sudan

Mine and cluster munitions clearance in South Sudan has made some IDPs feel safer,[200] even if risks from cluster contamination are considered relatively low, as evident from the zero casualty rates in some contaminated area of South Sudan.[201] Clearance of the mines and ERW has, however, been insufficient to encourage refugees to return to the country in any numbers. Returns are, indeed, triggered by factors other than cluster munition clearance, such as security and economic opportunity.

In the county of Magwi, on South Sudan's border with Uganda, there is evidence that some of the IDPs now living in the area feel safer.[202] Of those returning from Uganda – usually men, mostly living in the town – some reported feeling safer when visiting their ancestral land, either to keep an eye on it or to farm it.[203]

There is less evidence of people returning to the area to live, either from the town or from the refugee camps in Uganda.[204] The town is considered safer from armed groups than the decontaminated rural areas. The town is a place where humanitarian aid is easier to access and where daily work is sometimes available.

The proximity to Juba, the capital, is also important. According to a key informant from the area now living in Juba, despite the peace agreement, most of the women and children who left the country during the conflict are unlikely to return from the refugee camps in Uganda until South Sudan's economy recovers and the security situation improves or the Ugandan camps are forced to close.[205]

[196] IOM displacement tracking mechanism report.
[197] KII with other UN agency.
[198] Itad, Exploring Mine Action's Potential in Stabilisation and Peacebuilding Contexts, Iraq and Sudan Case Studies, January 2022.
[199] KIIs with NMAA and other UN agency in South Sudan, and KII with implementer in Myanmar.
[200] According to MAG reports.
[201] KII with other UN agency, KII with NMAA, and Mine Action Review (2020), Clearing the Mines 2020 report for South Sudan.
[202] GMAP quarterly reports, 2020.
[203] Ibid.
[204] IOM (2020) Magwi County Village Assessment Survey, Data Tracking Mechanism, Eastern Equatoria State, March 2020.
[205] KII with NMAA.

Finding 16: The inclusion of a capacity development component to GMAP2 contributed to ensuring that essential NMAA functions were sustained and enhanced, providing NMAAs greater legitimacy in the mine action sector. However, outside mine action, NMAA institutional legitimacy and sustainability remain weak, as some NMAAs are more accountable and responsive to donors than their own governments.

GMAP2 has largely contributed to improving NMAA capacity by strengthening mine action structures, systems and skills, using a mix of training, mentoring, study tours and equipment. The GMAP2 budget allocation to NMAA capacity development was small[206] and much of the training and coaching has been informal as well as formal, conducted outside the GMAP2 budget. The bulk of the capacity development budget was allocated to two countries: Angola and Somalia. Findings suggest broadly positive results despite being a relatively small overall programme component.

In terms of capacity development support, Lots 1 and 2 contractors and UN agencies have used different capacity assessment frameworks for identifying NMAA performance deficits, determining capacity development priorities and tracking changes in performance,[207] drawing on internationally standardised institutional functions for NMAAs.[208]

Participating countries recorded capacity gains in aggregate and in specific functional areas.[209] Notable gains were reported by GICHD in Lebanon and by NPA, which primarily led the capacity development component in terms of strategic planning and information management, in both conflict-affected and non-conflict settings – in Angola, Cambodia and Somalia.[210]

There are three key areas of capacity development support that emerged during the evaluation. Each of these areas is integral to the GMAP2 ToC process, as outlined in the table below.

Table 3: Areas of capacity development support and their links to the GMAP2 ToC

Specific areas of capacity development support	Links to ToC	Findings
Information management	Output – *Enhanced information management systems and data*	Angola was commended for making significant progress in reconciling the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database with operator records and improving the accuracy of the database. Cambodia was also credited for setting up a virtual private network to allow operators to input directly to the database. NPA also noted an improvement in Somalia's information management system, albeit from a lower base.[211] A maturity assessment conducted by UNMAS in Afghanistan reported improvements in strategic planning, operations and human resource management, although deficits in database management and QA were considered harder to close, to some extent attributed to staff turnover and funding deficits following transition.[212]

[206] 7.8% of total Lot 1 budget and 5.2% of Lot 2. Figures from original GMAP2 Lot 1 and Lot 2 proposals and first extension period (up to March 2021) proposal.
[207] For example, UN-led maturity assessment frameworks in Afghanistan, Sudan and Yemen, NPA/GICHD capacity assessments in Angola, Somalia, Cambodia and Vietnam, and capacity development review meeting hosted by GICHD.
[208] See Mine Action Review – Clearing the Mines 2020 framework, UN led maturity assessment frameworks in Afghanistan, Sudan and Yemen and NPA capacity assessments in Angola, Somalia, Cambodia and Vietnam.
[209] Although difficult to generalise across the programme as IPs use their own frameworks and not all countries participate.
[210] GMAP results framework.
[211] NPA (2020) Capacity Assessment Framework report.
[212] Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020.

		In Lebanon, GICHD worked with the LMAC to support the transition from IMSMA to IMSMA Core, helping to update and modernise to a fully Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based information management system. This helped to integrate the Routing-enhanced Media Access Control (RMAC) data management system with that of the LMAC data management system.[213]
Strategic planning and reporting	Output - *Enhanced plans, systems, procedures & practices*	GMAP2 supported the development and revision of mine action strategies and plans in a number of countries: Angola, South Sudan, Somalia and Lebanon. GICHD has long-standing ties in South Sudan and Lebanon. Here GICHD advisors have provided periodic short-term technical inputs, facilitating strategic and operational planning processes, enabling NMAAs to revise and update plans according to their most recent contamination data and to more accurately forecast annual funding requirements.[214] Their respective strategic planning ecosystems have evolved as a result, including the development of gender strategies and risk mitigation strategies.[215] Such periodic short-term technical support worked particularly well in settings where NPA have also had embedded long-term advisors. NPA's on-the-ground presence in Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Vietnam and Laos helped shepherd some strategic planning processes as well as contributing to wider NMAA capacity outcomes, particularly in information management and treaty reporting.[216] The presence of up-to-date and approved strategies and plans is important to donors, enhancing NMAA transparency and accountability to treaty obligations, ensuring donor funds are aligned to priorities. In Afghanistan for instance, the NMAA operational plan is used by bilateral donors to select prioritised tasks for funding and ensure donor complementarities rather than duplication.[217]
Policy development	Output - *Enhanced plans, systems, procedures & practices*	GMAP2 has also contributed to the development of new NMAA policies and guidelines, ensuring a more enabling regulatory environment, often supporting the integration of international standards into national systems. For example, IPs contributed to the development of 'mine free criteria' in Angola and Cambodia and to the development of IED/AIM clearance standards in Afghanistan. In Lebanon GMAP2 implementing partners took part in a process led by UNDP to review and design a revised prioritisation process for the LMAC.[218] Gains are fragile, however. Timeliness of treaty and donor reporting is often disrupted by NMAA staff turnover as much as by data gaps, contingent on a mix of ongoing embedded and periodic short-term external technical assistance. There is some evidence that GMAP2 has engaged on this institutional constraint, although staff turnover still

[213] KII with NMAA and Mine Action – Lebanon report (2018) The Monitor.
[214] KII with implementer; IP periodic reports.
[215] Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020.
[216] NPA (2020) Capacity Assessment Framework report; Lot 2 quarterly reports for Laos.
[217] KIIs with other donors, HMG and NMAA.
[218] KII with implementers and sub-contracted implementers.

		remains high in some contexts, for example in Afghanistan and South Sudan.[219]

One of the areas we looked at when reviewing capacity development effect was the extent to which NMAAs were integrated into wider government processes. What we observed is a tendency for NMAAs to become more accountable to donors than to their own governments. For example, the capacity development approaches have sought to strengthen NMAA capacity to comply with international norms and standards but placed less emphasis on promoting mechanisms that might strengthen horizontal accountability (for instance, between different parts of government) and also accountability downwards to communities.

The extent of integration and utilisation of NMAA strategies and plans, policies and data within such strategies and plans of other government departments or cross-governmental bodies varies. We noted strategic integration, a useful proxy for national legitimacy and accountability, to be higher in post-conflict countries than in conflict-affected countries. For instance, NMAA plans are more tightly coupled to other sector plans, particularly economic development plans, in Angola, Cambodia and Lebanon, whereas in South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia they are more closely aligned to HRPs, reflecting their primary sources of funding in crisis or conflict settings. We did, however, note limited demand for mine action data by other ministries across the country studies, which indicates a lack of interest in mine action and a disconnect in terms of integrating into national planning.[220]

Participation of other government ministries in strategic planning processes is also an indicator of horizontal accountability.[221] In South Sudan, where UNMAS remains the de facto mine action authority,[222] there was little participation in strategic planning processes beyond NMAA and humanitarian mine action agency staff,[223] whereas in Afghanistan, where UNMAS had handed over mine action management responsibility to government in June 2018, more than 11 different government departments sent representatives to attend a 2020 strategic planning workshop. The Chief Executive's office has also developed a stronger interest in mine action since the transition.[224] This illustrates that when national ownership is achieved, it can be particularly effective.

While the integration of mine action into such national strategies and plans, outlined above, reflects a degree of national commitment, ownership is somewhat constrained by capacity and funding deficits, and national mine action programmes remain heavily dependent on international financial and technical assistance. While GMAP2 is interested in finding ways to reduce government reliance on aid to fund national mine action programmes (see Finding 6), governments continue to rely heavily on donors such as the UK to sustain their operations, particularly in the absence of sufficient national budget appropriations.[225] Despite domestic funding deficits, some NMAA partners are well capacitated, often positioned as regional centres of excellence (e.g. Cambodia, Lebanon), while others remain heavily dependent on the UN's de facto leadership (e.g. South Sudan), although GMAP2 has advocated for transitioning such responsibility where feasible (e.g. Afghanistan, South Sudan and Yemen).

Nevertheless, such a lack of national funding can be a binding constraint to better governance.[226] Many NMAAs, including Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen, depend on donors to fund core recurrent costs – particularly salaries or incentives, not just operational plans. For instance, GMAP2 covers office rents and pays the stipends of 16 NMAA staff in Somalia, funds 95 NMAA staff in Afghanistan and covers the salaries of the NMAA monitoring and reporting unit staff in Cambodia.[227] In such contexts, NMAAs are unable to

[219] KIIs with NMAAs in Afghanistan and South Sudan; DMAC maturity report, UNMAS 2020.
[220] KII with DMAC in Afghanistan; KIIs with NMAA and UNMAS in South Sudan; Somalia Development Plan 2020–24.
[221] Schedler, A, Diamond, L J and Plattner, M F (1999) The Self-Restraining State, Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, USA.
[222] According to KIIs with NMAA, implementer, subcontracted implementer and other UN agencies.
[223] South Sudan NMAA (2020) Strategic planning review workshop report.
[224] KIIs with implementer and NMAA.
[225] Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020.
[226] Andrews, M (2014) The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. Cambridge University Press.
[227] GMAP2 Monitoring Reports.

recruit technical specialists on anything other than enhanced donor-funded terms, and key planning, monitoring and reporting functions are carried out by highly-paid donor-funded technical consultants. This has created a parallel system whereby contracted technical staff do the work and lower-paid civil servants take the decisions. Such renewable technical contracts have helped sustain key NMAA functions but, since payment is generally made via implementers, NMAA technical staff tend to remain more accountable to donors than to their own governments.

Poor national decision making has also hindered better mine action governance. For instance in Somalia, as noted above, the Puntland Ministry of Interior is keen for the state police to clear mines and ERW and not outsource to 'unsustainable' NGO consortia, who were initially the NMAA's preferred model of delivery. In Yemen, UNDP and the Yemeni authorities are looking to improve sector governance with the recent establishment of YMACC (see SOC 9).

There was also minimal evidence that NMAA directors are using the performance assessment frameworks to solve collective action problems, identifying and engaging on some of the underlying institutional norms that contribute to poor performance, and the performance tracking tools remain largely owned by implementers.[228] However, in Cambodia the evaluation team did note that CMAC management had used the capacity assessment scores to try to influence and leverage support from other parts of government.[229]

To respond to some of these institutional challenges, a recommendation in the formative report was for GMAP 'to share lessons (with implementers) regarding how to be more problem-driven and adaptive, and to think and work more politically',[230] i.e. to facilitate a demand-led approach to the issues that the NMAAs face. This goes above and beyond performance assessment templates for capacity development – which NPA employs in Somalia, Angola, Cambodia and Vietnam – but looks to address 'some of the institutional problems that impede NMAA effectiveness (e.g. policy dissonance, lack of institutional legislation, lack of state funding and links with other government institutions)'[231] which can impede their development. There has been limited evidence that GMAP has fulfilled this role,[232] and more needs to be done to support NMAA self-sufficiency;[233] the Somalia NMAA is still not formally recognised by the Federal Government of Somalia and so cannot access state funding,[234] while in Angola – although benefiting from UK Embassy backing – GMAP support is needed to ensure that progress is sustained around institutional strengthening, access to state funding and increasing understanding of the NMAA's position within the political environment.[235]

SOC 9: Challenges to better mine action governance in Yemen[236]

UNDP worked for three years with the Yemeni authority in Aden to create YMACC. Established in April 2020, YMACC is the body responsible for coordinating all mine action stakeholders and is mandated to undertake prioritisation, planning, tasking, accreditation, reporting, monitoring, quality management and information management.[237]

Still a fledgling institution, YMACC relies heavily on international support from UNDP, INGOs and a commercial partner, in areas such as the writing of national mine action standards and standard operating procedures (SOPs), information management and IMSMA core systems (with the help of GICHD), issuing tasking orders, developing strategies and plans, and implementing quality management protocols to ensure a high standard of work.[238]

In the context of a previous conflict of interest, where YEMAC held multiple functions at the same time, the creation of YMACC reflects a concerted international effort to improve mine action governance in Yemen by separating policy,

[228] KII with implementer.
[229] KIIs with implementer and NMAA stakeholders.
[230] Itad (2019) GMAP2 formative evaluation report, p.37.
[231] Ibid, p.33.
[232] …and drawn on their expertise in 'delivering adaptive management approaches informed by political economy analysis'. Ibid., p.37.
[233] This undermines ToC outcomes re: Assumption B1/C1: National authorities have the political will and legitimacy to improve their ability to regulate and manage mine action programme(s). See 'Annex 3: Implications of findings for ToC assumptions and outcomes'.
[234] KIIs with NMAA.
[235] Risks associated with the political transition and challenges with forthcoming elections in 2022 were raised in KIIs with HMG, implementers and NMAA stakeholders.
[236] This SOC refers to the Internationally Recognised Government only while the DFA is considering the mirroring of organisation structures.
[237] UNDP proposal to DFID 2020–21.
[238] KIIs with implementer, donor, subcontracted implementers, UNDP report to DFID Q2 2020, UNDP report to DFID Q4 2020.

coordination and delivery.[239] There is some early evidence that YMACC is becoming more strategic, moving away from a 'firefighting model' – for example, through the introduction and use of a prioritisation matrix that humanitarian organisations can use to request clearance tasks.[240] However, it is too early to tell whether progress will continue and the functional distinction will remain in the context of the prevailing war economy.

[239] KIIs with HMG, implementer, other donors, and subcontracted implementers.
[240] KIIs with implementer and subcontracted implementers.

6 Findings: Impact and Sustainability

Finding 17: GMAP has contributed more towards improving reconciliation in post-conflict contexts than peace in conflict-affected contexts, though the evidence base remains weak.

GMAP operates in countries affected by conflicts: some unresolved and ongoing, such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Yemen; others with fragile peace agreements, such as South Sudan; and some still recovering from the trauma of earlier wars, such as Cambodia and Angola.

Mine action is recognised as an integral part of a society's recovery from war.[241] Although inconclusive, our analysis suggests that GMAP2 mine clearance may have contributed to community healing by removing the reminders of war in some post-conflict contexts, such as Angola (see SOC 10).

SOC 10: Contributing to removing the reminders of war and healing in post-conflict Angola

Angola's civil war ended two decades ago and the country has mostly moved on. The majority of its youthful population have no memory of war. However, the mines remain an emotional reminder as well as a threat of the past. Fieldwork carried out by the evaluation team south of the capital in Kwanza Sul province found repeated appreciation for the mine clearance, as it allows families to leave some of the painful past behind. The mines were reminders of what the government (and associated political party) had done to some communities, and similarly what the 'rebels' (and their associated political party) had done to others. For older populations, many will have lost family members. Although there was no evidence of direct community-level tension that could be expected where communities have survivors from both sides of the war, there were clear expressions of relief that these differences could be left in the past as the threat and reminder were finally removed and communities could look forward, including with the increased opportunities that cleared land offered, rather than look backwards to the violence and suffering of the past.

We found little evidence of any causal relationship between mine clearance, durable peace and human security in the conflict-affected countries we studied, even though mine action is clearly embedded in peace agreements in Sudan and Myanmar. This is partly because the programme and the results framework have not been designed to capture mine action contributions to peace and stability.[242] Findings from Afghanistan did suggest that UNMAS tried to ensure equitable distribution of GMAP resources by prioritising the clearance of mines in contested areas, which increased short-term employment opportunities for people, particularly young men from politically marginalised groups, but had little effect in terms of peace and security in these localities (see SOC 11).

SOC 11: Limited stabilisation dividend in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan GMAP created employment for many local people, particularly young men, training a large rural cadre of deminers (and some risk educators). In some districts, such as Jawzjan, young men have also worked on projects initiated as a result of land being released, although this subsequent work was not available in districts outside government control, and there are fewer short-term employment opportunities in more marginalised areas, often contested by different armed groups.[243] In Zabul, a contested province in Southern Afghanistan, over 250 men from different sides of the conflict were employed for up to nine months in a variety of roles – as deminers, drivers and guards – on a mine clearance operation in a district on the province's southern border with Kandahar. Those employed, after protracted negotiations with a committee of local elders, included nominated individuals from different interest groups, including members of armed groups.

Such work enabled these men to provide for their families in the short term. They were happy with their monthly salaries, which were considered high, thought to be provided by foreign donors, and well above local averages. As a

[241] Donovan, W (1998) Aftermath: the Remnants of War. New York, Vintage Books; Harpviken, K B and Roberts, R (2004) Preparing the Ground for Peace, Mine Action in Support of Peace Building, OSLO, PRIO.
[242] Collaborative Learning Week; Itad, Exploring Mine Action's Potential in Stabilisation and Peacebuilding Contexts, 2022.
[243] KIIs with local stakeholders, including government officials, village elders and energy project officials.

result, their families had improved access to credit from local stores; they were able to meet basic needs, including food, flour, rice, fuel, medicine and clothing; and some sent their children to school.[244]

But none of the deminers we spoke with had been able to put aside any money. In the context of a war economy, employment in humanitarian mine clearance operations was better paid than working with the government or anti-government elements (AGEs)[245] but, as opportunities were short-lived, they needed other options. Two of the deminers we spoke with had been re-employed by the NGO to work on other demining contracts in the district, but most of the deminers were said to be still looking for work, despite newly acquired demining skills. Allegedly, some had returned to work with armed groups, while others had moved to cities or migrated.

Local government officials believed the security situation had worsened as more districts in the province were inaccessible to them. As a result, the population of the provincial capital had increased and government presence in rural areas had reduced, while AGEs' tax demands had also increased, as had the risk of access disputes between humanitarian development organisations and local armed groups.[246]

Finding 18: GMAP2 enabled state parties to make progress towards meeting mine ban treaty targets. However, declining aid flows have caused many countries to go off track, and there is a need for more innovative financing solutions if states are to meet treaty deadlines.

Seven of the nine countries in our evaluation sample are state parties to the mine ban treaty. Five of these are unlikely to meet their treaty targets by the 2025 deadline.[247] According to international observers, contributory factors include lack of ownership, absence of or constraints to implementation of concrete action plans, challenges to the application of efficient land release methodologies, and insufficient funding.[248]

NMAAs we spoke to considered the increasing implementation gaps to be largely due to donor funding deficits. They attributed the gaps to competing donor priorities, reduced aid budgets and COVID. The 2025 deadline was also considered over-optimistic. In such contexts, implementers have supported NMAAs to compile and submit extension requests in several countries.[249]

There is limited evidence of state budget appropriations to NMAAs beyond payment of a small number of civil servant salaries. While the majority of governments continue to rely on donors to fund mine action operations, there is evidence of some government funding to enable implementation of flagship projects, for example in Afghanistan and Angola.[250] It is unclear, however, if these funds emanate from multilateral sources, including budget support programmes and soft loans.

For instance, the Angolan government funds HALO to clear land in the Okavango delta, concerned with mitigating inefficiencies and fiduciary risks associated with using national operators. This is being done with a view to generating multiple strategically important outcomes, including rebuilding the agro-industrial development base, generating future revenues from tourism, regional trade and even potential exploitation of an area with potentially large hydrocarbon deposits.[251]

FCDO has played a lead role in the search for more sustainable financing solutions to funding NMAAs and their programmes – innovations that aim to enhance national capability to meet treaty targets and manage residual risks. There is evidence of a growing interest, principally among sector donors, to develop alternative financing models, often with a view to strengthening national ownership by making mine action more demand-driven. Ideas under discussion include improving NMAA access to national reconstruction

[244] KIIs with local deminers and verified in KIIs with implementers.
[245] A UN acronym for Taliban.
[246] KIIs with local government officials in Zabul.
[247] Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020.
[248] Ibid.
[249] South Sudan for instance.
[250] UNMAS (2020) Afghanistan Annual Report.
[251] Oak Foundation 2021.

funds through agricultural development loans to small farmers and by issuing social impact bonds and organising crowdfunding initiatives.[252] However, as more and more high-value land is cleared, the social and economic returns that may attract investment will become less and less, making raising funds increasingly difficult.

Finding 19: GMAP has contributed to UK regional economic and security objectives, particularly in Indo-Pacific countries where there is a limited aid programming presence.

GMAP2 has produced secondary benefits, contributing to UK soft power. Albeit hard to quantify, GMAP2 has added value to the work of diplomats in some Posts, more usually in post-conflict settings. It has also enabled the UK to become a more prominent and influential leader within the mine action sector itself (see **Error! Reference source not found.**).

In such contexts, GMAP2 has contributed to UK regional economic and security objectives, particularly in regions where the UK has a more limited humanitarian and development programming presence.[253] For instance in the Indo-Pacific region, GMAP2 is the largest UK aid programme in Laos. Here the programme has contributed to better diplomatic access in a heavily contaminated Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) country with increasing geostrategic importance to the UK (see SOC 12).

SOC 12: Contributing to access and influence in Laos

British diplomats in Laos are very supportive of GMAP2. Not only is mine action a good domestic media story, but also GMAP2 is the UK's largest bilateral development programme in the country. This contributes to furthering UK strategic interests, particularly given Laos's proximity and relations with neighbouring China, as well as its membership of ASEAN.

Mine action remains a high priority for the Laos government, as demonstrated by the facts that it has its own ministry-status programme and the government created an extra SDG that relates to it (SDG 18: Lives Safe from UXO [unexploded ordnance]).[254] The country was heavily bombed during America's war with Vietnam. The government welcomes continued UK support in clearing the ERW and such programmes are also an important provider of local employment and tax revenue.[255]

The programme supports diplomatic access to important government ministries, including the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Trade and Commerce and the Office of the Prime Minister, providing positive talking points. These close ties have at times also helped to facilitate GMAP2 delivery, including for instance the negotiation of memoranda of understanding (MOUs), securing visas and importing necessary equipment.

GMAP2 also provides diplomats with a reason to travel outside the capital, to meet the Lao people, including government officials and villagers from provinces where mine action is being undertaken. Such field visits can enable diplomats to form a deeper understanding of the realities in the country.

The presence of large British-owned demining organisations also serves to model good labour practice in a region where workers are known to be frequently exploited, with limited labour rights.[256]

[252] KIIs with HMG and other donors.
[253] Laos and Cambodia.
[254] KII with HMG; ICBL (2018) LAO PDR - Mine Action. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor report, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/lao-pdr/mine-action.aspx; https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19385Lao_Final_VNR_19_June_2018_web.pdf
[255] KII with HMG.
[256] Ford, M and Gillan, M (2016) Employment Relations and the State in Southeast Asia. Journal of Industrial Relations 58:2 (167–82).

7 Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

The following conclusions, lessons and recommendations are drawn from the three main sections of the report. The recommendations are largely made to FCDO with a view to supporting the design and contracting of future mine action programmes, ensuring that UK public investments in global mine action are effective and impactful in different national contexts.

7.1 Conclusions

Conclusion 1: GMAP adopts the 'global good' narrative of mine action alongside more complex-aware narratives captured in the GMAP ToC. However, there is insufficient granularity of programme design and adaptation of the ToC at country level to avoid these narratives coming into tension with each other, undermining GMAP's effectiveness and coherence with other stakeholders.

Historically, within mine action there has been a dominant narrative that mine action is a 'global good': that the strategic aim to declare land 'mine free' – a key objective of mine action treaties – is considered to be a valid end in itself. This has had a tendency to lean mine action towards an output focus where square metres cleared is the priority. In more recent years, a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of mine action outcomes is emerging as a complementary narrative, with an increasing appreciation of theory-based approaches to mine action programme design – led in no small part by GMAP itself.

GMAP uses both narratives: the global good narrative, as an easy message to convey to audiences who do not have the time to engage in the complexity; and the complexity narrative, for those who really need to understand how to maximise the programme's added value.

In principle, these narratives do not need to be in tension with each other – mine action can be an end in itself while contributing in varying degrees to secondary outcomes. However, by elevating the 'global good' argument in GMAP's business case, targets have been set that focus primarily on the delivery of clearing large areas of land, and this inevitably leads to a more output-driven focus. At the same time, GMAP has invested considerable effort to successfully move the sector – and GMAP itself – to be much more outcome-focused, both directly through its own implementers and also as a credible and proactive sector leader.

As such, the outward-facing side of GMAP presents a more progressive and complex-aware stance than the GMAP that faces Whitehall. This can be an asset for GMAP, creating a strategic ambiguity centrally that enables a context-specific strategic focus at country level. However, in the case of GMAP currently, the context-specific focus is not well articulated, which creates a tension from an evaluative perspective: we understand that GMAP values more than simply clearing large amounts of land, but it is not always clear what exactly that extra value is for each country, beyond the very broad outline of the global ToC. It also means that less attention is paid to how GMAP country-level activities can align with FCDO and national priorities. This lack of clarity ultimately undermines the coherence and effectiveness of GMAP and its overall added strategic value.

Conclusion 2: The combination of EORE and clearance as core mine action activities under GMAP has clearly made important contributions to the lives of the most vulnerable, promoting physical and food security, freedom of movement, livelihoods, trade and economic development. However, the concept of mine action as a 'global good' can disincentivise efforts to source complementary support that can enhance the quality of GMAP outcomes.

GMAP has played an important role building community relations, improving knowledge and shifting behaviour of at-risk groups, contributing to tangible improvements in local livelihoods, in both agriculturalist and pastoralist settings. Often there were improvements in local freedom of movement – which also improved access to markets, particularly for those living in remote border areas – and in humanitarian

emergency settings mine action ensured access to aid. Furthermore, GMAP contributed to economic development, particularly in terms of food and energy security in conflict-affected countries.

However, there is the persistent challenge within the sector whereby the quality and likelihood of outcomes related to clearance are dependent on additional assistance from humanitarian or development actors. This requires greater donor coordination and coherence of funding mechanisms; it requires ongoing engagement with a range of government ministries by the NMAAs, implementers and donors; and it requires all mine action stakeholders to see mine action as a service for others – i.e. mine action in itself is *not* simply a global good but is typically a prerequisite for further humanitarian and development activity. The tendency to fall back on the 'global good' narrative means that these options are not pursued as closely as they should be, and while progress to link outcome-level change to key performance indicators is improving, the primary targets remain output-focused.

This not only undermines the effectiveness of results but also misses opportunities for the mine action sector to seek alternative funding in an increasingly competitive market. As increasing importance is placed by donors on the triple nexus there may be partnership opportunities that mine action can explore, for example around nature-based solutions and regenerative agricultural techniques, durable solutions for increasing levels of IDPs and refugees, and community resilience and climate adaptation. The more mine action sees itself as a service that can enable others, the more it can articulate – and realise – its added strategic value.

Conclusion 3: Participatory approaches at community level to inform programme design and delivery are well established across the sector, especially where led by NGOs. However, weak incentives for implementers to transfer responsibilities to local stakeholders undermine long-term ambitions of fully transitioning the sector to national ownership.

There have been notable engagements in the participation of marginalised groups in the delivery of mine action, particularly women and ethnic minorities, with a strong commitment to CL throughout the delivery of mine action activities.

Achievements were also made in developing the capacity of local partners and NMAAs, despite a relatively small capacity development component of the programme. This sustained and strengthened the functionality of NMAAs, particularly in terms of strategy review processes and policy development, improving information management systems and skills, and making progress against treaty targets. Implementers also played an important role in strengthening the technical skills of national and local organisations to deliver mine action, particularly in contested hard-to-access areas. There have also been notable gains in transitioning responsibility for mine action to NMAAs, particularly around prioritisation and QA.

However, the programme has lacked a genuine commitment to national ownership, which is evident at the design stage of GMAP2, in particular for capacity development and support of local implementers. As such, only one of ten countries under Lots 1 and 2 had this as a formal component. Without more considered incentives for international implementers to exit, any ambition to transition to national ownership will be slow and incomplete.

Conclusion 4: The relative scale and global reach of GMAP, and the combination of funding mine action activities, advocacy, research and MEL, have created important strategic value for the mine action sector and positioned the UK as an influential thought leader, committed to promoting rules-based international systems. However, it remains to be seen how cuts to the UK aid budget will affect this.

As one of the largest funders within mine action, the value of GMAP funding for the sector has been significant. This has maintained a presence for the UK in countries where UK investments are low, such as Laos, or where UK engagement can be seen with deep suspicion, such as Myanmar. The funding provided through GMAP has maintained a UK presence in these countries that is geopolitically advantageous, and the range of countries selected by GMAP offers a significant global reach.

Also of notable significance is the design of GMAP as a complementary mix of direct funding for mine action combined with advocacy, research and investments in MEL, which is both unique for the sector and strategically successful. This has increased GMAP's VfM by promoting strategic coherence and collaboration across stakeholders, encouraging the sector to value evidence-informed decision making, and advocating for commitments to rules-based international systems. This has positioned GMAP as a respected and influential thought leader and important global stakeholder within the sector. It is unclear at this stage what the consequences will be of cuts to UK aid for GMAP and whether this will affect the UK's influence within the sector.

Conclusion 5: GMAP M&E systems under Lots 1 and 2 contracts continuously improve with the collection of valuable outcome-level data. This has not yet been met by similar improvements in analysis and learning, meaning the country programmes are uncertain of their real value, can be unaware of negative consequences of their work, and lack the knowledge to really test the GMAP ToC to inform adaptive management.

The INGOs have made constructive progress to improve how they measure immediate and intermediate outcomes, reporting regularly on outcome-level quantitative indicators in their results frameworks and providing anecdotal qualitative reporting every six months. This encourages them to engage with outcome-level change and better understand their effectiveness. However, there is less evidence that they engage in analysis and reflection that then informs programme design and adaptation, and the absence of country-specific ToCs hinders their abilities to articulate the change that they hope to see in the short and long term, compromising a more holistic review of what data and evidence is of most importance.

The implications of this are that the implementers lack the analytical capability to maximise effectiveness, that the benefits of mine action can be under-reported, and also that unintended negative consequences go unnoticed. This can affect issues around equity and conflict sensitivity and, going forward, is increasingly important when considering the UK's role in tackling pressing global issues such as climate change and ecological crises.

Conclusion 6: The choice of GMAP2 to expand its funding modalities to accommodate UN IPs has proved beneficial in some countries, but the decision to compartmentalise UN and INGO delivery modalities has missed an opportunity to promote the kind of coherence and collaboration gained within the Lot 1 and 2 consortia. It has also compromised GMAP's understanding of country contexts and achievements where it is solely reliant on inadequate UN reporting systems.

FCDO broadened its mix of implementers to account for the different operating environments, broadly working through UN agencies in conflict-affected settings and INGO consortia in post-conflict environments. The choice to partner with UNMAS in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan and with UNDP in Yemen was appropriate at the time GMAP2 was designed, ensuring strategic delivery of a far bigger CMP in a number of highly contaminated and complex protracted humanitarian emergencies. There were also clear benefits of utilising the UN delivery model to tap into complementary UN humanitarian and development resources.

However, there were and are opportunities for UN and INGO modalities to be funded within the same contexts; but, as this was not attempted within GMAP2, the kinds of collaboration and coordination gains of bringing different partners together in Lots 1 and 2 contracting (under GMAP1 and GMAP2) have not been tested. Although there are funding relationships between UN and INGOs, it remains to be seen whether deeper INGO–UN collaboration can be encouraged though existing GMAP funding mechanisms. Certainly it can be argued that GMAP's understanding of its added value has been weakened in some countries, primarily due to the inadequate reporting of the UN partners. This means that in countries led by the UN – conflict-affected countries where risks are highest – many of the assumptions and outcomes underpinning the GMAP ToC cannot be understood, and hence GMAP is unable to confidently claim that these programmes are well managed and maximising VfM. This has implications for understanding GMAP effectiveness, future evidence-informed investment decisions, and GMAP's ability to make its VfM business case at a time when it is subject to substantial ongoing FCDO spending cuts.

Conclusion 7: Conflict sensitivity is largely understood within the sector as 'do no harm' and typically in the interests of securing operational access to insecure areas. However, causal

pathways in the ToC that rely on mine action being conflict transformative are not currently supported by evidence[257] and seem unlikely, given that country-level programme teams do not deliberately build conflict transformation into their design nor coordinate with peacebuilding stakeholders.

Despite an increased awareness of what conflict sensitivity means within mine action and improvements in data collection by Lots 1 and 2 contractors, it is unclear to what extent mine action has benefited marginalised groups and to what extent the benefits of mine action are felt equitably across societies. This has implications for understanding whether mine action is conflict sensitive – a concept still typically understood within the mine action sector as negotiating access to insecure areas rather than transforming conflict dynamics.[258] If mine action has the aspiration to be conflict transformative then this needs to be designed into programmes, as it seems unlikely that they will be so by accident.[259] GMAP, therefore, cannot claim to be conflict transformative, and even struggles to demonstrate that it does no harm, as the data collected by implementers simply does not provide this level of insight.

7.2 Lessons

Lesson 1: While it is important to ensure centrally managed mine action programmes are underpinned by a global ToC, highlighting how mine action is intended to contribute to different humanitarian, stabilisation and development outcomes, such global strategic frameworks also need to be supplemented by more granular country-level intervention logics, particularly in countries where GMAP investment levels are particularly high. Unless the country-level outcomes of mine action are well specified and tailored to the particular operational context, there is always a risk that mine action will become an end in itself and limit strategic added value and effectiveness.

Lesson 2: While INGO delivery incurs lower central overhead costs, UN agencies are better suited to deliver mine action in some country contexts, particularly given their convening power and coordination capacities in humanitarian response. However, there is a trade-off whereby donor influence on UN delivery models and reporting systems is limited, meaning the added benefits of the UN engagement may not be well documented and articulated.

Lesson 3: While it is relatively easy to promote the participation of women in mine action programming**,** it is far harder to ensure that mine action is focused on tackling some of the drivers of structural inequalities, even leading to actions that can be transformative in terms of relations between groups, particularly in conflict-affected settings. Directing contract incentives in such a way that encourages implementers to focus their MEL resources to be more problem-driven and outcome-focused can help tackle some of these cross-cutting challenges.

Lesson 4: Current mine action data collection and reporting systems are insufficient to provide insights of conflict sensitivity. More needs to be done to develop conflict sensitive outcome-level indicators that look not just at gender but equity across conflict stakeholders.

Lesson 5: Mine action remains a largely international enterprise. The focus on sustaining and strengthening technical capacities was particularly important to donors and the international mine action community, but such interventions can be less sighted on tackling the institutional structures and norms that inhibit NMAA capacity and sustainability. Without this, implementers have focused more on promoting mechanisms that strengthen NMAA accountability to donor governments, rather than horizontally to other ministries or downwards to communities.

Lesson 6: Advocacy efforts will be stronger if part of a clearly defined advocacy strategy.

[257] However, we recognise that in the coming quarters Lots 1 and 2 are intending to report more evidence in this area.
[258] Itad Draft Conflict Sensitivity Guide 2022.
[259] Itad, Exploring Mine Action's Potential in Stabilisation and Peacebuilding Contexts, January 2022.

7.3 Recommendations

Below we set out recommendations for the main stakeholders of GMAP, organised under four key recommendation themes.

Key Recommendation Theme 1: Create an enabling environment for national ownership

FCDO	***Recommendation:*** Under the next GMAP, provide the resources and capabilities for implementers to undertake political economy analysis to inform country-level national transition strategies and link this to GMAP's advocacy strategy to coordinate other donors.
	Recommendation: Under the next GMAP, link programme outcomes and key performance indicators clearly to national transition indicators and implementer exit strategies, and allocate budget lines for implementer exiting.
LNGO, INGO and UN implementers	***Recommendation:*** Under the next GMAP, develop exit plans for all programmes, no matter the time frame, which are tied to locally-led national transition strategies, where those strategies exist.
	Recommendation: Immediately ensure that capacity building interventions are calibrated to improve ties between NMAAs and sector ministries and agencies, increasing horizontal accountability to national social and economic development objectives.
	Recommendation: Immediately commit to genuine partnerships with local implementers based on principles of equity, knowledge exchange and local leadership.
NMAAs	***Recommendation:*** Immediately work with donors and implementers to understand the structural and institutional challenges to integrating mine action into national strategies and plans.
	Recommendation: Immediately engage with complementary ministries to advocate for mine action to be allocated specific budgetary resources.

Key Recommendation Theme 2: Maximise the strategic effect of mine action

FCDO	***Recommendation:*** Continue to build on the success of developing a global mine action ToC by encouraging buy-in of other donors and NMAAs and continuing to invest in research, MEL and advocacy to improve the outcome-level focus across the sector.
	Recommendation: Under the next GMAP, engage country-based humanitarian, security and development teams in planning and allocative decisions of GMAP3 to develop context-specific outcomes that are aligned to country-level FCDO priorities.
	Recommendation: Under the next GMAP, adopt a blended approach to contracting which combines the added values of UN and INGO delivery modalities within the same country contexts where appropriate.

LNGO, INGO and UN implementers	***Recommendation:*** Under the next GMAP, develop country-level ToCs that identify complementarities and dependencies with other stakeholders and purposively build in targeted collaboration and coordination into programme design.
	Recommendation: Immediately adopt adaptive management processes informed by evidence and analysis to continuously improve the effectiveness of delivery models.
	Recommendation: Immediately use proximity to UN systems to leverage complementary humanitarian and development funding.
NMAAs	***Recommendation:*** Immediately advocate within government to integrate mine action into relevant sectoral strategies and national plans.
	Recommendation: Immediately utilise the ToC tools developed under GMAP2 to coordinate available resources and encourage shared responsibility for outcome-level change across the sector.

Key Recommendation Theme 3: Make improvements to MEL systems

FCDO	***Recommendation:*** In future contracts with UN agencies, include conditions that require the UN-led programmes to be monitored to a similar degree as those in Lots 1 & 2 and continue to provide leadership as an 'evidence advocate'.
	Recommendation: As part of a future programme design process, develop context-specific value propositions linked to country-level ToCs to provide clarity on expected added value from programming.
LNGO, INGO and UN implementers	***Recommendation:*** During the next programme design phase, use country-level ToCs to inform data collection priorities that will optimise analytical capability at an outcome level, linked to simple VfM frameworks, thinking beyond single-year time frames and expanding focus beyond individual clearance sites.
	Recommendation: Immediately prioritise the 'L' in MEL, making sure data collected is subject to regular analysis and learning processes which are embedded into the programme cycle, enabling evidence-informed adaptive management.
UN agencies specifically	***Recommendation:*** Immediately recognise that existing MEL systems are not fit for purpose, and overhaul data collection and reporting systems to focus on meaningful indicators that capture outcome-level change.
NMAAs	***Recommendation:*** Immediately develop simple MEL systems that collate and analyse evidence of outcome-level change from across the sector and encourage accountability of the sector as a whole to achieving those outcomes.

Key Recommendation Theme 4: Support the mine action sector for continued engagement within fragile contexts

FCDO	***Recommendation:*** Under the next GMAP, provide implementers with guidance and minimum expectations on how to conduct context analysis and ensure conflict sensitivity, supported by budget allocations to implementers.

LNGO, INGO and UN implementers	***Recommendation:*** Immediately conduct or review conflict analyses within fragile states and reflect on the risks and opportunities for programmes to be conflict sensitive.
	Recommendation: Under the next GMAP, ensure conflict sensitive indicators are integrated into MEL systems and analyse outcome data to inform extent of equitable distribution of benefits.
NMAAs	***Recommendation:*** Immediately work with mine action stakeholders to increase their contextual awareness of the role of the risks and opportunities of mine action within fragile and conflict contexts.

Annex 1: GMAP2 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Terms of Reference

Purpose of document

1. The UK government's Department for International Development (DFID) invites tenders from organisations within our Global Evaluation Framework Agreement (GEFA) to monitor and evaluate the Global Mine Action Programme 2 (GMAP2) which will operate from April 2018 until March 2020. These terms of reference (ToR) describe our requirements.

Introduction

2. In 2015, 1,600 people were killed and 5,000 injured by landmines or other explosive devices left behind following conflict. With international assistance, a total of 29 states are no longer suspected to be contaminated with mines since the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was adopted in 1997. GMAP2 continues the work of its predecessor programme, GMAP, operating from January 2014 until March 2018, to reduce the humanitarian and development impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The expected results include making safe 150 km^2 land; enabling 800,000 people to live their lives free from the threat of mines; and helping 100,000 adults and children to understand the dangers of landmines. The programme has three aims:

    0. Clearance and direct release of contaminated or suspected contaminated land (demining);
    1. Mine risk education (MRE);
    2. Building the capacity of partner countries to manage national mine action programmes.

3. These activities save lives, reduce fear and create an enabling environment for development, as land is brought back into productive use and is made safe for the return of those displaced and for resumption of service delivery. GMAP2 will build the capacity of regional and national demining authorities based on their priorities, including improving information and risk management systems, and increase the effectiveness of local management.

4. The current GMAP programme operates in Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, South Sudan, Somalia, Burma and Zimbabwe. The focus countries of GMAP2 are Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Somalia, Burma, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Sudan. There may be a future need for additional Mine Action Activities in Sri Lanka. Components of GMAP2 are subject to procurement and may be delivered though more than one supplier. The countries covered by the Service Provider will be confirmed during the inception phase.

5. GMAP2 is programmed through DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) under project number 300544. The theory of change (ToC) is included in these ToRs at Annex A. Please see the business case for further information including a discussion of the ToC.

Budget and contract

6. We anticipate a budget of up to £1 million for both monitoring and evaluation components. The contract will run from 01 July 2018 to 31 March 2020.

7. Dissemination activities and the secretariat function for the steering committee shall be included within proposal budgets.

8. Monitoring and evaluation will have a two-month mobilisation phase. Progress to the implementation phase will be dependent on satisfactory performance and delivery of the evaluation framework.

9. Key performance indicators will be agreed with DFID before formal contracting. DFID and the chosen Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will agree a clear payment schedule linked to performance milestones. Payment will be quarterly in arrears.

10. Tenderers are responsible for establishing the status of this requirement for the purpose of any government tax in the UK or Overseas. Any applicable taxes must be shown in Pro Forma 3 (invitation to tender (ITT) Volume 4). Tenderers must either supply a statement confirming they have investigated the tax position and advising no tax is applicable, or provide a figure at Pro Forma 3 of the tax due under any contract.

11. Subject to the satisfactory performance of the Service Provider, continuing need and availability of funding, the contract may be extended for a period of up to 12 months to cover continuing work in one or more countries which may have been added during the original contract period.

Roles

12. DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian & Security Department (CHASE) will both manage this programme and oversee the overall delivery of UK results targets on demining. Changes to the programme design will not be considered final until approved by DFID.

13. GMAP2 Service Providers contracted by DFID to carry out programme activities will provide data inputs to the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider as well as DFID on a quarterly basis at a minimum.

14. Reporting to the GMAP2 programme manager(s), the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will work closely with DFID's project team and country office advisers to achieve the following objectives:

    3. Assess progress of GMAP2 against agreed outputs and outcomes;
    4. Verify GMAP2 suppliers' reporting;
    5. Report on lessons learnt, gender equality, conflict sensitivity, value for money, financial management, risk, stewardship of assets, monitoring and evidence;
    6. Help provide accountability to UK taxpayers.

Requirements

15. Proposals should detail how the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will work closely with DFID's programme team and country office advisers to achieve the following objectives:

    7. Review causal pathways and assumptions of ToC;
    8. Assess whether GMAP2 has provided an efficient and effective approach in support of the UK's 2013 Mine Action Strategy https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260365/mine-action-policy.pdf
    9. Consider the extent to which programme activities reflect country government priorities;
    10. Make recommendations for adaptive management;
    11. Undertake case studies and analysis to provide contextual information to aid decision making;
    12. Disseminate lessons and good practices to build the global evidence base and inform future mine action programmes;

13. Present an inception report in no later than two months after the start of the contract; an interim report six months after programme start; and a summative report in April 2020.

16. Proposal should detail how the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will utilise a range of sources to inform evaluation design and delivery. This may include (but not be limited to):

14. Field visits to project and beneficiary locations
15. Independent or third-party monitoring;
16. Randomised control trials;
17. Local and regional government reporting;
18. Triangulation with other data sources;
19. Community feedback events;
20. Verification by NGOs and CSOs;
21. Other donors' monitoring and reports;
22. Remote sensing – satellites, drones, GPS.

Monitoring requirements

17. The monitoring and evaluation team provides analysis and advice to DFID on the following monitoring components of GMAP2:

23. Results: Whether the programme is on track against intended milestones and targets, and any unintended consequences (positive or negative);
24. Activities: Track the use of funding inputs and resources into how activities are delivered and whether they occur according to a predefined work plan;
25. Compliance: Ensures delivery is in accordance with local, national government laws, within donor requirements and to ethical standards;
26. Situation/context: Examines the operating environment, monitoring risks and assumptions, as well as political and institutional factors that may influence project progress;
27. Beneficiary: Investigates the experience and perceptions of project beneficiaries, including participation, access and treatment by the project, paying particular attention to vulnerable or marginalised groups in the population;
28. Financial: Tracks the use of input funds for activities and outputs, with attention paid to accurate forecasting of costs and budget monitoring, clear and audited accounting procedures, and adequate safeguards to prevent fraud and corruption;
    - Organisational: Covers the internal capacity of institutions involved with the project and partners to utilise and manage the project funds, undertake activities and delivery expected results.

18. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider must use a logframe to track country and overall progress on a quarterly basis and provide advice on ways to strengthen the programme. This advice will be informed by reports from GMAP2 partners, a single visit to each partner in the consortium within the first 6 months of the programme and ongoing dialogue with the GMAP2 suppliers and DFID. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will attend quarterly meetings with the DFID project team to provide advice on issues including, but not limited to:

29. Progress against outputs and outcomes;
30. Any impediments to achieving milestones;
31. Proposed changes to the original project workplan during implementation including on project proposals, amendments and contract addendums;

32. Recommendations to reallocate funds to maximise impact;
33. Implementation of lessons learnt;
34. Value for money;
35. Monitoring;
36. Evidence.

19. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider should propose how it will triangulate GMAP2 suppliers' reporting with information from other credible sources to provide advice to DFID on external context, operational, delivery, safeguarding, reputation and fiduciary risks. This includes an ongoing review of financial management, risk, stewardship of assets, and operational procedures.

20. In addition, the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider must:

37. Have the capacity and expertise to visit and advise on mine action projects in Somalia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Laos, Vietnam, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Lebanon (will only be required to visit a maximum of 10 of these countries);
38. Ensure data are disaggregated by age, gender and disability;
39. Work in a conflict-sensitive way and assess whether implementing organisations are doing the same;
40. Produce visit reports with recommendations which detail how the GMAP2 Supplier is ensuring duty of care, compliance, due diligence, and appropriate financial and asset management.

Evaluation requirements

21. Monitoring and Evaluation Providers must detail in proposals how they will ensure the evaluation speaks to countries new to GMAP programming but also examines evidence of historic benefits in communities where mine action has been taking place over a longer period.

22. The evaluation will be undertaken in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Evaluation Quality Standards. The proposal should detail how evaluation design will addressing the following factors:

41. Selection and balance of interventions;
42. Value for money – economy, efficiency, effectiveness, equity;
43. Coherence – How the interventions interact with other processes of change and the demining efforts of other donors and the national authorities and whether interventions support development of country governments' mine action capacity and ownership;
44. Conflict – The Service Provider shall provide, as part of its proposal, a conflict sensitivity strategy which includes an assessment of work in the proposed area and steps to avoid aggravating the causes and consequences of conflict wherever possible;
45. Gender – The Service Provider shall provide, as part of its proposal, a gender strategy that will detail how the Service Provider shall design, develop and implement the project in a way that takes into account the different needs, priorities, knowledge and capabilities of women, girls, men and boys, ensuring that they participate in, and benefit equally from, the proposed project;
46. Disability – The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider shall outline in its proposal how it will evaluate whether and how programming activities are made accessible and relevant to people with disability and to what extent mine action planning incorporates views of disability and victim assistance organisations and encourages inclusive employment practices;
47. Inclusion – Impact (if any) of demining on social equity, gender relations, and social exclusion, specifically the extent to which different local stakeholders (local leaders, both men and women

farmers, other community members) were involved in the whole site selection and clearance process;

48. Movement, migration and displacement.

23. Proposals should indicate preferred methodologies, and succinctly relate these to our monitoring and evaluation requirements and the ToC. In addition, the evaluation of GMAP2 should cover the following potential humanitarian and development benefits of mine clearance, risk education and capacity development:

49. Stability: increased opportunity for peaceful long-term development processes;
50. Economic development: enhanced employment opportunities in affected communities;
51. Infrastructure: routes available for local transport and trade;
52. Services: target communities have increased access to basic services;
53. Displacement: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) are able to return to areas made safe for habitation and work;

- National ownership: increasingly capable national mine action authorities able to coordinate and deliver clearance and MRE.

24. Reports should provide sources of evidence, including qualitative and/or quantitative data from affected communities. Gender equality and inclusion of people with disabilities and other marginalised groups should be addressed with disaggregation by sex, age, disability and other relevant factors.

Research study

Monitoring requirement	Timing
Inception	
Design global and country logframes with GMAP2 suppliers. Produce associated logframe report clarifying the definition of output and outcome statements, and the methodology for measuring indicators; and QA milestones and targets for DFID country office sign-off	July – August 2018 Logframe report – August 2018
Prepare templates for quarterly progress reports, advice to DFID programme manager, and visit reports	August 2018
Implementation	
Update global and country logframes, advising DFID of progress. Correspond with partner organisations to understand progress and follow up with any questions if needed, include DFID in correspondence unless requested otherwise; triangulate this information with external sources and advise DFID why progress is under or over expectations on a country by country basis; devise a concise, standard format to deliver the final advice to DFID programme manager(s)	Quarterly within 10 working days after completion of each quarter to allow DFID to make timely payment to Suppliers
Advise on remedial action for underperforming projects. Make recommendations for re-programming funds to achieve maximum impact; devise a concise, standard format for a template for advising DFID programme manager	When risks increase
Advise DFID on the suppliers proposed changes to the programme, including changes to workplan, budget lines, staffing and risk mitigation techniques	On request
Undertake monitoring visits up to 10 GMAP2 countries to check assets; review duty of care; undertake due diligence spot checks and undertake compliance checks	Mainly October 2018 – January 2019 At least 8 visits between October 2018 – January 2019, likely to be single visits to Syria, Lebanon, Somalia,

	South Sudan, Yemen, Sudan but could be any of the GMAP2 countries At least 2 visits between December 2018 – March 2019, likely to be single visits to Burma or Afghanistan Undertake spot check visits to either Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Angola in late 2019 if requested
Prepare draft exit plan covering asset disposal; delivery of finished work, and materials related to work-in-progress; return or destruction of confidential information	December 2019

25. In addition to examining the immediate impact of this programme, the evaluation will also be designed to consider the long-term benefits to communities of land clearance and risk education, by looking at evidence of historic benefits in communities where mine action has been taking place over a longer period (including but not exclusively that funded by the UK).

26. The study will include a systematic review of all the available evaluation and research studies on the longer-term impacts of demining, including as much as possible any locally commissioned research as well as the research commissioned by demining contractors themselves. Country selection for this study would be confirmed in the inception phase.

27. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider's proposal should detail how the learning gained from this evaluation will be shared with DFID, and how DFID can disseminate learning to country stakeholders and the international community.

Timeline

28. The table below illustrates specific deliverables.

Evaluation requirement	Timing
Inception	
Design global and country logframes with GMAP2 suppliers. Produce associated logframe report clarifying the definition of output and outcome statements, and the methodology for measuring indicators; and QA milestones and targets for DFID country office sign-off.	July–August 2018 Inception report – September 2018
Produce an evaluation framework and questions to be agreed with DFID during the inception phase	To be agreed with DFID no later than 2 months after the contract commences
Implementation	
Produce evaluation reports presenting summative findings answering the evaluation questions posed, and containing an executive summary and recommendations. All findings will be disaggregated where possible to allow analysis of findings for different groups.	**Interim report 6 months after the programme has started** **Research study – April 2020** **Draft summative report – beginning of January 2020** **Summative report April 2020** **Final report – 28 February 2020**

Inception phase

29. The M&E partner, in consultation with GMAP2 partners and the DFID project team will use the inception phase to develop the evaluation framework and agree evaluation questions. In addition to describing detailed design and methodology, the inception report will focus on the feasibility of data collection, establish a clear rationale for the countries to be selected for case studies, and collect

baseline data for these countries (including an overview of local context as it relates to various evaluation components such as gender, conflict and disability and inclusion).

30. Part of this process could include a workshop to bring stakeholders together, including beneficiary representatives. The framework, outcomes, indicators and questions must be agreed with DFID at the end of the inception phase, before implementation can begin. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will work out a sampling strategy during the inception phase that can cover a variety of contexts such as:

    54. Both rural, semi-urban, and urban areas (including areas where cleared land is being used for non-agricultural purposes like factories or tourist facilities);
    55. Both areas where demining efforts have focused on clearing agricultural land and areas where a greater focus has been on clearing key roads and other infrastructure;
    56. Varying levels of security and political stability.

Logframe development

31. We will expect the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider to develop specific indicators for different contexts. These indicators will be developed in cooperation with advisory leads in-country; with the chosen operator; and in accordance with other donors to ensure the international community is using standard indicators to measure progress. Indicators will build on those used in GMAP which are listed below:

    57. Number of beneficiaries of land release activities;
    58. Area of land released and in use, or with firm plans for use;
    59. Percentage of direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved livelihood opportunities;
    60. Percentage of direct beneficiaries surveyed reporting improved access to basic services and/or infrastructure following land release;
    61. Percentage of direct beneficiaries surveyed reported feeling safer after land release or MRE activities;
    62. Percentage of direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating increased understanding of MRE messages;
    63. Mine action programmes are managed, coordinated and regulated more effectively by mine action authorities.
32. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will work with the organisations selected to implement GMAP2 to develop a single workable global logframe, and corresponding country-level logframes, and to update them on a quarterly basis. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will also quality assure the milestones and targets to ensure they are challenging yet realistic and recommend a systematic process for updating milestones and associated rationale.

33. An associated logframe report should also clearly highlight (i) operational risks to delivery; (ii) the methodology for how all the indicators will be measured; and (iii) define the terminology in the output and outcome statements. The development of the logframe could, for instance, include a workshop to bring stakeholders together, including beneficiary representatives. The logframe must be agreed with DFID at the end of the inception phase, before implementation can begin.

34. Logframe development will take into account the needs and capabilities of people with disability and other vulnerable groups.

Exit strategy

35. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider shall cooperate to ensure the smooth transfer of responsibilities to any persons or organisation taking over such responsibilities after the contract ends. Three months before contract end, the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will prepare for DFID's approval a draft exit plan which shall cover:

    64. Asset management and disposal of all assets procured throughout the lifetime of the programme (this must be in accordance with DFID procedures on asset management and disposal);
    65. Delivery of finished work, and materials related to work-in-progress; and
    66. Return (or destruction of) all confidential information to DFID before the contract end date.

36. The exit plan should allow up to 60 days after the contract end for the exit process to be completed.

Team profile

37. The monitoring and evaluation teams should include:

Monitoring team	Evaluation team
An experienced team leader familiar with monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected context	An evaluation lead with experience in managing complex evaluations on humanitarian and stabilisation programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states
Team members with monitoring expertise in humanitarian or development programmes	Strong evaluation expertise in development programmes; including in theory-based evaluation
A diverse team with respect to equality characteristics, and a mix of local and international experts with first-hand experience delivering mine action programmes in each country GMAP2 operates. This should include, clearance, MRE or capacity-development work	
Ability to engage with local, national and international stakeholders, including possessing the relevant language skills and relevant visa-entry requirements for country visits	
Strong analytical skills to present implications of findings for policy and programmes	
Excellent report writing	
Fluent written and spoken English	

Governance arrangements and reporting

38. A steering committee will be established to oversee the evaluation, consisting of the DFID senior responsible owner, a relevant DFID senior manager, a DFID evaluation adviser, and an independent evaluation expert. To avoid a conflict of interest, the steering committee members will not concurrently be employed by any GMAP2 partner. The steering committee will meet twice per year.

39. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will provide analysis, advice and recommendations to DFID regarding programme performance and achievement of objectives. Changes to programme will not be considered final until approved by DFID.

40. The Service Provider shall also include details of how it encourages inclusive employment practices.

Reporting

41. The monitoring team lead and evaluation team lead should report to the account manager who will hold the relationship with DFID in the first instance.

42. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will keep DFID up-to-date with the progress of each GMAP2 project and alert the project team to any significant challenges that GMAP2 suppliers are facing with programme delivery. The primary contact will be the GMAP2 programme manager. Progress, lessons and evidence will be collated for all projects within quarterly progress reports, together with partner organisations.

43. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will attend quarterly meetings with the DFID project team.

Quality assurance

44. All evaluation reports will be independently quality assured through the Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS). The summative evaluation will be published. DFID will also publish management responses to these reports indicating the extent to which recommendations will be adopted.

Intellectual property rights

45. Any reports or documents prepared or information produced by or on behalf of the Supplier relating to the Contract and all intellectual property rights therein will be the property of the Crown. The Supplier will therefore assign to the Crown all intellectual property rights in such materials generated by the Supplier in the performance of the Contract and waive all moral rights relating to such materials.

Break point

46. Given the need for GMAP2 M&E to be responsive, flexible and adaptive in some areas, and the potential for scale up or down, the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider's performance, and workplan and budget will be reviewed at key time points and break points will be inserted into the contract to reflect this. Key review stages for the programme and contract will be at the end of the inception phase (likely to be two months from the start of the contract), and at key milestones in the contract. Progression beyond each break point will be subject to the outcome of reviews, satisfactory performance of the Monitoring and Evaluation Provider and agreement to any revised work plans or budgets. In the event that DFID determines not to proceed with the contract as a result of the review, the Contract will be terminated in accordance with the DFID Standard Terms and Conditions.

Risk management

47. Risks relating to monitoring and evaluation of GMAP2 are described here. More general risks to the programme's success are described in the business case.

Risk	Mitigating action	Likelihood after mitigating action	Impact after mitigating action
External context: Access to certain countries, such as South Sudan or Somalia, is not possible	Country-level risk assessment will be conducted as part of the inception phase. GMAP2 and monitoring or evaluation activities can be switched between countries to maintain overall progress in the event of a deteriorating security situation.	Possible	Moderate
Delivery: Monitoring or evaluation activities are delayed	CHASE will select a partner with a track record of timely delivery. Payments will be made on successful and timely delivery of agreed outputs.	Possible	Minor
Delivery: Data cannot be independently verified	Partners will be expected to use innovative methods to triangulate and check data reports from GMAP2 suppliers.	Possible	Minor
Delivery: Research produces uncritical findings in contexts where people are reluctant to speak out	The research will be led in each country by an experienced international consultant who is both familiar with DFID's requirements and the local political and social context.	Possible	Minor
Safeguarding: Staff come to harm in difficult operating environment	Partners will ensure appropriate duty of care arrangements including participation in a UK government-approved hostile environment training course, and adherence to FCO advice. Further details are presented in the duty of care section of these ToRs.	Unlikely	Major
Operational: DFID staff turnover results in inadequate oversight of monitoring and evaluation	Following the annual people survey, CHASE takes action to promote high staff well-being and morale. Vacancies are filled promptly. Any gap in evaluation adviser input will be addressed through cadre 10% time.	Possible	Minor
Delivery: Evaluation results are improperly influenced by close collaboration with GMAP2 suppliers established through monitoring activity	The monitoring team and evaluation teams will have separate reporting structures. Team leads are to report to the account manager.	Possible	Moderate
Fiduciary: Funds are diverted	Due diligence has already been undertaken on providers in the GEFA framework, who in turn are required to undertake due diligence on downstream partners in the supply chain. Reports of fraud will be promptly escalated and action taken to recover funds.	Unlikely	Minor
Reputational: UK press reporting causes embarrassment to the UK government	Incorrect stories will be challenged. DFID control procedures will be followed.	Unlikely	Minor

48. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will undergo a delivery chain mapping exercise to ensure reputational and delivery risks are identified and managed. This will be managed and reviewed on an ongoing basis, at a minimum at annual reviews but also as and when there are changes in the structure of the programme.

Aid transparency

49. In line with the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), DFID requires partners receiving and managing funds to release open data on how this money is spent, in a common, standard, re-usable format and to require this level of information from immediate subcontractors, subagencies and partners. The monitoring and evaluation provider should submit copies of its supply chain (sub-contractor) invoices and evidence of payment when invoicing DFID for its actual costs of procurement of local services and applicable management fee.

50. It is a contractual requirement for all suppliers to comply with this, and to ensure they have the appropriate tools to enable routine financial reporting, publishing of accurate data and providing evidence of this to DFID. Further IATI information is available from: http://www.aidtransparency.net/

Ethical considerations

51. It is essential that this piece of work is: independent, i.e. those conducting the evaluation, for example, must be objective and not connected with the intervention under study; be transparent, i.e. results must be publicly available; and use robust methodologies which, if replicated, will produce similar results.

52. All monitoring and evaluation must be of high quality and have practical value. The provider will:

    67. Adhere to ethical research principles around doing no harm, informed voluntary consent for participation, and confidentiality;
    68. Identify the need for and secure ethics approval for primary data collection and in-depth studies;
    69. Operate in accordance with international human rights commitments to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards;
    70. Respect cultural sensitivities.

UK aid branding

53. Suppliers that receive funding from DFID must use the UK aid logo on their development and humanitarian programmes to be transparent and acknowledge that they are funded by UK taxpayers. Suppliers should also acknowledge funding from the UK government in broader communications but no publicity is to be given to this Contract without the prior written consent of DFID. There may be locations where the use of the UK Aid logo will not be appropriate. Any exceptions to the rule above must be discussed with DFID on a case-by-case basis.

Duty of care

54. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider is responsible for the safety and well-being of its staff (as defined in Section 2 of the contract), informants and third parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for domestic and business property.

55. DFID will share available information with the monitoring provider on security status. On arrival in country, DFID or the British Embassy will provide a security briefing and visitor notes. All staff must register with their own embassy to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider must ensure appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their staff working under this contract, ensuring that they register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is available on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) website. The provider must ensure staff are up-to-date with the latest position.

56. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will be required to operate in conflict-affected areas where the security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. Travel will be subject to clearance from the UK government. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider must take account of risks related to the operating environment, ensuring appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures for staff. Staff should participate in a UK government-approved hostile environment training course prior to deployment.

57. The Monitoring and Evaluation Provider will be operating in areas at high risk of earthquakes and should be capable of redeploying as necessary to complete activities.

58. Tenderers must develop their proposal on the basis of being fully responsible for duty of care in line with these requirements and the initial risk assessment matrices prepared by DFID (see ITT Attachments 1–5). They must confirm in their response (ITT Attachment 6) for each duty of care assessment matrix that they:

    71. Fully accept responsibility for security and duty of care;
    72. Understand the risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan;
    73. Have the capability to manage their duty of care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

59. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of duty of care capability. DFID reserves the right to ask for clarification of any aspect of this evidence.

Selection criteria

60. Proposals of around 25 pages are invited to address these ToR. They should contain the following sections: Introduction, Methodology, Limitations, Data sources, Staffing, Timeline, Budget, Deliverables, Engagement with DFID, Ethical considerations, Risks, Dissemination.

61. The tender will follow an open and transparent selection process based on the following criteria:

    74. Interpretation of these ToR (10%)
    75. Quality, skills and experience of the team (20%)
    76. Design and methods (30%)
    77. Commercial (40%)

62. DFID will consider bids from organisations or consortia, but not a ‘sole-contractor’.

Environmental and social (E&S) safeguards

63. DFID works to embed E&S safeguards predominantly to ensure that our development and humanitarian interventions do no harm. They are also a key part of ensuring that our outcomes are sustainable, that they provide good value for money and that protect the positive results and transformative impacts for poverty reduction and development that we aim to deliver.

64. DFID needs to understand the scope of safeguard risks that might need to be considered in a given project, to ensure that risks are identified properly analysed and mitigation measures in place, with clear oversight responsibility for example to safeguard those directly or indirectly involved as beneficiaries or community members of DFID interventions.

65. Further considerations of particular importance to managing the risk of doing unintended harm to people and/or the environment include (but are not limited to)): social and poverty impact, gender equality, resource scarcity and environmental vulnerability, climate change, institutional environment, the political economy, conflict and fragility.

66. DFID Suppliers are expected to demonstrate:

78. **Top-level commitment: e**vidence of top-level organisational commitment to implement E&S safeguards, enhance E&S outcomes, and seek continual improvement. This should ideally take the form of a written statement signed by senior management, shared publicly.
79. **Appropriate systems and processes:** robust policies and systems in place for identifying E&S risks, implementing E&S safeguards, and monitoring performance relevant to this programme or investment, including regular field supervision and spot checks.
    - This should include, where relevant, clear policy and strategy and robust processes and documents such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), [child] safeguarding policies, Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), Stakeholder Engagement Plans (SEPs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan (OHSMPs) documentation.
80. **Adequate resources:** evidence on adequate financial, professional, and institutional resources in place to implement E&S safeguards, coordinate downstream partner implementation of E&S safeguards, and seek continual improvement throughout the entire lifecycle of this programme or investment? This should include adequate staff with specialist training and experience (including high-risk issues such as HIV/AIDs, gender-based violence, and child protection), and dedicated budgets.
81. **Strong track record:** suitability to deliver DFID's contract requirements, including assessment of an organisation's past performances, financial stability and organisational principles and track record of implementing E&S safeguards on similar programming.

Supporting documents

82. Annex A: Summary Risk Assessment Matrix
83. Annex B: Theory of Change
84. Annex C: Evaluability assessment
85. Annex D: Business case

Annex 2: GMAP2 Theory of Change (ToC)



Assumptions Group A: Inputs to Activities

The assumptions that enable the inputs to be used effectively by the contractor(s) to conduct GMAP activities:

(1) Contractors have authority/suitable arrangements with the national authorities to operate in the country (MOUs and/or accreditation).

(2) Contractors are able to generate a suitable in-country capability in a timely manner, including the acquisition and importation of vehicles and critical equipment.

(3) The security and/or political situation allows work to commence.

(4) HMG departments are fully apprised of UK mine action activities in the country and are able and willing to act as advocates when necessary.

Assumptions Group B: Activities to Outputs

The assumptions that enable the contractors' planned activities to deliver predicted outputs efficiently and on time

Assumptions	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8	B9	B10
Security and/or political situation allows work to continue uninterrupted	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Work is not interrupted by a natural, man-made or technological disaster/disruptive event	●		●	●	●	●	●	●		●
Work is not interrupted by a serious demining accident					●	●	●			
Trained staff remain in sector for the duration of the project		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Local suppliers remain engaged for the duration of the project			●	●	●	●	●	●		
Critical demining assets are not misappropriated during the project				●	●	●	●			
Critical demining assets are not damaged during the project				●	●	●	●			
Contractor(s) remain accredited by the national authorities for the duration of the project			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Information coming from activities (non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance and MRE activities) is recorded and retained in an effective way			●	●	●	●	●	●		
There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces)	●	●							●	●
National authorities have the political will and legitimacy to improve their ability to regulate and manage mine action programme(s)	●	●								●

Assumptions Group C: Outputs to Immediate Outcomes

The assumptions that enable the outputs from an activity to deliver an immediate outcome effectively

Assumptions	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Information stored by national authorities and/or contractors is used to prioritise land for clearance, reduce risk through MRE, and identify follow-on development opportunities		●					
National and/or provincial authorities ensure released land is handed over to potential beneficiaries without delay		●	●	●			
Return of land for intended use is not outweighed by natural, man-made or technological disaster/ disruptive event		●	●	●	●		
MRE messages are not undermined by socio-economic benefits of taking risks, e.g. farming land that has not yet been cleared or crossing minefields to collect water					●	●	
Actors have incentives to coordinate mine action activities with stabilisation, peace-building and/or development requirements	●						
National authorities have the political will and legitimacy to improve their ability to regulate and manage mine action programme(s)	●						●

Assumptions Group D: Immediate Outcomes to Intermediate Outcomes

The assumptions that enable the immediate outcome of an activity to become an intermediate outcome over time

Assumptions	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9
Cleared land remains available to beneficiaries and is not subject to expropriation or land seizure			●	●	●	●	●		
Complementary development inputs for targeted communities are applied to r1eleased land	●		●	●	●	●			
Productive use of released land is not outweighed by natural, man-made or technological disaster/disruptive event			●	●	●	●			
Following technical survey, clearance and/or MRE, people feel sufficiently confident that the released land is safe to use			●	●	●	●			
The risk of harm from uncleared land does no undermine the benefits of MRE to people living near cleared areas							●	●	
The opportunities for employment by the contractor(s) are allocated in a manner which enhances peace and stability		●							
National authorities have the political will and legitimacy to improve their ability to regulate and manage mine action programme(s)									●
HMG departments are kept appraised of UK mine action activities in the country and are able and willing to act as advocates when necessary	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Annex 3: Implications of findings for ToC assumptions and outcomes

As discussed throughout the findings section, a number of the ToC assumptions do not appear to have held, thus potentially undermining a number of intended outcomes. The table below identifies where report findings call into question ToC assumptions, and what outcomes these possibly undermine. In the first column we refer to the relevant Finding from the main body of this report; column 2 references the assumptions that have not always been met; and the third column highlights which outcomes may be undermined.

NB: As a global evaluation there are many examples of where these assumptions have and have not been met. The purpose here is to highlight some of the more common unmet assumptions for the purposes of focusing the FCDO and implementers on which aspects of the ToC may require greatest strengthening in the future.

Relevance and Coherence	Assumptions not met	ToC outcomes undermined
Finding 1/Finding 4: GMAP2 focused on delivering 'mine free' status. There is not the incentive, therefore, for those responsible for programme delivery to align with other stakeholders and fulfil alternate outcomes	• Actors have incentives to coordinate mine action activities with stabilisation, peacebuilding and/or development requirements • There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces) • Complementary development inputs for targeted communities are applied to released land	• Mine action activities are integrated within local and regional development plans and/or with complementary activities of other development agencies • Mine action is recognised and recorded as having contributed towards development and/or stabilisation outcomes in line with relevant SDGs
Finding 2: GMAP2 was not promoted or advocated by other FCDO entities in country	• HMG departments are kept appraised of UK mine action activities in the country and are able and willing to act as advocates when necessary	• Mine action is recognised and recorded as having contributed towards development and/or stabilisation outcomes in line with relevant SDGs
Finding 5: There is a lack of consistency in how implementers engage beneficiaries - 'beneficiary' also tends to focus on communities and not other government departments	• There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local communities, and legitimate security forces)	• Mine action activities are integrated within local and regional development plans and/or with complementary activities of other development agencies
Cross-cutting dimensions	**Assumptions not met**	**ToC Outcomes weakened**
Finding 7: The primary considerations for VfM by both the implementers and FCDO are economy and efficiency, with less attention paid to effectiveness which can often benefit from co-ordination with other stakeholders outside of mine action	• Actors have incentives to coordinate mine action activities with stabilisation, peacebuilding and/or development requirements	• Mine action activities are integrated within local and regional development plans and/or with complementary activities of other development agencies
Results	**Assumptions not met**	**ToC Outcomes weakened**
Finding 14: A lack of understanding of how land will be used post-clearance raises concerns that implementers	• There is effective coordination between GMAP contractors and other key stakeholders (national and provincial authorities, local	• Mine action activities are integrated within local and regional development plans and/or with complementary

are unable to fully coordinate with stakeholders from other sectors	communities, and legitimate security forces)	activities of other development agencies
Finding 16: Outside mine action NMAA institutional legitimacy and sustainability remain weak, as some NMAAs are more accountable and responsive to donors than their own governments	• National authorities have the political will and legitimacy to improve their ability to regulate and manage mine action programme(s)	• Effective mine action programmes increasingly managed & implemented by capable & legitimate national entities with minimal outside technical or financial support

Annex 4: Evaluation Framework

1**. Relevance:** To what extent and in what ways is the GMAP project design aligned to and coherent with the mine action priorities of UK, international, national government partners and community beneficiaries in selected GMAP project countries?		
Sub-questions	**Assessment criteria**	**Data sources**
1.1 To what extent and in what ways are GMAP project objectives and activities aligned to and coherent with the **HMG** mine action and wider security, stabilisation and development priorities in selected GMAP project countries?	• Mine action project proposals are aligned to HMG security and development policy framework • Mine action plans integrate DFID gender, disability policies, • Programmes informed by conflict sensitivity analysis • Human rights risks and risk of doing harm identified	• National security council country strategies • Strategic defence and security review • UK aid, tackling global challenges in national interest • KIIs with HMG (DFID, FCO-SU-CSSF, MOD) • Conflict sensitivity analysis, gender analysis, • Working effectively in conflict-affected and fragile situations, briefing paper, do no harm, DFD • Building stability overseas strategy • GMAP business case • Building peaceful states and societies • DFID mine action policy
1.2 To what extent and in what ways are GMAP project objectives aligned to and coherent with the **international** mine action and wider development priorities in GMAP project countries?	• Mine action aligned to priorities of overall international humanitarian and development response in country. • OCHA cluster reports articulate mine action linkages • Mine action integrated to other UN peace-building, resilience and livelihood programmes.	• Leave no one behind, SDGs and related UN initiatives • UN and Consortia Project proposals and plans • UN KIIs (UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS, OCHA), GMAP Contractors UN and Consortia Project proposals and plans • UN cluster group reports • CCM, CRPD, CCW and related international conventions/treaties
1.3 To what extent and in what ways are GMAP project objectives aligned to and coherent with the **national** mine action and wider development priorities in GMAP project countries?[260]	• Aligned to national, provincial and district development plans, particularly for economic growth, infrastructure investments, agricultural development • Links to livelihood and economic development projects identified in plans • Level of political will, sector leadership and prioritisation	• KII/FGD with national partners and national NGO partners • National development strategies and sector plans • NMA reports to International convention committees
1.4. To what extent is the project design informed by community beneficiary priorities, including vulnerable and marginalised groups?	• Extent of stakeholder participation from different ethno-religious groups in programme design • Project has assessed influence of social norms on planned actions • Potential benefits and costs on women and disabled appraised	• Project proposals • Baseline assessment • Contractor reports • On going data collection by GMAP contractors • FGDs • KIIs with communities
1.5 To what extent has the project design drawn on evidence of what has	• Integration of recommendations from GMAP1	• Contractor project proposals and plans

[260] Countries may have divided or subnational authorities (e.g. Yemen).

worked in previous programmes and other similar operational contexts?	• Clear theory of change and intervention logics underpins project design, clarity on causal assumptions, • Capacity development approaches informed by lessons from other mine action and/or institutional development programmes • MRE informed by effective behavioural change approaches • Design option appraised • Decisions for prioritising land clearance sites, MRE and capacity development tackle constraints to outcomes	• Project theory of change and intervention logic models • KII with project advisors and designers
2. Delivery: To what extent and in what ways has GMAP contractors ensured safety, efficiency, quality delivery of their projects?		
Sub-questions	**Assessment criteria**	**Data sources**
2.1 To what extent and in what ways is efficiency considered in project output delivery?	• Output resource allocation allocated according to impact weight • National staff rates aligned to market rates, • Open book accounting, competitive procurement, local content in other procurement • Activities undertaken are made on the basis of adequate needs assessment • Key cost drivers monitored	• KII with DFID and contractor programme management • GMAP consortia lead and partner reports • ITAD monitoring reports • Annual reviews/reports • Financial management report and data analysis • Procurement case studies • VfM assessments
2.2 To what extent and in what ways is quality considered in delivery of outputs?	• Frequency and clarity of coordination meetings • Consensus on plans and priorities for key component areas. • Extent to which ownership, land titling, risks of land grabbing and equity considerations and risks, including the risk of increasing gender inequality, have been assessed in contractor pre-clearance assessments (e.g. NTS) • Composition of MRE participation reflects those groups most at risk • Value added and cross fertilisation of key components • Plans adapted according to delivery realities, in year revisions agreed • Analysis, planning and control of mine action uses sex and age-disaggregated data and is reflected in reporting and information management systems • Monitoring data used for decision-making and adaptation of delivery plans. • Six monthly reports track immediate outcomes, annual reports contain lessons learnt	• GMAP consortia lead and partner reports • ITAD monitoring reports • Annual reviews • Coordination meeting minutes • Project operational plans • Specific diagnostic and study reports • Contractor meeting minutes • KII (M&E manager, results advisor, conflict and governance advisor, • FGD with government monitoring team
2.3 To what extent and in what ways is safety considered in delivery of outputs?	• Extent community liaison has mitigated insecurity and risk, trust built and access secured with local groups • Safety assurance of capacity development and other sub-contractors undertaken • Delivery team regularly updates and tracks personal, fiduciary, and reputational risk, threats monitored, escalated, incidents	• GMAP consortia lead and partner reports • ITAD monitoring reports • Annual reviews • Risk registers and risk reporting • Programme management and advisor interviews • Clearance team FGD

	reported, mechanisms to ensure equipment not abandoned, stolen or destroyed. • Manages neutrality in contexts where requires national security actor support Do no harm analysis and conflict sensitivity analysis undertaken at operational level	• Partner KII/FGD
3. Effectiveness: To what extent have project interventions contributed to outcomes identified in the GMAP theory of change (immediate and intermediate)?		
Sub-questions	**Assessment criteria**	**Data sources**
3.1 To what extent do national and local mine action authorities have the capability to legitimately manage mine action interventions in target areas with minimal outside technical and financial support?	Immediate • NMAA show leadership in regulating sector, managing and setting strategic direction, coordinating the sector's response • LMAA have capability to plan, implement and quality manager their own work • LMAA have operational staff with knowledge and skills to deliver efficient, safe, quality mine action Intermediate • Evidence of political commitment • Utility of IMSMA database • NMAA and LMAA less reliant on ODA and international humanitarian technical support • Capability assessment and balanced scorecards show incremental progress • NMAA and LMAA interventions compliant to international safety and accreditation norms • SOPs utilised	• KII with NMAA and LMAA • FGD with local NGO contractors • Contractor partner capacity development rating data • Trace studies with CD workshop participants
3.2 To what extent do communities feel safer and risk of death and injury to men, women, boys and girls is reduced?	Immediate • Area of land cleared and released. • Number of direct and indirect beneficiaries of land cleared and released. • % target beneficiaries demonstrating increased understanding of RE messages and changing behaviours • % target beneficiaries who report change in behavior • Number of landmine/ERW-related casualties (disaggregated) Intermediate • % accidents recorded attributed to blasts in target area • % agree feel safe to use land or let their children play or go to school on their own • relationship between land cleared and casualty numbers reduced in target area	• Perception survey data • FGD (community groups, target and control groups) • GMAP partner reports and M&E systems data • NMAA statistics • Health centre records
3.3. To what extent are routes in target areas being used for local transport and trade, access to markets and/or delivery of humanitarian aid?	Intermediate • Freedom of movement metrics (vehicle traffic/flows, number of registered transport operators, border tax income, humanitarian food and non-food item volumes in particular settings • % population classified as 'returnee', historical changes in district populations.	• GIS satellite data/Traffic survey data • UN IDP reports (OCHA/UNOPS/IOM) • KII with local government, humanitarian and security actors

	• Authorities record increased demand for key utility and service markets (electricity, water, medicines, food, security)	• FGDs and/or purposive surveys with discrete population groups (market traders/farmers/IDPs)
3.4 To what extent has mine action contributed to improved livelihood opportunities for women and men, including marginalized and vulnerable in target areas (enabling wider development)? (includes extent that public and private land is put to productive use (leading to improved livelihoods)	Immediate • % cleared areas included in local development plans • Square metres of formerly contaminated land either a) in use, or b) with firm plans for use following land release activities (disaggregated by purpose - residential, agricultural/pastoral, commercial, infrastructural) • Balance between use for government buildings and beneficiary focussed purposes (forestry, grazing, agriculture) • Annual crop yield/farm gate prices • Increase in land tax volume, land rights claims, number of small business registered with local authorities • % agree with statement concerning improvement in employment opportunities (formal/informal) • shift from direct employment (in mine action) to indirect employment (new opportunities)	• Post-Clearance Assessment reports • GIS survey data • KII with project teams • KII and FGDs (DDC, LDC members, cooperative associations -farmers, trucker, local government officials, commercial operators, ministry of agriculture, land…) • Secondary household surveys • Local authority records • Humanitarian and community development agency records
3.5 To what extent have refugees and IDPs returned to areas made safe for habitation and work?	Intermediate • Increase in % of district population classified as 'returnee' post clearance • Increase in district population	• KII (village elders, leaders) • OCHA IDP reports • IOM reports • FGD (communities) • Perception surveys • Schools and health centre records
3.6 To what extent to target communities have improved access to basic services? (disaggregated by basic service, gender and ethnicity)?	Intermediate • Proximity to water sources • Increase in school attendance rates by marginalised communities • Increase in frequency of health worker community visits to marginalised communities • Increase in frequency of agricultural extension worker visits to marginalised communities • Spill over effects generated by improved freedom of movement in key areas, Improved humanitarian relief flows Access to markets	• KII with LEA, health centre, police and militia, water supply authority, water vendors, • UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO local reports • INGO programme reports
4. Impact: To what extent has the project contributed to the impacts stated in the GMAP theory of change		
Sub-questions	**Assessment criteria**	**Data sources**
4.1 To what extent has mine action contributed to peace and security and support towards development in the affected country?	• Mine action recognised by conflict actors, including government as a factor contributing to peace and human security returns • Mine action benefits historically marginalised groups and those with grievances towards state • Improved national access to health, education and justice • Measurable progress towards APMBC and CCM compliance • Reduction in casualties from legacy mines	• Political statements, peace agreements, treaties, periodic declarations SDG 1 country reports • UNDP HDI country reports • DFID country strategy progress reports • SDG reports • Periodic treaty and convention reports

		• National economic development and transformation reports • World Bank macro- economic trend data • Ministry of finance data • Country conflict studies • Sector reports • Health and education statistics
5. Sustainability: to what extent are the effects of the immediate and intermediate outcomes likely to endure once the project has been completed?		
Sub-questions	**Assessment criteria**	**Data Sources**
5.1 To what extent are GMAP contractors using approaches that focus on generating sustainable results	• Exit strategies and plans in place • Extent capacity development focussed on institutionalising practice changes • Approaches to recruitment and training including local content dimensions • Engagement on constraints to sustainability (budget, staff movement, recruitment policies)	• Project proposals, plans and reports • KII (managers, advisors) • Partner FGD
5.2 Extent enhanced national and local mine action authorities capacity will endure after project is completed	• Reduction in number of external advisors embedded in NMAA • Increased ability of national entities to attract central budget funding for mine action through budgetary commitments at national and/or local level • Level of reliance on external donors (NMAA budget and staffing trends) • Donor transfers a % of recurrent and capital budget • Number of mine action agencies registered with NMAA • Rate of land released in sqm/HA (% increase?) after project completed • NMAA action acknowledged in national development strategies, plans and reports • NMAA contribute regular outcome data to macro-economic reports • Timely reporting against international convention obligations • Trend in number of landmine and ERW-related casualties (disaggregated)	• National Budget • National development reports • UN, World Bank country and sector reports • NMAA capacity development reports and diagnostics • Convention reports (APMBC, CCM) • Secondary surveys on state presence • FII (NMAA) • FGD (Local NGOs)

Annex 5: Utilisation Strategy

Extract from our inception report, outlining our utilisation strategy for the contract:

2.1. Utilisation

In order to add the most value possible from these three components, it is important that we identify ways to maximise the uptake of our findings by relevant stakeholders. The range of stakeholders is wide in a global programme of this size and where DFID is a major player within the sector. It might include DFID itself who could want to make programme design adaptations or implementing partners who might want to adopt different approaches in a particular country – or academics who may be focussed on research that it is particularly strategic for the sector. To make sure we get this right, it is important that we have a sound utilisation strategy which will be developed in the first quarter of the implementation period as part of the Research Study. This strategy will ensure coherence across the monitoring, evaluation and research components, and encourage the whole team to help shift the culture of mine action as it engages with key sector stakeholders throughout the course of this contract.

Specifically, this will involve interviewing the key GMAP stakeholders as part of an on-going process of consultations that will characterise our approach across the three components:

- What information is most valuable to each stakeholder, where do they get that information and what are the gaps?
- How do they currently communicate internally and externally? How do they prefer our M&E findings to be communicated?
- Are there any specific points in their operational cycles where information can be of greatest benefit? What are those and why are they important?
- Are there any potential *champions* from within the stakeholder group who may be prepared to promote particular information, lessons or ways of working?

Key informants for interview will include:

- 2–3 people from the GMAP team in London;
- The DFID M&E advisor to GMAP;
- The DFID programme managers in Afghanistan and Syria (where there is close engagement with GMAP) and one other country where DFID engagement in country is less committed.

For the Lot 1 and 2 contractors (MAG, HALO, NPA, GICHD), UNMAS and UNDP we will interview:

- The M&E managers at head office;
- The relevant consortium director;
- 2–3 programme managers at the country level.

In addition, we will interview:

- 2–3 local implementing partners;
- 2–3 NMAAs.

As well as interviewing the key stakeholders, we will also draw on the existing knowledge within Itad – in particular our organisational effectiveness team and available literature to understand the principles and behaviours that encourage learning and uptake. This will also be informed by a political economy analysis of the mine action sector which will seek to understand why the sector may be resistant (or not) to producing evidence and learning (see section 5.4.1 for more on this).

The above will then inform our utilisation strategy that will be adopted across the three components of our work. Key elements of the uptake and utilisation strategy will be:

- Identifying opportunities to incentivise uptake and utilisation amongst stakeholders, communicating in such a way that taps into existing interests, systems and opportunities to promote lessons;
- Collaborating with the GMAP2 M&E officers and other champions to identify potential problems and opportunities to encourage uptake and utilisation;
- Using *facilitated self-assessments* methods to identify key decision points in stakeholder processes and how information can be useful to support those decisions;
- Providing co-learning opportunities between the Itad research study team and selected stakeholder representatives.

For the monitoring and evaluation components, this strategy will utilise our strong relationships with DFID and Lot 1 and 2 contractors to encourage uptake of lessons and recommendations. We will use these experiences to foster similarly credible relationships with UNMAS and UNDP who are new to GMAP.

Annex 6: Itad Ethical Guidelines

This Statement of Ethical Principles sets a standard to which all Itad staff, consultants and partners aspire when working on Itad managed evaluations. Itad evaluators operate in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards. They will also take account of local and national laws.

Itad takes responsibility **for identifying the need for and securing any necessary Ethics approval for the study they are undertaking**. This may be from national or local Ethics committees in countries in which the study will be undertaken, or other stakeholder institutions with formal Ethics approval systems.

The conduct of all those working on Itad managed evaluations is characterised by the following general principles and values:

- **Principle 1: Independence and impartiality of the researchers**. Itad evaluators are independent and impartial. Any conflicts of interest or partiality will be made explicit.
- **Principle 2: Avoiding Harm**. Itad evaluators will ensure that the basic human rights of individuals and groups with whom they interact are protected. This is particularly important with regard to vulnerable people.
- **Principle 3: Child protection.** Itad follows the code of conduct established by Save the Children (2003) which covers awareness of child abuse, minimising risks to children, reporting and responding where concerns arise about possible abuse. Itad evaluators will obtain informed consent from parents or caregivers and from children themselves. Children will not be required to participate even if their parents' consent.
- **Principle 4: Treatment of Participants**. Itad evaluators are aware of differences in culture, local customs, religious beliefs and practices, personal interaction and gender roles, disability, age, and ethnicity, and will be mindful of the potential implications of these differences when planning, carrying out and reporting on evaluations.
- **Principle 5: Voluntary participation**. Participation in research and evaluation should be voluntary and free from external pressure. Information should not be withheld from prospective participants that might affect their willingness to participate. All participants have a right to withdraw from research/ evaluation and withdraw any data concerning them at any point without fear of penalty.
- **Principle 6: Informed consent**. Itad evaluators will inform participants how information and data obtained will be used, processed, shared, disposed of, prior to obtaining consent.
- **Principle 7: Ensuring confidentiality**. Itad evaluators will respect people's right to provide information in confidence and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. They will also inform participants about the scope and limits of confidentiality.
- **Principle 8: Data security**. Itad is registered under the UK Data Protection Act 1998 and has a Data Protection Policy which includes procedures on data retention and confidentiality. Itad evaluators will guard confidential material and personal information by the proper use of passwords and other security measures. Itad evaluators have an obligation to protect data and systems by following up-to-date recommendations to avoid damage from viruses and other malicious programmes. Plus, there is a duty to state how data will be stored, backed-up, shared, archived and (if necessary) disposed.
- **Principle 9: Sharing of findings**. Itad evaluators are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.

Annex 7: Advocacy evaluation report

Evaluating GMAP advocacy: Independent Evaluation Briefing Report

Richard Burge, 7th March 2021

How is GMAP advocacy defined? What is being evaluated?

For the purposes of this evaluation, GMAP advocacy is defined as what GMAP has brought to the mine action sector at the global level. It is what goes beyond the funded activities of GMAP. It is concerned with how having GMAP has enabled the FCDO and GMAP partners to engage and influence each other and the mine action sector. The interest therefore is in the engagement and influencing which comes primarily from the GMAP secretariat in FCDO (called the 'GMAP team') and secondarily from the 'GMAP boundary partners' which includes the NGO implementers (The HALO Trust, MAG, NPA), GICHD, the UN agencies (UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF) and the M&E provider (Itad).
As part of Itad's summative Evaluation on GMAP, Itad contracted Richard Burge to undertake an evaluation of the advocacy efforts and results of GMAP. It was agreed that this would be an independent evaluation briefing report that maintains distance from the core evaluation team. The assignment required an examination of how GMAP has engaged, advocated and influenced the mine action sector at the global level. The evaluation was focused on the results and relevance of GMAP advocacy through its engagement with implementing partners and other key actors. It was not focused on national level efforts by the GMAP boundary partners although where helpful some country examples have been provided as indicative of the global reach of GMAP.
The consultant designed evaluation questions to be used in the review of documentation, the framing of interviews and informed the structure of this report (see annex 1). The consultant also used an advocacy strategy framework[261] to identify and categorise advocacy outcomes. The evaluation was conducted over a period of four weeks between 5th Feb and 5th Mar 2021. It was agreed at the outset this would be a very tight timeframe with a limited number of days allocated (7 working days). Despite these limitations, the consultant was able to conduct interviews with 15 stakeholders (see annex 2) and reviewed a number of GMAP and relevant documents (see annex 3).
This is a stand-alone independent report which is designed to be used (a) for the GMAP secretariat at FCDO to use in its consideration of future support to global mine action and (b) for Itad to use in its summative Evaluation. It is not envisaged this will be a separately published deliverable.

GMAP advocacy – its relevance to the mine action sector

There is no explicit advocacy strategy in the GMAP2 Business Case (2018). In this document however there are implied advocacy positions. Overall, it makes a case for strengthening UK leadership in the mine action sector: '*UK funding for mine action saves lives, releases land for productive use and helps pave the way for further development programming*'.[262] It recognises that the UK has an obligation to assist mine-affected countries to clear their anti-personnel mines. The Business Case states there is a continued need for GMAP as the threat of landmines persists and the funding for mine action has decreased sharply. The substantial increase in funding through GMAP2 has clearly strengthened the position of the UK government as a key donor in the mine action sector. While the UK has a history of supporting mine action, the scale of GMAP2 funding has given the UK a significant 'seat at the table' with other actors in the global mine action sector. Within this context of the UK becoming one of the largest donors in global mine action, the GMAP2 Business Case has pointed to several areas which GMAP has sought to improve in the mine action sector: (i) land release, (ii) mine risk education, and (iii) capacity development on national mine

[261] Coffman, J and Beer, T (2015) The Advocacy Strategy Framework. Center for Evaluation Innovation.
[262] DFID GMAP Business Case (2018), p.5.

action authorities. It could be expected therefore that any advocacy efforts would be focused on these three areas. In addition, there are a number of elements in the Business Case which could also be considered as informing advocacy efforts and 'positions' (see Strategic Case, section F):[263]

- Build a stronger evidence base on the impact of mine action.
- Develop new ways to measure the outcome of mine risk education activities.
- Support national mine action authorities to perform their roles better.
- Identify and develop context-specific outcome and output indicators.
- Promote gender awareness and equality in mine action programmes.

As GMAP2 has been implemented, each of these advocacy 'positions' can be seen to be at the heart of what could be described as an ***implicit GMAP advocacy strategy*** which has led (or leading) to a number of ***advocacy outcomes.*** While not always obvious, or even thought of as advocacy, GMAP advocacy efforts have largely been focused on efforts which support the three areas (for example, better evidence to demonstrate impact of land release, measuring behaviour change in mine risk education). These broad areas are captured in the newly developed draft Theory of Change (ToC).[264]

GMAP advocacy – relevance to the mine action sector

This ToC allows us to identify where advocacy efforts have been focused over the last three years. They are divided into *direct* advocacy efforts (i.e. those where the GMAP team has largely led on engaging and influencing) and *indirect* advocacy efforts (i.e. those where the GMAP advocacy has been more driven by its boundary partners). There is also overlap where advocacy is being driven collectively and difficult to identify who is leading. The GMAP advocacy on meeting the Treaty obligation is seen as direct advocacy due to scale of GMAP and the evidence from the programme which is used to inform and support the advocacy of the FCDO Treaty team and HMA in Geneva.

Figure 7: Advocacy efforts clustered and mapped against the draft GMAP ToC on mine action



[263] DFID GMAP Business Case (2018), p.5 onwards.
[264] Itad (2021) A strategic framing of a sector-wide Theory of Change. January 2021.

How has GMAP advocacy been relevant at the global level? While this study was limited to the role of GMAP partners in the mine action sector, the issues identified and advocated on by GMAP are clearly relevant to the entire sector. As laid out in the formative evaluation,[265] GMAP is closely aligned to UN humanitarian and peacebuilding priorities in fragile and conflict affected settings (FCAS). The GMAP partners, both UN agencies and NGOs, have expressed how GMAP has encouraged issues and ways of working which have been socialised more widely in the mine action sector, such as the promotion of standardised beneficiary definitions, measuring behaviour change on risk education and, work in progress, the comprehensive mapping of all mine action areas in an overall theory of change. These results and outcomes of GMAP advocacy efforts are covered in Section 4.

It is also important to recognise the relevance of GMAP to the UK government. Firstly, as articulated by HMA Geneva,[266] GMAP has contributed significantly towards demonstrating how the UK is meeting its Treaty obligations. Secondly, as concluded in the formative evaluation, GMAP's geographical expansion has increased GMAP's relevance to broader HMG development and, more indirectly, UK foreign policy and security priorities. It is also recognised that GMAP1 was more development-focused as it worked more in post-conflict countries while GMAP2 is working more in FCAS countries which has seen an increasing focus in FCDO, so is more conflict- and stabilisation-focused.

GMAP advocacy – identifying results and outcomes

Advocacy results and outcomes have been identified mainly through stakeholder interviews and supported by evidence from document reviews. This approach is deliberate as the emphasis of this evaluation has been to surface advocacy outcomes from the experiences of each stakeholder involved in or closely connected to GMAP. Each stakeholder was therefore asked what they considered to be the most important GMAP advocacy efforts, results and outcomes.[267] There has been consensus around quite a few outcomes, as well as some which could be considered more niche. The advocacy outcomes were then grouped into three types of advocacy outcomes: (1) awareness and understanding, (2) will and commitment and (3) action.[268] Figure 8 below presents the headings for the advocacy outcomes categorised in this way. Each outcome is supported by a paragraph or two with supporting evidence with the aim to identify the evidence to support any GMAP contribution to change. It is not meant to be a rigorous contribution analysis.

Figure 8: GMAP advocacy outcomes

[265] Itad (2019) GMAP2 formative evaluation report
[266] Interview with Simon Cleobury, Deputy HMA Geneva, 22 February 2021.
[267] See Annex 9 for list of stakeholders interviewed between 10 February 2021 and 01 March 2021.
[268] There is a linear logic leading to policy change moving from awareness to will to action.

Awareness and understanding

GMAP has encouraged key actors to understand and accept there is a need to build a stronger evidence base on the impact of mine action

Box 1: There is a strong connection – and sequencing – between outcome 4.1 and a number of others:

1. There is a lack of evidence to demonstrate the link between mine action and development.
2. There is therefore an understanding of the need to build an evidence base – through Itad and GMAP implementers (outcome 4.1)
3. As a result, there is an emerging will and commitment by GMAP partners in how they are changing their approaches and 'behaviours' (see outcome 4.4)
4. And there is emerging evidence that GMAP partners are starting to act (see outcome 4.11).

This is a critical advocacy outcome which underpins other outcomes (see box 1). The advocacy for a stronger evidence base in the mine action sector has largely been driven by the GMAP team with the support and facilitation of Itad. Recognised in the GMAP2 Business Case that the evidence base is a real weakness in the sector, Itad undertook a rapid evidence assessment in 2018[269] and a literature review of humanitarian mine action and longer-term development in 2020.[270] The former pointed to a lack of evidence in the sector and in particular the link between mine action outputs and outcomes. The latter study aimed to address this by examining the literature. Itad has also led and facilitated a workshop in Nov 2019 on 'how to stimulate the mine action sector to better understand its links with longer-term development'.[271] Interviews with GMAP partners (both NGOs and UN agencies) indicated an awareness of the need and importance to build a strong evidence base particularly around outcomes and impact of mine action work. It is interesting to note that a couple of interviewees mentioned that this has been understood for some time, but not clearly articulated, and there is a body of 'grey literature' which can point to operational evidence but has not been fully utilised by researchers and evaluators. This advocacy outcome is moving into the right direction (as laid out in the box above) as some GMAP partners are now committing themselves for example to (i) update their strategies and approaches on outcomes and linking longer-term development with mine action and (ii) undertake geospatial studies and livelihood survey (e.g. recent study on Afghanistan).[272] Finally, in its role as an 'evidence advocate' Itad is seeing how it uses its research to advocate for better evidence and has adapted to support research to take advantage of opportunities to build the evidence base (see Itad inception report),[273] and with GMAP partners as in the case of the Afghanistan study with UNMAS.

GMAP has responded to and is generating interest in Innovative Finance

GMAP has helped to move forward discussions and generate interest on innovative financing. This idea has been one of the key areas of advocacy for HMA Geneva although the original idea appears to have come from The HALO Trust which has lobbied the UK since and possibly before the issue was raised at a Wilton Park Conference in 2017. As a result, the UK facilitated a side event with the Deputy HMA, The HALO Trust and an impact investor. Given the interest generated, GMAP has used its programme funding to support and commission research which will then be presented at a Directors' meeting in May 2021 and taken by GMAP to the Mine Action Support Group. This is a good example of GMAP using both its convening power – especially through HMA Geneva – and its funding mechanism where it can resource initiatives like this. One can observe the influence of GMAP in ensuring this study will also consider a key GMAP advocacy position: *The expectation is that Innovative Finance's more outcomes-based and effective approach would attract new funders, including those interested in the broader economic and social benefits of comprehensive mine action.*[274]

[269] Itad (2018) Expanding the Evidence Base of the Mine Action Sector. Geneva February Workshop Landscaping Paper v2.
[270] Itad (2020) GMAP2, Humanitarian Mine Action and Longer-Term Development: a Review of the Literature.
[271] Itad (2019) GMAP2, Summary report on workshop of 15 November 2019.
[272] DMAC (2020) Afghanistan Mine Action Livelihood Survey, 2020 (received from UNMAS, 24-02-21).
[273] Itad, GMAP2, Full Inception Report v2 (11.12.18).
[274] Taken from the PPT on Improving the effectiveness of mine action through innovative finance, January 2021.

GMAP has raised awareness on the need to consider conflict sensitivity (although there doesn't appear to be as strong a commitment and action as other GMAP-led positions)

While conflict sensitivity was one of the key recommendations coming out of Itad's formative evaluation, there doesn't appear to be the same level of enthusiasm or commitment by the other GMAP boundary partners. This could be that it is a relatively new issue which is being raised and so the efforts are on building knowledge and understanding of why and how the concept is important. It was reported in interviews that NGOs would like to see more sharing and participation on this issue, and an understanding that NGOs are also engaged on this issue outside of GMAP. In the case of one NGO they have been working on their own conflict-related initiative with several development and peace building NGOs. The case for a conflict sensitive approach needs to be made and in a way that convinces mine action players that it will add value and not add to workloads.

Will and commitment

GMAP has contributed to building a commitment by the mine action sector to deepen efforts to connect mine action to longer-term development

Developing a better understanding of the link between mine action outputs and impact has been an implied aim of GMAP with Itad contributing to improving the thinking. The previously mentioned literature review (in 4.1 above) concluded '*understanding that mine action depends on other development sectors has not resulted in active leveraging of partnerships to maximise benefits*'.[275] There does now appear to be a collective effort by the mine action sector to change their 'behaviour' and approaches to deepen their efforts to consider the longer-term development effects and outcomes of their work. GMAP has played a 'convening role' in bringing together key actors through its programme structure (bringing together NGOs on the one hand, and UN agencies on the other, and sometimes together) and, with Itad as a resource partner, facilitated discussions with the mine action sector on the link been mine action and development.[276] It is important to recognise that GMAP has been 'pushing at an open door' as the NGO and UN actors have largely been moving in this direction (e.g. provides UNMAS with support to pilot a geospatial study). It is at the country level where there are most noticeable differences where, for example, some FCDO officers 'buy into' this understanding of mine action contributing to development (e.g. recognition that mine clearance leads to better access for health benefits or economic development), but others don't (e.g. absence of mine action in FCDO country plans).

GMAP partners have committed themselves to measure behaviour change around risk education

As part of the overall advocacy around measuring outcomes, there is now a clear commitment by GMAP partners to measure behaviour change in communities affected by mines and specially in relation to risk education. There appears to be a shift away from relying on surveys to using Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to measure behaviour change. A success can be seen in how the three main NGOs – The HALO Trust, MAG and NPA – have come together to develop a new approach to measuring behaviour change in relation to risk education with an approach centred on conducting FGDs.[277] It is equally important for the UN agencies. As the last GMAP annual report (2020) states, '*The advances made in assessing behavioural change from MRE delivered by the INGO Partnership….has equal relevance to the UN-managed projects in GMAP2. Assessing behavioural change should be explored in 2020/21 by UNMAS in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan by drawing on the experiences of the Lot 1 or 2 partners*'.[278] In an interview with one of the UN

[275] Itad (2020) GMAP 2 Mine Action and Development - A Review of Literature.
[276] Itad (2019) Understanding the Contribution of Mine Action to Development. Summary report on workshop of 15 November 2019.
[277] Boyd, H, Kasack, S and Nielsen, N F (2020) Measuring Behavior Change Resulting from EORE and the Need for Complementary Risk Reduction Activities. The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 6.
[278] DFID GMAP2 Annual Review, April 2020.

agencies, UNICEF, behaviour change is a priority issue, so they have a keen interest in being involved in discussions about how to measure behaviour change.

GMAP has increased support to capacity development of national authorities (but more to do)

The GMAP2 Business Case states: '*The programme has been designed to help countries meet their national mine action commitments under the Ottowa and Oslo treaties, as well as ensuring the UK meets its own commitments. It will work with national mine action authorities to implement national plans and build national capacity. DFID will use the programme as the basis for UK leadership in increasing international support to demining."* It goes on to say that "*All implementing partners will be required to demonstrate how they each can contribute towards developing national mine action management capacities*' (and is captured in output 3 of GMAP2).[279] It was however recognised in Itad's formative evaluation that '*the level of political advocacy and support from UK Embassies/High Commissions and from DFID itself could have been stronger*'.[280] From the discussions with stakeholders the support to national authorities appears to be patchy in terms of countries and types of implementers (some of the NGOs are not as active as NPA or the UN agencies). It is also not an issue which came out strongly in most of the interviews. There is at best a commitment, but concrete action seems lacking. The UK will need to consider how it can reset its advocacy efforts and use its leverage to influence the international actors to step up more consistent support in this area.

Strengthened donor alignment and coherence

There is clear evidence from interviews that one of the perceived benefits of GMAP is that it has encouraged and led the way in getting donors to be more aligned in their strategic thinking and programming towards mine action. Most of the NGOs interviewed considered this to be a key area of GMAP advocacy which is starting to reap benefits with the collaboration between the FCDO and the Dutch MFA on the theory of change (and outcome indicators) for the mine action sector. There is potential that this work could be socialised further with other donors and UN agencies who can see their priority areas mapped out, how they then contribute to the work of others, and potentially how they can agree common and distinct indicators. Another example of efforts to strengthen donor alignment was reported by HMA which has pushed for donor alignment in its chairing and participation on the Treaty committees. As chair of one committee (on Enhancement of Cooperation Assistance) the HMA brought the GMAP SRO into a side event to present the ToC and donor alignment (presentation slides were reviewed as part of this assignment).[281]

Enabled the value and resourcing for M&E

GMAP's decision to contract a separate M&E partner has demonstrated the importance and value given to building an evidence base in the mine action sector. The GMAP2 Business Case called for an M&E partner to have both technical expertise (using people experienced in M&E of development programmes) and subject matter expertise (using people with experience of mine action). Having a specific monitoring function has also been an asset. The decision by GMAP to have an M&E partner is seen as valuable resource by other GMAP partners and other actors (such as the Dutch MFA). As one NGO interviewee said, '*Itad is a strong advocate for GMAP*'. GMAP partners have also given greater attention and value to their own M&E. There is however a slight tension in that while many see the M&E partner as a resource and facilitator, and close to the GMAP team, there is a risk that too much could rely upon the M&E partner which has sometimes moved away from being an M&E partner and started to lead and advocate for positions which go beyond its mandate (e.g. its push for conflict sensitivity).

[279] DFID (2018) GMAP Business Case.
[280] Itad (2019), GMAP2 ormative evaluation report.
[281] DFID (2020) Aligning Approaches to Measuring Mine Action Outcomes. Intersessional presentation, 22 June 2020.

Action

Standardised beneficiary definitions agreed and operationalised

This is one of the advocacy successes. It appears to be the result of a combined advocacy effort. On the one head by NGOs which were looking to develop common standards and on the other by GMAP/Itad in promoting and facilitating collaboration for the NGOs in the sector to come together to standardise. GMAP can take credit for making this happen (including pushing for inclusion of disability) – an indication of the convening power of FCDO with resources to back it up. The majority of interviewees agreed. As one GMAP partner said, '*this would not have happened if it wasn't for GMAP*'. To their credit, the GMAP partner NGOs have networked and socialised these definitions more widely bringing other NGOs on board – and getting input from the main UN agencies.[282] As a result, there appears to be momentum in the sector to take a further step forward and get these definitions adopted as by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Although one interviewee suggested that they could have been brought into the IMAS review much earlier although acknowledged the IMAS review and adoption process can be lengthy.

Take up of a comprehensive theory of change for the mine action sector

This advocacy outcome is connected to the outcome on donor alignment. In that outcome however the development of a theory of change covering the whole mine action sector can be seen as a tool for donor alignment. But the ToC is much more than just a tool. It is considered here as a concrete action of advocacy efforts as its reach goes beyond donor alignment but to the wider mine action community itself. From interviews, and written communications, the comprehensive ToC developed and proposed by Itad has been well received by GMAP's NGO partners. They expressed how they appreciate the holistic nature of the model and very much the associated theories of action. When raised with the UN agencies, they appeared much less sighted on the ToC, but there was a positive level of interest which suggests when finalised the ToC could be socialised more widely across the sector.

NGO implementers are now measuring and reporting outcomes

This advocacy result is linked to a number of other results (see 4.1 and 4.4). As with these areas the GMAP team, with Itad, has driven this forward. It is considered an advocacy result in its own right as it is an achievement for GMAP NGO partners to now start measuring and reporting on outcomes. Although, one interviewee commented that claims of change are still being made without sufficient evidence. It is not however for this report to comment on the take up and quality of the outcome measurement.[283]

NGO implementers working together in operations, sharing and learning on best practice

The GMAP2 programme has been structured to bring together NGOs under two consortia lots and the UN agencies under two other lots. This has widely considered as positive as, in the words of two of the NGOs, '*it has forced us to work together*' with clearly evidenced operational benefits (and value for money), sharing of documentation and procedures, and learning from each other's experiences. GMAP advocacy is implicit here – bringing NGOs to work together in this way possibly may be contributing to more effectiveness at the operational level, improving learning at the institutional level, and encouraging actors to share and demonstrate best practices in the mine action sector (e.g. on the use of FGDs). These are all areas which will be covered to an extent by Itad's summative evaluation. There is however a flip side which is the risk of creating division (see 5 below). This could however be mitigated against if there is to be a third GMAP.

[282] HMA Geneva (2020) Standard Beneficiary Definitions side event – chair's brief (19 November 20) and slide presentation.
[283] This is for the forthcoming annual review (2021) and summative evaluation (2021) undertaken by Itad. Not seen for this advocacy evaluation component.

What challenges or gaps are there in the GMAP advocacy?

While the GMAP advocacy efforts and outcomes are impressive, the interviews revealed a number of challenges or gaps which need to be considered if there is a future GMAP:

- *GMAP's programming (contracting modalities) has led to a division between a select number of NGOs and UN agencies.* Concerns were voiced that this may have given the impression to other actors in the mine action centre that the UK government has favoured some NGOs above others, and that within the GMAP model the NGOs are under much more scrutiny than the UN agencies particularly with regards to the demands coming from the M&E efforts and the reporting. There is a lack of common reporting between NGOs and UN agencies with the former requiring to provide much more extensive data and evidence than the latter. The efforts of GMAP to influence more transparency and accountability in UN reporting has been fraught at times particularly with UNMAS – but it is worth continuing to advocate for.

- *Limited diffusion of mine action within the FCDO.* The GMAP team has engaged other parts of the UK government in its advocacy efforts (see 6 below). There is a concern however that mine action is not more widely understood or socialised within the FCDO in particular its potential benefits to other areas of international development. It is not helped that there have been constant changes in the SRO – making it challenging for the FCDO to build an advocacy capability until now. Reasons for this could be that funding for GMAP has come from an internal humanitarian budget line (so not seen as 'development' by others), the increase in GMAP funding was seen as a political commitment in how it was announced, and that mine action is seen as a niche area with requiring expertise. There is however a real potential for GMAP in the future to engage more strategically with other teams and sectors within FCDO – and Posts in their country strategies – through the growing evidence base and attention to measuring outcomes.

- *Limited donor alignment missing some national donors and with the UN.* While there has been a concerted effort by FCDO to use GMAP to move towards stronger donor alignment in the mine action sector, the success so far has been limited to the Dutch MFA. It appears some donors have expressed interest (from third hand accounts) but others like the US have different priorities to those of GMAP. And the UN agencies have yet to be brought into the ToC process (at least according to one interviewee). It is acknowledged that the work on a comprehensive ToC is an attempt to demonstrate where all mine action actors could see themselves positioned.

- *A clear voice of national actors and women in global advocacy.* It is telling that all of the stakeholders interviewed for this exercise were international – and western – voices. Even though the focus was on the global advocacy efforts of GMAP, none of the stakeholders were from voices of people most affected by mine action or representatives of national authorities. There is also a distinct lack of a gender dimension to GMAP advocacy although it was recognised that an operational focus of a number of mine action actors is on the gender impact on mine action and inclusion of female-led or -only mine action teams. For the future, GMAP could see how national actors are brought into forums it has created – like the Informal Group of Friends – and possibly drawn from the Mine Action Support Group (*it is assumed that national actors are involved?*).

How is GMAP advocacy conducted?

GMAP advocacy is conducted partly as the natural course of a meeting or event, to further HMG interests and influence from its position in networks such as Mine Action Support Group, AP Mine

Ban Convention's intersessional meetings, and International Meetings of Mine Action Directors and UN Advisers. HMG actors (Deputy HMA Geneva and GMAP SRO) have hosted and led side events in these networks to put forward issues of interest. GMAP advocacy is also conducted by using its M&E service provider, Itad, to design and facilitate workshops and presentations.
As shown in section 4 GMAP partners have played a key role in the advocacy either as facilitators (especially Itad), contributors (all partners) of GMAP advocacy issues, or influencers (especially the NGOs). From nearly all interviews, it is clear that Itad is highly valued as a resource partner to GMAP. Itad has influenced the GMAP team by flagging issues, providing evidence, and working on deliverables to share with GMAP partners agreed with the SRO. With regards to the NGO partners, they have been and have continued to be strong advocates within GMAP and the wider mine action sector. Most of the NGOs and UN agencies interviewed see the advantages of GMAP providing the FCDO with an 'enabling and convening power' on the mine action sector. In the words of one interviewee, *"GMAP can enable the mine action community to make the case for the developmental benefits of mine clearance".* In tangible terms, most have welcomed the idea to establish the Informal Group of Friends (IGoF) which allows them to introduce and discuss issues outside of the more formal networks.
Within HMG, GMAP advocacy has focused on three audiences: (i) HMA Geneva is the main HMG partner in global advocacy efforts using GMAP to raise UK political access and influence in the mine action sector (as evidenced by a recent statement – source), and in particular contributing to highlighting standard beneficiary definition, innovative finance and use of evidence, (ii) Treaty team in FCDO which received inputs and evidence from the GMAP team and (iii) HMG posts worldwide where HMA in specific locations have vested interests, in particular Angola, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. They are interested in lobbying against cuts in mine action funding, as GMAP gives them influence in country with national governments.

Way forward?

If there is to be a GMAP3 it would be worth investing time into designing an advocacy strategy which builds on the advocacy efforts and outcomes as described in section 4 and the challenges identified in section 5. The overall advocacy strategy should be explicit in how advocacy will support the GMAP output areas and this could be depicted on the theory of change which has been developed. Key elements of advocacy could include: pushing for donor alignment (using the ToC and common outcome indicators), standardisation of definitions (and working towards IMAS adoption), consolidate efforts on outcome measurement, movement to achieve on common reporting, and continued building of the evidence base on the link between mine action outcomes and impact and wider development initiatives.

Annex 8: Guidance provided to implementers on EORE outcome indicators

COTs will conduct community-based FGDs during the same time as the pre and post knowledge retention questionnaires. While knowledge retention questionnaires are on an individual basis, the behaviour change FGDs are on a community level.

It will be the country lead's responsibility to determine whether the implementation of FGDs and knowledge retention questionnaires for the M&E of RE is appropriate given socio-political considerations. For instance, these two M&E acitivites may not be logistically possible for roving communities (e.g. IDPs and nomadic communities), however operators should still take into consideration these communties when planning RE sessions because they are likely to be more at risk.

The partnership will liaise with NMAAs and other relevant government authorities on these activities before implementation in order to obtain permission. Consequently, either or both of these indicators may not be required for each operator or country. Information on RE delivery can be viewed in the DFID GMAP 2 tender, section T5: Quality and suitability of the proposal to deliver MRE.

Timeline of RE and its M&E methods:

Before RE:

1. Pre RE behaviour change FGD
2. Pre Knowledge Retention Questionnaire
3. RE Session
4. Immediate Post RE Knowledge Retention Questionnaire

Three to six months later:

5. Post RE behaviour change FGD
6. Post knowledge retention questionnaire
7. Remedial RE if necessary

While these two M&E methods assess two separate things, there is a bit of overlap in the knowledge retention questionnaire in regards to behavioural intent, and therefore the participants of the knowledge retention questionnare and the FGD should be separate individuals when possible as it could be argued that the testing of individuals is in itself a method of revision exercise for participants, therefore, those who are involved in both knowledge retention survey and FGD may result in better performance on whichever test is conducted secondly. Participants of the questionnaire and FGD should be separately the same both pre and post RE in order to accurately compare scores. Personal, identifiable data on FGD group members shall not be made public
All knowledge retention and behavour change pre MRE surveys should ask all respondents whether or not they have received MRE before, when and by whom. This information will be used during the analysis stage to determine if there is any effect on knowledge retention and behaviour change for those who have received MRE more than once. The time alloted for the pre FGD and knowledge retention questionnaire is not the time for the facilitator to conduct MRE. In order to obtain non-influenced responses, the faciliator should wait to address any red flags of unsafe behaviour or gaps in knowledge during the MRE session proper.
Operators should use the analysis from these two RE indicators as a needs assessment for future RE activities by identifiying knowledge and behaviours from different genders and age groups within affected communities Analysis will be shared amongst the partnership and with NMAAs to inform lessons learned. Operators are also encouraged to attend relevant cluster group meetings in-country to standardise RE M&E across regions and the wider humanitarian and development community to help inform future activities of all RE providers.

1. % of mine-impacted communities reporting an overall increase in safe behaviours

Introduction

COTs will conduct focus group discussions with community members to collect reported/observed positive and negative behaviour changes as part of a pilot indicator. The FGD will focus on a set of pre-determined behaviours and the COT will be tasked with assessing to what level the participants have now adjusted their behaviour.

Identification and Selection

The behaviour change FGD should ideally only be conducted in areas where:

- The operator is currently not conducting clearance
- The communities are still impacted by mines/ERW
- MRE has not happened recently (in the past year)

While knowledge retention can be assessed regardless of whether the individuals surveyed are presently mine/ERW impacted, it is both not useful and irrelevent to determine behaviour change in communities which are no longer mine/ERW impacted or where the operator is currently conducting clearance as a) FGD particpants will not have the opportunity to change their behavior or use unsafe behaviours without the presence of mine/ERW threat; and b) the presence of the operator would likely influence/deter community members from partaking in unsafe behaviours. With this in mind, FGD participants should be selected with a level of awareness towards those in the community who are mine/ERW impacted. The geographical planning of RE is to be determined on a programme level, and to consider whether it is observed that community members are entering minefields knowingly, or entering on minefields currently being cleared.
This indicator is to be analysed through community-based RE and not for school, household, post EOD callouts or information dissemination through leaflets or books. Operators should endeavour to conduct at least one pre and post FGD per community that receives RE. It is recommended that a minimum of five, maximum of ten individuals partake in each FGD. The faciliator takes responsibility to ensure that each FGD is gender-balanced. It is noted that in a mixed-gender FGD, women may not feel comfortable speaking publicly and therefore it is under each programme's discretion whether separate FGDs for each gender in a community need to take place in order for safe and open discussion to occur. The planning considerations for MRE should also transfer to the planning for FGDs. Will some people in the community be excluded if the FGD happens at a certain time and place – can the operator mitigate this in order to be inclusive of all mine/ERW affected individuals? Take into consideration disability, ethnicity and other marginalised and vulnerable groups who may be institutionally excluded from community gatherings.

Survey

The process of the behaviour change FGD will see the faciliator ask a set list of questions to a group of people. The faciliator will write down or enter on a mobile data collection app all responses given.

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Pre RE FGD to assess instances of safe and unsafe behaviours			
#	Question	Analysis	Assessment
1	How far away is the nearest minefield to your community? How do you know this? Is the minefield marked with signs?	To determine whether FGD participants are aware of the minefields located nearby	N/A
2	Does anyone here currently use or in the future will use the hazardous land? If yes, in what way is the land currently used or in the future will use?	To determine if any FGD participants are using the hazardous land at the moment. To determine if any FGD participants plan to use the land after it is cleared in order to assess the value/desirability of the land	If any participants state that they are using the contaminated land, mark how many, in what way
3	Has anyone received MRE/RE before? If yes, when and by whom?	To compare safe behaviour results between those who have and have not	N/A

		received MRE prior to the upcoming MRE session	
4	How often do you come in contact with mines/ERW? If recently, when and where was the last item identified?	To determine the frequency/level/geography of mine/ERW impacted the FGD participants are. To also alert operator if there is a need for EOD callout or follow up community liaison	N/A (Required for Question 5)
5	What actions did you take after finding the item?	To determine if safe or unsafe behaviours after finding an item of ERW	For the facilitator to judge based on the list of safe and unsafe behaviours
6	In what ways do you protect yourselves and the community from the harm posed by the mine/ERW threat?	To determine if the community have a plan for how to respond to mine/ERW contamination	List all safe behaviours mentioned. If no safe behaviours are mentioned, score as unsafe
7	Have you observed behaviours from members of the community in interaction with mines/ERW which would, in your opinion be considered unsafe? Why?	To determine if FGD participants recognise what is unsafe. To assess whether MRE needs to happen in other areas of the community based on unsafe behaviour responses	N/A, cannot be scored if talking about other community members who are not present during the FGD

Post RE FGD to assess safe and unsafe behaviours			
#	Question	Analysis	Score
1	Does anyone here currently use or in the future will use the hazardous land? If yes, in what way is the land currently used or in the future will use?	To determine if any FGD participants are using the hazardous land at the moment. To determine if any FGD participants plan to use the land after it is cleared in order to assess the value/desirability of the land	If any participants state that they are using the contaminated land, mark how many, in what way
2	How often do you come in contact with mines/ERW? If recently, when and where was the last item identified?	To determine the frequency/level/geography of mine/ERW impacted the FGD participants are. To also alert operator if there is a need for EOD callout or follow up community liaison	N/A (Required for Question 3)
3	What actions did you take after finding the item?	To determine if safe or unsafe behaviours after finding an item of ERW	For the facilitator to judge based on the list of safe and unsafe behaviours
4	In what ways do you protect yourselves and the community from the harm posed by the mine/ERW threat?	To determine if the community have a plan for how to respond to mine/ERW contamination	List all safe behaviours mentioned. If no safe behaviours are mentioned, score as unsafe
5	Have you observed behaviours from members of the community in interaction with mines/ERW which would, in your opinion be considered unsafe? Why?[284]	To determine if FGD participants recognise what is unsafe. To assess whether MRE needs to happen in other areas of the community based on unsafe behaviour responses	N/A, cannot be scored if talking about other community members who are not present during the FGD
6	What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach to the mine/ERW threat?	To determine whether MRE is sufficient considering other factors which may influence community behaviour towards mine/ERW	List unsafe behaviours qualified with reasons expressed

[284] Please note that during the post-MRE FGD, it is important to discern that the response to question 5 is not the same as what was reported in the pre-MRE FGD.

		contamination, and to revise MRE where necessary	
7	Do you feel that your awareness of the risks associated with mine/ERW contamination has been increased after receiving RE?	To determine if awareness levels have increased	N/A for safe behaviour scoring, but can be used to compare pre and post FGD responses for change in awareness levels

The above seven questions should be adhered to as much as possible, in order to systematise data collection. However, It is possible to use different qualitative and quantitative methods to collect the same data (best suited to the local context), but the way in which the data is then analysed to then report on indicators, is important.
Questions listed as not applicable for scoring are still included as integral to qualitative and supporting analysis of this indicator. Facilitators are encouraged to ask follow-on questions dependent upon participant answers and whether further clarification is needed. In all cases, it is recommended that the entire FGD is transcribed for transparency purposes, and then for analysis to be done as a desk exercise afterwards.
The inclusion of question 1 in the pre RE FGD and question 7 in the post RE FGD is in response to the previous DFID GMAP contract which had an RE outcome indicator related to feelings of safety. As this indicator has been removed, operators will instead guage levels of awareness of risk concurrently with assessing safe behaviour. Therefore, this question is ask to determine particpant's mine/ERW awareness levels.
The time required to conduct each FGD may vary, though considering the above seven questions and any follow on discussion, it will likely take 15-30 minutes per discussion.

Analysis and Reporting

Safe behaviours include:

- Reporting to authorities when an item is identified
- Not touching or moving an item
- Changing a route in order to avoid known or suspected hazardous areas
- Telling other members of the community about known or suspected hazardous areas
- Discontinuing use of land once it is known that it is mined/fenced off

Unsafe behaviors include:

- Touching or moving an item
- Not reporting an item
- Knowingly transiting through a hazardous area (even deemed-safe footpaths)
- Explosive/scrap metal harvesting
- Knowingly using the hazardous area

Each FGD will be given a score as shown by the overall assessment below, at both the pre and post RE stages:

Scoring Matrix (On a scale of 1-5, 1 being very unsafe to 5 being very safe)		
	#	The FGD exhibits the following behaviours/overall assessment
	1	FGD participants outright state that they are knowingly engaging in very unsafe activity/or it is implied that this activity is still happening, ie explosive/scrap metal harvesting, ploughing the land
	2	FGD participants freely state that they are kowingly using the contaminated land (not applicable for cluster strike areas, more so for areas with a mine threat) due to economic desparation, but will use well trodden pathways while doing so to avoid hazards

	3	FGD participants do not actively use the contaminated land, but they may still use well trodden paths as acces; none respond that they report items to authorities; Unsafe behaviour seem to be out of ignorance (ie, moving an item to a tree or landmark to avoid the item being in the pathway of someone else) or fear (ie, when an item is found, it is no longer picked up, but communities may not report to authorities out of fear of retribution)
	4	FGD participants do not report any unsafe behaviours, hazardous areas are avoided, but have not consistently reported items to authorities, nor have exhibited reports of encouraging others in the community to report items
	5	FGD participants do not report any unsafe behaviours and have actively and consistently reported items to authorities

This score will be recorded and compared against with the post MRE FGD score. The Post MRE FGD should be conducted at least one month after the MRE session in order to give FGD participants time to use demonstrate safe behaviours. It is ideal to coordinate post MRE FGDs in tandem with post-MRE knowledge retention surveys in the same area. Community based FGDs are best for communities that will stay in the same location for at least one month and therefore nomadic communities which roam more frequent than this should yes, still have MRE, but to not be included in M&E methods.
Each group will have their score compared against pre and post RE session to determine if they have exhibited an increase in safe behaviours. From this, the total number of groups surveyed will be compared with the total number of groups who have demonstrated an increased understanding to calculate a percentage.
The implementation of pre and post RE FGDs will be used as a pilot at first in selected countries to identify triggers to risk taking behaviour. The consequence of this analysis will be to Include this information in future RE sessions or remedial RE sessions. Including the motivators (e.g. peers), influencers (e.g. teachers) and barriers (e.g. poverty) will indicate the likelihood of the adoption of safe behaviour and will be incorporated into the design and delivery of future RE.

2. % of RE direct beneficiaries surveyed demonstrating an increased knowledge of RE safety messages (D+SADD)

Introduction

COTs will conduct the RE knowledge retention questionnaire immediately before, immediately after, and three to six months after the RE session with the same participants to show transfer and retention of knowledge. While it is recommended that all three stages are used, if an operator has trouble returning to communities three to six months later, COTs will at least have the immediate post knowledge retention information. Conducting post RE M&E three to six months later would of course require more time and logistical planning for COTs who will have to return to the community to find the respondents, but it would result in more credible data that will demonstrate actual retention of knowledge.

Identification and Selection

The sample size of individuals surveyed should be 5% of RE participants per session. Operators should make every effort to balance surveys across sex and age, with adequate inclusion of persons with disabilities where identified. This indicator will be reported on standard household, school, community level sessions through face-to-face RE rather than through public information dissemination through leaflets and books.
Prior to the start of the knowledge retention questionnaire, the enumerator should select and record Identifiable data which should include:

- Their name and phone number[285]
- Sex
- Specific Age

[285] This is to ensure that the same individuals are contacted for the post questionnaire.

- Ability/Disability
- Geographic location (down to the village level)
- Type of RE session

Collection of information on ethnicity and religion by group is also recommended.
While consistent disaggregation of age threshold between adults and children beneficiaries of land release across countries may not be possible as the use of land may be tied to whether a person has completed or ended schooling and has commenced work, this age threshold based on use becomes irrelevant for RE activities. For the purpose of RE activities, data collection on specific ages are recommended in order to accurately disaggregate between adults and children RE beneficiaries according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child which defines children as anyone aged 17 years and younger.[286] Therefore, men and women RE beneficiaries will be anyone 18 years and older. However, it will be the decision of each country lead to discern whether this threshold definition is appropriate or whether age of adulthood should be adhered to according to country laws.

Survey

The Washington Group Short Set of Questions on Disability as referred earlier in this document should be conducted individually for each respondent prior to the pre knowledge retention questionnaire. The data disaggregation will be:

Women without disability	Women with disability	Men without disability	Men with disability	Girls without disability	Girls with disability	Boys without disability	Boys with disability

Knowledge retention questionnaires should be designed separately for adults and children. The below questions takes into account age difference and threat type. It will be the decision of each programme country lead to determine which questions are most suitable. Operators are encouraged to provide consent forms to guardians of children surveyed. If previous knowledge retention questionnaires are already implemented by operators, then the consistency of approach will hinge on whether similar questions are analysed and scored in the same way, as shown in the table below:

RE individual questionnaire to assess knowledge retention					
#	Adult / Child	Item Type	Question	Description	Score
1	Both	Mine	Can you identify the mine?	Show four photos for respondents to choose one. For children, show an identification card with a mixture of non hazardous items and one hazardous item and ask if they can spot the hazardous item.	1 point if correct
2	Both	UXO	Can you identify the UXO?		1 point if correct
3	Both	IED	Can you identify the IED?		1 point if correct
4	Both	Both	What do these photos represent?	Show photos which have danger signs and marking sticks	1 point if correct
5	Both	Both	What is the main thing should you do if you see a mine/UXO/IED/suspicious explosive item?	Correct if answer report to authorities/clearance operators. To be phrased simpler for children (to just suspicious item).	1 point if correct
6	Both*	Mine	What is the first thing you should do if you find yourself in a minefield?	Most correct answer is 'stand still and call for help' though if the respondent interprets this question as being in a minefield where no one else is nearby, then 'retrace my steps carefully' is also suitable.	2 points for the first answer or 1 point for the second answer.

[286] https://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Rights_overview.pdf Article 1.

7	Both*	Mine	What should you do if you see someone injured in a minefield?	If needed, clarify that in this scenario, the respondent is not in the minefield themselves. Correct if answer 'shout for help' or 'go and get help'	1 point if correct
8	Both*	Mine	What will happen if you step on a mine?	Correct if answer 'it will kill/injure/maim me'	1 point if correct
9	Both*	Both	What is the first thing you should do if you see someone touching a mine/ UXO/ IED/ explosive item?	Correct if answer 'advise the person to stop touching the item'	1 point if correct
10	Adult	Both	Where is it safe to make a fire?	Correct if answer on a bed of rocks or on soil which has been built higher	1 point if correct
11	Adult	UXO	What is the safest way to cultivate on UXO land?	Correct if answer with manual method using a spade at a shallow angle	1 point if correct
* Questions which may be suitable for children aged 10 and older					

Operators may choose to include additional questions in this knowledge retention questionnaire, but please note that only the above questions will be used in analysis for reporting on this indicator. Analysis from other questions may be used to determine the effectiveness of RE delivery, which would still be useful to report as a narrative paragraph in quarterly reports.
Each retention questionnaire should have a photo identification portion, identifying mines and/or UXO, whichever is relevant to the region and should have specific photos of items commonly used in the operators area of operations. Further, identification questions should be posed differently between adults and children, as shown in the table of questions above. The purpose of RE for children should be to make them aware of what ERW looks like, but not necessarily distinguish different types of ERW.
In the context of countries which are currently in conflict or in areas where not all hazardous areas have been identified and marked, respondents may not understand the questions 6 and 7. Further, for country contexts in which booby traps and IEDs look like household objects, question 3 may be difficult to answer as hazardous items could be made to look like anything. Therefore it will be under the discretion of the country lead operator to determine whether these questions can be rephrased to be appropriate for the context or removed altogether.
Wherever possible, knoweldge retention questionairres should be conducted face to face and not handed out for respondents to fill out themselves. Sometimes when asking questions number 5, 6 and 9, the respondent may list off every answer that they can remember or may answer all iterations of correct responses in order. To discern whether knowledge has been retained with regards to understanding actions in order of importance, also with consideration that analysing a multi-point answer is difficult, it is recommended that questions are phrased to encourage respondents to answer more thoughtfully to respond with one point. If respondents blurt out many responses, it will be up to the enumerator to ask again what the respondent thinks is the first or main thing they should do. At no point in the questionnaire should enumarators list out possible responses.
The amount of time needed to carry out the Washington Group Short Set, child consent form (where applicable) and questionnaire will likely be around 15 minutes per individual. Therefore, this amount of time should be factored in when scheduling the start time of RE sessions and total amount of time required for RE attendees.

Analysis and Reporting

The scoring for this indicator will be points based, with both the pre and post questionnaires resulting in a point score which will be compared against each other afterwards to determine whether each individual respondent has an increased or decreased understanding, or no change in knowledge retention. If all three stages of pre, immediate post and post questionnaires are conducted, analysis will compare the pre and post questionnaires. If only the first two stages are conducted, then analysis will compare pre and immediate post questionnaires with the caveat that statistics reported for this indicator may show higher than average increased knowledge retention. From this, the total number of RE direct beneficairies surveyed will be compared with the total number of these beneficiaries who have demonstrated an increased understanding to calculate a

percentage disaggregated by disability, sex and age, ie, “75% of girls with disability surveyed demonstrated an increased knowledge of RE safety messages”.
The points system for these questionnaires can be met through the following actions using mobile data collection technology (ie, Fulcrum): First, script the questionnaire into Fulcrum in the local language (an English version can be kept as a word document). Then, create choice lists for the most common answers which show the local language on the tablet, but a number in the data field that is then shown in the exported excel document. This will allow operators to streamline a points based system whereby the correct answer would be given 1 and incorrect answers would be given 0. For question 6, the progrmme will ascibe the number 2 for the most correct answer (stand still and call for help), 1 for the second best answer (retrace my steps carefully) and zero for all incorrect answers. As is obvious, the question and answer format for analysis of this indicator must be in single choice answer only. Additional questions included by the operator which will not be part of analysis should not include this numerical field value so as not to confuse the tally of scores during the analysis stage. Questions 1-4 which include pictures will require MRE teams to bring laminated photos to show when prompted by the fulcrumised questionnaire.
A pre, immediate post and post questionnaire should be created in the same fulcrum form to ensure that the same people interviewed have their data easily shown in the excel document on the same row. From here, the programme can total up points for the pre, immediate post and post questionnaires separately, compare this point score and determine if each individual surveyed has an increased or decreased score.

Annex 9: List of documents reviewed

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IOM (2020) Data Tracking Mechanism, South Sudan, Magwi County Village Assessment Survey

IOM (2021) DTM, South Sudan, Flow Monitoring Dashboards (Oct 20, Jan 21, July 21), www.dtm.iom.int

Itad quarterly monitoring reports (FY18-FY20)

Mine Action Review (2020, 2019, 2018) South Sudan: Land and cluster munitions monitor reports

Mine Action Review (2019) Clearing the mines

MAG (2018) GMAP2 Capacity Development, Internal monitoring and evaluation tool - NMAA Capabilities

MAG (2018) Lot2 Baseline Assessment Report 2018

MAG-GICHD Capacity Development Workplan - South Sudan

MAG (2018-2020) Lot 2 Quarterly Reports

MAG (2018) GMAP 2 Proposal (including gender and conflict analysis annexes)

MAG (2020) GMAP 2 Extension Proposal

MAG (2020) Q7 and Q8 invoices for Lot 2 countries

MAG (2020) South Sudan - Completed EORE Data Collection Template, including IMSMA casualty statistics

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UNMISS (2017) Human Rights Violations in Yei, (July 2016 - January 2017)

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Sudan

DFID (2019) GMAP 2 Annual Review, 1, March 2019

DFID (2020) GMAP2 Annual Review 2, April 2020

Mine Action (2019) Early Recovery and Peacebuilding Needs Assessment of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan, Safelane Global, Kings College and Mercy Corps

Mine Action Review (2020), Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants, Sudan

Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing The Mines, Sudan

UNMAS (2021) Proposal FCDO

UNMAS (2018) Sudan Proposal

UNMAS (2018) Map of South Kordofan Hazard Areas

UNMAS (2016) Landmine/ ERW Threat Map – Blue Nile

Yemen

Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, Annual report 2019

Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, Annual report 2020

Itad (2019) GMAP2 formative evaluation, Yemen draft summary country report

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Mine Action Review (2019) Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019, Yemen

Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing the Mines 2020, Yemen

Mine Action Review (2020) Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020, Yemen

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UNDP (2019) Yemen Q1 monitoring report

UNDP (2019) Yemen Q2 monitoring report

UNDP (2019) Yemen Q3 monitoring report

UNDP (2019) Yemen Q4 monitoring report

UNDP (2020) Yemen Q1 monitoring report

UNDP (2020) Yemen Q2 monitoring report

UNDP (2020) Yemen Q3 monitoring report

UNDP (2020) Yemen Q4 monitoring report

UNDP (2018) proposal to DFID 2018-2019

UNDP (2020) proposal to DFID 2020-2021

Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2019

Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2020 extension

Annex 10: List of stakeholders consulted

Global Programme Level

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII1	FCDO	HMG
KII2	FCDO	HMG
KII3	Dutch MFA	Other donor
KII4	GICHD	Implementer
KII5	NPA	Implementer
	NPA	Implementer
	NPA	Implementer
KII6	NPA	Implementer
KII7	UNMAS	Implementer
KII8	UNMAS	Implementer
KII9	UNMAS	Implementer
KII10	UNMAS	Implementer
KII11	UNDP	Implementer
	UNDP	Implementer
	UNDP	Implementer

Afghanistan

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII12	FCDO	HMG
KII13	USDOS	Other donor
KII14	USDOS	Other donor
KII15	German Embassy	Other donor
KII16	DMAC	NMAA
KII17	DMAC	NMAA
KII18	DMAC	NMAA
KII19	DMAC	NMAA
KII20	DMAC	NMAA
KII21	UNMAS	Implementer
KII22	UNMAS	Implementer
KII23	UNMAS	Implementer
KII24	UNMAS	Implementer
KII25	UNMAS	Implementer
KII26	UNMAS	Implementer
KII27	UNMAS	Implementer
KII28	UNMAS	Implementer
KII29	UNMAS	Implementer
KII30	UNHABITAT	Other UN agency
KII31	IOM	Other UN agency

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII32	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII33	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII34	DDG	Sub-contracted implementer
KII35	OMAR	Sub-contracted implementer
KII36	DAFA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII37	DAFA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII38	MCPA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII39	ATC	Sub-contracted implementer
KII40	Hairatan District Administration	Local government officials
KII41	Hairatan District Administration	Local government officials
KII42	Hairatan District Administration	Local government officials
KII43	Hairatan District Administration	Local government officials
KII44	Hairatan Oil and Gas Factory	Local community/beneficiaries
KII45	Hairatan village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII46	Hairatan village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII47	Hairatan village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII48	Hairatan village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII49	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII50	DMAC	NMAA
KII51	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII52	DMAC	NMAA
KII53	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII54	Village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII55	Village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII56	Village community member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII57	Local shopkeeper	Local community/beneficiaries
KII58	DMAC	NMAA
KII59	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII60	UNMAS	Implementer
KII61	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII62	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII63	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII64	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII65	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII66	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII67	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII68	Shirbirghan District Administration	Local government officials
KII69	Shirbirghan gas company	Local community/beneficiaries
KII70	Shirbirghan gas company	Local community/beneficiaries

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII71	Shirbirghan gas company	Local community/beneficiaries
KII72	Andkhoy electricity transmission project	Local community/beneficiaries
KII73	Andkhoy electricity transmission project	Local community/beneficiaries
KII74	CDC	Community-based organisation
KII75	CDC	Community-based organisation
KII76	CDC	Community-based organisation
KII77	Shor Jar 2 and Nazar Abad Rural Agricultural Development Project	Local community/beneficiaries
KII78	CDC	Community-based organisation
KII79	Shor Jar 2 Provincial Assembly	Local government officials
KII80	Nazar Abad Provincial Assembly	Local government officials
FGD1	Shor Jar-2 village community members (7 participants)	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD2	Nazar Abad village community members (7 participants)	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD3	Shor Jar-2 village community members (7 participants)	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD4	Nazar Abad village community members (7 participants)	Local community/beneficiaries
KII81	DMAC	NMAA
KII82	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII83	UNMAS	NMAA
KII84	DAFA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII85	MUDL	Local government officials
KII86	Kandahar District Governor's Office	Local government officials
KII87	DAIL	Local government officials
KII88	Directorate of MRRD	Local government officials
KII89	Daman Agricultural Development Project	Local government officials
KII90	DAIL	Local government officials
KII91	Daman Agricultural Development Project	Local government officials
KII92	DDG	Local government officials
KII93	DDG	Local government officials
KII94	Morghan Kichah Village community members	Local community/beneficiaries
KII95	Morghan Kichah Village community members	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD5	Morghan Kichah Village community members (9 persons)	Local community/beneficiaries
KII96	Morghan Kichah Village community members	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD6	Morghan Kichah Village community members (3 persons)	Local community/beneficiaries
KII97	HALO, local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries
KII98	HALO, Local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries
KII99	DAFA, Local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries
KII100	DAFA, Local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries
KII101	MCPA, Local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries
KII102	DAFA, Local deminer	Local community/beneficiaries

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII103	Village Elder	Local community/beneficiaries
KII104	Village community members in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District	Local community/beneficiaries
KII105	Haji Dilbar Village community members	Local community/beneficiaries
KII106	Village Elder	Local community/beneficiaries
KII107	Village Elder	Local community/beneficiaries
KII108	MCPA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII109	MCPA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII110	MRRD	Local government officials
KII111	MUDL	Local government officials
KII112	DAIL	Local government officials
KII113	Taranak Wa Jaldak District Governor	Local government officials
KII114	Qalat District Governor	Local government officials

Angola

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII115	UK Embassy	HMG
KII116	FCDO	HMG
KII117	CNIDAH	NMAA
KII118	US State	Other donor
KII119	JICA	Other donor
FGD7	Beneficiaries. Traders, local officials, village heads	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD8	Beneficiaries. Traders, local officials, village heads	Local community/beneficiaries
KII120	HALO	Implementer
KII121	HALO	Implementer
KII122	HALO	Implementer
KII123	HALO	Implementer
KII124	HALO	Implementer
KII125	HALO	Implementer
KII126	NPA	Implementer
KII127	NPA	Implementer
KII128	MAG	Implementer
KII129	MAG	Implementer
KII130	MAG	Implementer
KII131	MAG	Implementer
KII132	MAG	Implementer
KII133	Kings College/GICHD	Researcher

Cambodia

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII134	UK Embassy	HMG
KII135	UNDP	Other UN agency
KII136	FCDO	HMG
KII137	CMAA	NMAA
KII138	MAPU	NMAA
FGD9	Beneficiaries. Traders, local officials, village heads	Local community/beneficiaries
FGD10	Beneficiaries. Traders, local officials, village heads	Local community/beneficiaries
KII139	HALO	Implementer
KII140	HALO	Implementer
KII141	HALO	Implementer
KII142	HALO	Implementer
KII143	HALO	Implementer
KII144	HALO	Implementer
KII145	HALO	Implementer
KII146	MAG	Implementer
KII147	NPA	Implementer
KII148	NPA	Implementer

Lebanon

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII149	NPA	Implementer
KII150	MAG	Implementer
KII151	US State Department	Other donor
KII152	MAG	Implementer
KII153	DCA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII154	MAG	Implementer
KII155	NPA	Implementer
KII156	NPA	Implementer
KII157	MAG	Implementer
KII158	UNDP	Other UN agency
KII159	Local Authorities, Toul, Rakan Balouk, Moktar	Local government officials
KII160	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII161	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII162	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII163	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII164	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII165	Community Member, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII166	EORE participant, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII167	EORE participant, Toul	Local community/beneficiaries
KII168	Local Shepard, Blat	Local community/beneficiaries

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII169	Local Authority, Mokhtar, Blat	Local government officials
KII170	Police Officer, Blat	Local community/beneficiaries
KII171	Land Owner, Blat	Local community/beneficiaries
KII172	Land Owner, Blat	Local community/beneficiaries
KII173	Local Authority (Municipality and land owner), Blat	Local government officials
KII174	Local Authority, Municpality member, Blat	Local government officials
KII175	Civil Defence, Meis El Jabal	Local government officials
KII176	Land Owner, Municipality Meis Al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII177	Land Owner, Meis Al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII178	Farmer, Meis Al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII179	Land Owner, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII180	Land Owner, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII181	Land Owner, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII182	Land Owner, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII183	Land Owner, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII184	Farmer, Mais al Jabal	Local community/beneficiaries
KII185	Landowner of cleared minefield, EORE participant	Local community/beneficiaries
KII186	Administrator in Rmeish municipality, EORE participant	Local government officials / Local community/beneficiaries
KII187	Landowner of a cleared minefield, EORE participant	Local community/beneficiaries
KII188	LMAC	NMAA
KII189	FCDO	HMG
KII190	NPA	Implementer
KII191	MAG	Implementer
KII192	MAG	Implementer
KII193	MAG	Implementer
KII194	NPA	Implementer

Myanmar

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII195	FCDO	HMG
KII196	FCDO	HMG
KII197	NZ Embassy	Other donor
KII198	Norway MFA	Other donor
KII199	EU	Other donor
KII200	OCHA	Other UN agency
KII201	ICRC	Humanitarian actor
KII202	UNICEF	Other UN agency
KII203	UNHCR	Other UN agency
KII204	Thanintharyi State - Dept Social Welfare	State Government
KII205	MAG	Implementer

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII206	MAG	Implementer
KII207	MAG	Implementer
KII208	MAG	Implementer
KII209	MAG	Implementer
KII210	MAG	Implementer
KII211	MAG	Implementer
KII212	HALO	Implementer
KII213	HALO	Implementer
KII214	Oxfam	Other INGO
KII215	DCA/DDG	Other INGO
KII216	WPN (Kachin Development Organisation - 'Wunpawng Ninghtoi')	Sub-contracted implementer
KII217	WPN	Sub-contracted implementer
KII218	Kachin IDP Camp Committee Member	Local community/beneficiaries
KII219	Kachin IDP camp (Pa Kahtwang) resident	Local community/beneficiaries
KII220	Kachin IDP camp (Pa Kahtwang) resident	Local community/beneficiaries
KII221	Kachin, Kutkai township resident	Local community/beneficiaries
KII222	HALO (Shan State Office)	Implementer
KII223	Thanintharyi - Hton Ma Khar Village leader	Local community/beneficiaries
KII224	Thanintharyi - Hton Ma Khar Village resident	Local community/beneficiaries
KII225	Thanintharyi - Hton Ma Khar Village resident	Local community/beneficiaries
KII226	Village leader, Dawei township	Local community/beneficiaries
KII227	Dawei Township	Local community/beneficiaries
KII228	Dawei Township	Local community/beneficiaries
KII229	Shan State Youth Capacity Building Centre (SSYCBC)	Sub-contracted implementer
KII230	Kyankme Township, Shan State	Local community/beneficiaries

Somalia

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII231	NPA	Implementer
KII232	NPA	Implementer
KII233	NPA	Implementer
KII234	NPA	Implementer
KII235	NPA	Implementer
KII236	NPA	Implementer
KII237	NPA	Implementer
KII238	NPA	Implementer
KII239	NPA	Implementer
KII240	NPA	Implementer
KII241	HALO	Implementer

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII242	HALO (Somaliland Office)	Implementer
KII243	National Mine Action Authorities	NMAA
KII244	National Mine Action Authorities	NMAA
KII245	National Mine Action Authorities	NMAA
KII246	Ministry of Defence (Somaliland)	Government ministry
KII247	Ministry of Defence (Somaliland)	Government ministry
KII248	Ministry of Defence (Somaliland)	Government ministry
KII249	District Government – Education	Local government officials
KII250	District Government - Administration	Local government officials
KII251	NGO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII252	NGO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII253	NGO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII254	NGO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII255	NGO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII256	CSSF	HMG
KII257	FCDO	HMG
KII258	FCDO	HMG
KII259	FCDO (Somaliland)	HMG
KII260	FCDO (Somaliland)	HMG
KII261	OCHA	Other UN agency
KII262	GERMAN MFA	Other donor
KII263	UNMAS	Other UN Agency
KII264	UNOPS	Other UN Agency
KII265	MAG	Other INGOs
KII266	NGO (Clearance Team)	Sub-contracted implementer
KII267	NGO (COT Team)	Sub-contracted implementer
KII268	Local Elders	Local community/beneficiaries

South Sudan

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII269	FCDO (consultant advisor)	HMG
KII270	FCDO	HMG
KII271	US Department Of State	Other donor
KII272	MAG	Implementer
KII273	MAG	Implementer
KII274	MAG	Implementer
KII275	GICHD	Implementer
KII276	UNMAS	Other UN agency
KII277	UNMAS	Other UN agency
KII278	DRC/DDG	Other INGO
KII279	NMAA (and MAGWI county land owner)	NMAA

Sudan

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII280	NMAC	NMAA
KII281	UNMAS	Implementer
KII282	UNMAS	Implementer
KII283	UNMAS	Implementer
KII284	UNMAS	Implementer
KII285	OCHA	Other UN agency
KII286	UNDP	Other UN agency
KII287	UNICEF	Other UN agency
KII288	Japanese government	Other donor
KII289	OFDA/USAID	Other donor
KII290	NUMAD	Sub-contracted implementer
KII291	JASMAR	Sub-contracted implementer
KII292	GAH	Sub-contracted implementer
KII293	Safelane International	Sub-contracted implementer

Yemen

KII	Organisation / stakeholder	Stakeholder category
KII294	FCDO	HMG
KII295	FCDO	HMG
KII296	UNDP	Implementer
KII297	UNDP	Implementer
KII298	UNDP	Implementer
KII299	UNDP	Implementer
KII300	HALO	Sub-contracted implementer
KII301	DDG	Sub-contracted implementer
KII302	NPA	Sub-contracted implementer
KII303	YEMAC Sanaa	NMAA
KII304	WFP	Other UN agency
KII305	UNICEF	Other UN agency
KII306	ICRC	Humanitarian actor
KII307	US Department of State	Other donor

Other sources:

Mine Action and Stabilisation Collaborative Learning Event, October 2022. Convened by Itad, as part of its GMAP2 contract.

Annex B

SCHEDULE OF PRICES

1. When Payments shall be made on a 'Milestone Payment Basis' the following Clause 22.3 shall be substituted for Clause 22.3 of the Section 2, Framework Agreement Terms and Conditions.

22. PAYMENTS & INVOICING INSTRUCTIONS

22.3 Where the applicable payment mechanism is "Milestone Payment", invoice(s) shall be submitted for the amount(s) indicated in Annex B and payments will be made on satisfactory performance of the Services as set out in the Annex A, at the payment points defined as per Schedule of Payments or otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Schedule of Payments:

REDACTED